Psychology seminars

Humans are incredible learners, a talent supported by our ability to detect and transfer relational similarities between items and events. Spotting these common relations despite perceptual differences is challenging, yet there’s evidence that this ability begins early, with infants as young as 3 months discriminating same and different (Anderson et al., 2018; Ferry et al., 2015). How? To understand the underlying mechanisms, I examine how learning outcomes in the first year correspond with changes in input and in infant age. I discuss the commonalities in this process with that seen in older children and adults, as well as differences due to interactions with other maturing processes like language and visual attention.

Framing effects in individual decision-making have puzzled economists for decades because they are hard, if at all, to explain with rational choice theories. Why should mere changes in the description of a choice problem affect decision-making? Here, we examine the hypothesis that changes in framing cause changes in the allocation of attention to the different options – measured via eye-tracking – and give rise to changes in decision-making. We document that the framing of a sure alternative as a gain – as opposed to a loss – in a risk-taking task increases the attentional advantage of the sure option and induces a higher choice frequency of that option – a finding that is predicted by the attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM). The model also correctly predicts other key findings such as that the increased attentional advantage of the sure option in the gain frame should also lead quicker decisions in this frame. In addition, the data reveal that increasing risk aversion at higher stake sizes may also be driven by attentional processes because the sure option receives significantly more attention – regardless of frame – at higher stakes. We also corroborate the causal impact of framing-induced changes of attention on choice with an additional experiment that manipulates attention exogenously. Finally, to study the precise mechanisms underlying the framing effect we structurally estimate an aDDM that allows for frame and option-dependent parameters. The estimation results indicate that – in addition to the direct effects of framing-induced changes in attention on choice – the gain frame also causes (i) an increase in the attentional discount of the gamble and (ii) an increased concavity of utility. Our findings suggest that the traditional explanation of framing effects in risky choice in terms of a more concave value function in the gain domain is seriously incomplete and that attentional mechanisms as hypothesized in the aDDM play a key role.

Emotion processing is thought to be impaired in autism and linked to atypical visual exploration and arousal modulation to others faces and gaze, yet evidence is equivocal. We propose that, where observed, atypical socioemotional processing is due to alexithymia, a distinct but frequently co-occurring condition which affects emotional self-awareness and Interoception. In study 1 (N = 80), we tested this hypothesis by studying the spatio-temporal dynamics and entropy of eye-gaze during emotion processing tasks. Evidence from traditional and novel methods revealed that atypical eye-gaze and emotion recognition is best predicted by alexithymia in both autistic and non-autistic individuals. In Study 2 (N = 70), we assessed interoceptive and autonomic signals implicated in socioemotional processing, and found evidence for alexithymia (not autism) driven effects on gaze and arousal modulation to emotions. We also conducted two large-scale studies (N = 1300), using confirmatory factor-analytic and network modelling and found evidence that Alexithymia and Autism are distinct at both a latent level and their intercorrelations. We argue that: 1) models of socioemotional processing in autism should conceptualise difficulties as intrinsic to alexithymia, and 2) assessment of alexithymia is crucial for diagnosis and personalised interventions in autism.

Historically pregnant women and their unborn baby have been amongst those with the poorest outcomes in previous epidemics, most notably the Zika virus. For much of 2020, with the emergence of the novel coronavirus, the effect on the fetus remains unclear. While initial reports suggest that vertical transmission with SARS-CoV2 is reassuringly rare, the complex socioeconomic, domestic and broader maternal lifestyle factors which can influence a child’s lifelong well-being have been modulated during the experience of this pandemic. The developing brain is particularly susceptible to maternal stress, resulting in permanent structural changes and increased incidence of behavioural and mental health illness later in childhood. A large international longitudinal survey is being undertaken by the Department of Psychology to better understand the impact of the pandemic on those yet to be born.

Global responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have resulted in various forms of “lockdown” being imposed on citizens. These lockdown measures have resulted in significant changes to all aspects of daily life for all those who live under them. Lockdowns have however, also provided a unique opportunity for psychologists to examine how changes in the structure of daily life influence our experience of time. This talk will review recent research examining the impact on covid-19 on real-world time experience. It will look to discuss whether the factors which influence “normal” time experience also influenced time experience during lockdown. Finally, it will try to highlight some potential future directions for enhancing our understanding of real-life time distortion.

Cognitive bias is a "subjective reality" that is uniquely created in the brain and affects our various behaviors. It may lead to what is widely called irrationality in behavioral economics, such as inaccurate judgment and illogical interpretation, but it also has an adaptive aspect in terms of mental hygiene. When such cognitive bias is regarded as a product of information processing in the brain, the approach to clarify the mechanism in the brain will play a part in finding the direct relations between the brain and the mind. In my talk, I will introduce our studies investigating the neural and molecular bases of cognitive biases, especially focusing on the role of dopamine.

It has long been known that when viewing a set of images, we misjudge individual elements as being closer to the mean than they are (Hollingworth, 1910) and recall seeing the (absent) set mean (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott (1995). Recent studies found that viewing sets of images, simultaneously or sequentially, leads to perception of set statistics (mean, range) with poor memory for individual elements. Ensemble perception was found for sets of simple images (e.g. circles varying in size or brightness; lines of varying orientation), complex objects (e.g. faces of varying emotion), as well as for objects belonging to the same category. When the viewed set does not include its mean or prototype, nevertheless, observers report and act as if they have seen this central image or object – a form of false memory. Physiologically, detailed sensory information at cortical input levels is processed hierarchically to form an integrated scene gist at higher levels. However, we are aware of the gist before the details. We propose that images and objects belonging to a set or category are represented as their gist, mean or prototype, plus individual differences from that gist. Under constrained viewing conditions, only the gist is perceived and remembered. This theory also provides a basis for compressed neural representation. Extending this theory to scenes and episodes supplies a generalized basis for false memories. They seem right, match generalized expectations, so are believable without challenging examination. This theory could be tested by analyzing the typicality of false memories, compared to rejected alternatives.

One of the central challenges facing the science of consciousness is that of identifying ways of measuring consciousness. Can we go beyond our pre-theoretical ways of detecting consciousness and develop independently validated measures of consciousness. Some theorists think not, arguing that we cannot go beyond the everyday markers of consciousness with which we begin. Others are more optimistic, and hold that we will be able to develop independent measures of consciousness, or "consciousness meters". This talk discusses various ways in which one might attempt to validate a consciousness meter, arguing that the most promising approach involves treating consciousness as a natural kind.

Existing accounts of analogical transfer highlight the importance of comparison-based schema abstraction in aiding retrieval of relevant prior knowledge from memory. In this talk, we discuss an alternative view, the category status hypothesis—which states that if knowledge of a target principle is represented as a relational category, it is easier to activate as a result of categorizing (as opposed to cue-based reminding)—and briefly review supporting evidence. We then further investigate this hypothesis by designing study tasks that promote different facets of category-level representations and assess their impact on spontaneous analogical transfer. A Baseline group compared two analogous cases; the remaining groups experienced comparison plus another task intended to impact the category status of the knowledge representation. The Intension group read an abstract statement of the principle with a supporting task of generating a new case. The Extension group read two more positive cases with the task of judging whether each exemplified the target principle. The Mapping group read a contrast case with the task of revising it into a positive example of the target principle (thereby providing practice moving in both directions between type and token, i.e., evaluating a given case relative to knowledge and using knowledge to generate a revised case). The results demonstrated that both Intension and Extension groups led to transfer improvements over Baseline (with the former demonstrating both improved accessibility of prior knowledge and ability to apply relational concepts). Implications for theories of analogical transfer are discussed.

It is generally acknowledged that analogy is a core mechanism of human cognition, but paradoxically, analogies based on structural similarities would rarely be implemented spontaneously (e.g. without an explicit invitation to compare two representations). The scarcity of deep spontaneous analogies is at odds with the demonstration that familiar concepts from our daily-life are spontaneously used to encode the structure of our experiences. Based on this idea, we will present experimental works highlighting the predominant role of structural similarities in analogical retrieval. The educational stakes lurking behind the tendency to encode the problem’s structures through familiar concepts will also be addressed.

To organize various experiences in a coherent mental representation, we need to properly estimate the duration and temporal order of different events. Yet, our perception of time is noisy and vulnerable to various illusions. Studying these illusions can elucidate the mechanism by which the brain perceives time. In this talk, I will review a few studies on how the brain perceives duration of events and the temporal order between self-generated motion and sensory feedback. Combined with computational models at different levels, these experiments illustrated that the brain incorporates the prior knowledge of the statistical distribution of the duration of stimuli and the decay of memory when estimating duration of an individual event, and adjusts its perception of temporal order to changes in the statistics of the environment.

Computational and cognitive neuroscience techniques have made great strides towards describing the neural computations underlying perceptual inference and decision-making under uncertainty. These tools tell us how and why perceptual illusions occur, which brain areas may represent noisy information in a probabilistic manner, and so on. However, an understanding of the subjective, qualitative aspects of perception remains elusive: qualia, or the personal, intrinsic properties of phenomenal awareness, have remained out of reach of these computational analytic insights. Here, I propose that metacognitive computations, and the subjective feelings that go along with them, give us a solid starting point for understanding subjective experience in general. Specifically, perceptual metacognition possesses ontological and practical properties that provide a powerful and unique opportunity for studying the studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience using established tools of computational and cognitive neuroscience. By capitalizing on decades of developments in formal computational model comparisons as applied to the specific properties of perceptual metacognition, we are now in a privileged position to reveal new and exciting insights about how the brain constructs our subjective conscious experiences.

I argue that the evolution of our life history, with its distinctively long, protected human childhood allows an early period of broad hypothesis search and exploration, before the demands of goal-directed exploitation set in. This cognitive profile is also found in other animals and is associated with early behaviours such as neophilia and play. I relate this developmental pattern to computational ideas about explore-exploit trade-offs, search and sampling, and to neuroscience findings. I also present several lines of new empirical evidence suggesting that young human learners are highly exploratory, both in terms of their search for external information and their search through hypothesis spaces. In fact, they are sometimes more exploratory than older learners and adults.

The recent pandemic arrived at a time when mental health of children and young people was deteriorating, particular among teenage girls and young women. Lockdown produced a plethora of mental health surveys, but very few of these had pre-pandemic data. This talk will summarise the current evidence of how covid-19 seems to have affected the mental health of children and young people from various studies in the UK.

Research on analogical processing and reasoning has provided strong evidence that the use of adequate educational analogies has strong and positive effects on the learning of mathematics. In this talk I will show some experimental results suggesting that analogies based on spatial representations might be particularly effective to improve mathematics learning. Since fostering mathematics learning also involves addressing psychosocial factors such as the development of mathematical anxiety, providing social incentives to learn, and fostering engagement and motivation, I will argue that one area to explore with great potential to improve math learning is applying analogical research in the development of learning games aimed to improve math learning. Finally, I will show some early prototypes of an educational project devoted to developing games designed to foster the learning of early mathematics in kindergarten children.

Analogical reasoning is a complex ‘high-level’ cognitive process characterised by making inferences based on analogical comparisons. As with other high-level processes, development takes place over a protracted time period and believed to result from changes in multiple ‘lower-level’ systems. In the case of analogical reasoning, changes in systems responsible for conceptual knowledge, task knowledge, inhibition, and working memory have all been causally implicated in development. Whilst there is evidence that each of these systems contributes to development, what the relative contribution of each across development is, and how they interact with each, remain largely unanswered questions. In this presentation, I will describe how cross-sectional trajectory analysis can be used as a complementary method to shed light on these questions.

Learning by analogy is a powerful tool children’s developmental repertoire, as well as in educational contexts such as mathematics, where the key knowledge base involves building flexible schemas. However, noticing and learning from analogies develops over time and is cognitively resource intensive. I review studies that provide insight into the relationship between mechanisms driving children’s developing analogy skills, highlighting environmental inputs (parent talk and prior experiences priming attention to relations) and neuro-cognitive factors (Executive Functions and brain injury). I then note implications for mathematics learning, reviewing experimental findings that show analogy can improve learning, but also that both individual differences in EFs and environmental factors that reduce available EFs such as performance pressure can predict student learning.