Evolutionarily, the expansion of the human neocortex accounts for many of the unique cognitive abilities of humans. This expansion appears to reflect the increased proliferative potential of basal progenitors (BPs) in mammalian evolution. Further cortical progenitors generate both glutamatergic excitatory neurons (ENs) and GABAergic inhibitory interneurons (INs) in human cortex, whereas they produce exclusively ENs in rodents. The increased proliferative capacity and neuronal subtype generation of cortical progenitors in mammalian evolution may have evolved through epigenetic alterations. However, whether or how the epigenome in cortical progenitors differs between humans and other species is unknown. Here, we report that histone H3 acetylation is a key epigenetic regulation in BP profiling of sorted BPs, we show that H3K9 acetylation is low in murine BPs and high in amplification, neuronal subtype generation and cortical expansion. Through epigenetic profiling of sorted BPs, we show that H3K9 acetylation is low in murine BPs and high in human BPs. Elevated H3K9ac preferentially increases BP proliferation, increasing the size and folding of the normally smooth mouse neocortex. Furthermore, we found that the elevated H3 acetylation activates expression of IN genes in in developing mouse cortex and promote proliferation of IN progenitor-like cells in cortex of Pax6 mutant mouse models. Mechanistically, H3K9ac drives the BP amplification and proliferation of these IN progenitor-like cells by increasing expression of the evolutionarily regulated gene, TRNP1. Our findings demonstrate a previously unknown mechanism that controls neocortex expansion and generation of neuronal subtypes. Keywords: Cortical development, neurogenesis, basal progenitors, cortical size, gyrification, excitatory neuron, inhibitory interneuron, epigenetic profiling, epigenetic regulation, H3 acetylation, H3K9ac, TRNP1, PAX6

The idea that perception in humans relies on some form of probabilistic computations has become very popular over the last decades. It has been extremely difficult however to characterize the extent and the nature of the probabilistic representations and operations that are manipulated by neural populations in the human cortex. Several theoretical works suggest that probabilistic representations are present from low-level sensory areas to high-level areas. According to this view, the neural dynamics implements some forms of probabilistic message passing (i.e. neural sampling, probabilistic population coding, etc.) which solves the problem of perceptual inference. Here I will present recent experimental evidence that human and non-human primate perception implements some form of message passing. I will first review findings showing probabilistic integration of sensory evidence across space and time in primate visual cortex. Second, I will show that the confidence reports in a hierarchical task reveal that uncertainty is represented both at lower and higher levels, in a way that is consistent with probabilistic message passing both from lower to higher and from higher to lower representations. Finally, I will present behavioral and neural evidence that human perception takes into account pairwise correlations in sequences of sensory samples in agreement with the message passing hypothesis, and against standard accounts such as accumulation of sensory evidence or predictive coding.

Agent-causal libertarian free will asserts that the conscious agent is the ultimate cause of her own voluntary behavior. A major reason to reject libertarian free will is that it seems incompatible with our current knowledge of physics. In this talk I will argue how quantum processes, specifically non-random collapses of the wavefunction in the human cortex, may enable libertarian free will. I will discuss how this account can be empirically tested.

In many ways, cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to use physiological observation to clarify the mechanisms that shape behavior. Over the past 25 years, fMRI has provided a system-wide and yet somewhat spatially precise view of the response in human cortex evoked by a wide variety of stimuli and task contexts. The current talk focuses on the other direction of inference; the implications of this observed functional organization for behavior. To begin, we must interrogate the methodological and empirical frameworks underlying our derivation of this organization, partially by exploring its relationship to and predictability from gross neuroanatomy. Next, across a series of studies, the implications of two properties of functional organization for behavior will be explored: 1) the co-localization of visual working memory and perceptual processing and 2) implicit learning in the context of distributed responses. In sum, these results highlight the limitations of our current approach and hint at a new general mechanism for explaining observed behavior in context with the neural substrate.

The last quarter century has provided extensive evidence that some regions of the human cortex are selectively engaged in processing a single specific domain of information, from faces, places, and bodies to language, music, and other people’s thoughts. This work dovetails with earlier theories in cognitive science highlighting domain specificity in human cognition, development, and evolution. But many questions remain unanswered about even the clearest cases of domain specificity in the brain, the selective engagement of the FFA, PPA, and EBA in the perception of faces, places, and bodies, respectively. First, these claims lack precision, saying little about what is computed and how, and relying on human judgements to decide what counts as a face, place, or body. Second, they provide no account of the reliably varying responses of these regions across different “preferred” images, or across different “nonpreferred” images for each category. Third, the category selectivity of each region is vulnerable to refutation if any of the vast set of as-yet-untested nonpreferred images turns out to produce a stronger response than preferred images for that region. Fourth, and most fundamentally, they provide no account of why, from a computational point of view, brains should exhibit this striking degree of functional specificity in the first place, and why we should have the particular visual specializations we do, for faces, places, and bodies, but not (apparently) for food or snakes. The advent of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to model visual processing in the ventral pathway has opened up many opportunities to address these long-standing questions in new ways. I will describe ongoing efforts in our lab to harness CNNs to do just that.