Cognition seminars

One of the most common medical conditions you’ve (maybe) never heard of – functional neurological disorder – lays at the interface of neurology and psychiatry and offers a window into fundamental brain-mind-body processes. Across ancient and modern times, functional neurological disorder has had a long and tumultuous history, with an evolving debate and understanding of how biopsychosocial factors contribute to the manifestation of the disorder. A central issue in contemporary discussions has revolved around questioning the extent to which emotions play a mechanistic and aetiological role in functional neurological disorder. Critical in this context, however, is that this ongoing debate has largely omitted the question of what emotions are in the first place. This talk first brings together advances in the understanding of working principles of the brain fundamental to introducing a new understanding of what emotions are. Building on recent theoretical frameworks from affective neuroscience, the idea of how the predictive process of emotion construction can be an integral component of the pathophysiology of functional neurological disorder is discussed.

Repetitive spatiotemporal patterns in resting-state brain activities have been widely observed in various species and regions, such as rat and cat visual cortices. Since they resemble the preceding brain activities during tasks, they are assumed to reflect past experiences embedded in neuronal circuits. Moreover, spatiotemporal patterns involving whole-brain activities may also reflect a process that integrates information distributed over the entire brain, such as motor and visual information. Therefore, revealing such patterns may elucidate how the information is integrated to generate consciousness. In this talk, I will introduce our proposed method to estimate repetitive spatiotemporal patterns from resting-state brain activity data and show the spatiotemporal patterns estimated from human resting-state magnetoencephalography (MEG) and electroencephalography (EEG) data. Our analyses suggest that the patterns involved whole-brain propagating activities that reflected a process to integrate the information distributed over frequencies and networks. I will also introduce our current attempt to reveal signal flows and their roles in the spatiotemporal patterns using a big dataset. - Takeda et al., Estimating repetitive spatiotemporal patterns from resting-state brain activity data. NeuroImage (2016); 133:251-65. - Takeda et al., Whole-brain propagating patterns in human resting-state brain activities. NeuroImage (2021); 245:118711.

Voluntary actions are actions that agents choose to make. Volition is the set of cognitive processes that implement such choice and initiation. These processes are often held essential to modern societies, because they form the cognitive underpinning for concepts of individual autonomy and individual responsibility. Nevertheless, psychology and neuroscience have struggled to define volition, and have also struggled to study it scientifically. Laboratory experiments on volition, such as those of Libet, have been criticised, often rather naively, as focussing exclusively on meaningless actions, and ignoring the factors that make voluntary action important in the wider world. In this talk, I will first review these criticisms, and then look at extending scientific approaches to volition in three directions that may enrich scientific understanding of volition. First, volition becomes particularly important when the range of possible actions is large and unconstrained - yet most experimental paradigms involve minimal response spaces. We have developed a novel paradigm for eliciting de novo actions through verbal fluency, and used this to estimate the elusive conscious experience of generativity. Second, volition can be viewed as a mechanism for flexibility, by promoting adaptation of behavioural biases. This view departs from the tradition of defining volition by contrasting internally-generated actions with externally-triggered actions, and instead links volition to model-based reinforcement learning. By using the context of competitive games to re-operationalise the classic Libet experiment, we identified a form of adaptive autonomy that allows agents to reduce biases in their action choices. Interestingly, this mechanism seems not to require explicit understanding and strategic use of action selection rules, in contrast to classical ideas about the relation between volition and conscious, rational thought. Third, I will consider volition teleologically, as a mechanism for achieving counterfactual goals through complex problem-solving. This perspective gives a key role in mediating between understanding and planning on the one hand, and instrumental action on the other hand. Taken together, these three cognitive phenomena of generativity, flexibility, and teleology may partly explain why volition is such an important cognitive function for organisation of human behaviour and human flourishing. I will end by discussing how this enriched view of volition can relate to individual autonomy and responsibility.

Humans constantly make perceptual decisions on human faces and voices. These regularly come with the challenge of receiving only uncertain sensory evidence, resulting from noisy input and noisy neural processes. Efficiently adapting one’s internal decision system including prior expectations and subsequent metacognitive assessments to these challenges is crucial in everyday life. However, the exact decision mechanisms and whether these represent modifiable states remain unknown in the general population and clinical patients with psychosis. Using data from a laboratory-based sample of healthy controls and patients with psychosis as well as a complementary, large online sample of healthy controls, I will demonstrate how a combination of perceptual face and voice recognition decision fidelity, metacognitive ratings, and Bayesian computational modelling may be used as indicators to differentiate between non-clinical and clinical states in the future.

Young children have sophisticated representations of their visual and linguistic environment. Where do these representations come from? How much knowledge arises through generic learning mechanisms applied to sensory data, and how much requires more substantive (possibly innate) inductive biases? We examine these questions by training neural networks solely on longitudinal data collected from a single child (Sullivan et al., 2020), consisting of egocentric video and audio streams. Our principal findings are as follows: 1) Based on visual only training, neural networks can acquire high-level visual features that are broadly useful across categorization and segmentation tasks. 2) Based on language only training, networks can acquire meaningful clusters of words and sentence-level syntactic sensitivity. 3) Based on paired visual and language training, networks can acquire word-referent mappings from tens of noisy examples and align their multi-modal conceptual systems. Taken together, our results show how sophisticated visual and linguistic representations can arise through data-driven learning applied to one child’s first-person experience.

This talk will not be recorded

Fastball is a novel, fast, passive biomarker of cognitive function, that uses cheap, scalable electroencephalography (EEG) technology. It is sensitive to early dementia; language, education, effort and anxiety independent and can be used in any setting including patients’ homes. It can capture a range of cognitive functions including semantic memory, recognition memory, attention and visual function. We have shown that Fastball is sensitive to cognitive dysfunction in Alzheimer’s disease and Mild Cognitive Impairment, with data collected in patients’ homes using low-cost portable EEG. We are now preparing for significant scale-up and the validation of Fastball in primary and secondary care.

Any sensory experience of the world, from the touch of a caress to the smile on our friend’s face, is embedded in time and it is often associated with the perception of the flow of it. The perception of time is therefore a peculiar sensory experience built without dedicated sensors. How the perception of time and the content of a sensory experience interact to give rise to this unique percept is unclear. A few empirical evidences show the existence of this interaction, for example the speed of a moving object or the number of items displayed on a computer screen can bias the perceived duration of those objects. However, to what extent the coding of time is embedded within the coding of the stimulus itself, is sustained by the activity of the same or distinct neural populations and subserved by similar or distinct neural mechanisms is far from clear. Addressing these puzzles represents a way to gain insight on the mechanism(s) through which the brain represents the passage of time. In my talk I will present behavioral and neuroimaging studies to show how concurrent changes of visual stimulus duration, speed, visual contrast and numerosity, shape and modulate brain’s and pupil’s responses and, in case of numerosity and time, influence the topographic organization of these features along the cortical visual hierarchy.

The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one's own behavior and, through them, external events. Why is this subjective feeling important for humans? Is it just a by-product of our actions? Previous studies have shown that the sense of agency can affect the intensity of sensory input because we predict the input from our motor intention. However, my research has found that the sense of agency plays more roles than just predictions. It enhances perceptual processes of sensory input and potentially helps to harvest more information about the link between the external world and the self. Furthermore, our recent research found both indirect and direct evidence that the sense of agency is important for people's exploratory behaviors, and this may be linked to proximal exploitations of one's control in the environment. In this talk, I will also introduce the paradigms we use to study the sense of agency as a result of perceptual processes, and our findings of individual differences in this sense and the implications.

With the increasing use of automated face recognition (AFR) technologies, it is important to consider whether these systems not only perform accurately, but also equitability or without “bias”. Despite rising public, media, and scientific attention to this issue, the sources of bias in AFR are not fully understood. This talk will explore how human cognitive biases may impact our assessments of performance differentials in AFR systems and our subsequent use of those systems to make decisions. We’ll also show how, if we adjust our definition of what a “biased” AFR algorithm looks like, we may be able to create algorithms that optimize the performance of a human+algorithm team, not simply the algorithm itself.

The regulation of body weight relies on homeostatic mechanisms that use a combination of internal signals and external cues to initiate and terminate food intake. Homeostasis depends on intricate communication between the body and the hypothalamus involving numerous neural and hormonal signals. However, there is growing evidence that higher-level cognitive function may also influence energy balance. For instance, research has shown that BMI is consistently linked to various brain, cognitive, and personality measures, implicating executive, reward, and attentional systems. Moreover, the rise in obesity rates over the past half-century is attributed to the affordability and widespread availability of highly processed foods, a phenomenon that contradicts the idea that food intake is solely regulated by homeostasis. I will suggest that prefrontal systems involved in value computation and motivation act to limit food overconsumption when food is scarce or expensive, but promote over-eating when food is abundant, an optimum strategy from an economic standpoint. I will review the genetic and neuroscience literature on the CNS control of body weight. I will present recent studies supporting a role of prefrontal systems in weight control. I will also present contradictory evidence showing that frontal executive and cognitive findings in obesity may be a consequence not a cause of increased hunger. Finally I will review the effects of obesity on brain anatomy and function. Chronic adiposity leads to cerebrovascular dysfunction, cortical thinning, and cognitive impairment. As the most common preventable risk factor for dementia, obesity poses a significant threat to brain health. I will conclude by reviewing evidence for treatment of obesity in adults to prevent brain disease.

Humans and animals learn and plan with flexibility and efficiency well beyond that of modern Machine Learning methods. This is hypothesized to owe in part to the ability of animals to build structured representations of their environments, and modulate these representations to rapidly adapt to new settings. In the first part of this talk, I will discuss theoretical work describing how learned representations in hippocampus enable rapid adaptation to new goals by learning predictive representations, while entorhinal cortex compresses these predictive representations with spectral methods that support smooth generalization among related states. I will also cover recent work extending this account, in which we show how the predictive model can be adapted to the probabilistic setting to describe a broader array of generalization results in humans and animals, and how entorhinal representations can be modulated to support sample generation optimized for different behavioral states. In the second part of the talk, I will overview some of the ways in which we have combined many of the same mathematical concepts with state-of-the-art deep learning methods to improve efficiency and performance in machine learning applications like physical simulation, relational reasoning, and design.

Understanding what makes human unique is a fundamental research drive for comparative psychologists. Cognitive abilities such as theory of mind, cooperation or mental time travel have been considered uniquely human. Despite empirical evidence showing that animals other than humans are able (to some extent) of these cognitive achievements, findings are still heavily contested. In this context, being able to abstract relations of similarity has also been considered one of the hallmarks of human cognition. While previous research has shown that other animals (e.g., primates) can attend to relational similarity, less is known about what invertebrates can do. In this talk, I will present a series of spatial matching tasks that previously were used with children and great apes and that I adapted for use with wild-caught bumblebees. The findings from these studies suggest striking similarities between vertebrates and invertebrates in their abilities to attend to relational similarity.

Humans are natural teachers; learning through instruction is one of the most fundamental ways that we learn. Interactive Task Learning (ITL) is an emerging research agenda that studies the design of complex intelligent robots that can acquire new knowledge through natural human teacher-robot learner interactions. ITL methods are particularly useful for designing intelligent robots whose behavior can be adapted by humans collaborating with them. In this talk, I will summarize our recent findings on the structure that human instruction naturally has and motivate an intelligent system design that can exploit their structure. The system – AILEEN – is being developed using the common model of cognition. Architectures that implement the Common Model of Cognition - Soar, ACT-R, and Sigma - have a prominent place in research on cognitive modeling as well as on designing complex intelligent agents. However, they miss a critical piece of intelligent behavior – analogical reasoning and generalization. I will introduce a new memory – concept memory – that integrates with a common model of cognition architecture and supports ITL.

Visual working memory (VWM) is limited in capacity, but memorizing meaningful objects may refine this limitation. However, meaningless and meaningful stimuli usually differ perceptually and an object’s association with meaning is typically already established before the actual experiment. We applied a strict control over these potential confounds by asking observers (N=45) to actively learn associations of (initially) meaningless objects. To this end, a change detection task presented Chinese characters, which were meaningless to our observers. Subsequently, half of the characters were consistently paired with pictures of animals. Then, the initial change detection task was repeated. The results revealed enhanced VWM performance after learning, in particular for meaning-associated characters (though not quite reaching the accuracy level attained by N=20 native Chinese observers). These results thus provide direct experimental evidence that the short-term retention of objects benefits from active learning of an object’s association with meaning in long-term memory.

Metacognition has long been defined as “cognition about cognition”. One of its aspects is the error monitoring ability, which includes being aware of one’s own errors without external feedback. This ability is mostly investigated in two-alternative forced choice tasks, where the performance has all or none nature in terms of accuracy. The previous literature documents the effect of different influences on the error monitoring ability, such as working memory, feedback and sensorimotor involvement. However, these demonstrations fall short of generalizing to the real life scenarios where the errors often have a magnitude and a direction. To bridge this gap, recent studies showed that humans could keep track of the magnitude and the direction of their errors in temporal, spatial and numerical domains in two metrics: confidence and short-long/few-more judgements. This talk will cover how the documented effects that are obtained in the two alternative forced choices tasks apply to the temporal error monitoring ability. Finally, how magnitude and direction monitoring (i.e., confidence and short-long judgements) can be differentiated as the two indices of temporal error monitoring ability will be discussed.