Cognition seminars

How do humans perceive daily objects of various features and categorize these seemingly intuitive and effortless mental representations? Prior literature focusing on the role of the inferotemporal region (IT) has revealed object category clustering that is consistent with the semantic predefined structure (superordinate, ordinate, subordinate). It has however been debated whether the neural signals in the IT regions are a reflection of such categorical hierarchy [Wen et al.,2018; Bracci et al., 2017]. Visual attributes of images that correlated with semantic and category dimensions may have confounded these prior results. Our study aimed to address this debate by building and comparing models using the DNN AlexNet, to explain the variance in representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM) of neural signals in the IT region. We found that mid and high level perceptual attributes of the DNN model contribute the most to neural RDMs in the IT region. Semantic categories, as in predefined structure, were moderately correlated with mid to high DNN layers (r = [0.24 - 0.36]). Variance partitioning analysis also showed that the IT neural representations were mostly explained by DNN layers, while semantic categorical RDMs brought little additional information. In light of these results, we propose future works should focus more on the specific role IT plays in facilitating the extraction and coding of visual features that lead to the emergence of categorical conceptualizations.

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies and variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to the frequently suboptimal inference strategies used by humans. We examined inference problems involving rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that were suboptimal relative to the Bayesian ideal observer. These suboptimal strategies reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but high bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but displayed weaker, near-normative bias. Our results yield new insights into the principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference, and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that are sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality of the inference process.

Cognitive effort has long been an important explanatory factor in the study of human behavior in health and disease. Yet, the biophysical nature of cognitive effort remains far from understood. In this talk, I will offer a network perspective on cognitive effort. I will begin by canvassing a recent perspective that casts cognitive effort in the framework of network control theory, developed and frequently used in systems engineering. The theory describes how much energy is required to move the brain from one activity state to another, when activity is constrained to pass along physical pathways in a connectome. I will then turn to empirical studies that link this theoretical notion of energy with cognitive effort in a behaviorally demanding task, and with a metabolic notion of energy as accessible to FDG-PET imaging. Finally, I will ask how this structurally-constrained activity flow can provide us with insights about the brain’s non-equilibrium nature. Using a general tool for quantifying entropy production in macroscopic systems, I will provide evidence to suggest that states of marked cognitive effort are also states of greater entropy production. Collectively, the work I discuss offers a complementary view of cognitive effort as a dynamical process occurring atop a complex network.

Error monitoring refers to the ability to monitor one's own task performance without explicit feedback. This ability is studied typically in two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigms. Recent research showed that humans can also keep track of the magnitude and direction of errors in different magnitude domains (e.g., numerosity, duration, length). Based on the evidence that suggests a shared mechanism for magnitude representations, we aimed to investigate whether metric error monitoring ability is commonly governed across different magnitude domains. Participants reproduced/estimated temporal, numerical, and spatial magnitudes after which they rated their confidence regarding first order task performance and judged the direction of their reproduction/estimation errors. Participants were also tested in a 2AFC perceptual decision task and provided confidence ratings regarding their decisions. Results showed that variability in reproductions/estimations and metric error monitoring ability, as measured by combining confidence and error direction judgements, were positively related across temporal, spatial, and numerical domains. Metacognitive sensitivity in these metric domains was also positively associated with each other but not with metacognitive sensitivity in the 2AFC perceptual decision task. In conclusion, the current findings point at a general metric error monitoring ability that is shared across different metric domains with limited generalizability to perceptual decision-making.

Recent economics literature has seen a revival of interest to psychologically-grounded theories of decision under risk. We review the recent proposals in this direction, compare it to classical estimations based on utility functions, and discuss their appropriateness using some original experimental data.

Behavioural difficulties are seen as hallmarks of many neurodevelopmental conditions. Differences in functional brain organisation have been observed in these conditions, but little is known about how they are related to a child’s profile of behavioural difficulties. We investigated whether behavioural difficulties are associated with how the brain is functionally organised in an intentionally heterogeneous and transdiagnostic sample of 957 children aged 5-15. We used consensus community detection to derive data-driven profiles of behavioural difficulties and constructed functional connectomes from a subset of 238 children with resting-state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data. We identified three distinct profiles of behaviour that were characterised by principal difficulties with hot executive function, cool executive function, and learning. Global organisation of the functional connectome did not differ between the groups, but multivariate patterns of connectivity at the level of Intrinsic Connectivity Networks (ICNs), nodes, and hubs significantly predicted group membership in held-out data. Fronto-parietal connector hubs were under-connected in all groups relative to a comparison sample, and children with hot vs cool executive function difficulties were distinguished by connectivity in ICNs associated with cognitive control, emotion processing, and social cognition. This demonstrates both general and specific neurodevelopmental risk factors in the functional connectome. (https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.09.15.21262637v1)

The seminar will first outline the architecture of the human mind, specifying general and domain-specific mental processes. The place of causal reasoning and its relations with the other processes will be specified. Experimental, psychometric, developmental, and brain-based evidence will be summarized. The main message of the talk is that causal thought involves domain-specific core processes rooted in perception and served by special brain networks which capture interactions between objects. With development, causal reasoning is increasingly associated with a general abstraction system which generates general principles underlying inductive, analogical, and deductive reasoning and also heuristics for specifying causal relations. These associations are discussed in some detail. Possible implications for artificial intelligence and educational implications are also discussed.

Selection is the hallmark of attention: processing improves for attended items but is relatively impaired for unattended items. It is well known that visual spatial attention changes sensory signals and perception in this selective fashion. In the work I will present, we asked whether and how attentional selection happens across time. First, our experiments revealed that voluntary temporal attention (attention to specific points in time) is selective, resulting in perceptual tradeoffs across time. Second, we measured small eye movements called microsaccades and found that directing voluntary temporal attention increases the stability of the eyes in anticipation of an attended stimulus. Third, we developed a computational model of dynamic attention, which proposes specific mechanisms underlying temporal attention and its selectivity. Lastly, I will mention how we are testing predictions of the model with MEG. Altogether, this research shows how precisely timed voluntary attention helps manage inherent limits in visual processing across short time intervals, advancing our understanding of attention as a dynamic process.

In a famous philosophical paradox, Buridan's ass perishes because he is equally hungry and thirsty, and cannot make up his mind whether to first drink or eat. We are faced daily with the need to pick between alternatives that are equally attractive (or not) to us. What are the processes that allow us to avoid paralysis and to rapidly select between such equal options when there are no preferences or rational reasons to rely on? One solution that was offered is that although on a higher cognitive level there is symmetry between the alternatives, on a neuronal level the symmetry does not maintain. What is the nature of this asymmetry of the neuronal level? In this talk I will present experiments addressing this important phenomenon using measures of human behavior, EEG, EMG and large scale neural network modeling, and discuss mechanisms involved in the process of intention formation and execution, in the face of alternatives to choose from. Specifically, I will show results revealing the temporal dynamics of rapid intention formation and, moreover, ‘change of intention’ in a free choice picking scenario, in which the alternatives are on a par for the participant. The results suggest that even in arbitrary choices, endogenous or exogenous biases that are present in the neural system for selecting one or another option may be implicitly overruled; thus creating an implicit and non-conscious ‘change of mind’. Finally, the question is raised: in what way do such rapid implicit ‘changes of mind’ help retain one’s self-control and free-will behavior?

It is well established that the opportunity to compare learning stimuli in a novel word learning/extension task elicits a larger number of conceptually relevant generalizations than standard no-comparison conditions. I will present results suggesting that the effectiveness of comparison depends on factors such as semantic distance, number of training items, dimension distinctiveness and interactions with age. I will address these issues in the case of familiar and unfamiliar object nouns and relational nouns. The alignment strategies followed by children during learning and at test (i.e., when learning items are compared and how children reach a solution) will be described with eye-tracking data. We will also assess the extent to which children’s performance in these tasks are associated with executive functions (inhibition and flexibility) and world knowledge. Finally, we will consider these issues in children with cognitive deficits (Intellectual deficiency, DLD)

Every thought is associated with a unique pattern of brain activity. Thus, in principle, it should be possible to use these activity patterns as "brain fingerprints" for different thoughts and to read out what a person is thinking based on their brain activity alone. Indeed, using machine learning considerable progress has been made in such "brainreading" in recent years. It is now possible to decode which image a person is viewing, which film sequence they are watching, which emotional state they are in or which intentions they hold in mind. This talk will provide an overview of the current state of the art in brain reading. It will also highlight the main challenges and limitations of this research field. For example, mathematical models are needed to cope with the high dimensionality of potential mental states. Furthermore, the ethical concerns raised by (often premature) commercial applications of brain reading will also be discussed.

When we remember a stimulus we rarely maintain a full fidelity representation of the observed item. Our working memory instead maintains a mixture of the observed feature values and categorical/gist information. I will discuss evidence from computational models supporting a mix of categorical and fine-detail information in working memory. Having established the need for two memory formats in working memory, I will discuss whether categorical and fine-detailed information for a stimulus are represented separately or as a single unified representation. Computational models of these two potential cognitive structures make differing predictions about the pattern of responses in visual working memory recall tests. The present study required participants to remember the orientation of stimuli for later reproduction. The pattern of responses are used to test the competing representational structures and to quantify the relative amount of fine-detailed and categorical information maintained. The effects of set size, encoding time, serial order, and response order on memory precision, categorical information, and guessing rates are also explored. (This is a 60 min talk).

Sleep is classically presented as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Yet, there is increasing evidence showing that sleep and wakefulness can actually intermingle and that wake-like and sleep-like activity can be observed concomitantly in different brain regions. I will here explore the implications of this conception of sleep as a local phenomenon for cognition and consciousness. In the first part of my presentation, I will show how local modulations of sleep depth during sleep could support the processing of sensory information by sleepers. I will also how, under certain circumstances, sleepers can learn while sleeping but also how they can forget. In the second part, I will show how the reverse phenomenon, sleep intrusions during waking, can explain modulations of attention. I will focus in particular on modulations of subjective experience and how the local sleep framework can inform our understanding of everyday phenomena such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Through this presentation and the exploration of both sleep and wakefulness, I will seek to connect changes in neurophysiology with changes in behaviour and subjective experience.

In the past few years, there has been growing evidence that the basic ability for relational generalization starts in early infancy, with 3-month-olds seeming to learn relational abstractions with little training. Further, work with toddlers seem to suggest that relational generalizations are no more difficult than those based on objects, and they can readily consider both simultaneously. Likewise, causal learning research with adults suggests that people infer causal relationships at multiple levels of abstraction simultaneously as they learn about novel causal systems. These findings all appear counter to theories of concept learning that posit when concepts are first learned they tend to be concrete (tied to specific contexts and features) and abstraction proceeds incrementally as learners encounter more examples. The current talk will not question the veracity of any of these findings but will present several others from my and others’ research on relational learning that suggests that when the perceptual or conceptual content becomes more complex, patterns of incremental abstraction re-emerge. Further, the specific contexts and task parameters that support or hinder abstraction reveal the underlying cognitive processes. I will then consider whether the models that posit simultaneous, immediate learning at multiple levels of abstraction can accommodate these more complex patterns.

How our senses work both separately and together involves rich computational problems. I will discuss the spatial and representational problems faced by the visual and auditory system, focusing on two issues. 1. How does the brain correct for discrepancies in the visual and auditory spatial reference frames? I will describe our recent discovery of a novel type of otoacoustic emission, the eye movement related eardrum oscillation, or EMREO (Gruters et al, PNAS 2018). 2. How does the brain encode more than one stimulus at a time? I will discuss evidence for neural time-division multiplexing, in which neural activity fluctuates across time to allow representations to encode more than one simultaneous stimulus (Caruso et al, Nat Comm 2018). These findings all emerged from experimentally testing computational models regarding spatial representations and their transformations within and across sensory pathways. Further, they speak to several general problems confronting modern neuroscience such as the hierarchical organization of brain pathways and limits on perceptual/cognitive processing.

Previous work looking at individual differences in face identity processing (FIP) has found that most commonly used lab-based performance assessments are unfortunately not sufficiently sensitive on their own for measuring performance in both the upper and lower tails of the general population simultaneously. So more recently, researchers have begun incorporating multiple testing procedures into their assessments. Still, though, the growing consensus seems to be that at the individual level, there is quite a bit of variability between test scores. The overall consequence of this is that extreme scores will still occur simply by chance in large enough samples. To mitigate this issue, our recent work has developed measures of intra-individual FIP consistency to refine selection of those with superior abilities (i.e. from the upper tail). For starters, we assessed consistency of face matching and recognition in neurotypical controls, and compared them to a sample of SRs. In terms of face matching, we demonstrated psychophysically that SRs show significantly greater consistency than controls in exploiting spatial frequency information than controls. Meanwhile, we showed that SRs’ recognition of faces is highly related to memorability for identities, yet effectively unrelated among controls. So overall, at the high end of the FIP spectrum, consistency can be a useful tool for revealing both qualitative and quantitative individual differences. Finally, in conjunction with collaborators from the Rheinland-Pfalz Police, we developed a pair of bespoke work samples to get bias-free measures of intraindividual consistency in current law enforcement personnel. Officers with higher composite scores on a set of 3 challenging FIP tests tended to show higher consistency, and vice versa. Overall, this suggests that not only is consistency a reasonably good marker of superior FIP abilities, but could present important practical benefits for personnel selection in many other domains of expertise.

Recent breakthroughs in neurobiology indicate that time is ripe to understand the cellular-level mechanisms of conscious experience. Accordingly, we have recently proposed that conscious processing depends on the integration between top-down and bottom-up information streams and that there exists a specific cellular mechanism that gates this integration. I will first describe this cellular mechanism and demonstrate how it controls signal propagation within the thalamocortical system. Then I will show how this cellular-level mechanism provides a natural explanation for why conscious experience is modulated by top-down processing. Besides shining new light on the neural basis of consciousness, this perspective unravels the mechanisms of internally generated perception, such as dreams, imagery, and hallucinations.