Cognition seminars

Children's emerging ability to acquire and apply relational same-different concepts is often cited as a defining feature of human cognition, providing the foundation for abstract thought. Yet, young learners often struggle to ignore irrelevant surface features to attend to structural similarity instead. I will argue that young children have--and retain--genuine relational concepts from a young age, but tend to neglect abstract similarity due to a learned bias to attend to objects and their properties. Critically, this account predicts that differences in the structure of children's environmental input should lead to differences in the type of hypotheses they privilege and apply. I will review empirical support for this proposal that has (1) evaluated the robustness of early competence in relational reasoning, (2) identified cross-cultural differences in relational and object bias, and (3) provided evidence that contextual factors play a causal role in relational reasoning. Together, these studies suggest that the development of abstract thought may be more malleable and context-sensitive than initially believed.

Recent success in training artificial agents and robots derives from a combination of direct learning of behavioral policies and indirect learning via value functions. Policy learning and value learning employ distinct algorithms that depend upon evaluation of errors in performance and reward prediction errors, respectively. In mammals, behavioral learning and the role of mesolimbic dopamine signaling have been extensively evaluated with respect to reward prediction errors; but there has been little consideration of how direct policy learning might inform our understanding. I’ll discuss our recent work on classical conditioning in naïve mice (https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.05.31.446464v1) that provides multiple lines of evidence that phasic dopamine signaling regulates policy learning from performance errors in addition to its well-known roles in value learning. This work points towards new opportunities for unraveling the mechanisms of basal ganglia control over behavior under both adaptive and maladaptive learning conditions.

One of the most important questions in psychology and neuroscience is understanding how the outside world maps to internal representations. Classical psychophysics approaches to this problem have a number of limitations: they mostly study low dimensional perpetual spaces, and are constrained in the number and diversity of participants and experiments. As ecologically valid perception is rich, high dimensional, contextual, and culturally dependent, these impediments severely bias our understanding of perceptual representations. Recent technological advances—the emergence of so-called “Virtual Labs”— can significantly contribute toward overcoming these barriers. Here I present a number of specific strategies that my group has developed in order to probe representations across a number of dimensions. 1) Massive online experiments can increase significantly the amount of participants and experiments that can be carried out in a single study, while also significantly diversifying the participant pool. We have developed a platform, PsyNet, that enables “experiments as code,” whereby the orchestration of computer servers, recruiting, compensation of participants, and data management is fully automated and every experiment can be fully replicated with one command line. I will demonstrate how PsyNet allows us to recruit thousands of participants for each study with a large number of control experimental conditions, significantly increasing our understanding of auditory perception. 2) Virtual lab methods also enable us to run experiments that are nearly impossible in a traditional lab setting. I will demonstrate our development of adaptive sampling, a set of behavioural methods that combine machine learning sampling techniques (Monte Carlo Markov Chains) with human interactions and allow us to create high-dimensional maps of perceptual representations with unprecedented resolution. 3) Finally, I will demonstrate how the aforementioned methods can be applied to the study of perceptual priors in both audition and vision, with a focus on our work in cross-cultural research, which studies how perceptual priors are influenced by experience and culture in diverse samples of participants from around the world.

In this talk I outline the technical challenges and current solutions to layer fMRI. Specifically, I describe our acquisition strategies for maximizing resolution, spatial coverage, time efficiency as well as, perhaps most importantly, vascular specificity. Novel applications from our group, including mapping feedforward and feedback connections to M1 during task and sensory input modulation and S1 during a sensory prediction task are be shown. Layer specific activity in dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex during a working memory task is also demonstrated. Additionally, I’ll show preliminary work on mapping whole brain layer-specific resting state connectivity and hierarchy.

This talk will focus on the idea that the kind of similarity driving analogical retrieval is determined by the kind of features encoded regarding the source and the target cue situations. Emphasis will be put on educational perspectives in order to show the influence of world semantics on learners’ problem representations and solving strategies, as well as the difficulties arising from semantic incongruence between representations and strategies. Special attention will be given to the recoding of semantically incongruent representations, a crucial step that learners struggle with, in order to illustrate a promising path for going beyond informal strategies.

To act effectively and flexibly in an imperfectly predictable environment with only incomplete and unreliable sensory information, animals must learn to form and compute with internal representations that reflect their necessarily uncertain beliefs about the state of the world. The optimal approach to handling uncertainty is rooted in Bayesian probability, and indeed humans and other animals often approach Bayes optimality with a degree of robustness and flexibility that continues to evade artificial systems. However, the question of how neural circuits organise to achieve this performance remains one of the fundamental mysteries of neuroscience. I will discuss a series of models built around the idea that distributional information is naturally encoded in a distributed fashion by neural population firing rates that converge on the mean values of non-linear functions of state. We will see that such representations emerge naturally in task-optimised systems, and also provide a simple and effective substrate for unsupervised learning. Finally, I will sketch ongoing work that links the emergence of such representations to the architecture of recurrent neural circuits. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2021-07-07. Recording duration: 00:52:28.

Goal-directed navigation requires precise estimates of spatial relationships between current position and future goal, as well as planning of an associated route or action. While neurons in the hippocampal formation can represent the animal’s position and nearby trajectories, their role in determining the animal’s destination or action has been questioned. We thus hypothesize that brain regions outside the hippocampal formation may play complementary roles in navigation, particularly for guiding goal-directed behaviours based on the brain’s internal cognitive map. In this seminar, I will first describe a subpopulation of neurons in the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) that increase their firing when the animal approaches environmental boundaries, such as walls or edges. This boundary coding is independent of direct visual or tactile sensation but instead depends on inputs from the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC) that contains spatial tuning cells, such as grid cells or border cells. However, unlike MEC border cells, we found that RSC border cells encode environmental boundaries in a self-centred egocentric coordinate frame, which may allow an animal for efficient avoidance from approaching walls or edges during navigation. I will then discuss whether the brain can possess a precise estimate of remote target location during active environmental exploration. Such a spatial code has not been described in the hippocampal formation. However, we found that neurons in the rat orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) form spatial representations that persistently point to the animal’s subsequent goal destination throughout navigation. This destination coding emerges before navigation onset without direct sensory access to a distal goal, and are maintained via destination-specific neural ensemble dynamics. These findings together suggest key roles for extra-hippocampal regions in spatial navigation, enabling animals to choose appropriate actions toward a desired destination by avoiding possible dangers.

Visual knowledge obtained from our lifelong experience of the world plays a critical role in our ability to build short-term memories. We propose a mechanistic explanation of how working memory (WM) representations are built from the latent representations of visual knowledge and can then be reconstructed. The proposed model, Memory for Latent Representations (MLR), features a variational autoencoder with an architecture that corresponds broadly to the human visual system and an activation-based binding pool of neurons that binds items’ attributes to tokenized representations. The simulation results revealed that shape information for stimuli that the model was trained on, can be encoded and retrieved efficiently from latents in higher levels of the visual hierarchy. On the other hand, novel patterns that are completely outside the training set can be stored from a single exposure using only latents from early layers of the visual system. Moreover, the representation of a given stimulus can have multiple codes, representing specific visual features such as shape or color, in addition to categorical information. Finally, we validated our model by testing a series of predictions against behavioral results acquired from WM tasks. The model provides a compelling demonstration of visual knowledge yielding the formation of compact visual representation for efficient memory encoding.

There has been a recent surge of interest in the question of whether and how deep learning algorithms might be capable of abstract reasoning, much of which has centered around datasets based on Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM), a visual analogy problem set commonly employed to assess fluid intelligence. This has led to the development of algorithms that are capable of solving RPM-like problems directly from pixel-level inputs. However, these algorithms require extensive direct training on analogy problems, and typically generalize poorly to novel problem types. This is in stark contrast to human reasoners, who are capable of solving RPM and other analogy problems zero-shot — that is, with no direct training on those problems. Indeed, it’s this capacity for zero-shot reasoning about novel problem types, i.e. fluid intelligence, that RPM was originally designed to measure. I will present some results from our recent efforts to model this capacity for zero-shot reasoning, based on an extension of a recently proposed approach to analogical mapping we refer to as Probabilistic Analogical Mapping (PAM). Our RPM model uses deep learning to extract attributed graph representations from pixel-level inputs, and then performs alignment of objects between source and target analogs using gradient descent to optimize a graph-matching objective. This extended version of PAM features a number of new capabilities that underscore the flexibility of the overall approach, including 1) the capacity to discover solutions that emphasize either object similarity or relation similarity, based on the demands of a given problem, 2) the ability to extract a schema representing the overall abstract pattern that characterizes a problem, and 3) the ability to directly infer the answer to a problem, rather than relying on a set of possible answer choices. This work suggests that PAM is a promising framework for modeling human zero-shot reasoning.

Understanding how the brain uses information is a fundamental goal of neuroscience. Several human disorders (ranging from autism spectrum disorder to PTSD to Alzheimer’s disease) may stem from disrupted information processing. Therefore, this basic knowledge is not only critical for understanding normal brain function, but also vital for the development of new treatment strategies for these disorders. Memory may be defined as the retention over time of internal representations gained through experience, and the capacity to reconstruct these representations at later times. Long-lasting physical brain changes (‘engrams’) are thought to encode these internal representations. The concept of a physical memory trace likely originated in ancient Greece, although it wasn’t until 1904 that Richard Semon first coined the term ‘engram’. Despite its long history, finding a specific engram has been challenging, likely because an engram is encoded at multiple levels (epigenetic, synaptic, cell assembly). My lab is interested in understanding how specific neurons are recruited or allocated to an engram, and how neuronal membership in an engram may change over time or with new experience. Here I will describe both older and new unpublished data in our efforts to understand memories in mice.

Hongjing Lu will present a new computational model of Probabilistic Analogical Mapping (PAM, in collaboration with Nick Ichien and Keith Holyoak) that finds systematic correspondences between inputs generated by machine learning. The model adopts a Bayesian framework for probabilistic graph matching, operating on semantic relation networks constructed from distributed representations of individual concepts (word embeddings created by Word2vec) and of relations between concepts (created by our BART model). We have used PAM to simulate a broad range of phenomena involving analogical mapping by both adults and children. Our approach demonstrates that human-like analogical mapping can emerge from comparison mechanisms applied to rich semantic representations of individual concepts and relations. More details can be found https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2103/2103.16704.pdf

Previous work with complex memory span tasks, in which simple choice decisions are imposed between presentations of to-be-remembered items, shows that these secondary tasks reduce memory span. It is less clear how reconfiguring and maintaining various amounts of information affects decision speeds. We documented and replicated a non-linear effect of accumulating memory items on concurrent processing judgments, showing that this pattern could be made linear by introducing "lead-in" processing judgments prior to the start of the memory list. With lead-in judgments, there was a large and consistent cost to processing response times with the introduction of the first item in the memory list, which increased gradually per item as the list accumulated. However, once presentation of the list was complete, decision responses sped rapidly: within a few seconds, decisions were at least as fast as when remembering a single item. This pattern of findings is inconsistent with the idea that merely holding information in mind conflicts with attention-demanding decision tasks. Instead, it is possible that reconfiguring memory items for responding provokes conflict between memory and processing in complex span tasks.

At the foundation of human conscious experience lie basic embodied experiences of selfhood – experiences of simply ‘being alive’. In this talk, I will make the case that this central feature of human existence is underpinned by predictive regulation of the interior of the body, using the framework of predictive processing, or active inference. I start by showing how conscious experiences of the world around us can be understood in terms of perceptual predictions, drawing on examples from psychophysics and virtual reality. Then, turning the lens inwards, we will see how the experience of being an ‘embodied self’ rests on control-oriented predictive (allostatic) regulation of the body’s physiological condition. This approach implies a deep connection between mind and life, and provides a new way to understand the subjective nature of consciousness as emerging from systems that care intrinsically about their own existence. Contrary to the old doctrine of Descartes, we are conscious because we are beast machines.

Human society operates on large-scale cooperation and shared norms of fairness. However, individual differences in cooperation and incentives to free-riding on others’ cooperation make large-scale cooperation fragile and can lead to reduced social-welfare. Deciphering the neural codes representing potential rewards/costs for self and others is crucial for understanding social decision-making and cooperation. I will first talk about how we integrate computational modeling with functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural representation of social value and the modulation by oxytocin, a nine-amino acid neuropeptide, in participants evaluating monetary allocations to self and other (self-other allocations). Then I will introduce our recent studies examining the neurobiological mechanisms underlying intergroup decision-making using hyper-scanning, and share with you how we alter intergroup decisions using psychological manipulations and pharmacological challenge. Finally, I will share with you our on-going project that reveals how individual cooperation spreads through human social networks. Our results help to better understand the neurocomputational mechanism underlying interpersonal and intergroup decision-making.

In Europe, the number of people aged 65 and older is increasing dramatically, and research related to ageing is more crucial than ever. The main research dedicated to age-related changes concentrates on cognitive or sensory deficits. This is also the case in vision research. However, the majority of older adults ages without major cognitive or optical or deficits. These are foremost good news, but even in the absence of neurodegenerative or eye diseases changes in visual perception occur. It has been suggested that age-related changes are due to a general decline of cognitive, perceptual and sensory functions. However, more recent studies reveal large individual differences within the ageing population and whereas some functions show age-related deterioration, others are surprisingly unaffected. Overall, it becomes increasingly apparent that perceptual changes in healthy ageing cannot be attributed to one single underlying factor. I will present studies from various areas of visual perception that challenge the view that age-related changes are primarily related to decline. Instead, our findings suggest that age-related changes are the result of visual experience, such that the brain ages optimally given the input it receives.

Interoception, the sense of internal bodily signals, is essential for physiological homeostasis, cognition, and emotions. While human insular cortex (InsCtx) is implicated in interoception, the cellular and circuit mechanisms remain unclear. I will describe our recent work imaging mouse InsCtx neurons during two physiological deficiency states – hunger and thirst. InsCtx ongoing activity patterns reliably tracked the gradual return to homeostasis, but not changes in behavior. Accordingly, while artificial induction of hunger/thirst in sated mice via activation of specific hypothalamic neurons (AgRP/SFOGLUT) restored cue-evoked food/water-seeking, InsCtx ongoing activity continued to reflect physiological satiety. During natural hunger/thirst, food/water cues rapidly and transiently shifted InsCtx population activity to the future satiety-related pattern. During artificial hunger/thirst, food/water cues further shifted activity beyond the current satiety-related pattern. Together with circuit-mapping experiments, these findings suggest that InsCtx integrates visceral-sensory inputs regarding current physiological state with hypothalamus-gated amygdala inputs signaling upcoming ingestion of food/water, to compute a prediction of future physiological state.

Transient changes in dopamine activity in response to reward and punishment have been known to regulate reward-related learning. However, the cellular basis that detects the transient dopamine signaling has long been unclear. Using two-photon microscopy and optogenetics, I have shown that transient increases and decreases of dopamine modulate plasticity of dopamine D1 and D2 receptor-expressing cells in the nucleus accumbens, respectively. At the behavioral level, I characterized that these D1 and D2 cells cooperatively tune learning by generalization and discrimination learning. Interestingly, disturbance of the dopamine signaling impaired D2 cell plasticity and discrimination learning, which was analogous to salience misattribution seen in subjects with schizophrenia.

The last decade in the field of neuroscience has been marked by intense debate on the meaning of the term fear. Whereas some have argued that fear (as well as other emotions) relies on cognitive capacities that are unique to humans, others view it as a negative state constructed from essential building blocks. This latter definition posits that fear states are associated with varying readouts that one could consider to be parallel processes or serial events tied to a specific hierarchy. Within this framework, innate defensive behaviors are considered to be common displays of fear states that lie under the control of hard-wired brain circuits. As a general rule, these defensive behaviors can be classified as either reactive or cognitive based on a thread imminence continuum. However, while evidence of the neuronal circuits that lead to these divergent behavioral strategies has accrued over the last decades, most literature has considered these responses in isolation. As a result, important misconceptions have arisen regarding how fear circuits are distributed in the brain and the contribution of specific nodes within these circuits to defensive behaviors. To mitigate the status quo, I will conduct a systematic comparison of brain circuits driving the expression of freezing and active avoidance behavior, which I will use as well-studied proxies of reactive and cognitive fear, respectively. In addition, I propose that by integrating associative information with interoceptive and exteroceptive signals the central nucleus of the amygdala plays a crucial role in biasing the selection of defensive behaviors.