n the neurosciences the need for some 'overarching' theory is sometimes expressed, but it is not always obvious what is meant by this. One can perhaps agree that in modern science observation and experimentation is normally complemented by 'theory', i.e. the development of theoretical concepts that help guiding and evaluating experiments and measurements. A deeper discussion of 'brain theory' will require the clarification of some further distictions, in particular: theory vs. model and brain research (and its theory) vs. neuroscience. Other questions are: Does a theory require mathematics? Or even differential equations? Today it is often taken for granted that the whole universe including everything in it, for example humans, animals, and plants, can be adequately treated by physics and therefore theoretical physics is the overarching theory. Even if this is the case, it has turned out that in some particular parts of physics (the historical example is thermodynamics) it may be useful to simplify the theory by introducing additional theoretical concepts that can in principle be 'reduced' to more complex descriptions on the 'microscopic' level of basic physical particals and forces. In this sense, brain theory may be regarded as part of theoretical neuroscience, which is inside biophysics and therefore inside physics, or theoretical physics. Still, in neuroscience and brain research, additional concepts are typically used to describe results and help guiding experimentation that are 'outside' physics, beginning with neurons and synapses, names of brain parts and areas, up to concepts like 'learning', 'motivation', 'attention'. Certainly, we do not yet have one theory that includes all these concepts. So 'brain theory' is still in a 'pre-newtonian' state. However, it may still be useful to understand in general the relations between a larger theory and its 'parts', or between microscopic and macroscopic theories, or between theories at different 'levels' of description. This is what I plan to do.

Recently, the field of computational neuroscience has seen an explosion of the use of trained recurrent network models (RNNs) to model patterns of neural activity. These RNN models are typically characterized by tuned recurrent interactions between rate 'units' whose dynamics are governed by smooth, continuous differential equations. However, the response of biological single neurons is better described by all-or-none events - spikes - that are triggered in response to the processing of their synaptic input by the complex dynamics of their membrane. One line of research has attempted to resolve this discrepancy by linking the average firing probability of a population of simplified spiking neuron models to rate dynamics similar to those used for RNN units. However, challenges remain to account for complex temporal dependencies in the biological single neuron response and for the heterogeneity of synaptic input across the population. Here, we make progress by showing how to derive dynamic rate equations for a population of spiking neurons with multi-timescale adaptation properties - as this was shown to accurately model the response of biological neurons - while they receive independent time-varying inputs, leading to plausible asynchronous activity in the network. The resulting rate equations yield an insightful segregation of the population's response into dynamics that are driven by the mean signal received by the neural population, and dynamics driven by the variance of the input across neurons, with respective timescales that are in agreement with slice experiments. Further, these equations explain how input variability can shape log-normal instantaneous rate distributions across neurons, as observed in vivo. Our results help interpret properties of the neural population response and open the way to investigating whether the more biologically plausible and dynamically complex rate model we derive could provide useful inductive biases if used in an RNN to solve specific tasks.