Natural behavior reveals the way that gaze serves the needs of the current task, and the complex cognitive control mechanisms that are involved. It has become increasingly clear that even the simplest actions involve complex decision processes that depend on an interaction of visual information, knowledge of the current environment, and the intrinsic costs and benefits of actions choices. I will explore these ideas in the context of walking in natural terrain, where we are able to recover the 3D structure of the visual environment. We show that subjects choose flexible paths that depend on the flatness of the terrain over the next few steps. Subjects trade off flatness with straightness of their paths towards the goal, indicating a nuanced trade-off between stability and energetic costs on both the time scale of the next step and longer-range constraints.

Human vision is full of puzzles. Observers can grasp the essence of a scene in an instant, yet when probed for details they are at a loss. People have trouble finding their keys, yet they may be quite visible once found. How does one explain this combination of marvelous successes with quirky failures? I will describe our attempts to develop a unifying theory that brings a satisfying order to multiple phenomena. One key is to understand peripheral vision. A visual system cannot process everything with full fidelity, and therefore must lose some information. Peripheral vision must condense a mass of information into a succinct representation that nonetheless carries the information needed for vision at a glance. We have proposed that the visual system deals with limited capacity in part by representing its input in terms of a rich set of local image statistics, where the local regions grow — and the representation becomes less precise — with distance from fixation. This scheme trades off computation of sophisticated image features at the expense of spatial localization of those features. What are the implications of such an encoding scheme? Critical to our understanding has been the use of methodologies for visualizing the equivalence classes of the model. These visualizations allow one to quickly see that many of the puzzles of human vision may arise from a single encoding mechanism. They have suggested new experiments and predicted unexpected phenomena. Furthermore, visualization of the equivalence classes has facilitated the generation of testable model predictions, allowing us to study the effects of this relatively low-level encoding on a wide range of higher-level tasks. Peripheral vision helps explain many of the puzzles of vision, but some remain. By examining the phenomena that cannot be explained by peripheral vision, we gain insight into the nature of additional capacity limits in vision. In particular, I will suggest that decision processes face general-purpose limits on the complexity of the tasks they can perform at a given time.

The assumed data generating models (response distributions) of experimental or observational data in cognitive science have become increasingly complex over the past decades. This trend follows a revolution in model estimation methods and a drastic increase in computing power available to researchers. Today, higher-level cognitive functions can well be captured by and understood through computational cognitive models, a common example being drift diffusion models for decision processes. Such models are often expressed as the combination of two modeling layers. The first layer is the response distribution with corresponding distributional parameters tailored to the cognitive process under investigation. The second layer are latent models of the distributional parameters that capture how those parameters vary as a function of design, stimulus, or person characteristics, often in an additive manner. Such cognitive models can thus be understood as special cases of distributional regression models where multiple distributional parameters, rather than just a single centrality parameter, are predicted by additive models. Because of their complexity, distributional models are quite complicated to estimate, but recent advances in Bayesian estimation methods and corresponding software make them increasingly more feasible. In this talk, I will speak about the specification, estimation, and post-processing of Bayesian distributional regression models and how they can help to better understand cognitive processes.

My research focuses, broadly speaking, on how emotions impact decision making. Specifically, I am interested in affective biases, a phenomenon known to be important in depression. Using a rodent decision-making task, combined with computational modelling I have investigated how different antidepressant and pro-depressant manipulations that are known to alter mood in humans alter judgement bias, and provided insight into the decision processes that underlie these behaviours. I will also highlight how the combination of behaviour and modelling can provide a truly translation approach, enabling comparison and interpretation of the same cognitive processes between animal and human research.

We will start our talk with a short video of our research, illustrating methods (some old and new) and findings that have provided our current understanding of how visual capabilities develop in infancy and early childhood. However, our research poses some outstanding questions. We will briefly discuss three issues, which are linked by a common focus on the development of visual attentional processing: (1) How do recurrent cortical loops contribute to development? Cortical selectivity (e.g., to orientation, motion, and binocular disparity) develops in the early months of life. However, these systems are not purely feedforward but depend on parallel pathways, with recurrent feedback loops playing a critical role. The development of diverse networks, particularly for motion processing, may explain changes in dynamic responses and resolve developmental data obtained with different methodologies. One possible role for these loops is in top-down attentional control of visual processing. (2) Why do hyperopic infants become strabismic (cross-eyes)? Binocular interaction is a particularly sensitive area of development. Standard clinical accounts suppose that long-sighted (hyperopic) refractive errors require accommodative effort, putting stress on the accommodation-convergence link that leads to its breakdown and strabismus. Our large-scale population screening studies of 9-month infants question this: hyperopic infants are at higher risk of strabismus and impaired vision (amblyopia and impaired attention) but these hyperopic infants often under- rather than over-accommodate. This poor accommodation may reflect poor early attention processing, possibly a ‘soft sign’ of subtle cerebral dysfunction. (3) What do many neurodevelopmental disorders have in common? Despite similar cognitive demands, global motion perception is much more impaired than global static form across diverse neurodevelopmental disorders including Down and Williams Syndromes, Fragile-X, Autism, children with premature birth and infants with perinatal brain injury. These deficits in motion processing are associated with deficits in other dorsal stream functions such as visuo-motor co-ordination and attentional control, a cluster we have called ‘dorsal stream vulnerability’. However, our neuroimaging measures related to motion coherence in typically developing children suggest that the critical areas for individual differences in global motion sensitivity are not early motion-processing areas such as V5/MT, but downstream parietal and frontal areas for decision processes on motion signals. Although these brain networks may also underlie attentional and visuo-motor deficits , we still do not know when and how these deficits differ across different disorders and between individual children. Answering these questions provide necessary steps, not only increasing our scientific understanding of human visual brain development, but also in designing appropriate interventions to help each child achieve their full potential.

The stream of consciousness refers to ideas, images, and memories that meander across the mind when we are otherwise unoccupied. The standard view is that these thoughts are associationistic in character and they arise from subpersonal processes—we are for the most part passive observers of them. Drawing on a series of laboratory studies we have conducted as well as Buddhist models of mind, I argue that these views are importantly incorrect. On the alternative view I put forward, these thoughts arise from minimal decision processes, which lie in a grey zone: They are both manifestations of agency as well as obstacles to it.