Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the way the brain enables us to act on the sensory world is its flexibility. We can make a general inference about many sensory features (rating the ripeness of mangoes or avocados) and map a single stimulus onto many choices (slicing or blending mangoes). These can be thought of as flexibly mapping many (features) to one (inference) and one (feature) to many (choices) sensory inputs to actions. Both theoretical and experimental investigations of this sort of flexible sensorimotor mapping tend to treat sensory areas as relatively static. Models typically instantiate flexibility through changing interactions (or weights) between units that encode sensory features and those that plan actions. Experimental investigations often focus on association areas involved in decision-making that show pronounced modulations by cognitive processes. I will present evidence that the flexible formatting of visual information in visual cortex can support both generalized inference and choice mapping. Our results suggest that visual cortex mediates many forms of cognitive flexibility that have traditionally been ascribed to other areas or mechanisms. Further, we find that a primary difference between visual and putative decision areas is not what information they encode, but how that information is formatted in the responses of neural populations, which is related to difference in the impact of causally manipulating different areas on behavior. This scenario allows for flexibility in the mapping between stimuli and behavior while maintaining stability in the information encoded in each area and in the mappings between groups of neurons.

Subsecond timing underlies nearly all sensory and motor activities across species and is critical to survival. While subsecond temporal information has been found across cortical and subcortical regions, it is unclear if it is generated locally and intrinsically or if it is a read out of a centralized clock-like mechanism. Indeed, mechanisms of subsecond timing at the circuit level are largely obscure. Primary sensory areas are well-suited to address these question as they have early access to sensory information and provide minimal processing to it: if temporal information is found in these regions, it is likely to be generated intrinsically and locally. We test this hypothesis by training mice to perform an audio-visual temporal pattern sensory discrimination task as we use 2-photon calcium imaging, a technique capable of recording population level activity at single cell resolution, to record activity in primary visual cortex (V1). We have found significant changes in network dynamics through mice’s learning of the task from naive to middle to expert levels. Changes in network dynamics and behavioral performance are well accounted for by an intrinsic model of timing in which the trajectory of q network through high dimensional state space represents temporal sensory information. Conversely, while we found evidence of other temporal encoding models, such as oscillatory activity, we did not find that they accounted for increased performance but were in fact correlated with the intrinsic model itself. These results provide insight into how subsecond temporal information is encoded mechanistically at the circuit level.

Understanding Human ability to learn novel concepts from just a few sensory experiences is a fundamental problem in cognitive neuroscience. I will describe a recent work with Ben Sorcher and Surya Ganguli (PNAS, October 2022) in which we propose a simple, biologically plausible, and mathematically tractable neural mechanism for few-shot learning of naturalistic concepts. We posit that the concepts that can be learned from few examples are defined by tightly circumscribed manifolds in the neural firing-rate space of higher-order sensory areas. Discrimination between novel concepts is performed by downstream neurons implementing ‘prototype’ decision rule, in which a test example is classified according to the nearest prototype constructed from the few training examples. We show that prototype few-shot learning achieves high few-shot learning accuracy on natural visual concepts using both macaque inferotemporal cortex representations and deep neural network (DNN) models of these representations. We develop a mathematical theory that links few-shot learning to the geometric properties of the neural concept manifolds and demonstrate its agreement with our numerical simulations across different DNNs as well as different layers. Intriguingly, we observe striking mismatches between the geometry of manifolds in intermediate stages of the primate visual pathway and in trained DNNs. Finally, we show that linguistic descriptors of visual concepts can be used to discriminate images belonging to novel concepts, without any prior visual experience of these concepts (a task known as ‘zero-shot’ learning), indicated a remarkable alignment of manifold representations of concepts in visual and language modalities. I will discuss ongoing effort to extend this work to other high level cognitive tasks.

Quantifying the timing (duration and frequency) of brief visual events is vital to human perception, multisensory integration and action planning. For example, this allows us to follow and interact with the precise timing of speech and sports. Here we investigate how visual event timing is represented and transformed across the brain’s hierarchy: from sensory processing areas, through multisensory integration areas, to frontal action planning areas. We hypothesized that the dynamics of neural responses to sensory events in sensory processing areas allows derivation of event timing representations. This would allow higher-level processes such as multisensory integration and action planning to use sensory timing information, without the need for specialized central pacemakers or processes. Using 7T fMRI and neural model-based analyses, we found responses that monotonically increase in amplitude with visual event duration and frequency, becoming increasingly clear from primary visual cortex to lateral occipital visual field maps. Beginning in area MT/V5, we found a gradual transition from monotonic to tuned responses, with response amplitudes peaking at different event timings in different recording sites. While monotonic response components were limited to the retinotopic location of the visual stimulus, timing-tuned response components were independent of the recording sites' preferred visual field positions. These tuned responses formed a network of topographically organized timing maps in superior parietal, postcentral and frontal areas. From anterior to posterior timing maps, multiple events were increasingly integrated, response selectivity narrowed, and responses focused increasingly on the middle of the presented timing range. These results suggest that responses to event timing are transformed from the human brain’s sensory areas to the association cortices, with the event’s temporal properties being increasingly abstracted from the response dynamics and locations of early sensory processing. The resulting abstracted representation of event timing is then propagated through areas implicated in multisensory integration and action planning.

A central goal in neuroscience is to understand how orchestrated computations in the brain arise from the properties of single neurons and networks of such neurons. Answering this question requires theoretical advances that shine light into the ‘black box’ of representations in neural circuits. In this talk, we will demonstrate theoretical approaches that help describe how cognitive and behavioral task implementations emerge from the structure in neural populations and from biologically plausible neural networks. First, we will introduce an analytic theory that connects geometric structures that arise from neural responses (i.e., neural manifolds) to the neural population’s efficiency in implementing a task. In particular, this theory describes a perceptron’s capacity for linearly classifying object categories based on the underlying neural manifolds’ structural properties. Next, we will describe how such methods can, in fact, open the ‘black box’ of distributed neuronal circuits in a range of experimental neural datasets. In particular, our method overcomes the limitations of traditional dimensionality reduction techniques, as it operates directly on the high-dimensional representations, rather than relying on low-dimensionality assumptions for visualization. Furthermore, this method allows for simultaneous multi-level analysis, by measuring geometric properties in neural population data, and estimating the amount of task information embedded in the same population. These geometric frameworks are general and can be used across different brain areas and task modalities, as demonstrated in the work of ours and others, ranging from the visual cortex to parietal cortex to hippocampus, and from calcium imaging to electrophysiology to fMRI datasets. Finally, we will discuss our recent efforts to fully extend this multi-level description of neural populations, by (1) investigating how single neuron properties shape the representation geometry in early sensory areas, and by (2) understanding how task-efficient neural manifolds emerge in biologically-constrained neural networks. By extending our mathematical toolkit for analyzing representations underlying complex neuronal networks, we hope to contribute to the long-term challenge of understanding the neuronal basis of tasks and behaviors.

The idea that perception in humans relies on some form of probabilistic computations has become very popular over the last decades. It has been extremely difficult however to characterize the extent and the nature of the probabilistic representations and operations that are manipulated by neural populations in the human cortex. Several theoretical works suggest that probabilistic representations are present from low-level sensory areas to high-level areas. According to this view, the neural dynamics implements some forms of probabilistic message passing (i.e. neural sampling, probabilistic population coding, etc.) which solves the problem of perceptual inference. Here I will present recent experimental evidence that human and non-human primate perception implements some form of message passing. I will first review findings showing probabilistic integration of sensory evidence across space and time in primate visual cortex. Second, I will show that the confidence reports in a hierarchical task reveal that uncertainty is represented both at lower and higher levels, in a way that is consistent with probabilistic message passing both from lower to higher and from higher to lower representations. Finally, I will present behavioral and neural evidence that human perception takes into account pairwise correlations in sequences of sensory samples in agreement with the message passing hypothesis, and against standard accounts such as accumulation of sensory evidence or predictive coding.

The theory of predictive processing posits that the brain computes expectations to process information predictively. Empirical evidence in support of this theory, however, is scarce and largely limited to sensory areas. Here, we report a precise and adaptive mechanism in the frontal cortex of non-human primates consistent with predictive processing of temporal events. We found that the speed of neural dynamics is precisely adjusted according to the average time of an expected stimulus. This speed adjustment, in turn, enables neurons to encode stimuli in terms of deviations from expectation. This lawful relationship was evident across multiple experiments and held true during learning: when temporal statistics underwent covert changes, neural responses underwent predictable changes that reflected the new mean. Together, these results highlight a precise mathematical relationship between temporal statistics in the environment and neural activity in the frontal cortex that may serve as a mechanism for predictive temporal processing.

Animals depend on fast and reliable detection of novel stimuli in their environment. Neurons in multiple sensory areas respond more strongly to novel in comparison to familiar stimuli. Yet, it remains unclear which circuit, cellular, and synaptic mechanisms underlie those responses. Here, we show that spike-timing-dependent plasticity of inhibitory-to-excitatory synapses generates novelty responses in a recurrent spiking network model. Inhibitory plasticity increases the inhibition onto excitatory neurons tuned to familiar stimuli, while inhibition for novel stimuli remains low, leading to a network novelty response. The generation of novelty responses does not depend on the periodicity but rather on the distribution of presented stimuli. By including tuning of inhibitory neurons, the network further captures stimulus-specific adaptation. Finally, we suggest that disinhibition can control the amplification of novelty responses. Therefore, inhibitory plasticity provides a flexible, biologically plausible mechanism to detect the novelty of bottom-up stimuli, enabling us to make experimentally testable predictions.