Cognition seminars

Every movement we make requires us to precisely coordinate muscle activity across our body in space and time. In this talk I will describe our efforts to understand how the brain generates flexible, coordinated movement. We have taken a behavior-centric approach to this problem, starting with the development of quantitative frameworks for mouse locomotion (LocoMouse; Machado et al., eLife 2015, 2020) and locomotor learning, in which mice adapt their locomotor symmetry in response to environmental perturbations (Darmohray et al., Neuron 2019). Combined with genetic circuit dissection, these studies reveal specific, cerebellum-dependent features of these complex, whole-body behaviors. This provides a key entry point for understanding how neural computations within the highly stereotyped cerebellar circuit support the precise coordination of muscle activity in space and time. Finally, I will present recent unpublished data that provide surprising insights into how cerebellar circuits flexibly coordinate whole-body movements in dynamic environments.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

Humans and other animals approach reward and avoid punishment and pay attention to cues predicting these events. Such motivated behavior thus appears to be guided by value, which directs behavior towards or away from positively or negatively valenced outcomes. Moreover, it is facilitated by (top-down) salience, which enhances attention to behaviorally relevant learned cues predicting the occurrence of valenced outcomes. Using human neuroimaging, we recently separated value (ventral striatum, posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex) from salience (anterior ventromedial cortex, occipital cortex) in the domain of liquid reward and punishment. Moreover, we investigated potential drivers of learned salience: the probability and uncertainty with which valenced and non-valenced outcomes occur. We find that the brain dissociates valenced from non-valenced probability and uncertainty, which indicates that reinforcement matters for the brain, in addition to information provided by probability and uncertainty alone, regardless of valence. Finally, we assessed learning signals (unsigned prediction errors) that may underpin the acquisition of salience. Particularly the insula appears to be central for this function, encoding a subjective salience prediction error, similarly at the time of positively and negatively valenced outcomes. However, it appears to employ domain-specific time constants, leading to stronger salience signals in the aversive than the appetitive domain at the time of cues. These findings explain why previous research associated the insula with both valence-independent salience processing and with preferential encoding of the aversive domain. More generally, the distinction of value and salience appears to provide a useful framework for capturing the neural basis of motivated behavior.

Contrary to the original normative decision-making standpoint, empirical studies have repeatedly reported that risk preferences are affected by the disclosure of choice outcomes (feedback). Although no consensus has yet emerged regarding the properties and mechanisms of this effect, a widespread and intuitive hypothesis is that repeated feedback affects risk preferences by means of a learning effect, which alters the representation of subjective probabilities. Here, we ran a series of seven experiments (N= 538), tailored to decipher the effects of feedback on risk preferences. Our results indicate that the presence of feedback consistently increases risk-taking, even when the risky option is economically less advantageous. Crucially, risk-taking increases just after the instructions, before participants experience any feedback. These results challenge the learning account, and advocate for a dispositional effect, induced by the mere anticipation of feedback information. Epistemic curiosity and regret avoidance may drive this effect in partial and complete feedback conditions, respectively.

Many situations rely on the accurate identification of people with whom we are unfamiliar. For example, security at airports or in police investigations require the identification of individuals from photo-ID. Yet, the identification of unfamiliar faces is error prone, even for practitioners who routinely perform this task. Indeed, even training protocols often yield no discernible improvement. The challenge of unfamiliar face identification is often thought of as a perceptual problem; however, this assumption ignores the potential role of decision-making and its contributing factors (e.g., criterion placement). In this talk, I am going to present a series of experiments that investigate the role of decision-making in face identification.

Recent research has seen many behavioral comparisons between humans and deep neural networks (DNNs) in the domain of image classification. Often, comparison studies focus on the end-result of the learning process by measuring and comparing the similarities in the representations of object categories once they have been formed. However, the process of how these representations emerge—that is, the behavioral changes and intermediate stages observed during the acquisition—is less often directly and empirically compared. In this talk, I'm going to report a detailed investigation of the learning dynamics in human observers and various classic and state-of-the-art DNNs. We develop a constrained supervised learning environment to align learning-relevant conditions such as starting point, input modality, available input data and the feedback provided. Across the whole learning process we evaluate and compare how well learned representations can be generalized to previously unseen test data. Comparisons across the entire learning process indicate that DNNs demonstrate a level of data efficiency comparable to human learners, challenging some prevailing assumptions in the field. However, our results also reveal representational differences: while DNNs' learning is characterized by a pronounced generalisation lag, humans appear to immediately acquire generalizable representations without a preliminary phase of learning training set-specific information that is only later transferred to novel data.

2024 BACN Mid-Career Prize Lecture Adaptive behavior requires the ability to focus on a current task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability), and to rapidly switch tasks when circumstances change (cognitive flexibility). How people control task focus and switch-readiness has therefore been the target of burgeoning research literatures. Here, I review and integrate these literatures to derive a cognitive architecture and functional rules underlying the regulation of stability and flexibility. I propose that task focus and switch-readiness are supported by independent mechanisms whose strategic regulation is nevertheless governed by shared principles: both stability and flexibility are matched to anticipated challenges via an incremental, online learner that nudges control up or down based on the recent history of task demands (a recency heuristic), as well as via episodic reinstatement when the current context matches a past experience (a recognition heuristic).

Keynote Address to British Association of Cognitive Neuroscience, London, 10th September 2024

2024 BACN Early-Career Prize Lecture Many of our decisions affect other people. Our choices can decelerate climate change, stop the spread of infectious diseases, and directly help or harm others. Prosocial behaviours – decisions that help others – could contribute to reducing the impact of these challenges, yet their computational and neural mechanisms remain poorly understood. I will present recent work that examines prosocial motivation, how willing we are to incur costs to help others, prosocial learning, how we learn from the outcomes of our choices when they affect other people, and prosocial preferences, our self-reports of helping others. Throughout the talk, I will outline the possible computational and neural bases of these behaviours, and how they may differ from young adulthood to old age.

Join the NRC for their upcoming Spring Seminar Series hybrid event

Within the last decade, Deep Artificial Neural Networks (DNNs) have emerged as powerful computer vision systems that match or exceed human performance on many benchmark tasks such as image classification. But whether current DNNs are suitable computational models of the human visual system remains an open question: While DNNs have proven to be capable of predicting neural activations in primate visual cortex, psychophysical experiments have shown behavioral differences between DNNs and human subjects, as quantified by error consistency. Error consistency is typically measured by briefly presenting natural or corrupted images to human subjects and asking them to perform an n-way classification task under time pressure. But for how long should stimuli ideally be presented to guarantee a fair comparison with DNNs? Here we investigate the influence of presentation time on error consistency, to test the hypothesis that higher-level processing drives behavioral differences. We systematically vary presentation times of backward-masked stimuli from 8.3ms to 266ms and measure human performance and reaction times on natural, lowpass-filtered and noisy images. Our experiment constitutes a fine-grained analysis of human image classification under both image corruptions and time pressure, showing that even drastically time-constrained humans who are exposed to the stimuli for only two frames, i.e. 16.6ms, can still solve our 8-way classification task with success rates way above chance. We also find that human-to-human error consistency is already stable at 16.6ms.