Cognition seminars

Although animals can estimate numerical quantities, true counting and arithmetic abilities are unique to humans and are inextricably linked to symbolic competence. However, our unprecedented numerical skills are deeply rooted in our neuronal heritage as primates and vertebrates. I argue that numerical competence in humans is the result of three neural constraints. First, I propose that the neuronal mechanisms of quantity estimation are part of our evolutionary heritage and can be witnessed across primate and vertebrate phylogeny. Second, I suggest that a basic understanding of number, what numerical quantity means, is innately wired into the brain and gives rise to an intuitive number sense, or number instinct. Third and finally, I argue that symbolic counting and arithmetic in humans is rooted in an evolutionarily and ontogenetically primeval neural system for non-symbolic number representations. These three neural constraints jointly determine the basic processing of number concepts in the human mind.

The assumed data generating models (response distributions) of experimental or observational data in cognitive science have become increasingly complex over the past decades. This trend follows a revolution in model estimation methods and a drastic increase in computing power available to researchers. Today, higher-level cognitive functions can well be captured by and understood through computational cognitive models, a common example being drift diffusion models for decision processes. Such models are often expressed as the combination of two modeling layers. The first layer is the response distribution with corresponding distributional parameters tailored to the cognitive process under investigation. The second layer are latent models of the distributional parameters that capture how those parameters vary as a function of design, stimulus, or person characteristics, often in an additive manner. Such cognitive models can thus be understood as special cases of distributional regression models where multiple distributional parameters, rather than just a single centrality parameter, are predicted by additive models. Because of their complexity, distributional models are quite complicated to estimate, but recent advances in Bayesian estimation methods and corresponding software make them increasingly more feasible. In this talk, I will speak about the specification, estimation, and post-processing of Bayesian distributional regression models and how they can help to better understand cognitive processes.

Comparison is a powerful learning process that improves learning in many domains. For over 10 years, my colleagues and I have researched how we can use comparison to support better learning of school mathematics within classroom settings. In 5 short-term experimental, classroom-based studies, we evaluated comparison of solution methods for supporting mathematics knowledge and tested whether prior knowledge impacted effectiveness. We next developed supplemental Algebra I curriculum and professional development for teachers to integrate Comparison and Explanation of Multiple Strategies (CEMS) in their classrooms and tested the promise of the approach when implemented by teachers in two studies. Benefits and challenges emerged in these studies. I will conclude with evidence-based guidelines for effectively supporting comparison and explanation in the classroom. Overall, this program of research illustrates how cognitive science research can guide the design of effective educational materials as well as challenges that occur when bridging from cognitive science research to classroom instruction.

While various forms of cells have been found in relation to the hippocampus cognitive map and navigation system, how these cells are formed and what is read from them is still a mystery. In the current lecture I will talk about several projects which tackle these issues. First, I will show how the formation of border cells in the coginitive map is related to a coordinate transformation, second I will discuss the interaction between the reward system (VTA) and the hippocampus. Finally I will describe a project using place cells as a proxy for associative memory for assessing deficits in Alzheimer’s disease.

To date, neuroimaging research has had a limited focus on non-social features of autism. As a result, neurobiological explanations for atypical sensory perception in autism are lacking. To address this, we quantitively condensed findings from the non-social autism fMRI literature in line with the current best practices for neuroimaging meta-analyses. Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), we conducted a series of robust meta-analyses across 83 experiments from 52 fMRI studies investigating differences between autistic (n = 891) and typical (n = 967) participants. We found that typical controls, compared to autistic people, show greater activity in the prefrontal cortex (BA9, BA10) during perception tasks. More refined analyses revealed that, when compared to typical controls, autistic people show greater recruitment of the extrastriate V2 cortex (BA18) during visual processing. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of current theories of autistic perception, and highlight some of the challenges of cognitive neuroscience research in autism.

I will begin by describing recent research taking a new, model-based approach to perceptual development. This approach uncovers fundamental changes in information processing underlying the protracted development of perception, action, and decision-making in childhood. For example, integration of multiple sensory estimates via reliability-weighted averaging – widely used by adults to improve perception – is often not seen until surprisingly late into childhood, as assessed by both behaviour and neural representations. This approach forms the basis for a newer question: the scope for the nervous system to deploy useful computations (e.g. reliability-weighted averaging) to optimise perception and action using newly-learned sensory signals provided by technology. Our initial model system is augmenting visual depth perception with devices translating distance into auditory or vibro-tactile signals. This problem has immediate applications to people with partial vision loss, but the broader question concerns our scope to use technology to tune in to any signal not available to our native biological receptors. I will describe initial progress on this problem, and our approach to operationalising what it might mean to adopt a new signal comparably to a native sense. This will include testing for its integration (weighted averaging) alongside the native senses, assessing the level at which this integration happens in the brain, and measuring the degree of ‘automaticity’ with which new signals are used, compared with native perception.

It seems we see the world in full detail. However, the eye is not a camera nor is the brain a computer. Incredible metabolic constraints render us unable to encode more than a fraction of information available in each glance. Instead, our illusion of stable and complete perception is accomplished by parsimonious representation relying on natural order inherent in the surrounding environment. I will begin by discussing previous behavioral work from our lab demonstrating one such strategy by which the visual system represents average properties of Gestalt-grouped sets of individual objects, warping individual object representations toward the Gestalt-defined mean. I will then discuss on-going work using a behavioral index of averaging Gestalt-grouped information established in our previous work in conjunction with an ERP-index of VSTM capacity (the CDA) to measure whether the Gestalt-grouping and perceptual averaging strategy acts to boost memory capacity above the classic “four-item” limit. Finally, I will outline our pre-registered study to determine whether this perceptual strategy is indeed engaged in a “smart” manner under normal circumstances, or compromises fidelity for capacity by perceptually-averaging in trials with only four items that could otherwise be individually represented.

Many flexible behaviors are thought to rely on internal representations of an animal’s spatial relationship to its environment and of the consequences of its actions in that environment. While such representations—e.g. of head direction and value—have been extensively studied, how they are combined to guide behavior is not well understood. I will discuss how we are exploring these questions using a classical visual learning paradigm for the fly. I’ll begin by describing a simple policy that, when tethered to an internal representation of heading, captures structured behavioral variability in this task. I’ll describe how ambiguities in the fly’s visual surroundings affect its perception and, when coupled to this policy, manifest in predictable changes in behavior. Informed by newly-released connectomic data, I’ll then discuss how these computations might be carried out and combined within specific circuits in the fly’s central brain, and how perception and action might interact to shape individual differences in learning performance.

Spontaneous and sensory-evoked cortical activity is highly state-dependent, promoting the functional flexibility of cortical circuits underlying perception and cognition. Using neural recordings in combination with behavioral state monitoring, we find that arousal and motor activity have complementary roles in regulating local cortical operations, providing dynamic control of sensory encoding. These changes in encoding are linked to altered performance on perceptual tasks. Neuromodulators, such as acetylcholine, may regulate this state-dependent flexibility of cortical network function. We therefore recently developed an approach for dual mesoscopic imaging of acetylcholine release and neural activity across the entire cortical mantle in behaving mice. We find spatiotemporally heterogeneous patterns of cholinergic signaling across the cortex. Transitions between distinct behavioral states reorganize the structure of large-scale cortico-cortical networks and differentially regulate the relationship between cholinergic signals and neural activity. Together, our findings suggest dynamic state-dependent regulation of cortical network operations at the levels of both local and large-scale circuits. Zoom Meeting ID: 964 8138 3003 Contact host if you cannot connect.

Converging evidence from fMRI and EEG shows that audtiory spatial attention engages the same fronto-parietal network associated with visuo-spatial attention. This network is distinct from an auditory-biased processing network that includes other frontal regions; this second network is can be recruited when observers extract rhythmic information from visual inputs. We recently used a dual-task paradigm to examine whether this "division of labor" between a visuo-spatial network and an auditory-rhythmic network can be observed in a working memory paradigm. We varied the sensory modality (visual vs. auditory) and information domain (spatial or rhythmic) that observers had to store in working memory, while also performing an intervening task. Behavior, pupilometry, and EEG results show a complex interaction across the working memory and intervening tasks, consistent with two cognitive control networks managing auditory and visual inputs based on the kind of information being processed.

Bats are extreme aviators and amazing navigators. Many bat species nightly commute dozens of kilometres in search of food, and some bat species annually migrate over thousands of kilometres. Studying bats in their natural environment has always been extremely challenging because of their small size (mostly <50 gr) and agile nature. We have recently developed novel miniature technology allowing us to GPS-tag small bats, thus opening a new window to document their behaviour in the wild. We have used this technology to track fruit-bats pups over 5 months from birth to adulthood. Following the bats’ full movement history allowed us to show that they use novel short-cuts which are typical for cognitive-map based navigation. In a second study, we examined how nectar-feeding bats make foraging decisions under competition. We show that by relying on a simple reinforcement learning strategy, the bats can divide the resource between them without aggression or communication. Together, these results demonstrate the power of the large scale natural approach for studying animal behavior.

Human vision relies on rapid eye movements (saccades) 2-3 times every second to bring peripheral targets to central foveal vision for high resolution inspection. This rapid sampling of the world defines the perception-action cycle of natural vision and profoundly impacts our perception. Marmosets have similar visual processing and eye movements as humans, including a fovea that supports high-acuity central vision. Here, I present a novel approach developed in my laboratory for investigating the neural mechanisms of visual processing using naturalistic free viewing and simple target foraging paradigms. First, we establish that it is possible to map receptive fields in the marmoset with high precision in visual areas V1 and MT without constraints on fixation of the eyes. Instead, we use an off-line correction for eye position during foraging combined with high resolution eye tracking. This approach allows us to simultaneously map receptive fields, even at the precision of foveal V1 neurons, while also assessing the impact of eye movements on the visual information encoded. We find that the visual information encoded by neurons varies dramatically across the saccade to fixation cycle, with most information localized to brief post-saccadic transients. In a second study we examined if target selection prior to saccades can predictively influence how foveal visual information is subsequently processed in post-saccadic transients. Because every saccade brings a target to the fovea for detailed inspection, we hypothesized that predictive mechanisms might prime foveal populations to process the target. Using neural decoding from laminar arrays placed in foveal regions of area MT, we find that the direction of motion for a fixated target can be predictively read out from foveal activity even before its post-saccadic arrival. These findings highlight the dynamic and predictive nature of visual processing during eye movements and the utility of the marmoset as a model of active vision. Funding sources: NIH EY030998 to JM, Life Sciences Fellowship to JY

ONS figures suggest that at least 10% of individuals suffering COVID -19 Infection continue to experience several weeks after testing positive, and other studies report the proportions as even higher (e.g. Logue et al., 2021). One of the most prevalent reported symptoms among these “Long Covid” sufferers is cognitive dysfunction (Davis et al., 2020). However, to date the cognitive sequelae of COVID -19 are little understood. There are a number of reasons why COVID -19 infection might be associated with cognitive impairment and mental illness (e.g. Bougakov et al., 2020). In particular, increasing evidence indicates inflammation (e.g. Huang et al., 2020) and dysfunctional clotting (e.g. Taquet et al., 2021) as issues of major concern, both of which have been previously linked to a range of cognitive deficits (e.g. Vintimilla et al., 2019; Cumming et al., 2013). Indeed, evidence is beginning to emerge that cognitive issues may be widespread in the post-infection period, particularly among hospitalised and ventilated patients (e.g. Hampshire et al., 2020; Alemanno et al,. 2020). Here I shall present “Hot off the [SPSS]Press” results from a study on memory and cognition following COVID infection in a non-hospitalized cohort.

Behavioural measurements are often overlooked by computational neuroscientists, who prefer to focus on electrophysiological recordings or neuroimaging data. This attitude is largely due to perceived lack of depth/richness in relation to behavioural datasets. I will show how contemporary psychophysics can deliver extremely rich and highly constraining datasets that naturally interface with computational modelling. More specifically, I will demonstrate how psychophysics can be used to guide/constrain/refine computational models, and how models can be exploited to design/motivate/interpret psychophysical experiments. Examples will span a wide range of topics (from feature detection to natural scene understanding) and methodologies (from cascade models to deep learning architectures).

Among mammals, excellent color vision has evolved only in certain non-human primates. And yet, color is often assumed to be just a low-level stimulus feature with a modest role in encoding and recognizing objects. The rationale for this dogma is compelling: object recognition is excellent in grayscale images (consider black-and-white movies, where faces, places, objects, and story are readily apparent). In my talk I will discuss experiments in which we used color as a tool to uncover an organizational plan in inferior temporal cortex (parallel, multistage processing for places, faces, colors, and objects) and a visual-stimulus functional representation in prefrontal cortex (PFC). The discovery of an extensive network of color-biased domains within IT and PFC, regions implicated in high-level object vision and executive functions, compels a re-evaluation of the role of color in behavior. I will discuss behavioral studies prompted by the neurobiology that uncover a universal principle for color categorization across languages, the first systematic study of the color statistics of objects and a chromatic mechanism by which the brain may compute animacy, and a surprising paradoxical impact of memory on face color. Taken together, my talk will put forward the argument that color is not primarily for object recognition, but rather for the assessment of the likely behavioral relevance, or meaning, of the stuff we see.

Over the last fifteen years, Simona Ginsburg and I developed an evolutionary approach for studying basic consciousness, suggesting that the evolution of learning drove the evolutionary transition to from non-conscious to conscious animals. I present the rationale underlying this thesis, which has led to the identification of a capacity that we call the evolutionary transition marker, which, when we find evidence of it, we have evidence that the major evolutionary transition in which we are interested has gone to completion. I then put forward our proposal that the evolutionary marker of basic consciousness is a complex form of associative learning that we call unlimited associative learning (UAL), and that the evolution of this capacity drove the transition to consciousness. I discuss the implications of this thesis for questions pertaining to the neural dynamics that constitute conscious, to its taxonomic distribution and to the ecological context in which it first emerged. I end by pointing to some of the ways in which the relationship between UAL and consciousness can be experimentally tested in humans and in non-human animals.