Cognition seminars

How do people learn in real-world environments where the space of possible actions can be vast or even infinite? The study of human learning has made rapid progress in past decades, from discovering the neural substrate of reward prediction errors, to building AI capable of mastering the game of Go. Yet this line of research has primarily focused on learning through repeated interactions with the same stimuli. How are humans able to rapidly adapt to novel situations and learn from such sparse examples? I propose a theory of how generalization guides human learning, by making predictions about which unobserved options are most promising to explore. Inspired by Roger Shepard’s law of generalization, I show how a Bayesian function learning model provides a mechanism for generalizing limited experiences to a wide set of novel possibilities, based on the simple principle that similar actions produce similar outcomes. This model of generalization generates predictions about the expected reward and underlying uncertainty of unexplored options, where both are vital components in how people actively explore the world. This model allows us to explain developmental differences in the explorative behavior of children, and suggests a general principle of learning across spatial, conceptual, and structured domains.

Consciousness is a phenomenon unlike any other studied in natural science. Yet when building theories and designing experiments, we often proceed as if this were not the case. In this talk, I present two recent investigations of mine which explore the implications of consciousness' unique epistemic context for scientific theory building and experimental design. The first investigation is concerned with falsifications of theories of consciousness and identifies a rather deep problem in the usual scheme of testing theories. The second is an axiomatization and subsequent formalization of some of consciousness' more problematic epistemic features that allows to precisely quantify where the usual scientific methodology ceases to be applicable. For both cases, I indicate ways to resolve the problem.

Human neuroimaging research has consistently shown that drug addiction is associated with structural and functional changes within the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). In view of the important role of the OFC in value-based decision-making, these changes have been hypothesised to bias choice towards drug use despite and at the expense of other competing pursuits, thereby explaining drug addiction. Here I will present in vivo recording data in the OFC supporting this hypothesis in a choice-based model of addiction where rats could choose between two actions, one rewarded by a drug (cocaine or heroin), the other by a nondrug alternative (saccharin).

How can people coordinate their actions or make joint decisions? One possibility is that each person attempts to predict the actions of the other(s), and best-responds accordingly. But this can lead to bad outcomes, and sometimes even vicious circularity. An alternative view is that each person attempts to work out what the two or more players would agree to do, if they were to bargain explicitly. If the result of such a "virtual" bargain is "obvious," then the players can simply play their respective roles in that bargain. I suggest that virtual bargaining is essential to genuinely social interaction (rather than viewing other people as instruments), and may even be uniquely human. This approach aims to respect methodological individualism, a key principle in many areas of social science, while explaining how human groups can, in a very real sense, be "greater" than the sum of their individual members.

Current computational models of visual salience accurately predict the distribution of fixations on isolated visual stimuli. It is not known, however, whether the global salience of a stimulus, that is its effectiveness in the competition for attention with other stimuli, is a function of the local salience or an independent measure. Further, do task and familiarity with the competing images influence eye movements? In this talk, I will present the analysis of a computational model of the global salience of natural images. We trained a machine learning algorithm to learn the direction of the first saccade of participants who freely observed pairs of images. The pairs balanced the combinations of new and already seen images, as well as task and task-free trials. The coefficients of the model provided a reliable measure of the likelihood of each image to attract the first fixation when seen next to another image, that is their global salience. For example, images of close-up faces and images containing humans were consistently looked first and were assigned higher global salience. Interestingly, we found that global salience cannot be explained by the feature-driven local salience of images, the influence of task and familiarity was rather small and we reproduced the previously reported left-sided bias. This computational model of global salience allows to analyse multiple other aspects of human visual perception of competing stimuli. In the talk, I will also present our latest results from analysing the saccadic reaction time as a function of the global salience of the pair of images.

Previous work suggests that children’s ability to understand metaphors emerges late in development. Researchers argue that children’s initial failure to understand metaphors is due to an inability to reason about shared relational structures between concepts. However, recent work demonstrates that preschoolers, toddlers, and even infants are already capable of relational reasoning. Might preschoolers also be capable of understanding metaphors, given more sensitive experimental paradigms? I explore whether preschoolers (N = 200, ages 4-5) understand functional metaphors, namely metaphors based on functional similarities. In Experiment 1a, preschoolers rated functional metaphors (e.g. “Roofs are hats”; “Clouds are sponges”) as “smarter” than nonsense statements. In Experiment 1b, adults (N = 48) also rated functional metaphors as “smarter” than nonsense statements (e.g. “Dogs are scissors”; “Boats are skirts”). In Experiment 2, preschoolers preferred functional explanations (e.g. “Both hold water”) over perceptual explanations (e.g. “Both are fluffy”) when interpreting a functional metaphor (e.g. “Clouds are sponges”). In Experiment 3, preschoolers preferred functional metaphors over nonsense statements in a dichotomous-choice task. Overall, this work demonstrates preschoolers’ early-emerging ability to understand functional metaphors.

People from cultures around the world tend to borrow from the domain of space to represent abstract concepts. For example, in the domain on time, we use spatial metaphors (e.g., describing the future as being in front and the past behind), accompany our speech with spatial gestures (e.g., gesturing to the left to refer to a past event), and use external tools that project time onto a spatial reference frame (e.g., calendars). Importantly, these associations are also present in the way we think and reason about time, suggesting that space and time are also linked in the mind. In this talk, I will explore the developmental origins and functional implications of these types of cross-dimensional associations. To start, I will discuss the roles that language and culture play in shaping how children in the US and India represent time. Next, I will use word learning and memory as test cases for exploring why cross-dimensional associations may be cognitively advantageous. Finally, I will talk about future directions and the practical implications for this line of work, with a focus on how encouraging spatial representations of abstract concepts could improve learning outcomes.

Outside the foveola, visual acuity and other visual functions gradually deteriorate with increasing eccentricity. Humans compensate for these limitations by relying on a tight link between perception and action; rapid gaze shifts (saccades) occur 2-3 times every second, separating brief “fixation” intervals in which visual information is acquired and processed. During fixation, however, the eye is not immobile. Small eye movements incessantly shift the image on the retina even when the attended stimulus is already foveated, suggesting a much deeper coupling between visual functions and oculomotor activity. Thanks to a combination of techniques allowing for high-resolution recordings of eye position, retinal stabilization, and accurate gaze localization, we examined how attention and eye movements are controlled at this scale. We have shown that during fixation, visual exploration of fine spatial detail unfolds following visuomotor strategies similar to those occurring at a larger scale. This behavior compensates for non-homogenous visual capabilities within the foveola and is finely controlled by attention, which facilitates processing at selected foveal locations. Ultimately, the limits of high acuity vision are greatly influenced by the spatiotemporal modulations introduced by fixational eye movements. These findings reveal that, contrary to common intuition, placing a stimulus within the foveola is necessary but not sufficient for high visual acuity; fine spatial vision is the outcome of an orchestrated synergy of motor, cognitive, and attentional factors.

Figure-ground organisation and perceptual grouping are classic topics in Gestalt and perceptual psychology. They often appear alongside one another in introductory textbook chapters on perception and have a long history of investigation. However, they are typically discussed as separate processes of perceptual organisation with their own distinct phenomena and mechanisms. Here, I will propose that perceptual grouping and figure-ground organisation are strongly linked. In particular, perceptual grouping can provide a basis for, and may share mechanisms with, a wide range of figure-ground principles. To support this claim, I will describe a new class of figure-ground principles based on perceptual grouping between edges and demonstrate that this inter-edge grouping (IEG) is a powerful influence on figure-ground organisation. I will also draw support from our other results showing that grouping between edges and regions (i.e., edge-region grouping) can affect figure-ground organisation (Palmer & Brooks, 2008) and that contextual influences in figure-ground organisation can be gated by perceptual grouping between edges (Brooks & Driver, 2010). In addition to these modern observations, I will also argue that we can describe some classic figure-ground principles (e.g., symmetry, convexity, etc.) using perceptual grouping mechanisms. These results suggest that figure-ground organisation and perceptual grouping have more than a mere association under the umbrella topics of Gestalt psychology and perceptual organisation. Instead, perceptual grouping may provide a mechanism underlying a broad class of new and extant figure-ground principles.

Much of our daily behavior is driven by rewards. The ability to learn to pursue rewarding experiences is, in fact, an essential metric of mental health. Conversely, reduced capacity to engage in adaptive goal-oriented behavior is the hallmark of apathy, and present in the psychotic disorder. The search for its underlying mechanisms has resulted in findings of profound impairments in learning from rewards and the associated blunted activation in key reward areas of the brain of patients with psychosis. An emerging research field has been relying on digital phenotyping tools and ecological momentary assessments (EMA) that map patients’ current mood, behavior and context in the flow of their daily lives. Using these tools, we have started to see a different picture of apathy, one that is exquisitely driven by the environment. For one, reward sensitivity appears to be blunted by stressors, and exposure to undue chronic stress in the daily life may result in apathy in those predisposed to psychosis. Secondly, even patients with psychosis who exhibit clinically elevated levels of apathy are perfectly capable of seeking out and enjoying social interactions in their daily life, if their environment allows them to do so. The use of digital phenotyping tools in combination with neuroimaging of apathy not only allows us to add meanings to the neurobiological findings, but could also help design rational interventions.

Reliable and validated measures of emotion in animals are of great import; they are crucial to better understanding and developing treatments for human mood disorders, and they are necessary for ensuring good animal welfare. We have developed a novel measure of emotion in animals that is grounded in theory and psychological research – decision-making under ambiguity. Specifically, we consider that more ‘optimistic’ decisions about ambiguous stimuli reflect more positive emotional states, while the opposite is true for more ‘pessimistic’ decisions. In this talk, we will outline the background behind and implementation of this measure, meta-analyses that have been conducted to validate the measure, and discuss how computational modelling has been used to further understand the cognitive processes underlying ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ decision-making as an indicator of animal emotion and welfare.

Sleep has been classically described as an all-or-nothing global phenomenon. However, a growing body of evidence indicates that typical sleep hallmarks, such as slow waves and spindles, occur and are regulated locally. I will present here evidence indicating that slow waves, in particular, may be related with, and offer a read-out of, local and long-range brain connectivity. In fact, slow waves do not only track changes related to both experience-dependent plasticity and brain maturation during development, but also appear to be actively involved in the fine regulation of brain plasticity and in the removal of metabolic wastes. I will also show that, consistent with a local regulation of sleep, slow waves can often occur locally during wakefulness, with an incidence that varies as a function of time spent awake and of previous rest. These waking slow waves are associated with impaired performance during cognitive tasks and may contribute to explain attention lapses and errors commonly associated with insufficient sleep.

Narratives of human evolution have focused on cortical expansion and increases in brain size relative to body size, but considered that changes in life history, such as in age at sexual maturity and thus the extent of childhood and maternal dependence, or maximal longevity, are evolved features that appeared as consequences of selection for increased brain size, or increased cognitive abilities that decrease mortality rates, or due to selection for grandmotherly contribution to feeding the young. Here I build on my recent finding that slower life histories universally accompany increased numbers of cortical neurons across warm-blooded species to propose a simpler framework for human evolution: that slower development to sexual maturity and increased post-maturity longevity are features that do not require selection, but rather inevitably and immediately accompany evolutionary increases in numbers of cortical neurons, thus fostering human social interactions and cultural and technological evolution as generational overlap increases.