The Neuroscience Institute at Jersey Shore University Medical Center, New Jersey, USA is seeking a postdoctoral fellow to work on basic, clinical, and translational projects in the fields of seizures, epilepsy, human intracranial EEG, signal processing, cognition and consciousness. The fellow will join a multidisciplinary team of five epileptologists, neurosurgeons, epilepsy nurses, nurse practitioners, neuropsychologists and researchers providing holistic care to patients with epilepsy. The postdoctoral fellows will have access to the large clinical, imaging, and EEG databases, and outcome measures of cutting edge treatment modalities within the system for research purposes. The successful candidate will be well versed in data collection, processing, programming and will lead an independent research project working closely with collaborators and publish high-quality research.

Over the last 20 years, neuroimaging and electrophysiology techniques have become central to understanding the mechanisms that accompany loss and recovery of consciousness. Much of this research is performed in the context of healthy individuals with neurotypical brain dynamics. Yet, a true understanding of how consciousness emerges from the joint action of neurons has to account for how severely pathological brains, often showing phenotypes typical of unconsciousness, can nonetheless generate a subjective viewpoint. In this presentation, I will start from the context of Disorders of Consciousness and will discuss recent work aimed at finding generalizable signatures of consciousness that are reliable across a spectrum of brain electrophysiological phenotypes focusing in particular on the notion of edge-of-chaos criticality.

Overview of neurosurgery specialty interplay between neurology, psychiatry and neurosurgery. Discussion on benefits and disadvantages of classifications. Presentation of sub-specialties: trauma, oncology, functional, pediatric, vascular and spine. How does an ordinary day of a neurosurgeon look like; outpatient clinic, emergencies, pre/intra/post operative patient care. An ordinary operation. Myth-busting and practical insights of every day practice. An ordinary operation. Hint for research on clinical problems to be solved. The coming ethical frontiers of neuroprosthetics. In part two we will explore the explanatory gap and its significance. We will review the more than 200 theories of the hard problem of consciousness, from the prevailing to the unconventional. Finally, we are going to reflect on the AI advancements and the claims of LLMs becoming conscious

Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

We can perceive aesthetic properties such as beauty and sublimity in artworks, environmental nature and even ordinary life. How about consciousness? Does consciousness have aesthetic properties? If so, what kind of aesthetic properties conscious experiences can have? If conscious experiences can have some kinds of aesthetic properties, how can we appreciate them? These questions constitute "Consciousness Aesthetics". In this talk, I will introduce consciousness aesthetics as a new field of aesthetics and discuss some of such questions.

Various clinical cases have provided evidence linking cardiovascular, neurological, and psychiatric disorders to changes in the brain-heart interaction. Our recent experimental evidence on patients with disorders of consciousness revealed that observing brain-heart interactions helps to detect residual consciousness, even in patients with absence of behavioral signs of consciousness. Those findings support hypotheses suggesting that visceral activity is involved in the neurobiology of consciousness and sum to the existing evidence in healthy participants in which the neural responses to heartbeats reveal perceptual and self-consciousness. Furthermore, the presence of non-linear, complex, and bidirectional communication between brain and heartbeat dynamics can provide further insights into the physiological state of the patient following severe brain injury. These developments on methodologies to analyze brain-heart interactions open new avenues for understanding neural functioning at a large-scale level, uncovering that peripheral bodily activity can influence brain homeostatic processes, cognition, and behavior.

There are many mysteries in the universe. One of the most significant, often considered the final frontier in science, is understanding how our subjective experience, or consciousness, emerges from the collective action of neurons in biological systems. While substantial progress has been made over the past decades, a unified and widely accepted explanation of the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness remains elusive. The field is rife with theories that frequently provide contradictory explanations of the phenomenon. To accelerate progress, we have adopted a new model of science: adversarial collaboration in team science. Our goal is to test theories of consciousness in an adversarial setting. Adversarial collaboration offers a unique way to bolster creativity and rigor in scientific research by merging the expertise of teams with diverse viewpoints. Ideally, we aim to harness collective intelligence, embracing various perspectives, to expedite the uncovering of scientific truths. In this talk, I will highlight the effectiveness (and challenges) of this approach using selected case studies, showcasing its potential to counter biases, challenge traditional viewpoints, and foster innovative thought. Through the joint design of experiments, teams incorporate a competitive aspect, ensuring comprehensive exploration of problems. This method underscores the importance of structured conflict and diversity in propelling scientific advancement and innovation.

In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.

Conscious emotional experiences are very rich in their nature, and can encompass anything ranging from the most intense panic when facing immediate threat, to the overwhelming love felt when meeting your newborn. It is then no surprise that capturing all aspects of emotional consciousness, such as intensity, valence, and bodily responses, into one theory has become the topic of much debate. Key questions in the field concern how we can actually measure emotions and which type of experiments can help us distill the neural correlates of emotional consciousness. In this talk I will give a brief overview of theories of emotional consciousness and where they disagree, after which I will dive into the evidence proposed to support these theories. Along the way I will discuss to what extent studying emotional consciousness is ‘special’ and will suggest several tools and experimental contrasts we have at our disposal to further our understanding on this intriguing topic.

Although each of us was once a baby, infant consciousness remains mysterious and there is no received view about when, and in what form, consciousness first emerges. Some theorists defend a ‘late-onset’ view, suggesting that consciousness requires cognitive capacities which are unlikely to be in place before the child’s first birthday at the very earliest. Other theorists defend an ‘early-onset’ account, suggesting that consciousness is likely to be in place at birth (or shortly after) and may even arise during the third trimester. Progress in this field has been difficult, not just because of the challenges associated with procuring the relevant behavioral and neural data, but also because of uncertainty about how best to study consciousness in the absence of the capacity for verbal report or intentional behavior. This review examines both the empirical and methodological progress in this field, arguing that recent research points in favor of early-onset accounts of the emergence of consciousness.

We are now clearly entering a new age in our relationship with machines. The power of AI natural language processors and image generators has rapidly exceeded the expectations of even those who developed them. Serious questions are now being asked about the extent to which machines could become — or perhaps already are — sentient or conscious. Do AI machines understand the instructions they are given and the answers they provide? In this talk I will consider the prospects for conscious machines, by which I mean machines that have feelings, know about their own existence, and about ours. I will suggest that the recent focus on information processing in models of consciousness, in which the brain is treated as a kind of digital computer, have mislead us about the nature of consciousness and how it is produced in biological systems. Treating the brain as an energy processing system is more likely to yield answers to these fundamental questions and help us understand how and when machines might become minds.

Repetitive spatiotemporal patterns in resting-state brain activities have been widely observed in various species and regions, such as rat and cat visual cortices. Since they resemble the preceding brain activities during tasks, they are assumed to reflect past experiences embedded in neuronal circuits. Moreover, spatiotemporal patterns involving whole-brain activities may also reflect a process that integrates information distributed over the entire brain, such as motor and visual information. Therefore, revealing such patterns may elucidate how the information is integrated to generate consciousness. In this talk, I will introduce our proposed method to estimate repetitive spatiotemporal patterns from resting-state brain activity data and show the spatiotemporal patterns estimated from human resting-state magnetoencephalography (MEG) and electroencephalography (EEG) data. Our analyses suggest that the patterns involved whole-brain propagating activities that reflected a process to integrate the information distributed over frequencies and networks. I will also introduce our current attempt to reveal signal flows and their roles in the spatiotemporal patterns using a big dataset. - Takeda et al., Estimating repetitive spatiotemporal patterns from resting-state brain activity data. NeuroImage (2016); 133:251-65. - Takeda et al., Whole-brain propagating patterns in human resting-state brain activities. NeuroImage (2021); 245:118711.

In popular media, there is often a connection drawn between the advent of awareness in artificial agents and those same agents simultaneously achieving human or superhuman level intelligence. In this talk, I will examine the validity and potential application of this seemingly intuitive link between consciousness and intelligence. I will do so by examining the cognitive abilities associated with three contemporary theories of conscious function: Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Information Generation Theory (IGT), and Attention Schema Theory (AST), and demonstrating that all three theories specifically relate conscious function to some aspect of domain-general intelligence in humans. With this insight, we will turn to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and find that, while still far from demonstrating general intelligence, many state-of-the-art deep learning methods have begun to incorporate key aspects of each of the three functional theories. Given this apparent trend, I will use the motivating example of mental time travel in humans to propose ways in which insights from each of the three theories may be combined into a unified model. I believe that doing so can enable the development of artificial agents which are not only more generally intelligent but are also consistent with multiple current theories of conscious function.

Theories of consciousness are commonly grouped into "first-order" and "higher-order" families. As conventional wisdom has it, many more animals are likely to be conscious if a first-order theory is correct. But two recent developments have put pressure on the first/higher-order distinction. One is the argument (from Shea and Frith) that an effective global workspace mechanism must involve a form of metacognition. The second is Lau's "perceptual reality monitoring" (PRM) theory, a member of the "higher-order" family in which conscious sensory content is not re-represented, only tagged with a temporal index and marked as reliable. I argue that the first/higher-order distinction has become so blurred that it is no longer particularly useful. Moreover, the conventional wisdom about animals should not be trusted. It could be, for example, that the distribution of PRM in the animal kingdom is wider than the distribution of global broadcasting.

Clinical assessment of consciousness is a significant issue, with recent research suggesting some brain-damaged patients who are assessed as unconscious are in fact conscious. Misdiagnosis of consciousness can also be detrimental when it comes to general anaesthesia, causing numerous psychological problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Avoiding awareness with overdose of anaesthetics, however, can also lead to cognitive impairment. Currently available objective assessment of consciousness is limited in accuracy or requires expensive equipment with major barriers to translation. In this talk, we will outline our recent theory-guided and data-driven approaches to develop new, optimized consciousness measures that will be robustly evaluated on an unprecedented breadth of high-quality neural data, recorded from the fly model system. We will overcome the subjective-choice problem in data-driven and theory-guided approaches with a comprehensive data analytic framework, which has never been applied to consciousness detection, integrating previously disconnected streams of research in consciousness detection to accelerate the translation of objective consciousness measures into clinical settings.

We examine consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer science (TCS), a branch of mathematics concerned with understanding the underlying principles of computation and complexity, including the implications and surprising consequences of resource limitations. We propose a formal TCS model, the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM). The CTM is influenced by Alan Turing's simple yet powerful model of computation, the Turing machine (TM), and by the global workspace theory (GWT) of consciousness originated by cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, George Mashour, and others. However, the CTM is not a standard Turing Machine. It’s not the input-output map that gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness, but what’s under the hood. Nor is the CTM a standard GW model. In addition to its architecture, what gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness is its predictive dynamics (cycles of prediction, feedback and learning), its internal multi-modal language Brainish, and certain special Long Term Memory (LTM) processors, including its Inner Speech and Model of the World processors. Phenomena generally associated with consciousness, such as blindsight, inattentional blindness, change blindness, dream creation, and free will, are considered. Explanations derived from the model draw confirmation from consistencies at a high level, well above the level of neurons, with the cognitive neuroscience literature. Reference. L. Blum and M. Blum, "A theory of consciousness from a theoretical computer science perspective: Insights from the Conscious Turing Machine," PNAS, vol. 119, no. 21, 24 May 2022. https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2115934119

Peripersonal space (PPS) defines the portion of space where interactions between our body and the external environment more likely occur. There is no physical boundary defining the PPS with respect to the extrapersonal space, but PPS is continuously constructed by a dedicated neural system integrating external stimuli and tactile stimuli on the body, as a function of their potential interaction. This mechanism represents a primary interface between the individual and the environment. In this talk, I will present most recent evidence and highlight the current debate about the neural and computational mechanisms of PPS, its main functions and properties. I will discuss novel data showing how PPS dynamically shapes to optimize body-environment interactions. I will describe a novel electrophysiological paradigm to study and measure PPS, and show how this has been used to search for a basic marker of potentials of self-environment interaction in newborns and patients with disorders of consciousness. Finally, I will discuss how PPS is also involved in, and in turn shaped by, social interactions. Under these acceptances, I will discuss how PPS plays a key role in self-consciousness.

Scientific studies of consciousness can be roughly categorized into two directions: (1) How/where does consciousness emerge? (the mechanism of consciousness) and (2) Why is there consciousness? (the function of consciousness). I will summarize my past research on the quest for consciousness in these two directions.

If the mind controls the brain, then there is free will and its corollaries, dignity and responsibility. You are king in your skull-sized kingdom and the architect of your destiny. If, on the other hand, the brain controls the mind, an incendiary conclusion follows: There can be no free will, no praise, no punishment and no purgatory. In this webinar, Professor George Paxinos will discuss his highly respected work on the construction of human and experimental animal brain atlases. He has discovered 94 brain regions, 64 homologies and published 58 books. His first book, The Rat Brain in Stereotaxic Coordinates, is the most cited publication in neuroscience and, for three decades, the third most cited book in science. Professor Paxinos will also present his recently published novel, A River Divided, which was 21 years in the making. Neuroscience principles were used in the formation of charters, such as those related to the mind, soul, free will and consciousness. Environmental issues are at the heart of the novel, including the question of whether the brain is the right ‘size’ for survival. Professor Paxinos studied at Berkeley, McGill and Yale and is now Scientia Professor of Medical Sciences at Neuroscience Research Australia and The University of New South Wales in Sydney.

Prof. Marcello Massimini will give a talk addressed to the Humanitas University Undergraduate Neurological Society students and Humanitas Neuro Center members about consciousness and his groundbreaking studies on this topic. Prof. Maurizio Cecconi and Dr. Villa will then give their clinical point of view as neurointensivists on the pathologic states of consciousness.

We have been developing Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) using electrocorticography (ECoG) [1] , which is recorded by electrodes implanted on brain surface, and magnetoencephalography (MEG) [2] , which records the cortical activities non-invasively, for the clinical applications. The invasive BCI using ECoG has been applied for severely paralyzed patient to restore the communication and motor function. The non-invasive BCI using MEG has been applied as a neurofeedback tool to modulate some pathological neural activities to treat some neuropsychiatric disorders. Although these techniques have been developed for clinical application, BCI is also an important tool to investigate neural function. For example, motor BCI records some neural activities in a part of the motor cortex to generate some movements of external devices. Although our motor system consists of complex system including motor cortex, basal ganglia, cerebellum, spinal cord and muscles, the BCI affords us to simplify the motor system with exactly known inputs, outputs and the relation of them. We can investigate the motor system by manipulating the parameters in BCI system. Recently, we are developing some BCIs to visualize and manipulate our perception and mental imagery. Although these BCI has been developed for clinical application, the BCI will be useful to understand our neural system to generate the perception and imagery. In this talk, I will introduce our study of phantom limb pain [3] , that is controlled by MEG-BCI, and the development of a communication BCI using ECoG [4] , that enable the subject to visualize the contents of their mental imagery. And I would like to discuss how much we can control our cortical activities that represent our perception and mental imagery. These examples demonstrate that BCI is a promising tool to visualize and manipulate the perception and imagery and to understand our consciousness. References 1. Yanagisawa, T., Hirata, M., Saitoh, Y., Kishima, H., Matsushita, K., Goto, T., Fukuma, R., Yokoi, H., Kamitani, Y., and Yoshimine, T. (2012). Electrocorticographic control of a prosthetic arm in paralyzed patients. AnnNeurol 71, 353-361. 2. Yanagisawa, T., Fukuma, R., Seymour, B., Hosomi, K., Kishima, H., Shimizu, T., Yokoi, H., Hirata, M., Yoshimine, T., Kamitani, Y., et al. (2016). Induced sensorimotor brain plasticity controls pain in phantom limb patients. Nature communications 7, 13209. 3. Yanagisawa, T., Fukuma, R., Seymour, B., Tanaka, M., Hosomi, K., Yamashita, O., Kishima, H., Kamitani, Y., and Saitoh, Y. (2020). BCI training to move a virtual hand reduces phantom limb pain: A randomized crossover trial. Neurology 95, e417-e426. 4. Ryohei Fukuma, Takufumi Yanagisawa, Shinji Nishimoto, Hidenori Sugano, Kentaro Tamura, Shota Yamamoto, Yasushi Iimura, Yuya Fujita, Satoru Oshino, Naoki Tani, Naoko Koide-Majima, Yukiyasu Kamitani, Haruhiko Kishima (2022). Voluntary control of semantic neural representations by imagery with conflicting visual stimulation. arXiv arXiv:2112.01223.

Polaris Koi (Philosophy) and Jake Gavenas (Neuroscience) begin the seminar by arguing that agentive control is the key requirement for free will, drawing on folk-philosophy findings to support this claim (Gavenas et al., in prep). They explore how two executive control processes that functionally involve consciousness—inhibition and top-down control of attention—connect self-control and free will.

Exposure to sensory regularities in the environment induces the human brain to form expectations about incoming stimuli and remains partially preserved in the absence of consciousness (i.e. coma and sleep). While regularity often refers to stimuli presented at a fixed pace, we recently explored whether auditory prediction extends to pseudo-regular sequences where sensory prediction is induced by locking sound onsets to heartbeat signals and whether it can occur across vigilance states. In a series of experiments in healthy volunteers, we found neural and cardiac evidence of auditory prediction during heartbeat-based auditory regularities in wakefulness and N2 sleep. This process could represent an important mechanism for detecting unexpected stimuli in the environment even in states of limited conscious and attentional resources.

Flow is defined as an altered state of consciousness with excessive attention and enormous sense of pleasure, when engaged in a challenging task, first postulated by a psychologist, the late M. Csikszentmihayli. The main focus of this talk will be “Team Flow,” but there were two lines of previous studies in our laboratory as its background. First is inter-body and inter-brain coordination/synchrony between individuals. Considering various rhythmic echoing/synchronization phenomena in animal behavior, it could be regarded as the biological, sub-symbolic and implicit origin of social interactions. The second line of precursor research is on the state of Solo Flow in game playing. We employed attenuation of AEP (Auditory Evoked Potential) to task-irrelevant sound probes as an objective-neural indicator of such a Flow status, and found that; 1) Mutual link between the ACC & the TP is critical, and 2) overall, top-down influence is enhanced while bottom-up causality is attenuated. Having these as the background, I will present our latest study of Team Flow in game playing. We found that; 3) the neural correlates of Team Flow is distinctively different from those of Solo Flow nor of non-flow social, 4) the left medial temporal cortex seems to form an integrative node for Team Flow, receiving input related to Solo Flow state from the right PFC and input related to social state from the right IFC, and 5) Intra-brain (dis)similarity of brain activity well predicts (dis)similarity of skills/cognition as well as affinity for inter-brain coherence.

The vestibular system plays an essential role in everyday life, contributing to a surprising range of functions from reflexes to the highest levels of perception and consciousness. Three orthogonal semicircular canals detect rotational movements of the head and the otolith organs sense translational acceleration, including the gravitational vertical. But, how vestibular signals are encoded by the human brain? We have recently combined innovative methods for eliciting virtual rotation and translation sensations with fMRI to identify brain areas representing vestibular signals. We have identified a bilateral inferior parietal, ventral premotor/anterior insula and prefrontal network and confirmed that these areas reliably possess information about the rotation and translation. We have also investigated how vestibular signals are integrated with other sensory cues to generate our perception of the external environment.

Measuring the degree of consciousness an organism possesses has remained a longstanding challenge in Neuroscience. In part, this is due to the difficulty of finding the appropriate mathematical tools for describing such a subjective phenomenon. Current methods relate the level of consciousness to the complexity of neural activity, i.e., using the information contained in a stream of recorded signals they can tell whether the subject might be awake, asleep, or anaesthetised. Usually, the signals stemming from a complex system are correlated in time; the behaviour of the future depends on the patterns in the neural activity of the past. However these past-future relationships remain either hidden to, or not taken into account in the current measures of consciousness. These past-future correlations are likely to contain more information and thus can reveal a richer understanding about the behaviour of complex systems like a brain. Our work employs the "epsilon-machines” framework to account for the time correlations in neural recordings. In a nutshell, epsilon-machines reveal how much of the past neural activity is needed in order to accurately predict how the activity in the future will behave, and this is summarised in a single number called "statistical complexity". If a lot of past neural activity is required to predict the future behaviour, then can we say that the brain was more “awake" at the time of recording? Furthermore, if we read the recordings in reverse, does the difference between forward and reverse-time statistical complexity allow us to quantify the level of time asymmetry in the brain? Neuroscience predicts that there should be a degree of time asymmetry in the brain. However, this has never been measured. To test this, we used neural recordings measured from the brains of fruit flies and inferred the epsilon-machines. We found that the nature of the past and future correlations of neural activity in the brain, drastically changes depending on whether the fly was awake or anaesthetised. Not only does our study find that wakeful and anaesthetised fly brains are distinguished by how statistically complex they are, but that the amount of correlations in wakeful fly brains was much more sensitive to whether the neural recordings were read forward vs. backwards in time, compared to anaesthetised brains. In other words, wakeful fly brains were more complex, and time asymmetric than anaesthetised ones.

In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.

In the first part of this talk, I will briefly present the unfolding argument by Doerig et al. (2019) and the various replies in the philosophical and neuroscientific literature. In the second part of the talk, I will explore the ramifications that this debate has for the science of consciousness and its philosophy, with particular focus on these questions: (i) which type of explanation should a theory of consciousness provide? (ii) what is the evidential basis for theories of consciousness?

I will build from Niccolo's discussion of the Blockhead argument to argue that having an FeedForward Network (FN) responding like an recurrent network (RN) in a consciousness experiment is not enough to convince us the two are the same with regards to the posession of mental states and conscious experience. I will then argue that a robust functional equivalence between FFN and RN is akso not supported by the mathematical work on the Universal Approximator theorem, and is also unlikely to hold, as a conjecture, given data in cognitive neuroscience; I will argue that an equivalence of RN and FFN may only apply to static functions between input/output layers and not to the temporal patterns or to the network's reactions to structural perturbations. Finally, I review data indicating that consciousness has functional characteristics, such as a flexible control of behavior, and that cognitive/brain dynamics reveal interacting top-down and bottom-up processes, which are necessary for the mediation of such control processes.

Sleep is classically presented as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Yet, there is increasing evidence showing that sleep and wakefulness can actually intermingle and that wake-like and sleep-like activity can be observed concomitantly in different brain regions. I will here explore the implications of this conception of sleep as a local phenomenon for cognition and consciousness. In the first part of my presentation, I will show how local modulations of sleep depth during sleep could support the processing of sensory information by sleepers. I will also how, under certain circumstances, sleepers can learn while sleeping but also how they can forget. In the second part, I will show how the reverse phenomenon, sleep intrusions during waking, can explain modulations of attention. I will focus in particular on modulations of subjective experience and how the local sleep framework can inform our understanding of everyday phenomena such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Through this presentation and the exploration of both sleep and wakefulness, I will seek to connect changes in neurophysiology with changes in behaviour and subjective experience.

Recent breakthroughs in neurobiology indicate that time is ripe to understand the cellular-level mechanisms of conscious experience. Accordingly, we have recently proposed that conscious processing depends on the integration between top-down and bottom-up information streams and that there exists a specific cellular mechanism that gates this integration. I will first describe this cellular mechanism and demonstrate how it controls signal propagation within the thalamocortical system. Then I will show how this cellular-level mechanism provides a natural explanation for why conscious experience is modulated by top-down processing. Besides shining new light on the neural basis of consciousness, this perspective unravels the mechanisms of internally generated perception, such as dreams, imagery, and hallucinations.

Interest in psychedelic compounds is growing due to their remarkable potential for understanding altered neural states and their breakthrough status to treat various psychiatric disorders. However, there are major knowledge gaps regarding how psychedelics affect the brain. The Computational Neuroscience Laboratory at the Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University, uses multimodal neuroimaging to test hypotheses of the brain’s functional reorganisation under psychedelics, informed by the accounts of hierarchical predictive processing, using dynamic causal modelling (DCM). DCM is a generative modelling technique which allows to infer the directed connectivity among brain regions using functional brain imaging measurements. In this webinar, Associate Professor Adeel Razi and PhD candidate Devon Stoliker will showcase a series of previous and new findings of how changes to synaptic mechanisms, under the control of serotonin receptors, across the brain hierarchy influence sensory and associative brain connectivity. Understanding these neural mechanisms of subjective and therapeutic effects of psychedelics is critical for rational development of novel treatments and for the design and success of future clinical trials. Associate Professor Adeel Razi is a NHMRC Investigator Fellow and CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholar at the Turner Institute of Brain and Mental Health, Monash University. He performs cross-disciplinary research combining engineering, physics, and machine-learning. Devon Stoliker is a PhD candidate at the Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University. His interest in consciousness and psychiatry has led him to investigate the neural mechanisms of classic psychedelic effects in the brain.

Category theory is a branch of mathematics which have been used to organize various regions of mathematics and related sciences from a radical “relation-first” point of view. Why consciousness researchers should care about category theory? " "There are (at least) 3 reasons:" "1 Everything is relational" "2 Everything is relation" "3 Relation is everything" "In this talk we explain the reasons above more concretely and introduce the ideas to utilize basic concepts in category theory for consciousness studies.

It is generally agreed upon that qualities of conscious experience instantiate structural properties, usually called relations. They furnish a representation of qualities (or qualia, in fact) in terms of a mathematical space Q (rather than a set), which is crucial to both modelling and measuring of conscious experience." "What is usually disregarded is that “only such structural properties generalize across individuals” (Austen Clark), but that qualities themselves as differentiated by stimulus specifications, behavior or reports do not. We show that this implies that only the part of Q which is invariant with respect to the automorphism group has a well-defined referent, while individual elements do not. This poses a prima facie limitation of any theory or experiment that aims to address individual qualities. We show how mathematical theories of consciousness can overcome this limitation via symmetry groups and group actions, making accessible to science what is properly called private language.