Psychology seminars

What happens when the nervous system fails to adapt? Our perception of the world relies on a nervous system that learns and adapts to sensory information. Based on our experience we can predict what a wooden surface will feel like, that fire is hot, and that a gentle caress from a partner can be soothing. But our sensory experience of the world is not static – warm water can feel like fire on sunburned skin and the gentle brush of our clothes can be excruciating after an injury. In pathological conditions such as chronic pain, changes in nervous system function can cause normally innocuous sensory stimuli to be perceived as aversive or painful long after the initial injury has happened. These changes can sometimes be similar to the formation of a pain ‘memory’ that can modulate and distort our perception of sensory information. Our research program seeks to understand how fundamental processes that govern the formation and maintenance of plastic changes in the nervous system can lead to pathological conditions and how we can reverse engineer these changes to treat chronic conditions.

Machine learning researchers frequently focus on human-level performance, in particular in games. However, in these applications human (or human-level) behavior is commonly reduced to a simple dot on a performance graph. Cognitive science, in particular theories of learning and decision making, could hold the key to unlock what is behind this dot, thereby gaining further insights into human cognition and the design principles of intelligent algorithms. However, cognitive experiments commonly focus on relatively simple paradigms such as restricted multi-armed bandit tasks. In this talk, I will argue that cognitive science can turn its lens to more complex scenarios to study exploration in real-world domains and online games. I will show in one large data set of online food delivery orders and across many online games how current cognitive theories of learning and exploration can describe human behavior in the wild, but also how these tasks demand us to expand our theoretical toolkit to describe a rich repertoire of real-world behaviors such as empowerment and fun.

My talk will discuss the use of some of these four, simple Matlab functions to simulate models of timing, and to fit models to empirical data. Feel free to examine the code and the relatively brief book chapter that explains the code before the talk if you would like to learn more about computational/mathematical modeling.

Uncertainty plays a critical role in reinforcement learning and decision making. However, exactly how subjective uncertainty influences behaviour remains unclear. Multi-armed bandits are a useful framework to gain more insight into this. Paired with computational tools such as Kalman filters, they allow us to closely characterize the interplay between trial-by-trial value, uncertainty, learning, and choice. In this talk, I will present recent research where we also measured participants visual fixations on the options in a multi-armed bandit task. The estimated value of each option, and the uncertainty in these estimations, influenced what subjects looked at in the period before making a choice and their subsequent choice, as additionally did fixation itself. Uncertainty also determined how long participants looked at the obtained outcomes. Our findings clearly show the importance of uncertainty in learning and decision making.

During this talk, I will seek to reposition synaesthesia as model system for understanding variation in the construction of the human mind and brain. People with synaesthesia inhabit a remarkable mental world in which numbers can be coloured, words can have tastes, and music is a visual spectacle. Synaesthesia has now been documented for over two hundred years but key questions remain unanswered about why it exists, and what such conditions might mean for theories of the human mind. I will argue that we need to rethink synaesthesia as not just representing exceptional experiences, but as a product of an unusual neurodevelopmental cascade from genes to brain to cognition of which synaesthesia is only one outcome. Rather than synaesthesia being a kind of 'dangling qualia' (atypical experiences attached to a typical mind/brain) it should be thought of as unusual experiences that accompany an unusual mind/brain. Specifically, differences in the brains of synaesthetes support a distinctive way of thinking (enhanced memory, imagery etc.) and may also predispose towards particular clinical vulnerabilities. It is this neurodiverse phenotype that is an important object of study in its own right and may explain any adaptive value for having synaesthesia.

Perception can be strongly serially-dependent (i.e. biased toward previously seen stimuli). Recently, serial dependencies in perception were proposed as a mechanism for perceptual stability, increasing the apparent continuity of the complex environments we experience in everyday life. For example, stable scene perception can be actively achieved by the visual system through global serial dependencies, a special kind of serial dependence between summary statistical representations. Serial dependence occurs also between emotional expressions, but it is highly selective for the same identity. Overall, these results further support the notion of serial dependence as a global, highly specialized, and purposeful mechanism. However, serial dependence could also be a deleterious phenomenon in unnatural or unpredictable situations, such as visual search in radiological scans, biasing current judgments toward previous ones even when accurate and unbiased perception is needed. For example, observers make consistent perceptual errors when classifying a tumor- like shape on the current trial, seeing it as more similar to the shape presented on the previous trial. In a separate localization test, observers make consistent errors when reporting the perceived position of an objects on the current trial, mislocalizing it toward the position in the preceding trial. Taken together, these results show two opposite sides of serial dependence; it can be a beneficial mechanism which promotes perceptual stability, but at the same time a deleterious mechanism which impairs our percept when fine recognition is needed.

Many psychological theories assume that qualitatively different cognitive processes can result in identical responses. Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models allow researchers to disentangle latent cognitive processes based on observed response frequencies. Recently, MPT models have been extended to explicitly account for participant and item heterogeneity. These hierarchical Bayesian MPT models provide the opportunity to connect two traditionally isolated disciplines. Whereas cognitive psychology has often focused on the experimental validation of MPT model parameters on the group level, psychometrics provides the necessary concepts and tools for measuring differences in MPT parameters on the item or person level. Moreover, MPT parameters can be regressed on covariates to model latent processes as a function of personality traits or other person characteristics.

Interval timing is a fundamental component action, and is susceptible to motor-related temporal distortions. Previous studies have shown that movement biases temporal estimates, but have primarily considered self-modulated movement only. However, real-world encounters often include situations in which movement is restricted or perturbed by environmental factors. In the following experiments, we introduced viscous movement environments to externally modulate movement and investigated the resulting effects on temporal perception. In two separate tasks, participants timed auditory intervals while moving a robotic arm that randomly applied four levels of viscosity. Results demonstrated that higher viscosity led to shorter perceived durations. Using a drift-diffusion model and a Bayesian observer model, we confirmed these biasing effects arose from perceptual mechanisms, instead of biases in decision making. These findings suggest that environmental perturbations are an important factor in movement-related temporal distortions, and enhance the current understanding of the interactions of motor activity and cognitive processes. https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.10.26.355396v1

From robots to humans, the ability to learn from experience turns a rigid response system into a flexible, adaptive one. In this talk, I will discuss emerging findings regarding the neural and cognitive mechanisms by which learning shapes decisions. The lecture will focus on how multiple brain regions interact to support learning, what this means for how memories are built, and the consequences for how decisions are made. Results emerging from this work challenge the traditional view of separate learning systems and advance understanding of how memory biases decisions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways.

How do people learn in real-world environments where the space of possible actions can be vast or even infinite? The study of human learning has made rapid progress in past decades, from discovering the neural substrate of reward prediction errors, to building AI capable of mastering the game of Go. Yet this line of research has primarily focused on learning through repeated interactions with the same stimuli. How are humans able to rapidly adapt to novel situations and learn from such sparse examples? I propose a theory of how generalization guides human learning, by making predictions about which unobserved options are most promising to explore. Inspired by Roger Shepard’s law of generalization, I show how a Bayesian function learning model provides a mechanism for generalizing limited experiences to a wide set of novel possibilities, based on the simple principle that similar actions produce similar outcomes. This model of generalization generates predictions about the expected reward and underlying uncertainty of unexplored options, where both are vital components in how people actively explore the world. This model allows us to explain developmental differences in the explorative behavior of children, and suggests a general principle of learning across spatial, conceptual, and structured domains.

Consciousness is a phenomenon unlike any other studied in natural science. Yet when building theories and designing experiments, we often proceed as if this were not the case. In this talk, I present two recent investigations of mine which explore the implications of consciousness' unique epistemic context for scientific theory building and experimental design. The first investigation is concerned with falsifications of theories of consciousness and identifies a rather deep problem in the usual scheme of testing theories. The second is an axiomatization and subsequent formalization of some of consciousness' more problematic epistemic features that allows to precisely quantify where the usual scientific methodology ceases to be applicable. For both cases, I indicate ways to resolve the problem.

How can people coordinate their actions or make joint decisions? One possibility is that each person attempts to predict the actions of the other(s), and best-responds accordingly. But this can lead to bad outcomes, and sometimes even vicious circularity. An alternative view is that each person attempts to work out what the two or more players would agree to do, if they were to bargain explicitly. If the result of such a "virtual" bargain is "obvious," then the players can simply play their respective roles in that bargain. I suggest that virtual bargaining is essential to genuinely social interaction (rather than viewing other people as instruments), and may even be uniquely human. This approach aims to respect methodological individualism, a key principle in many areas of social science, while explaining how human groups can, in a very real sense, be "greater" than the sum of their individual members.

Current computational models of visual salience accurately predict the distribution of fixations on isolated visual stimuli. It is not known, however, whether the global salience of a stimulus, that is its effectiveness in the competition for attention with other stimuli, is a function of the local salience or an independent measure. Further, do task and familiarity with the competing images influence eye movements? In this talk, I will present the analysis of a computational model of the global salience of natural images. We trained a machine learning algorithm to learn the direction of the first saccade of participants who freely observed pairs of images. The pairs balanced the combinations of new and already seen images, as well as task and task-free trials. The coefficients of the model provided a reliable measure of the likelihood of each image to attract the first fixation when seen next to another image, that is their global salience. For example, images of close-up faces and images containing humans were consistently looked first and were assigned higher global salience. Interestingly, we found that global salience cannot be explained by the feature-driven local salience of images, the influence of task and familiarity was rather small and we reproduced the previously reported left-sided bias. This computational model of global salience allows to analyse multiple other aspects of human visual perception of competing stimuli. In the talk, I will also present our latest results from analysing the saccadic reaction time as a function of the global salience of the pair of images.

Previous work suggests that children’s ability to understand metaphors emerges late in development. Researchers argue that children’s initial failure to understand metaphors is due to an inability to reason about shared relational structures between concepts. However, recent work demonstrates that preschoolers, toddlers, and even infants are already capable of relational reasoning. Might preschoolers also be capable of understanding metaphors, given more sensitive experimental paradigms? I explore whether preschoolers (N = 200, ages 4-5) understand functional metaphors, namely metaphors based on functional similarities. In Experiment 1a, preschoolers rated functional metaphors (e.g. “Roofs are hats”; “Clouds are sponges”) as “smarter” than nonsense statements. In Experiment 1b, adults (N = 48) also rated functional metaphors as “smarter” than nonsense statements (e.g. “Dogs are scissors”; “Boats are skirts”). In Experiment 2, preschoolers preferred functional explanations (e.g. “Both hold water”) over perceptual explanations (e.g. “Both are fluffy”) when interpreting a functional metaphor (e.g. “Clouds are sponges”). In Experiment 3, preschoolers preferred functional metaphors over nonsense statements in a dichotomous-choice task. Overall, this work demonstrates preschoolers’ early-emerging ability to understand functional metaphors.

People from cultures around the world tend to borrow from the domain of space to represent abstract concepts. For example, in the domain on time, we use spatial metaphors (e.g., describing the future as being in front and the past behind), accompany our speech with spatial gestures (e.g., gesturing to the left to refer to a past event), and use external tools that project time onto a spatial reference frame (e.g., calendars). Importantly, these associations are also present in the way we think and reason about time, suggesting that space and time are also linked in the mind. In this talk, I will explore the developmental origins and functional implications of these types of cross-dimensional associations. To start, I will discuss the roles that language and culture play in shaping how children in the US and India represent time. Next, I will use word learning and memory as test cases for exploring why cross-dimensional associations may be cognitively advantageous. Finally, I will talk about future directions and the practical implications for this line of work, with a focus on how encouraging spatial representations of abstract concepts could improve learning outcomes.