Cognition seminars

The question of how syntactic structure can be built at the neural level has come to the forefront of cognitive neuroscience in the last decade. Neural oscillations have been widely recognised as playing an important role in building syntactic representations. In this talk I will review existing oscillatory approaches to syntactic structure building and assess their functionality in light of basic properties of a hierarchical syntactic structure, such as varied length of syntactic phrases, nesting of constituents, overlap in length between different levels of the syntactic hierarchy and others. I will also briefly discuss key requirements on neural structure building mechanisms from the perspective of a real-time parser.

Materials with complex appearances, like textiles and foodstuffs, pose challenges for conventional theories of vision. How does the brain learn to see properties of the world—like the glossiness of a surface—that cannot be measured by any other senses? Recent advances in unsupervised deep learning may help shed light on material perception. I will show how an unsupervised deep neural network trained on an artificial environment of surfaces that have different shapes, materials and lighting, spontaneously comes to encode those factors in its internal representations. Most strikingly, the model makes patterns of errors in its perception of material that follow, on an image-by-image basis, the patterns of errors made by human observers. Unsupervised deep learning may provide a coherent framework for how many perceptual dimensions form, in material perception and beyond.

The talk will give a tour of Guided Search 6.0 (GS6), the latest evolution of the Guided Search model of visual search. Part 1 describes The Mechanics of Search. Because we cannot recognize more than a few items at a time, selective attention is used to prioritize items for processing. Selective attention to an item allows its features to be bound together into a representation that can be matched to a target template in memory or rejected as a distractor. The binding and recognition of an attended object is modeled as a diffusion process taking > 150 msec/item. Since selection occurs more frequently than that, it follows that multiple items are undergoing recognition at the same time, though asynchronously, making GS6 a hybrid serial and parallel model. If a target is not found, search terminates when an accumulating quitting signal reaches a threshold. Part 2 elaborates on the five sources of Guidance that are combined into a spatial “priority map” to guide the deployment of attention (hence “guided search”). These are (1) top-down and (2) bottom-up feature guidance, (3) prior history (e.g. priming), (4) reward, and (5) scene syntax and semantics. Finally, in Part 3, we will consider the internal representation of what we are searching for; what is often called “the search template”. That search template is really two templates: a guiding template (probably in working memory) and a target template (in long term memory). Put these pieces together and you have GS6.

I will discuss the mechanisms that determine whether a weak visual stimulus will reach consciousness or not. If the stimulus is simple, early visual cortex acts as a relay station that sends the information to higher visual areas. If the stimulus arrives at a minimal strength, it will be stored in working memory and can be reported. However, during more complex visual perceptions, which for example depend on the segregation of a figure from the background, early visual cortex’ role goes beyond a simply relay. It now acts as a cognitive blackboard and conscious perception depends on it. Our results inspire new approaches to create a visual prosthesis for the blind, by creating a direct interface with the visual brain. I will discuss how high-channel-number interfaces with the visual cortex might be used to restore a rudimentary form of vision in blind individuals.

In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.

The talk argues for a new approach to analysing analogical reasoning in scientific practice. Traditionally, philosophers of science tend to analyse analogical reasoning in either a top-down way or a bottom-up way. Examples of top-down approaches include Mary Hesse’s seminal work (1963) and Paul Bartha’s articulation model (2010), while most popular bottom-up approach is John Norton’s material approach (2018). I will address the problems of these traditional approaches and introduce an alternative approach, which is motivated by my exemplar-based approach to the history of science, defended in my recent book (2020).

Many models of attention assume that attentional selection takes place at a specific moment in time which demarcates the critical transition from pre-attentive to attentive processing of sensory input. We argue that this intuitively appealing account is not only inaccurate, but has led to substantial conceptual confusion (to the point where some attention researchers offer to abandon the term ‘attention’ altogether). As an alternative, we offer a “diachronic” framework that describes attentional selectivity as a process that unfolds over time. Key to this view is the concept of attentional episodes, brief periods of intense attentional amplification of sensory representations that regulate access to working memory and response-related processes. We describe how attentional episodes are linked to earlier attentional mechanisms and to recurrent processing at the neural level. We present data showing that multiple sequential events can be involuntarily encoded in working memory when they appear during the same attentional episode, whether they are relevant or not. We also discuss the costs associated with processing multiple events within a single episode. Finally, we argue that breaking down the dichotomy between pre-attentive and attentive (as well as early vs. late selection) offers new solutions to old problems in attention research that have never been resolved. It can provide a unified and conceptually coherent account of the network of cognitive and neural processes that produce the goal-directed selectivity in perceptual processing that is commonly referred to as “attention”.

Human vision is full of puzzles. Observers can grasp the essence of a scene in an instant, yet when probed for details they are at a loss. People have trouble finding their keys, yet they may be quite visible once found. How does one explain this combination of marvelous successes with quirky failures? I will describe our attempts to develop a unifying theory that brings a satisfying order to multiple phenomena. One key is to understand peripheral vision. A visual system cannot process everything with full fidelity, and therefore must lose some information. Peripheral vision must condense a mass of information into a succinct representation that nonetheless carries the information needed for vision at a glance. We have proposed that the visual system deals with limited capacity in part by representing its input in terms of a rich set of local image statistics, where the local regions grow — and the representation becomes less precise — with distance from fixation. This scheme trades off computation of sophisticated image features at the expense of spatial localization of those features. What are the implications of such an encoding scheme? Critical to our understanding has been the use of methodologies for visualizing the equivalence classes of the model. These visualizations allow one to quickly see that many of the puzzles of human vision may arise from a single encoding mechanism. They have suggested new experiments and predicted unexpected phenomena. Furthermore, visualization of the equivalence classes has facilitated the generation of testable model predictions, allowing us to study the effects of this relatively low-level encoding on a wide range of higher-level tasks. Peripheral vision helps explain many of the puzzles of vision, but some remain. By examining the phenomena that cannot be explained by peripheral vision, we gain insight into the nature of additional capacity limits in vision. In particular, I will suggest that decision processes face general-purpose limits on the complexity of the tasks they can perform at a given time.

One of Tali's cherished goals was to transform biology into physics. In his view, biologists were far too enamored by the details of the specific models they studied, losing sight of the big principles that may govern the behavior of these models. One such big principle that he suggested was the 'information bottleneck (IB) principle'. The iIB principle is an information-theoretical approach for extracting the relevant information that one random variable carries about another. Tali applied the IB principle to numerous problems in biology, gaining important insights in the process. Here I will describe two applications of the IB principle to neurobiological data. The first is the formalization of the notion of surprise that allowed us to rigorously estimate the memory duration and content of neuronal responses in auditory cortex, and the second is an application to behavior, allowing us to estimate 'optimal policies under information constraints' that shed interesting light on rat behavior.

Smooth pursuit eye movements are among our most intriguing motor behaviors. They are able to keep the line of sight on smoothly moving targets with little or no overt effort or deliberate planning, and they can respond quickly and accurately to changes in the trajectory of motion of targets. Nevertheless, despite these seeming automatic characteristics, pursuit is highly sensitive to high-level factors, such as the choices made about attention, or beliefs about the direction of upcoming motion. Investigators have struggled for decades with the problem of incorporating both high- and low-level processes into a single coherent model. This talk will present an overview of the current state of efforts to incorporate high- and low-level influences, as well as new observations that add to our understanding of both types of influences. These observations (in contrast to much of the literature) focus on the directional properties of pursuit. Studies will be presented that show: (1) the direction of smooth pursuit made to pursue fields of noisy random dots depends on the relative reliability of the sensory signal and the expected motion direction; (2) smooth pursuit shows predictive responses that depend on the interpretation of cues that signal an impending collision; and (3) smooth pursuit during a change in target direction displays kinematic properties consistent with the well-known two-thirds power law. Implications for incorporating high- and low-level factors into the same framework will be discussed.

Extensive research has revealed that the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex maintain a rich representation of space through the coordinated activity of place cells, grid cells, and other spatial cell types. Frequently described as a ‘cognitive map’ or a ‘hippocampal map’, these maps are thought to support episodic memory through their instantiation and retrieval. Though often a useful and intuitive metaphor, a map typically evokes a static representation of the external world. However, the world itself, and our experience of it, are intrinsically dynamic. In order to make the most of their maps, a navigator must be able to adapt to, incorporate, and overcome these dynamics. Here I describe three projects where we address how hippocampal and entorhinal representations do just that. In the first project, I describe how boundaries dynamically anchor entorhinal grid cells and human spatial memory alike when the shape of a familiar environment is changed. In the second project, I describe how the hippocampus maintains a representation of the recent past even in the absence of disambiguating sensory and explicit task demands, a representation which causally depends on intrinsic hippocampal circuitry. In the third project, I describe how the hippocampus preserves a stable representation of context despite ongoing representational changes across a timescale of weeks. Together, these projects highlight the dynamic and adaptive nature of our hippocampal and entorhinal representations, and set the stage for future work building on these techniques and paradigms.

Anjan Chatterjee is a Professor of Neurology, Psychology, and Architecture and the founding Director of the Penn Center for Neuroaesthetics. His research explores the field of neuroaesthetics: how our brain experiences and responds to art. Lucas Kelly is a renowned visual artist, with work featured across several solo and group exhibitions, most notably in the survey of abstract painting “The Painted World” at PS1 Museum of Modern Art. As the inaugural Artist in Residence for the Penn Center for Neuroaesthetics, Lucas has collaborated with Anjan on a forthcoming exhibition, considering the emotions involved in aesthetic engagement informed by research. This event will feature a moderated conversation between Anjan and Lucas, discussing topics at the intersection of neuroscience and experience of visual art.

A major challenge of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how the brain as a network gives rise to our cognition. Simultaneous [18F]-fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography functional magnetic resonance imaging (FDG-PET/fMRI) provides the opportunity to investigate brain connectivity not only via spatially distant, synchronous cerebrovascular hemodynamic responses (functional connectivity), but also glucose metabolism (metabolic connectivity). However, how these two modalities of brain connectivity differ in their relation to cognition is unknown. In this webinar, Dr Katharina Voigt will discuss recent findings demonstrating the advantage of simultaneous FDG-PET/fMRI in providing a more complete picture of the neural mechanisms underlying cognition, that calls for a combination of both modalities in future cognitive neuroscience. Dr Katharina Voigt is a Research Fellow within the Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, Monash University. Her research interests include systems neuroscience, simultaneous PET-MRI, and decision-making.