Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

Understanding what drives foraging decisions in animals requires careful manipulation of the value of available options while monitoring animal choices. Value-based decision-making tasks, in combination with formal learning models, have provided both an experimental and theoretical framework to study foraging decisions in lab settings. While these approaches were successfully used in the past to understand what drives choices in mammals, very little work has been done on fruit flies. This is even though fruit flies have served as a model organism for many complex behavioural paradigms. To fill this gap we developed a single-animal, trial-based decision-making task, where freely walking flies experienced optogenetic sugar-receptor neuron stimulation. We controlled the value of available options by manipulating the probabilities of optogenetic stimulation. We show that flies integrate a reward history of chosen options and forget value of unchosen options. We further discover that flies assign higher values to rewards experienced early in the behavioural session, consistent with formal reinforcement learning models. Finally, we show that the probabilistic rewards affect walking trajectories of flies, suggesting that accumulated value is controlling the navigation vector of flies in a graded fashion. These findings establish the fruit fly as a model organism to explore the genetic and circuit basis of value-based decisions.