What it’s like is all there is: The value of Consciousness

Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

Vision for perception versus vision for action: dissociable contributions of visual sensory drives from primary visual cortex and superior colliculus neurons to orienting behaviors

The primary visual cortex (V1) directly projects to the superior colliculus (SC) and is believed to provide sensory drive for eye movements. Consistent with this, a majority of saccade-related SC neurons also exhibit short-latency, stimulus-driven visual responses, which are additionally feature-tuned. However, direct neurophysiological comparisons of the visual response properties of the two anatomically-connected brain areas are surprisingly lacking, especially with respect to active looking behaviors. I will describe a series of experiments characterizing visual response properties in primate V1 and SC neurons, exploring feature dimensions like visual field location, spatial frequency, orientation, contrast, and luminance polarity. The results suggest a substantial, qualitative reformatting of SC visual responses when compared to V1. For example, SC visual response latencies are actively delayed, independent of individual neuron tuning preferences, as a function of increasing spatial frequency, and this phenomenon is directly correlated with saccadic reaction times. Such “coarse-to-fine” rank ordering of SC visual response latencies as a function of spatial frequency is much weaker in V1, suggesting a dissociation of V1 responses from saccade timing. Consistent with this, when we next explored trial-by-trial correlations of individual neurons’ visual response strengths and visual response latencies with saccadic reaction times, we found that most SC neurons exhibited, on a trial-by-trial basis, stronger and earlier visual responses for faster saccadic reaction times. Moreover, these correlations were substantially higher for visual-motor neurons in the intermediate and deep layers than for more superficial visual-only neurons. No such correlations existed systematically in V1. Thus, visual responses in SC and V1 serve fundamentally different roles in active vision: V1 jumpstarts sensing and image analysis, but SC jumpstarts moving. I will finish by demonstrating, using V1 reversible inactivation, that, despite reformatting of signals from V1 to the brainstem, V1 is still a necessary gateway for visually-driven oculomotor responses to occur, even for the most reflexive of eye movement phenomena. This is a fundamental difference from rodent studies demonstrating clear V1-independent processing in afferent visual pathways bypassing the geniculostriate one, and it demonstrates the importance of multi-species comparisons in the study of oculomotor control.

Analyzing Network-Level Brain Processing and Plasticity Using Molecular Neuroimaging

Behavior and cognition depend on the integrated action of neural structures and populations distributed throughout the brain. We recently developed a set of molecular imaging tools that enable multiregional processing and plasticity in neural networks to be studied at a brain-wide scale in rodents and nonhuman primates. Here we will describe how a novel genetically encoded activity reporter enables information flow in virally labeled neural circuitry to be monitored by fMRI. Using the reporter to perform functional imaging of synaptically defined neural populations in the rat somatosensory system, we show how activity is transformed within brain regions to yield characteristics specific to distinct output projections. We also show how this approach enables regional activity to be modeled in terms of inputs, in a paradigm that we are extending to address circuit-level origins of functional specialization in marmoset brains. In the second part of the talk, we will discuss how another genetic tool for MRI enables systematic studies of the relationship between anatomical and functional connectivity in the mouse brain. We show that variations in physical and functional connectivity can be dissociated both across individual subjects and over experience. We also use the tool to examine brain-wide relationships between plasticity and activity during an opioid treatment. This work demonstrates the possibility of studying diverse brain-wide processing phenomena using molecular neuroimaging.

Rethinking Attention: Dynamic Prioritization

Decades of research on understanding the mechanisms of attentional selection have focused on identifying the units (representations) on which attention operates in order to guide prioritized sensory processing. These attentional units fit neatly to accommodate our understanding of how attention is allocated in a top-down, bottom-up, or historical fashion. In this talk, I will focus on attentional phenomena that are not easily accommodated within current theories of attentional selection – the “attentional platypuses,” as they allude to an observation that within biological taxonomies the platypus does not fit into either mammal or bird categories. Similarly, attentional phenomena that do not fit neatly within current attentional models suggest that current models need to be revised. I list a few instances of the ‘attentional platypuses” and then offer a new approach, the Dynamically Weighted Prioritization, stipulating that multiple factors impinge onto the attentional priority map, each with a corresponding weight. The interaction between factors and their corresponding weights determines the current state of the priority map which subsequently constrains/guides attention allocation. I propose that this new approach should be considered as a supplement to existing models of attention, especially those that emphasize categorical organizations.

On finding what you’re (not) looking for: prospects and challenges for AI-driven discovery

Recent high-profile scientific achievements by machine learning (ML) and especially deep learning (DL) systems have reinvigorated interest in ML for automated scientific discovery (eg, Wang et al. 2023). Much of this work is motivated by the thought that DL methods might facilitate the efficient discovery of phenomena, hypotheses, or even models or theories more efficiently than traditional, theory-driven approaches to discovery. This talk considers some of the more specific obstacles to automated, DL-driven discovery in frontier science, focusing on gravitational-wave astrophysics (GWA) as a representative case study. In the first part of the talk, we argue that despite these efforts, prospects for DL-driven discovery in GWA remain uncertain. In the second part, we advocate a shift in focus towards the ways DL can be used to augment or enhance existing discovery methods, and the epistemic virtues and vices associated with these uses. We argue that the primary epistemic virtue of many such uses is to decrease opportunity costs associated with investigating puzzling or anomalous signals, and that the right framework for evaluating these uses comes from philosophical work on pursuitworthiness.

Maintaining Plasticity in Neural Networks

Nonstationarity presents a variety of challenges for machine learning systems. One surprising pathology which can arise in nonstationary learning problems is plasticity loss, whereby making progress on new learning objectives becomes more difficult as training progresses. Networks which are unable to adapt in response to changes in their environment experience plateaus or even declines in performance in highly non-stationary domains such as reinforcement learning, where the learner must quickly adapt to new information even after hundreds of millions of optimization steps. The loss of plasticity manifests in a cluster of related empirical phenomena which have been identified by a number of recent works, including the primacy bias, implicit under-parameterization, rank collapse, and capacity loss. While this phenomenon is widely observed, it is still not fully understood. This talk will present exciting recent results which shed light on the mechanisms driving the loss of plasticity in a variety of learning problems and survey methods to maintain network plasticity in non-stationary tasks, with a particular focus on deep reinforcement learning.

Doubting the neurofeedback double-blind do participants have residual awareness of experimental purposes in neurofeedback studies?

Neurofeedback provides a feedback display which is linked with on-going brain activity and thus allows self-regulation of neural activity in specific brain regions associated with certain cognitive functions and is considered a promising tool for clinical interventions. Recent reviews of neurofeedback have stressed the importance of applying the “double-blind” experimental design where critically the patient is unaware of the neurofeedback treatment condition. An important question then becomes; is double-blind even possible? Or are subjects aware of the purposes of the neurofeedback experiment? – this question is related to the issue of how we assess awareness or the absence of awareness to certain information in human subjects. Fortunately, methods have been developed which employ neurofeedback implicitly, where the subject is claimed to have no awareness of experimental purposes when performing the neurofeedback. Implicit neurofeedback is intriguing and controversial because it runs counter to the first neurofeedback study, which showed a link between awareness of being in a certain brain state and control of the neurofeedback-derived brain activity. Claiming that humans are unaware of a specific type of mental content is a notoriously difficult endeavor. For instance, what was long held as wholly unconscious phenomena, such as dreams or subliminal perception, have been overturned by more sensitive measures which show that degrees of awareness can be detected. In this talk, I will discuss whether we will critically examine the claim that we can know for certain that a neurofeedback experiment was performed in an unconscious manner. I will present evidence that in certain neurofeedback experiments such as manipulations of attention, participants display residual degrees of awareness of experimental contingencies to alter their cognition.

Quasicriticality and the quest for a framework of neuronal dynamics

Critical phenomena abound in nature, from forest fires and earthquakes to avalanches in sand and neuronal activity. Since the 2003 publication by Beggs & Plenz on neuronal avalanches, a growing body of work suggests that the brain homeostatically regulates itself to operate near a critical point where information processing is optimal. At this critical point, incoming activity is neither amplified (supercritical) nor damped (subcritical), but approximately preserved as it passes through neural networks. Departures from the critical point have been associated with conditions of poor neurological health like epilepsy, Alzheimer's disease, and depression. One complication that arises from this picture is that the critical point assumes no external input. But, biological neural networks are constantly bombarded by external input. How is then the brain able to homeostatically adapt near the critical point? We’ll see that the theory of quasicriticality, an organizing principle for brain dynamics, can account for this paradoxical situation. As external stimuli drive the cortex, quasicriticality predicts a departure from criticality while maintaining optimal properties for information transmission. We’ll see that simulations and experimental data confirm these predictions and describe new ones that could be tested soon. More importantly, we will see how this organizing principle could help in the search for biomarkers that could soon be tested in clinical studies.

Autopoiesis and Enaction in the Game of Life

Enaction plays a central role in the broader fabric of so-called 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition. Although the origin of the enactive approach is widely dated to the 1991 publication of the book "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, many of the central ideas trace to much earlier work. Over 40 years ago, the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela put forward the notion of autopoiesis as a way to understand living systems and the phenomena that they generate, including cognition. Varela and others subsequently extended this framework to an enactive approach that places biological autonomy at the foundation of situated and embodied behavior and cognition. I will describe an attempt to place Maturana and Varela's original ideas on a firmer foundation by studying them within the context of a toy model universe, John Conway's Game of Life (GoL) cellular automata. This work has both pedagogical and theoretical goals. Simple concrete models provide an excellent vehicle for introducing some of the core concepts of autopoiesis and enaction and explaining how these concepts fit together into a broader whole. In addition, a careful analysis of such toy models can hone our intuitions about these concepts, probe their strengths and weaknesses, and move the entire enterprise in the direction of a more mathematically rigorous theory. In particular, I will identify the primitive processes that can occur in GoL, show how these can be linked together into mutually-supporting networks that underlie persistent bounded entities, map the responses of such entities to environmental perturbations, and investigate the paths of mutual perturbation that these entities and their environments can undergo.

Intrinsic Geometry of a Combinatorial Sensory Neural Code for Birdsong

Understanding the nature of neural representation is a central challenge of neuroscience. One common approach to this challenge is to compute receptive fields by correlating neural activity with external variables drawn from sensory signals. But these receptive fields are only meaningful to the experimenter, not the organism, because only the experimenter has access to both the neural activity and knowledge of the external variables. To understand neural representation more directly, recent methodological advances have sought to capture the intrinsic geometry of sensory driven neural responses without external reference. To date, this approach has largely been restricted to low-dimensional stimuli as in spatial navigation. In this talk, I will discuss recent work from my lab examining the intrinsic geometry of sensory representations in a model vocal communication system, songbirds. From the assumption that sensory systems capture invariant relationships among stimulus features, we conceptualized the space of natural birdsongs to lie on the surface of an n-dimensional hypersphere. We computed composite receptive field models for large populations of simultaneously recorded single neurons in the auditory forebrain and show that solutions to these models define convex regions of response probability in the spherical stimulus space. We then define a combinatorial code over the set of receptive fields, realized in the moment-to-moment spiking and non-spiking patterns across the population, and show that this code can be used to reconstruct high-fidelity spectrographic representations of natural songs from evoked neural responses. Notably, we find that topological relationships among combinatorial codewords directly mirror acoustic relationships among songs in the spherical stimulus space. That is, the time-varying pattern of co-activity across the neural population expresses an intrinsic representational geometry that mirrors the natural, extrinsic stimulus space.  Combinatorial patterns across this intrinsic space directly represent complex vocal communication signals, do not require computation of receptive fields, and are in a form, spike time coincidences, amenable to biophysical mechanisms of neural information propagation.

No Free Lunch from Deep Learning in Neuroscience: A Case Study through Models of the Entorhinal-Hippocampal Circuit

Research in Neuroscience, as in many scientific disciplines, is undergoing a renaissance based on deep learning. Unique to Neuroscience, deep learning models can be used not only as a tool but interpreted as models of the brain. The central claims of recent deep learning-based models of brain circuits are that they shed light on fundamental functions being optimized or make novel predictions about neural phenomena. We show, through the case-study of grid cells in the entorhinal-hippocampal circuit, that one may get neither. We rigorously examine the claims of deep learning models of grid cells using large-scale hyperparameter sweeps and theory-driven experimentation, and demonstrate that the results of such models are more strongly driven by particular, non-fundamental, and post-hoc implementation choices than fundamental truths about neural circuits or the loss function(s) they might optimize. We discuss why these models cannot be expected to produce accurate models of the brain without the addition of substantial amounts of inductive bias, an informal No Free Lunch result for Neuroscience.

A multi-level account of hippocampal function in concept learning from behavior to neurons

A complete neuroscience requires multi-level theories that address phenomena ranging from higher-level cognitive behaviors to activities within a cell. Unfortunately, we don't have cognitive models of behavior whose components can be decomposed into the neural dynamics that give rise to behavior, leaving an explanatory gap. Here, we decompose SUSTAIN, a clustering model of concept learning, into neuron-like units (SUSTAIN-d; decomposed). Instead of abstract constructs (clusters), SUSTAIN-d has a pool of neuron-like units. With millions of units, a key challenge is how to bridge from abstract constructs such as clusters to neurons, whilst retaining high-level behavior. How does the brain coordinate neural activity during learning? Inspired by algorithms that capture flocking behavior in birds, we introduce a neural flocking learning rule to coordinate units that collectively form higher-level mental constructs ("virtual clusters"), neural representations (concept, place and grid cell-like assemblies), and parallels recurrent hippocampal activity. The decomposed model shows how brain-scale neural populations coordinate to form assemblies encoding concept and spatial representations, and why many neurons are required for robust performance. Our account provides a multi-level explanation for how cognition and symbol-like representations are supported by coordinated neural assemblies formed through learning.

Associative memory of structured knowledge

A long standing challenge in biological and artificial intelligence is to understand how new knowledge can be constructed from known building blocks in a way that is amenable for computation by neuronal circuits. Here we focus on the task of storage and recall of structured knowledge in long-term memory. Specifically, we ask how recurrent neuronal networks can store and retrieve multiple knowledge structures. We model each structure as a set of binary relations between events and attributes (attributes may represent e.g., temporal order, spatial location, role in semantic structure), and map each structure to a distributed neuronal activity pattern using a vector symbolic architecture (VSA) scheme. We then use associative memory plasticity rules to store the binarized patterns as fixed points in a recurrent network. By a combination of signal-to-noise analysis and numerical simulations, we demonstrate that our model allows for efficient storage of these knowledge structures, such that the memorized structures as well as their individual building blocks (e.g., events and attributes) can be subsequently retrieved from partial retrieving cues. We show that long-term memory of structured knowledge relies on a new principle of computation beyond the memory basins. Finally, we show that our model can be extended to store sequences of memories as single attractors.

Learning predictive maps in the brain for spatial navigation

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

A parsimonious description of global functional brain organization in three spatiotemporal patterns

Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has yielded seemingly disparate insights into large-scale organization of the human brain. The brain’s large-scale organization can be divided into two broad categories: zero-lag representations of functional connectivity structure and time-lag representations of traveling wave or propagation structure. In this study, we sought to unify observed phenomena across these two categories in the form of three low-frequency spatiotemporal patterns composed of a mixture of standing and traveling wave dynamics. We showed that a range of empirical phenomena, including functional connectivity gradients, the task-positive/task-negative anti-correlation pattern, the global signal, time-lag propagation patterns, the quasiperiodic pattern and the functional connectome network structure, are manifestations of these three spatiotemporal patterns. These patterns account for much of the global spatial structure that underlies functional connectivity analyses and unifies phenomena in resting-state functional MRI previously thought distinct.

Learning static and dynamic mappings with local self-supervised plasticity

Animals exhibit remarkable learning capabilities with little direct supervision. Likewise, self-supervised learning is an emergent paradigm in artificial intelligence, closing the performance gap to supervised learning. In the context of biology, self-supervised learning corresponds to a setting where one sense or specific stimulus may serve as a supervisory signal for another. After learning, the latter can be used to predict the former. On the implementation level, it has been demonstrated that such predictive learning can occur at the single neuron level, in compartmentalized neurons that separate and associate information from different streams. We demonstrate the power such self-supervised learning over unsupervised (Hebb-like) learning rules, which depend heavily on stimulus statistics, in two examples: First, in the context of animal navigation where predictive learning can associate internal self-motion information always available to the animal with external visual landmark information, leading to accurate path-integration in the dark. We focus on the well-characterized fly head direction system and show that our setting learns a connectivity strikingly similar to the one reported in experiments. The mature network is a quasi-continuous attractor and reproduces key experiments in which optogenetic stimulation controls the internal representation of heading, and where the network remaps to integrate with different gains. Second, we show that incorporating global gating by reward prediction errors allows the same setting to learn conditioning at the neuronal level with mixed selectivity. At its core, conditioning entails associating a neural activity pattern induced by an unconditioned stimulus (US) with the pattern arising in response to a conditioned stimulus (CS). Solving the generic problem of pattern-to-pattern associations naturally leads to emergent cognitive phenomena like blocking, overshadowing, saliency effects, extinction, interstimulus interval effects etc. Surprisingly, we find that the same network offers a reductionist mechanism for causal inference by resolving the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.

A Framework for a Conscious AI: Viewing Consciousness through a Theoretical Computer Science Lens

We examine consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer science (TCS), a branch of mathematics concerned with understanding the underlying principles of computation and complexity, including the implications and surprising consequences of resource limitations. We propose a formal TCS model, the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM). The CTM is influenced by Alan Turing's simple yet powerful model of computation, the Turing machine (TM), and by the global workspace theory (GWT) of consciousness originated by cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, George Mashour, and others. However, the CTM is not a standard Turing Machine. It’s not the input-output map that gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness, but what’s under the hood. Nor is the CTM a standard GW model. In addition to its architecture, what gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness is its predictive dynamics (cycles of prediction, feedback and learning), its internal multi-modal language Brainish, and certain special Long Term Memory (LTM) processors, including its Inner Speech and Model of the World processors. Phenomena generally associated with consciousness, such as blindsight, inattentional blindness, change blindness, dream creation, and free will, are considered. Explanations derived from the model draw confirmation from consistencies at a high level, well above the level of neurons, with the cognitive neuroscience literature. Reference. L. Blum and M. Blum, "A theory of consciousness from a theoretical computer science perspective: Insights from the Conscious Turing Machine," PNAS, vol. 119, no. 21, 24 May 2022. https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2115934119

A model of colour appearance based on efficient coding of natural images

An object’s colour, brightness and pattern are all influenced by its surroundings, and a number of visual phenomena and “illusions” have been discovered that highlight these often dramatic effects. Explanations for these phenomena range from low-level neural mechanisms to high-level processes that incorporate contextual information or prior knowledge. Importantly, few of these phenomena can currently be accounted for when measuring an object’s perceived colour. Here we ask to what extent colour appearance is predicted by a model based on the principle of coding efficiency. The model assumes that the image is encoded by noisy spatio-chromatic filters at one octave separations, which are either circularly symmetrical or oriented. Each spatial band’s lower threshold is set by the contrast sensitivity function, and the dynamic range of the band is a fixed multiple of this threshold, above which the response saturates. Filter outputs are then reweighted to give equal power in each channel for natural images. We demonstrate that the model fits human behavioural performance in psychophysics experiments, and also primate retinal ganglion responses. Next we systematically test the model’s ability to qualitatively predict over 35 brightness and colour phenomena, with almost complete success. This implies that contrary to high-level processing explanations, much of colour appearance is potentially attributable to simple mechanisms evolved for efficient coding of natural images, and is a basis for modelling the vision of humans and other animals.

How communication networks promote cross-cultural similarities: The case of category formation

Individuals vary widely in how they categorize novel phenomena. This individual variation has led canonical theories in cognitive and social science to suggest that communication in large social networks leads populations to construct divergent category systems. Yet, anthropological data indicates that large, independent societies consistently arrive at similar categories across a range of topics. How is it possible for diverse populations, consisting of individuals with significant variation in how they view the world, to independently construct similar categories? Through a series of online experiments, I show how large communication networks within cultures can promote the formation of similar categories across cultures. For this investigation, I designed an online “Grouping Game” to observe how people construct categories in both small and large populations when tasked with grouping together the same novel and ambiguous images. I replicated this design for English-speaking subjects in the U.S. and Mandarin-speaking subjects in China. In both cultures, solitary individuals and small social groups produced highly divergent category systems. Yet, large social groups separately and consistently arrived at highly similar categories both within and across cultures. These findings are accurately predicted by a simple mathematical model of critical mass dynamics. Altogether, I show how large communication networks can filter lexical diversity among individuals to produce replicable society-level patterns, yielding unexpected implications for cultural evolution. In particular, I discuss how participants in both cultures readily harnessed analogies when categorizing novel stimuli, and I examine the role of communication networks in promoting cross-cultural similarities in analogy-making as the key engine of category formation.

The Standard Model of the Retina

The science of the retina has reached an interesting stage of completion. There exists now a consensus standard model of this neural system - at least in the minds of many researchers - that serves as a baseline against which to evaluate new claims. The standard model links phenomena from molecular biophysics, cell biology, neuroanatomy, synaptic physiology, circuit function, and visual psychophysics. It is further supported by a normative theory explaining what the purpose is of processing visual information this way. Most new reports of retinal phenomena fit squarely within the standard model, and major revisions seem increasingly unlikely. Given that our understanding of other brain circuits with comparable complexity is much more rudimentary, it is worth considering an example of what success looks like. In this talk I will summarize what I think are the ingredients that led to this mature understanding of the retina. Equally important, a number of practices and concepts that are currently en vogue in neuroscience were not needed or indeed counterproductive. I look forward to debating how these lessons might extend to other areas of brain research.

Spatial uncertainty provides a unifying account of navigation behavior and grid field deformations

To localize ourselves in an environment for spatial navigation, we rely on vision and self-motion inputs, which only provide noisy and partial information. It is unknown how the resulting uncertainty affects navigation behavior and neural representations. Here we show that spatial uncertainty underlies key effects of environmental geometry on navigation behavior and grid field deformations. We develop an ideal observer model, which continually updates probabilistic beliefs about its allocentric location by optimally combining noisy egocentric visual and self-motion inputs via Bayesian filtering. This model directly yields predictions for navigation behavior and also predicts neural responses under population coding of location uncertainty. We simulate this model numerically under manipulations of a major source of uncertainty, environmental geometry, and support our simulations by analytic derivations for its most salient qualitative features. We show that our model correctly predicts a wide range of experimentally observed effects of the environmental geometry and its change on homing response distribution and grid field deformation. Thus, our model provides a unifying, normative account for the dependence of homing behavior and grid fields on environmental geometry, and identifies the unavoidable uncertainty in navigation as a key factor underlying these diverse phenomena.

Interpersonal synchrony of body/brain, Solo & Team Flow

Flow is defined as an altered state of consciousness with excessive attention and enormous sense of pleasure, when engaged in a challenging task, first postulated by a psychologist, the late M. Csikszentmihayli. The main focus of this talk will be “Team Flow,” but there were two lines of previous studies in our laboratory as its background. First is inter-body and inter-brain coordination/synchrony between individuals. Considering various rhythmic echoing/synchronization phenomena in animal behavior, it could be regarded as the biological, sub-symbolic and implicit origin of social interactions. The second line of precursor research is on the state of Solo Flow in game playing. We employed attenuation of AEP (Auditory Evoked Potential) to task-irrelevant sound probes as an objective-neural indicator of such a Flow status, and found that; 1) Mutual link between the ACC & the TP is critical, and 2) overall, top-down influence is enhanced while bottom-up causality is attenuated. Having these as the background, I will present our latest study of Team Flow in game playing. We found that; 3) the neural correlates of Team Flow is distinctively different from those of Solo Flow nor of non-flow social, 4) the left medial temporal cortex seems to form an integrative node for Team Flow, receiving input related to Solo Flow state from the right PFC and input related to social state from the right IFC, and 5) Intra-brain (dis)similarity of brain activity well predicts (dis)similarity of skills/cognition as well as affinity for inter-brain coherence.

Nonlinear spatial integration in retinal bipolar cells shapes the encoding of artificial and natural stimuli

Vision begins in the eye, and what the “retina tells the brain” is a major interest in visual neuroscience. To deduce what the retina encodes (“tells”), computational models are essential. The most important models in the retina currently aim to understand the responses of the retinal output neurons – the ganglion cells. Typically, these models make simplifying assumptions about the neurons in the retinal network upstream of ganglion cells. One important assumption is linear spatial integration. In this talk, I first define what it means for a neuron to be spatially linear or nonlinear and how we can experimentally measure these phenomena. Next, I introduce the neurons upstream to retinal ganglion cells, with focus on bipolar cells, which are the connecting elements between the photoreceptors (input to the retinal network) and the ganglion cells (output). This pivotal position makes bipolar cells an interesting target to study the assumption of linear spatial integration, yet due to their location buried in the middle of the retina it is challenging to measure their neural activity. Here, I present bipolar cell data where I ask whether the spatial linearity holds under artificial and natural visual stimuli. Through diverse analyses and computational models, I show that bipolar cells are more complex than previously thought and that they can already act as nonlinear processing elements at the level of their somatic membrane potential. Furthermore, through pharmacology and current measurements, I illustrate that the observed spatial nonlinearity arises at the excitatory inputs to bipolar cells. In the final part of my talk, I address the functional relevance of the nonlinearities in bipolar cells through combined recordings of bipolar and ganglion cells and I show that the nonlinearities in bipolar cells provide high spatial sensitivity to downstream ganglion cells. Overall, I demonstrate that simple linear assumptions do not always apply and more complex models are needed to describe what the retina “tells” the brain.

Being awake while sleeping, being asleep while awake: consequences on cognition and consciousness

Sleep is classically presented as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Yet, there is increasing evidence showing that sleep and wakefulness can actually intermingle and that wake-like and sleep-like activity can be observed concomitantly in different brain regions. I will here explore the implications of this conception of sleep as a local phenomenon for cognition and consciousness. In the first part of my presentation, I will show how local modulations of sleep depth during sleep could support the processing of sensory information by sleepers. I will also how, under certain circumstances, sleepers can learn while sleeping but also how they can forget. In the second part, I will show how the reverse phenomenon, sleep intrusions during waking, can explain modulations of attention. I will focus in particular on modulations of subjective experience and how the local sleep framework can inform our understanding of everyday phenomena such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Through this presentation and the exploration of both sleep and wakefulness, I will seek to connect changes in neurophysiology with changes in behaviour and subjective experience.

Noise-induced properties of active dendrites

Neuronal dendritic trees display a wide range of nonlinear input integrations due to their voltage-dependent active calcium channels. We reveal that in vivo-like fluctuating input enhances nonlinearity substantially in a single dendritic compartment and shifts the input-output relation to exhibiting nonmonotonous or bistable dynamics. In particular, with the slow activation of calcium dynamics, we analyze noise-induced bistability and its timescales. We show bistability induces long-timescale fluctuation that can account for observed dendritic plateau potentials in vivo conditions. In a multicompartmental model neuron with realistic synaptic input, we show that noise-induced bistability persists in a wide range of parameters. Using Fredholm's theory to calculate the spiking rate of multivariable neurons, we discuss how dendritic bistability shifts the spiking dynamics of single neurons and its implications for network phenomena in the processing of in vivo–like fluctuating input.

Of Grids and Maps

Neuroscientific methods successfully account for a system’s functional properties, but leave out the subjective properties of the accompanying experience. According to IIT, phenomenology can be studied scientifically by unfolding the cause-effect structure specified by a system. To illustrate how, in this talk I compare two systems (a grid and a map) to show that they can be functionally equivalent in performing fixation, but only one can specify a cause-effect structure that accounts for the extendedness of phenomenal space.

Demystifying the richness of visual perception

Human vision is full of puzzles. Observers can grasp the essence of a scene in an instant, yet when probed for details they are at a loss. People have trouble finding their keys, yet they may be quite visible once found. How does one explain this combination of marvelous successes with quirky failures? I will describe our attempts to develop a unifying theory that brings a satisfying order to multiple phenomena. One key is to understand peripheral vision. A visual system cannot process everything with full fidelity, and therefore must lose some information. Peripheral vision must condense a mass of information into a succinct representation that nonetheless carries the information needed for vision at a glance. We have proposed that the visual system deals with limited capacity in part by representing its input in terms of a rich set of local image statistics, where the local regions grow — and the representation becomes less precise — with distance from fixation. This scheme trades off computation of sophisticated image features at the expense of spatial localization of those features. What are the implications of such an encoding scheme? Critical to our understanding has been the use of methodologies for visualizing the equivalence classes of the model. These visualizations allow one to quickly see that many of the puzzles of human vision may arise from a single encoding mechanism. They have suggested new experiments and predicted unexpected phenomena. Furthermore, visualization of the equivalence classes has facilitated the generation of testable model predictions, allowing us to study the effects of this relatively low-level encoding on a wide range of higher-level tasks. Peripheral vision helps explain many of the puzzles of vision, but some remain. By examining the phenomena that cannot be explained by peripheral vision, we gain insight into the nature of additional capacity limits in vision. In particular, I will suggest that decision processes face general-purpose limits on the complexity of the tasks they can perform at a given time.

Conceptual Change Induced by Analogical Reasoning Sparks “Aha!” Moments

Although analogical reasoning has been assumed to involve insight and its associated “aha!” experience, the relationship between these phenomena has never been directly probed empirically. In this study we investigated the relationship between representational change and the “aha!” experience during analogical reasoning. A novel set of verbal analogy stimuli were developed for use as an insight task. Across two experiments, participants reported significantly stronger aha moments and showed greater evidence of representational change on trials with more semantically distant analogies. Further, the strength of reported aha moments was correlated with the degree to which participants’ descriptions of the analogies changed over the course of each trial. Lastly, we probed the individual differences associated with a tendency to report stronger "aha" experiences, particularly related to mood, curiosity, and reward responsiveness. The findings shed light on the affective components of analogical reasoning and suggest that measuring affective responses during such tasks may elucidate novel insights into the mechanisms of creative analogical reasoning.

Probabilistic Analogical Mapping with Semantic Relation Networks

Hongjing Lu will present a new computational model of Probabilistic Analogical Mapping (PAM, in collaboration with Nick Ichien and Keith Holyoak) that finds systematic correspondences between inputs generated by machine learning. The model adopts a Bayesian framework for probabilistic graph matching, operating on semantic relation networks constructed from distributed representations of individual concepts (word embeddings created by Word2vec) and of relations between concepts (created by our BART model). We have used PAM to simulate a broad range of phenomena involving analogical mapping by both adults and children. Our approach demonstrates that human-like analogical mapping can emerge from comparison mechanisms applied to rich semantic representations of individual concepts and relations. More details can be found https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2103/2103.16704.pdf

Integrated Information Theory and Its Implications for Free Will

Integrated information theory (IIT) takes as its starting point phenomenology, rather than behavioral, functional, or neural correlates of consciousness. The theory characterizes the essential properties of phenomenal existence—which is immediate and indubitable. These are translated into physical properties, expressed operationally as cause-effect power, which must be satisfied by the neural substrate of consciousness. On this basis, the theory can account for clinical and experimental data about the presence and absence of consciousness. Current work aims at accounting for specific qualities of different experiences, such as spatial extendedness and the flow of time. Several implications of IIT have ethical relevance. One is that functional equivalence does not imply phenomenal equivalence—computers may one day be able to do everything we do, but they will not experience anything. Another is that we do have free will in the fundamental, metaphysical sense—we have true alternatives and we, not our neurons, are the true cause of our willed actions.

Sleepless in Vienna - how to rescue folding-deficient dopamine transporters by pharmacochaperoning

Diseases that arise from misfolding of an individual protein are rare. However, collectively, these folding diseases represent a large proportion of hereditary and acquired disorders. In fact, the term "Molecular Medicine" was coined by Linus Pauling in conjunction with the study of a folding disease, i.e. sickle cell anemia. In the past decade, we have witnessed an exponential growth in the number of mutations, which have been identified in genes encoding solute carriers (SLC). A sizable faction - presumably the majority - of these mutations result in misfolding of the encoded protein. While studying the export of the GABA transporter (SLC6A1) and of the serotonin transporter (SLC6A4), from the endoplasmic reticulum (ER), we discovered by serendipity that some ligands can correct the folding defect imparted by point mutations. These bind to the inward facing state. The most effective compound is noribogaine, the metabolite of ibogaine (an alkaloid first isolated from the shrub Tabernanthe iboga). There are 13 mutations in the human dopamine transporter (DAT, SLC6A3), which give rise to a syndrome of infantile Parkinsonism and dystonia. We capitalized on our insights to explore, if the disease-relevant mutant proteins were amenable to pharmacological correction. Drosopohila melanogaster, which lack the dopamine transporter, are hyperactive and sleepless (fumin in Japanese). Thus, mutated human DAT variants can be introduced into fumin flies. This allows for examining the effect of pharmacochaperones on delivery of DAT to the axonal territory and on restoring sleep. We explored the chemical space populated by variations of the ibogaine structure to identify an analogue (referred to as compound 9b), which was highly effective: compound 9b also restored folding in DAT variants, which were not amenable to rescue by noribogaine. Deficiencies in the human creatine transporter-1 (CrT1, SLC6A8) give rise to a syndrome of intellectual disability and seizures and accounts for 5% of genetically based intellectual disabilities in boys. Point mutations occur, in part, at positions, which are homologous to those of folding-deficient DAT variants. CrT1 lacks the rich pharmacology of monoamine transporters. Nevertheless, our insights are also applicable to rescuing some disease-related variants of CrT1. Finally, the question arises how one can address the folding problem. We propose a two-pronged approach: (i) analyzing the effect of mutations on the transport cycle by electrophysiological recordings; this allows for extracting information on the rates of conformational transitions. The underlying assumption posits that - even when remedied by pharmacochaperoning - folding-deficient mutants must differ in the conformational transitions associated with the transport cycle. (ii) analyzing the effect of mutations on the two components of protein stability, i.e. thermodynamic and kinetic stability. This is expected to provide a glimpse of the energy landscape, which governs the folding trajectory.

Learning under uncertainty in autism and anxiety

Optimally interacting with a changeable and uncertain world requires estimating and representing uncertainty. Psychiatric and neurodevelopmental conditions such as anxiety and autism are characterized by an altered response to uncertainty. I will review the evidence for these phenomena from computational modelling, and outline the planned experiments from our lab to add further weight to these ideas. If time allows, I will present results from a control sample in a novel task interrogating a particular type of uncertainty and their associated transdiagnostic psychiatric traits.

Inclusive Basic Research

Methodology for understanding the basic phenomena of life can be done in vitro or in vivo, under tightly-controlled experimental conditions designed to limit variability. However stringent the protocol, these experiments do not occur in a cultural vacuum and they are often subject to the same societal biases as other research disciplines. Many researchers uphold the status quo of biased basic research by not questioning the characteristics of their experimental animals, or the people from whom their tissue samples were collected. This means that our fundamental understanding of life has been built on biased models. This session will explore the ways in which basic life sciences research can be biased and the implications of this. We will discuss practical ways to assess your research design and how to make sure it is representative.

Choosing, fast and slow: Implications of prioritized-sampling models for understanding automaticity and control

The idea that behavior results from a dynamic interplay between automatic and controlled processing underlies much of decision science, but has also generated considerable controversy. In this talk, I will highlight behavioral and neural data showing how recently-developed computational models of decision making can be used to shed new light on whether, when, and how decisions result from distinct processes operating at different timescales. Across diverse domains ranging from altruism to risky choice biases and self-regulation, our work suggests that a model of prioritized attentional sampling and evidence accumulation may provide an alternative explanation for many phenomena previously interpreted as supporting dual process models of choice. However, I also show how some features of the model might be taken as support for specific aspects of dual-process models, providing a way to reconcile conflicting accounts and generating new predictions and insights along the way.

A discussion on the necessity for Open Source Hardware in neuroscience research

Research tools are paramount for scientific development, they enable researchers to observe and manipulate natural phenomena, learn their principles, make predictions and develop new technologies, treatments and improve living standards. Due to their costs and the geographical distribution of manufacturing companies access to them is not widely available, hindering the pace of research, the ability of many communities to contribute to science and education and reap its benefits. One possible solution for this issue is to create research tools under the open source ethos, where all documentation about them (including their designs, building and operating instructions) are made freely available. Dubbed Open Science Hardware (OSH), this production method follows the established and successful principles of open source software and brings many advantages over traditional creation methods such as: economic savings (see Pearce 2020 for potential economic savings in developing open source research tools), distributed manufacturing, repairability, and higher customizability. This development method has been greatly facilitated by recent technological developments in fast prototyping tools, Internet infrastructure, documentation platforms and lower costs of electronic off-the-shelf components. Taken together these benefits have the potential to make research more inclusive, equitable, distributed and most importantly, more reliable and reproducible, as - 1) researchers can know their tools inner workings in minute detail - 2) they can calibrate their tools before every experiment and having them running in optimal condition everytime - 3) given their lower price point, a)students can be trained/taught with hands on classes, b) several copies of the same instrument can be built leading to a parallelization of data collection and the creation of more robust datasets. - 4) Labs across the world can share the exact same type of instruments and create collaborative projects with standardized data collection and sharing.

Thinking the Right Thoughts

In many learning and decision scenarios, especially sequential settings like mazes or games, it is easy to state an objective function but difficult to compute it, for instance because this can require enumerating many possible future trajectories. This, in turn, motivates a variety of more tractable approximations which then raise resource-rationality questions about whether and when an efficient agent should invest time or resources in computing decision variables more accurately. Previous work has used a simple all-or-nothing version of this reasoning as a framework to explain many phenomena of automaticity, habits, and compulsion in humans and animals. Here, I present a more finegrained theoretical analysis of deliberation, which attempts to address not just whether to deliberate vs. act, but which of many possible actions and trajectories to consider. Empirically, I first motivate and compare this account to nonlocal representations of spatial trajectories in the rodent place cell system, which are thought to be involved in planning. I also consider its implications, in humans, for variation over time and situations in subjective feelings of mental effort, boredom, and cognitive fatigue. Finally, I present results from a new study using magnetoencephalography in humans to measure subjective consideration of possible trajectories during a sequential learning task, and study its relationship to rational prioritization and to choice behavior.

Interacting synapses stabilise both learning and neuronal dynamics in biological networks

Distinct synapses influence one another when they undergo changes, with unclear consequences for neuronal dynamics and function. Here we show that synapses can interact such that excitatory currents are naturally normalised and balanced by inhibitory inputs. This happens when classical spike-timing dependent synaptic plasticity rules are extended by additional mechanisms that incorporate the influence of neighbouring synaptic currents and regulate the amplitude of efficacy changes accordingly. The resulting control of excitatory plasticity by inhibitory activation, and vice versa, gives rise to quick and long-lasting memories as seen experimentally in receptive field plasticity paradigms. In models with additional dendritic structure, we observe experimentally reported clustering of co-active synapses that depends on initial connectivity and morphology. Finally, in recurrent neural networks, rich and stable dynamics with high input sensitivity emerge, providing transient activity that resembles recordings from the motor cortex. Our model provides a general framework for codependent plasticity that frames individual synaptic modifications in the context of population-wide changes, allowing us to connect micro-level physiology with behavioural phenomena.

Integration and unification in the science of consciousness

Despite undeniable progress in the science of consciousness, there is no consensus on even fundamental theoretical and empirical questions, such as whether ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is a scientifically respectable concept, whether phenomenal consciousness overflows access consciousness, or whether the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness are in the front or in the back of the cerebral cortex. Notably, disagreement also concerns proposed theories of consciousness. However, since not all theories are mutually incompatible, there have been attempts to make theoretical progress by integrating or unifying them. I shall argue that this is preferable over proposing yet another theory, but that one should not expect it to yield a complete theory of consciousness. Rather, theoretical work in consciousness research should focus on core hypotheses about consciousness that different theories of consciousness have in common. Such a ‘minimal unifying model’ of consciousness can then be used as a basis for formulating more specific hypotheses about consciousness.

More than mere association: Are some figure-ground organisation processes mediated by perceptual grouping mechanisms?

Figure-ground organisation and perceptual grouping are classic topics in Gestalt and perceptual psychology. They often appear alongside one another in introductory textbook chapters on perception and have a long history of investigation. However, they are typically discussed as separate processes of perceptual organisation with their own distinct phenomena and mechanisms. Here, I will propose that perceptual grouping and figure-ground organisation are strongly linked. In particular, perceptual grouping can provide a basis for, and may share mechanisms with, a wide range of figure-ground principles. To support this claim, I will describe a new class of figure-ground principles based on perceptual grouping between edges and demonstrate that this inter-edge grouping (IEG) is a powerful influence on figure-ground organisation. I will also draw support from our other results showing that grouping between edges and regions (i.e., edge-region grouping) can affect figure-ground organisation (Palmer & Brooks, 2008) and that contextual influences in figure-ground organisation can be gated by perceptual grouping between edges (Brooks & Driver, 2010). In addition to these modern observations, I will also argue that we can describe some classic figure-ground principles (e.g., symmetry, convexity, etc.) using perceptual grouping mechanisms. These results suggest that figure-ground organisation and perceptual grouping have more than a mere association under the umbrella topics of Gestalt psychology and perceptual organisation. Instead, perceptual grouping may provide a mechanism underlying a broad class of new and extant figure-ground principles.

Can subjective experience be quantified? Critically examining computational cognitive neuroscience approaches

Computational and cognitive neuroscience techniques have made great strides towards describing the neural computations underlying perceptual inference and decision-making under uncertainty. These tools tell us how and why perceptual illusions occur, which brain areas may represent noisy information in a probabilistic manner, and so on. However, an understanding of the subjective, qualitative aspects of perception remains elusive: qualia, or the personal, intrinsic properties of phenomenal awareness, have remained out of reach of these computational analytic insights. Here, I propose that metacognitive computations, and the subjective feelings that go along with them, give us a solid starting point for understanding subjective experience in general. Specifically, perceptual metacognition possesses ontological and practical properties that provide a powerful and unique opportunity for studying the studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience using established tools of computational and cognitive neuroscience. By capitalizing on decades of developments in formal computational model comparisons as applied to the specific properties of perceptual metacognition, we are now in a privileged position to reveal new and exciting insights about how the brain constructs our subjective conscious experiences.

How embodiment can solve the problem of phenomenal consciousness

A Connectionist Account of Analogy-Making

Analogy-making is considered to be one of the cognitive processes which are hard to be accounted for in connectionist terms. A number of models have been proposed, but they are either tailed for specific analogical tasks or require complicated mechanisms which don’t fit into the mainstream connectionist modelling paradigm. In this talk I will present a new connectionist account of analogy-making based on the vector approach to representing symbols (VARS). This approach allows representing relational structures of varying complexity by numeric vectors with fixed dimensionality. I will also present a simple and computationally efficient mechanism of aligning VARS representations, which integrates both semantic similarity and structural constraints. The results of a series of simulations will demonstrate that VARS can account for basic analogical phenomena.

Modulation of C. elegans behavior by gut microbes

We are interested in understanding how microbes impact the behavior of host animals. Animal nervous systems likely evolved in environments richly surrounded by microbes, yet the impact of bacteria on nervous system function has been relatively under-studied. A challenge has been to identify systems in which both host and microbe are amenable to genetic manipulation, and which enable high-throughput behavioral screening in response to defined and naturalistic conditions. To accomplish these goals, we use an animal host — the roundworm C. elegans, which feeds on bacteria — in combination with its natural gut microbiome to identify inter-organismal signals driving host-microbe interactions and decision-making. C. elegans has some of the most extensive molecular, neurobiological and genetic tools of any multicellular eukaryote, and, coupled with the ease of gnotobiotic culture in these worms, represents a highly attractive system in which to study microbial influence on host behavior. Using this system, we discovered that commensal bacterial metabolites directly modulate nervous system function of their host. Beneficial gut microbes of the genus Providencia produce the neuromodulator tyramine in the C. elegans intestine. Using a combination of behavioral analysis, neurogenetics, metabolomics and bacterial genetics we established that bacterially produced tyramine is converted to octopamine in C. elegans, which acts directly in sensory neurons to reduce odor aversion and increase sensory preference for Providencia. We think that this type of sensory modulation may increase association of C. elegans with these microbes, increasing availability of this nutrient-rich food source for the worm and its progeny, while facilitating dispersal of the bacteria.

Contextual inference underlies the learning of sensorimotor repertoires

Humans spend a lifetime learning, storing and refining a repertoire of motor memories. However, it is unknown what principle underlies the way our continuous stream of sensori-motor experience is segmented into separate memories and how we adapt and use this growing repertoire. Here we develop a principled theory of motor learning based on the key insight that memory creation, updating, and expression are all controlled by a single computation – contextual inference. Unlike dominant theories of single-context learning, our repertoire-learning model accounts for key features of motor learning that had no unified explanation and predicts novel phenomena, which we confirm experimentally. These results suggest that contextual inference is the key principle underlying how a diverse set of experiences is reflected in motor behavior.

Carnosine negatively modulates pro-oxidant activities of M1 peripheral macrophages and prevents neuroinflammation induced by amyloid-β in microglial cells

Carnosine is a natural dipeptide widely distributed in mammalian tissues and exists at particularly high concentrations in skeletal and cardiac muscles and brain. A growing body of evidence shows that carnosine is involved in many cellular defense mechanisms against oxidative stress, including inhibition of amyloid-β (Aβ) aggregation, modulation of nitric oxide (NO) metabolism, and scavenging both reactive nitrogen and oxygen species. Different types of cells are involved in the innate immune response, with macrophage cells representing those primarily activated, especially under different diseases characterized by oxidative stress and systemic inflammation such as depression and cardiovascular disorders. Microglia, the tissue-resident macrophages of the brain, are emerging as a central player in regulating key pathways in central nervous system inflammation; with specific regard to Alzheimer’s disease (AD) these cells exert a dual role: on one hand promoting the clearance of Aβ via phagocytosis, on the other hand increasing neuroinflammation through the secretion of inflammatory mediators and free radicals. The activity of carnosine was tested in an in vitro model of macrophage activation (M1) (RAW 264.7 cells stimulated with LPS + IFN-γ) and in a well-validated model of Aβ-induced neuroinflammation (BV-2 microglia treated with Aβ oligomers). An ample set of techniques/assays including MTT assay, trypan blue exclusion test, high performance liquid chromatography, high-throughput real-time PCR, western blot, atomic force microscopy, microchip electrophoresis coupled to laser-induced fluorescence, and ELISA aimed to evaluate the antioxidant and anti-inflammatory activities of carnosine was employed. In our experimental model of macrophage activation (M1), therapeutic concentrations of carnosine exerted the following effects: 1) an increased degradation rate of NO into its non-toxic end-products nitrite and nitrate; 2) the amelioration of the macrophage energy state, by restoring nucleoside triphosphates and counterbalancing the changes in ATP/ADP, NAD+/NADH and NADP+/NADPH ratio obtained by LPS + IFN-γ induction; 3) a reduced expression of pro-oxidant enzymes (NADPH oxidase, Cyclooxygenase-2) and of the lipid peroxidation product malondialdehyde; 4) the rescue of antioxidant enzymes expression (Glutathione peroxidase 1, Superoxide dismutase 2, Catalase); 5) an increased synthesis of transforming growth factor-β1 (TGF-β1) combined with the negative modulation of interleukines 1β and 6 (IL-1β and IL-6), and 6) the induction of nuclear factor erythroid-derived 2-like 2 (Nrf2) and heme oxygenase-1 (HO-1). In our experimental model of Aβ-induced neuroinflammation, carnosine: 1) prevented cell death in BV-2 cells challenged with Aβ oligomers; 2) lowered oxidative stress by decreasing the expression of inducible nitric oxide synthase and NADPH oxidase, and the concentrations of nitric oxide and superoxide anion; 3) decreased the secretion of pro-inflammatory cytokines such as IL-1β simultaneously rescuing IL-10 levels and increasing the expression and the release of TGF-β1; 4) prevented Aβ-induced neurodegeneration in primary mixed neuronal cultures challenged with Aβ oligomers and these neuroprotective effects was completely abolished by SB431542, a selective inhibitor of type-1 TGF-β receptor. Overall, our data suggest a novel multimodal mechanism of action of carnosine underlying its protective effects in macrophages and microglia and the therapeutic potential of this dipeptide in counteracting pro-oxidant and pro-inflammatory phenomena observed in different disorders characterized by elevated levels of oxidative stress and inflammation such as depression, cardiovascular disorders, and Alzheimer’s disease.

A Rare Visuospatial Disorder

Cases with visuospatial abnormalities provide opportunities for understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Three cases of visual mirror-reversal have been reported: AH (McCloskey, 2009), TM (McCloskey, Valtonen, & Sherman, 2006) and PR (Pflugshaupt et al., 2007). This research reports a fourth case, BS -- with focal occipital cortical dysgenesis -- who displays highly unusual visuospatial abnormalities. They initially produced mirror reversal errors similar to those of AH, who -- like the patient in question -- showed a selective developmental deficit. Extensive examination of BS revealed phenomena such as: mirror reversal errors (sometimes affecting only parts of the visual fields) in both horizontal and vertical planes; subjective representation of visual objects and words in distinct left and right visual fields; subjective duplication of objects of visual attention (not due to diplopia); uncertainty regarding the canonical upright orientation of everyday objects; mirror reversals during saccadic eye movements on oculomotor tasks; and failure to integrate visual with other sensory inputs (e.g., they feel themself moving backwards when visual information shows they are moving forward). Fewer errors are produced under conditions of certain visual variables. These and other findings have led the researchers to conclude that BS draws upon a subjective representation of visual space that is structured phenomenally much as it is anatomically in early visual cortex (i.e., rotated through 180 degrees, split into left and right fields, etc.). Despite this, BS functions remarkably well in their everyday life, apparently due to extensive compensatory mechanisms deployed at higher (executive) processing levels beyond the visual modality.

Understanding the visual demands of underwater habitats for aquatic animals used in neuroscience research

Zebrafish and cichlids are popular models in visual neuroscience, due to their amenability to advanced research tools and their diverse set of visually guided behaviours. It is often asserted that animals’ neural systems are adapted to the statistical regularities in their natural environments, but relatively little is known about the visual spatiotemporal features in the underwater habitats that nurtured these fish. To address this gap, we have embarked on an examination of underwater habitats in northeastern India and Lake Tanganyika (Zambia), where zebrafish and cichlids are native. In this talk, we will describe the methods used to conduct a series of field measurements and generate a large and diverse dataset of these underwater habitats. We will present preliminary results suggesting that the demands for visually-guided navigation differ between these underwater habitats and the terrestrial habitats characteristic of other model species.

Neural and computational principles of the processing of dynamic faces and bodies

Body motion is a fundamental signal of social communication. This includes facial as well as full-body movements. Combining advanced methods from computer animation with motion capture in humans and monkeys, we synthesized highly-realistic monkey avatar models. Our face avatar is perceived by monkeys as almost equivalent to a real animal, and does not induce an ‘uncanny valley effect’, unlike all other previously used avatar models in studies with monkeys. Applying machine-learning methods for the control of motion style, we were able to investigate how species-specific shape and dynamic cues influence the perception of human and monkey facial expressions. Human observers showed very fast learning of monkey expressions, and a perceptual encoding of expression dynamics that was largely independent of facial shape. This result is in line with the fact that facial shape evolved faster than the neuromuscular control in primate phylogenesis. At the same time, it challenges popular neural network models of the recognition of dynamic faces that assume a joint encoding of facial shape and dynamics. We propose an alternative physiologically-inspired neural model that realizes such an orthogonal encoding of facial shape and expression from video sequences. As second example, we investigated the perception of social interactions from abstract stimuli, similar to the ones by Heider & Simmel (1944), and also from more realistic stimuli. We developed and validated a new generative model for the synthesis of such social interaction, which is based on a modification of human navigation model. We demonstrate that the recognition of such stimuli, including the perception of agency, can be accounted for by a relatively elementary physiologically-inspired hierarchical neural recognition model, that does not require the assumption of sophisticated inference mechanisms, as postulated by some cognitive theories of social recognition. Summarizing, this suggests that essential phenomena in social cognition might be accounted for by a small set of simple neural principles that can be easily implemented by cortical circuits. The developed technologies for stimulus control form the basis of electrophysiological studies that can verify specific neural circuits, as the ones proposed by our theoretical models.

Cortical-like dynamics in recurrent circuits optimized for sampling-based probabilistic inference

Sensory cortices display a suite of ubiquitous dynamical features, such as ongoing noise variability, transient overshoots, and oscillations, that have so far escaped a common, principled theoretical account. We developed a unifying model for these phenomena by training a recurrent excitatory-inhibitory neural circuit model of a visual cortical hypercolumn to perform sampling-based probabilistic inference. The optimized network displayed several key biological properties, including divisive normalization, as well as stimulus-modulated noise variability, inhibition-dominated transients at stimulus onset, and strong gamma oscillations. These dynamical features had distinct functional roles in speeding up inferences and made predictions that we confirmed in novel analyses of awake monkey recordings. Our results suggest that the basic motifs of cortical dynamics emerge as a consequence of the efficient implementation of the same computational function — fast sampling-based inference — and predict further properties of these motifs that can be tested in future experiments