Cognition seminars

In the real world, object arrangement follows a number of rules. Some of the rules pertain to the spatial relations between objects and scenes (i.e., syntactic rules) and others about the contextual relations (i.e., semantic rules). Research has shown that violation of semantic rules influences interval timing with the duration of scenes containing such violations to be overestimated as compared to scenes with no violations. However, no study has yet investigated whether both semantic and syntactic violations can affect timing in the same way. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the effect of scene violations on timing is due to attentional or other cognitive accounts. Using an oddball paradigm and real-world scenes with or without semantic and syntactic violations, we conducted two experiments on whether time dilation will be obtained in the presence of any type of scene violation and the role of attention in any such effect. Our results from Experiment 1 showed that time dilation indeed occurred in the presence of syntactic violations, while time compression was observed for semantic violations. In Experiment 2, we further investigated whether these estimations were driven by attentional accounts, by utilizing a contrast manipulation of the target objects. The results showed that an increased contrast led to duration overestimation for both semantic and syntactic oddballs. Together, our results indicate that scene violations differentially affect timing due to violation processing differences and, moreover, their effect on timing seems to be sensitive to attentional manipulations such as target contrast.

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the way the brain enables us to act on the sensory world is its flexibility. We can make a general inference about many sensory features (rating the ripeness of mangoes or avocados) and map a single stimulus onto many choices (slicing or blending mangoes). These can be thought of as flexibly mapping many (features) to one (inference) and one (feature) to many (choices) sensory inputs to actions. Both theoretical and experimental investigations of this sort of flexible sensorimotor mapping tend to treat sensory areas as relatively static. Models typically instantiate flexibility through changing interactions (or weights) between units that encode sensory features and those that plan actions. Experimental investigations often focus on association areas involved in decision-making that show pronounced modulations by cognitive processes. I will present evidence that the flexible formatting of visual information in visual cortex can support both generalized inference and choice mapping. Our results suggest that visual cortex mediates many forms of cognitive flexibility that have traditionally been ascribed to other areas or mechanisms. Further, we find that a primary difference between visual and putative decision areas is not what information they encode, but how that information is formatted in the responses of neural populations, which is related to difference in the impact of causally manipulating different areas on behavior. This scenario allows for flexibility in the mapping between stimuli and behavior while maintaining stability in the information encoded in each area and in the mappings between groups of neurons.

There are many mysteries in the universe. One of the most significant, often considered the final frontier in science, is understanding how our subjective experience, or consciousness, emerges from the collective action of neurons in biological systems. While substantial progress has been made over the past decades, a unified and widely accepted explanation of the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness remains elusive. The field is rife with theories that frequently provide contradictory explanations of the phenomenon. To accelerate progress, we have adopted a new model of science: adversarial collaboration in team science. Our goal is to test theories of consciousness in an adversarial setting. Adversarial collaboration offers a unique way to bolster creativity and rigor in scientific research by merging the expertise of teams with diverse viewpoints. Ideally, we aim to harness collective intelligence, embracing various perspectives, to expedite the uncovering of scientific truths. In this talk, I will highlight the effectiveness (and challenges) of this approach using selected case studies, showcasing its potential to counter biases, challenge traditional viewpoints, and foster innovative thought. Through the joint design of experiments, teams incorporate a competitive aspect, ensuring comprehensive exploration of problems. This method underscores the importance of structured conflict and diversity in propelling scientific advancement and innovation.

First, a new measure of MI for reaction times is proposed that takes the entire RT distribution into account. Second, we present some recent developments in TWIN modeling, including a new proposal for the sound-induced flash illusion (SIFI).

In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.

The nature of emotions and their neural underpinnings remain debated. Appraisal theories such as the component process model propose that the perception and evaluation of events (appraisal) is the key to eliciting the range of emotions we experience. Here we study whether the framework of appraisal theories provides a clearer account for the differentiation of emotional episodes and their functional organisation in the brain. We developed a stealth game to manipulate appraisals in a systematic yet immersive way. The interactive nature of video games heightens self-relevance through the experience of goal-directed action or reaction, evoking strong emotions. We show that our manipulations led to changes in behaviour, physiology and brain activations.

In the current virtual journal club Dr Di Luca will present findings from a series of psychophysical investigations where he measured sensitivity and bias in the perception of the timing of stimuli. He will present how improved detection with longer sequences and biases in reporting isochrony can be accounted for by optimal statistical predictions. Among his findings was also that the timing of stimuli that occasionally deviate from a regularly paced sequence is perceptually distorted to appear more regular. Such change depends on whether the context these sequences are presented is also regular. Dr Di Luca will present a Bayesian model for the combination of dynamically updated expectations, in the form of a priori probability, with incoming sensory information. These findings contribute to the understanding of how the brain processes temporal information to shape perceptual experiences.

Conscious emotional experiences are very rich in their nature, and can encompass anything ranging from the most intense panic when facing immediate threat, to the overwhelming love felt when meeting your newborn. It is then no surprise that capturing all aspects of emotional consciousness, such as intensity, valence, and bodily responses, into one theory has become the topic of much debate. Key questions in the field concern how we can actually measure emotions and which type of experiments can help us distill the neural correlates of emotional consciousness. In this talk I will give a brief overview of theories of emotional consciousness and where they disagree, after which I will dive into the evidence proposed to support these theories. Along the way I will discuss to what extent studying emotional consciousness is ‘special’ and will suggest several tools and experimental contrasts we have at our disposal to further our understanding on this intriguing topic.

We use rapid eye, head, and body movements to extract information from a new part of the visual scene upon each new gaze fixation. But the consequences of such visual actions go beyond their intended sensory outcomes. On the one hand, intrinsic consequences accompany movement preparation as covert internal processes (e.g., predictive changes in the deployment of visual attention). On the other hand, visual actions have incidental consequences, side effects of moving the sensory surface to its intended goal (e.g., global motion of the retinal image during saccades). In this talk, I will present studies in which we investigated intrinsic and incidental sensory consequences of visual actions and their sensorimotor functions. Our results provide insights into continuously interacting top-down and bottom-up sensory processes, and they reify the necessity to study perception in connection to motor behavior that shapes its fundamental processes.

Note the later start time!

Psychology and neuroscience are increasingly looking to fine-grained analyses of decision-making behaviour, seeking to characterise not just the variation between subjects but also a subject's variability across time. When analysing the behaviour of each subject in a choice task, we ideally want to know not only when the subject has learnt the correct choice rule but also what the subject tried while learning. I introduce a simple but effective Bayesian approach to inferring the probability of different choice strategies at trial resolution. This can be used both for inferring when subjects learn, by tracking the probability of the strategy matching the target rule, and for inferring subjects use of exploratory strategies during learning. Applied to data from rodent and human decision tasks, we find learning occurs earlier and more often than estimated using classical approaches. Around both learning and changes in the rewarded rules the exploratory strategies of win-stay and lose-shift, often considered complementary, are consistently used independently. Indeed, we find the use of lose-shift is strong evidence that animals have latently learnt the salient features of a new rewarded rule. Our approach can be extended to any discrete choice strategy, and its low computational cost is ideally suited for real-time analysis and closed-loop control.

Although each of us was once a baby, infant consciousness remains mysterious and there is no received view about when, and in what form, consciousness first emerges. Some theorists defend a ‘late-onset’ view, suggesting that consciousness requires cognitive capacities which are unlikely to be in place before the child’s first birthday at the very earliest. Other theorists defend an ‘early-onset’ account, suggesting that consciousness is likely to be in place at birth (or shortly after) and may even arise during the third trimester. Progress in this field has been difficult, not just because of the challenges associated with procuring the relevant behavioral and neural data, but also because of uncertainty about how best to study consciousness in the absence of the capacity for verbal report or intentional behavior. This review examines both the empirical and methodological progress in this field, arguing that recent research points in favor of early-onset accounts of the emergence of consciousness.