Psychology seminars

Many models of attention assume that attentional selection takes place at a specific moment in time which demarcates the critical transition from pre-attentive to attentive processing of sensory input. We argue that this intuitively appealing account is not only inaccurate, but has led to substantial conceptual confusion (to the point where some attention researchers offer to abandon the term ‘attention’ altogether). As an alternative, we offer a “diachronic” framework that describes attentional selectivity as a process that unfolds over time. Key to this view is the concept of attentional episodes, brief periods of intense attentional amplification of sensory representations that regulate access to working memory and response-related processes. We describe how attentional episodes are linked to earlier attentional mechanisms and to recurrent processing at the neural level. We present data showing that multiple sequential events can be involuntarily encoded in working memory when they appear during the same attentional episode, whether they are relevant or not. We also discuss the costs associated with processing multiple events within a single episode. Finally, we argue that breaking down the dichotomy between pre-attentive and attentive (as well as early vs. late selection) offers new solutions to old problems in attention research that have never been resolved. It can provide a unified and conceptually coherent account of the network of cognitive and neural processes that produce the goal-directed selectivity in perceptual processing that is commonly referred to as “attention”.

Human vision is full of puzzles. Observers can grasp the essence of a scene in an instant, yet when probed for details they are at a loss. People have trouble finding their keys, yet they may be quite visible once found. How does one explain this combination of marvelous successes with quirky failures? I will describe our attempts to develop a unifying theory that brings a satisfying order to multiple phenomena. One key is to understand peripheral vision. A visual system cannot process everything with full fidelity, and therefore must lose some information. Peripheral vision must condense a mass of information into a succinct representation that nonetheless carries the information needed for vision at a glance. We have proposed that the visual system deals with limited capacity in part by representing its input in terms of a rich set of local image statistics, where the local regions grow — and the representation becomes less precise — with distance from fixation. This scheme trades off computation of sophisticated image features at the expense of spatial localization of those features. What are the implications of such an encoding scheme? Critical to our understanding has been the use of methodologies for visualizing the equivalence classes of the model. These visualizations allow one to quickly see that many of the puzzles of human vision may arise from a single encoding mechanism. They have suggested new experiments and predicted unexpected phenomena. Furthermore, visualization of the equivalence classes has facilitated the generation of testable model predictions, allowing us to study the effects of this relatively low-level encoding on a wide range of higher-level tasks. Peripheral vision helps explain many of the puzzles of vision, but some remain. By examining the phenomena that cannot be explained by peripheral vision, we gain insight into the nature of additional capacity limits in vision. In particular, I will suggest that decision processes face general-purpose limits on the complexity of the tasks they can perform at a given time.

Anjan Chatterjee is a Professor of Neurology, Psychology, and Architecture and the founding Director of the Penn Center for Neuroaesthetics. His research explores the field of neuroaesthetics: how our brain experiences and responds to art. Lucas Kelly is a renowned visual artist, with work featured across several solo and group exhibitions, most notably in the survey of abstract painting “The Painted World” at PS1 Museum of Modern Art. As the inaugural Artist in Residence for the Penn Center for Neuroaesthetics, Lucas has collaborated with Anjan on a forthcoming exhibition, considering the emotions involved in aesthetic engagement informed by research. This event will feature a moderated conversation between Anjan and Lucas, discussing topics at the intersection of neuroscience and experience of visual art.

Many tasks that are easy for humans are difficult for machines. In particular, while humans excel at tasks that require generalising across problems, machine systems notably struggle. One such task that has received a good amount of attention is the Synthetic Visual Reasoning Test (SVRT). The SVRT consists of a range of problems where simple visual stimuli must be categorised into one of two categories based on an unknown rule that must be induced. Conventional machine learning approaches perform well only when trained to categorise based on a single rule and are unable to generalise without extensive additional training to tasks with any additional rules. Multiple theories of higher-level cognition posit that humans solve such tasks using structured relational representations. Specifically, people learn rules based on structured representations that generalise to novel instances quickly and easily. We believe it is possible to model this approach in a single system which learns all the required relational representations from scratch and performs tasks such as SVRT in a single run. Here, we present a system which expands the DORA/LISA architecture and augments the existing model with principally novel components, namely a) visual reasoning based on the established theories of recognition by components; b) the process of learning complex relational representations by synthesis (in addition to learning by analysis). The proposed augmented model matches human behaviour on SVRT problems. Moreover, the proposed system stands as perhaps a more realistic account of human cognition, wherein rather than using tools that has been shown successful in the machine learning field to inform psychological theorising, we use established psychological theories to inform developing a machine system.

A common result is that comparison settings (i.e., several stimuli introduced simultaneously) favor conceptualization and generalization. However still little is known of the solving strategies used by children to compare and generalize novel words. Understanding the temporal dynamics of children’s solving strategies may help assess which processes underlie generalization. We tested children in noun and relational noun generalization tasks and collected eye tracking data. To analyze and interpret the data we followed predictions made by existing models of analogical reasoning and generalization. The data reveals clear patterns of exploration in which participants compare learning items before searching for a solution. Analyses of the beginning of trials show that early comparisons favor generalization and that errors may be caused by a lake of early comparison. Children then pursue their search in different ways according to the task. In this presentation I will present the generalization strategies revealed by eye tracking, compare the strategies from both tasks and confront them to existing models.

Despite the common advice “not to judge a book by its cover”, we form impressions of character within a second of seeing a stranger’s face. These impressions have widespread consequences for society and for the economy, making it vital that we have a clear theoretical understanding of which impressions are important and how they are formed. In my talk, I outline a data-driven approach to answering these questions, starting by building models of the key dimensions underlying impressions of naturalistic face images. Overall, my findings suggest deeper links between the fields of face perception and social stereotyping than have previously been recognised.

International organizations, governments and companies are increasingly committed to developing measures that encourage adoption of sustainable consumption patterns among the population. However, their success requires a deep understanding of the everyday purchasing decision process and the elements that shape it. Price is an element that stands out. Prior research concluded that the influence of price on purchase decisions varies across consumer profiles. Yet no consumer behavior study to date has assessed the differences of price processing among consumers adopting sustainable habits (prosocial) as opposed to those who have not (non-prosocial). This is the first study to resort to neuroimaging tools to explore the underlying neural mechanisms that reveal the effect of price on prosocial and non-prosocial consumers. Self-reported findings indicate that prosocial consumers place greater value on collective costs and benefits while non-prosocial consumers place a greater weight on price. The neural data gleaned from this analysis offers certain explanations as to the origin of the differences. Non-prosocial (vs. prosocial) consumers, in fact, exhibit a greater activation in brain areas involved with reward, valuation and choice when evaluating price information. These findings could steer managers to improve market segmentation and assist institutions in their design of campaigns fostering environmentally sustainable behaviors

The efficacy of images to create quantitative measures of urban perception has been explored in psychology, social science, urban planning and architecture over the last 50 years. The ability to scale these measurements has become possible only in the last decade, due to increased urban surveillance in the form of street view and satellite imagery, and the accessibility of such data. This talk will present a series of projects which make use of imagery and CNNs to predict, measure and interpret the social and physical environments of our cities.

The role of attention in working memory remains controversial, but there is some agreement on the notion that the focus of attention holds mnemonic representations in a privileged state of heightened accessibility in working memory, resulting in better memory performance for items that receive focused attention during retention. Closely related, representations held in the focus of attention are often observed to be robust and protected from degradation caused by either perceptual interference (e.g., Makovski & Jiang, 2007; van Moorselaar et al., 2015) or decay (e.g., Barrouillet et al., 2007). Recent findings indicate, however, that representations held in the focus of attention are particularly vulnerable to degradation, and thus, appear to be particularly fragile rather than robust (e.g., Hitch et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2014). The present set of experiments aims at understanding the apparent paradox of information in the focus of attention having a protected vs. vulnerable status in working memory. To that end, we examined the effect of perceptual interference on memory performance for information that was held within vs. outside the focus of attention, across different ways of bringing items in the focus of attention and across different time scales.

Analogy offers a new interpretation of a common concern in ethics: whether decision making includes or excludes a consideration of moral issues. This is often discussed as the moral awareness of decision makers and considered a motivational concern. The possible new interpretation is that moral awareness is in part a matter of expertise. Some failures of moral awareness can then be understood as stemming from novicehood. Studies of analogical transfer are consistent with the possibility that moral awareness is in part a matter of expertise, that as a result motivation is less helpful than some prior theorizing would predict, and that many adults are not as expert in the domain of ethics as one might hope. The possibility of expert knowledge of ethical principles leads to new questions and opportunities.

Psychological essentialism is ubiquitous. It is one of primary bases of thoughts and behaviours throughout our entire lifetime. Human's such characteristics that find an unseen hidden entity behind observable phenomena or exemplars, however, lead us to somehow biased thinking and reasoning even in the realm of science, including psychology. For example, a latent variable extracted from various measurements is just a statistical property calculated in structural equation modeling, therefore, is not necessary to be a fundamental reality. Yet, we occasionally feel that there is the essential nature of such a psychological construct a priori. This talk will demonstrate examples of psychological essentialism in psychology and examine its resultant influences on working memory related issues, e. g., working memory training. Such demonstration, examination, and subsequent discussions on these topics will provide us an opportunity to reconsider the concept of working memory.

Human cognitive abilities seem qualitatively different from the cognitive abilities of other primates, a difference Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli (2008) attribute to role-based relational reasoning—inferences and generalizations based on the relational roles to which objects (and other relations) are bound, rather than just the features of the objects themselves. Role-based relational reasoning depends on the ability to dynamically bind arguments to relational roles. But dynamic binding cannot be sufficient for relational thinking: Some non-human animals solve the dynamic binding problem, at least in some domains; and many non-human species generalize affordances to completely novel objects and scenes, a kind of universal generalization that likely depends on dynamic binding. If they can solve the dynamic binding problem, then why can they not reason about relations? What are they missing? I will present simulations with the LISA model of analogical reasoning (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) suggesting that the missing pieces are multi-role integration (the capacity to combine multiple role bindings into complete relations) and structure mapping (the capacity to map different systems of role bindings onto one another). When LISA is deprived of either of these capacities, it can still generalize affordances universally, but it cannot reason symbolically; granted both abilities, LISA enjoys the full power of relational (symbolic) thought. I speculate that one reason it may have taken relational reasoning so long to evolve is that it required evolution to solve both problems simultaneously, since neither multi-role integration nor structure mapping appears to confer any adaptive advantage over simple role binding on its own.

Voluntary control of behavior requires the ability to dynamically integrate internal states and external evidence to achieve one’s goals. However, neuroscientific studies of intentional action and critical philosophical commentary of that research have taken a rather narrow turn in recent years, focussing on the neural precursors of spontaneous simple actions as potential realizers of intentions. In this session, we show how the debate can benefit from incorporating other types of experimental approaches, focussing on agency in dynamic contexts.

Analogical reasoning remains foundational to the human ability to forge meaningful patterns within the sea of information that continually inundates the senses. Yet, meaningful patterns rely not only on the recognition of attributional similarities but also dissimilarities. Just as the perception of images rests on the juxtaposition of lightness and darkness, reasoning relationally requires systematic attention to both similarities and dissimilarities. With that awareness, my colleagues and I have expanded the study of relational reasoning beyond analogous reasoning and attributional similarities to highlight forms based on the nature of core dissimilarities: anomalous, antinomous, and antithetical reasoning. In this presentation, I will delineate the character of these relational reasoning forms; summarize procedures and measures used to assess them; overview key research findings; and describe how the forms of relational reasoning work together in the performance of complex problem solving. Finally, I will share critical next steps for research which has implications for instructional practice.

Did we eat spaghetti for lunch because we saw our colleague eat spaghetti? What drives a risk decision? How can our breakfast impact our decisions throughout the day? Research from different disciplines such as economics, psychology and neuroscience have attempted to investigate the motives and modulators of human decision making. Human decisions can be flexibly modulated by the different experiences we have in our daily lives, at the same time, bodily processes, such as metabolism can also impact economic behavior. These modulations can occur through our social networks, through the impact of our own behavior on the social environment, but also simply by the food we have eaten. Here, I will present a series of recent studies from my lab in which we shed light on the psychological, neural and metabolic motives and modulators of human decision making.