Seminars

Daphna Shohamy and Ashok Litwin-Kumar bridge experimental and computational neuroscience to explain how the brain assigns significance to memories, how dopamine shapes memory-guided decisions, and how bodily signals influence learning. Isabel Low moderates a public discussion and question session.

Why do individuals, both humans and animals, exhibit personal biases in two-alternative decision-making tasks, even when no clear reason exists to favor one alternative over another? In this talk, I will explore two competing hypotheses to explain these idiosyncratic biases. The first suggests that such tendencies arise from unique personal experiences, where past associations between actions and feedback influence future choices. The second hypothesis proposes that the bias reflects irreducible microscopic heterogeneities in the dynamics of decision-making networks. I will present experimental data and theoretical findings that support the latter hypothesis, shedding new light on the neural mechanisms behind seemingly irrational preferences. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2025-03-05. Recording duration: 00:50:36.

In this webinar on spatial navigation circuits, three researchers—Ann Hermundstad, Ila Fiete, and Barbara Webb—discussed how diverse species solve navigation problems using specialized yet evolutionarily conserved brain structures. Hermundstad illustrated the fruit fly’s central complex, focusing on how hardwired circuit motifs (e.g., sinusoidal steering curves) enable rapid, flexible learning of goal-directed navigation. This framework combines internal heading representations with modifiable goal signals, leveraging activity-dependent plasticity to adapt to new environments. Fiete explored the mammalian head-direction system, demonstrating how population recordings reveal a one-dimensional ring attractor underlying continuous integration of angular velocity. She showed that key theoretical predictions—low-dimensional manifold structure, isometry, uniform stability—are experimentally validated, underscoring parallels to insect circuits. Finally, Webb described honeybee navigation, featuring path integration, vector memories, route optimization, and the famous waggle dance. She proposed that allocentric velocity signals and vector manipulation within the central complex can encode and transmit distances and directions, enabling both sophisticated foraging and inter-bee communication via dance-based cues.

Every movement we make requires us to precisely coordinate muscle activity across our body in space and time. In this talk I will describe our efforts to understand how the brain generates flexible, coordinated movement. We have taken a behavior-centric approach to this problem, starting with the development of quantitative frameworks for mouse locomotion (LocoMouse; Machado et al., eLife 2015, 2020) and locomotor learning, in which mice adapt their locomotor symmetry in response to environmental perturbations (Darmohray et al., Neuron 2019). Combined with genetic circuit dissection, these studies reveal specific, cerebellum-dependent features of these complex, whole-body behaviors. This provides a key entry point for understanding how neural computations within the highly stereotyped cerebellar circuit support the precise coordination of muscle activity in space and time. Finally, I will present recent unpublished data that provide surprising insights into how cerebellar circuits flexibly coordinate whole-body movements in dynamic environments.

2024 BACN Early-Career Prize Lecture Many of our decisions affect other people. Our choices can decelerate climate change, stop the spread of infectious diseases, and directly help or harm others. Prosocial behaviours – decisions that help others – could contribute to reducing the impact of these challenges, yet their computational and neural mechanisms remain poorly understood. I will present recent work that examines prosocial motivation, how willing we are to incur costs to help others, prosocial learning, how we learn from the outcomes of our choices when they affect other people, and prosocial preferences, our self-reports of helping others. Throughout the talk, I will outline the possible computational and neural bases of these behaviours, and how they may differ from young adulthood to old age.

Cognitive maps confer animals with flexible intelligence by representing spatial, temporal, and abstract relationships that can be used to shape thought, planning, and behavior. Cognitive maps have been observed in the hippocampus, but their algorithmic form and the processes by which they are learned remain obscure. Here, we employed large-scale, longitudinal two-photon calcium imaging to record activity from thousands of neurons in the CA1 region of the hippocampus while mice learned to efficiently collect rewards from two subtly different versions of linear tracks in virtual reality. The results provide a detailed view of the formation of a cognitive map in the hippocampus. Throughout learning, both the animal behavior and hippocampal neural activity progressed through multiple intermediate stages, gradually revealing improved task representation that mirrored improved behavioral efficiency. The learning process led to progressive decorrelations in initially similar hippocampal neural activity within and across tracks, ultimately resulting in orthogonalized representations resembling a state machine capturing the inherent struture of the task. We show that a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and a biologically plausible recurrent neural network trained using Hebbian learning can both capture core aspects of the learning dynamics and the orthogonalized representational structure in neural activity. In contrast, we show that gradient-based learning of sequence models such as Long Short-Term Memory networks (LSTMs) and Transformers do not naturally produce such orthogonalized representations. We further demonstrate that mice exhibited adaptive behavior in novel task settings, with neural activity reflecting flexible deployment of the state machine. These findings shed light on the mathematical form of cognitive maps, the learning rules that sculpt them, and the algorithms that promote adaptive behavior in animals. The work thus charts a course toward a deeper understanding of biological intelligence and offers insights toward developing more robust learning algorithms in artificial intelligence.

The last decade has seen a burgeoning interest in studying the neural and computational mechanisms that underpin social learning (learning from others). Many findings support the view that learning from other people is underpinned by the same, ‘domain-general’, mechanisms underpinning learning from non-social stimuli. Despite this, the idea that humans possess social-specific learning mechanisms - adaptive specializations moulded by natural selection to cope with the pressures of group living - persists. In this talk I explore the persistence of this idea. First, I present dissociations between social and non-social learning - patterns of data which are difficult to explain under the domain-general thesis and which therefore support the idea that we have evolved special mechanisms for social learning. Subsequently, I argue that most studies that have dissociated social and non-social learning have employed paradigms in which social information comprises a secondary, additional, source of information that can be used to supplement learning from non-social stimuli. Thus, in most extant paradigms, social and non-social learning differ both in terms of social nature (social or non-social) and status (primary or secondary). I conclude that status is an important driver of apparent differences between social and non-social learning. When we account for differences in status, we see that social and non-social learning share common (dopamine-mediated) mechanisms.

Theories from reinforcement learning have been highly influential for interpreting neural activity in the biological circuits critical for animal and human learning. Central among these is the identification of phasic activity in dopamine neurons as a reward prediction error signal that drives learning in basal ganglia and prefrontal circuits. However, recent findings suggest that dopaminergic prediction error signals have access to complex, structured reward predictions and are sensitive to more properties of outcomes than learning theories with simple scalar value predictions might suggest. Here, I will present recent work in which we probed the identity-specific structure of reward prediction errors in an odor-guided choice task and found evidence for multiple predictive “threads” that segregate reward predictions, and reward prediction errors, according to the specific sensory features of anticipated outcomes. Our results point to an expanded class of neural reinforcement learning algorithms in which biological agents learn rich associative structure from their environment and leverage it to build reward predictions that include information about the specific, and perhaps idiosyncratic, features of available outcomes, using these to guide behavior in even quite simple reward learning tasks.

Brains can gracefully weed out irrelevant stimuli to guide behavior. This feat is believed to rely on a progressive selection of task-relevant stimuli across the cortical hierarchy, but the specific across-area interactions enabling stimulus selection are still unclear. Here, we propose that population gating, occurring within A1 but controlled by top-down inputs from mPFC, can support across-area stimulus selection. Examining single-unit activity recorded while rats performed an auditory context-dependent task, we found that A1 encoded relevant and irrelevant stimuli along a common dimension of its neural space. Yet, the relevant stimulus encoding was enhanced along an extra dimension. In turn, mPFC encoded only the stimulus relevant to the ongoing context. To identify candidate mechanisms for stimulus selection within A1, we reverse-engineered low-rank RNNs trained on a similar task. Our analyses predicted that two context-modulated neural populations gated their preferred stimulus in opposite contexts, which we confirmed in further analyses of A1. Finally, we show in a two-region RNN how population gating within A1 could be controlled by top-down inputs from PFC, enabling flexible across-area communication despite fixed inter-areal connectivity.

New tasks are often similar in structure to old ones. Animals that take advantage of such conserved or “abstract” task structures can master new tasks with minimal training. To understand the neural basis of this abstraction, we developed a novel behavioural paradigm for mice: the “ABCD” task, and recorded from their medial frontal neurons as they learned. Animals learned multiple tasks where they had to visit 4 rewarded locations on a spatial maze in sequence, which defined a sequence of four “task states” (ABCD). Tasks shared the same circular transition structure (… ABCDABCD …) but differed in the spatial arrangement of rewards. As well as improving across tasks, mice inferred that A followed D (i.e. completed the loop) on the very first trial of a new task. This “zero-shot inference” is only possible if animals had learned the abstract structure of the task. Across tasks, individual medial Frontal Cortex (mFC) neurons maintained their tuning to the phase of an animal’s trajectory between rewards but not their tuning to task states, even in the absence of spatial tuning. Intriguingly, groups of mFC neurons formed modules of coherently remapping neurons that maintained their tuning relationships across tasks. Such tuning relationships were expressed as replay/preplay during sleep, consistent with an internal organisation of activity into multiple, task-matched ring attractors. Remarkably, these modules were anchored to spatial locations: neurons were tuned to specific task space “distances” from a particular spatial location. These newly discovered “Spatially Anchored Task clocks” (SATs), suggest a novel algorithm for solving abstraction tasks. Using computational modelling, we show that SATs can perform zero-shot inference on new tasks in the absence of plasticity and guide optimal policy in the absence of continual planning. These findings provide novel insights into the Frontal mechanisms mediating abstraction and flexible behaviour.

Environmental boundaries anchor cognitive maps that support memory. However, trapezoidal boundary geometry distorts the regular firing patterns of entorhinal grid cells proposedly providing a metric for cognitive maps. Here, we test the impact of trapezoidal boundary geometry on human spatial memory using immersive virtual reality. Consistent with reduced regularity of grid patterns in rodents and a grid-cell model based on the eigenvectors of the successor representation, human positional memory was degraded in a trapezoid compared to a square environment; an effect particularly pronounced in the trapezoid’s narrow part. Congruent with spatial frequency changes of eigenvector grid patterns, distance estimates between remembered positions were persistently biased; revealing distorted memory maps that explained behavior better than the objective maps. Our findings demonstrate that environmental geometry affects human spatial memory similarly to rodent grid cell activity — thus strengthening the putative link between grid cells and behavior along with their cognitive functions beyond navigation.

Natural perception relies inherently on inferring causal structure in the environment. However, the neural mechanisms and functional circuits that are essential for representing and updating the hidden causal structure during multisensory processing are unknown. To address this, monkeys were trained to infer the probability of a potential common source from visual and proprioceptive signals on the basis of their spatial disparity in a virtual reality system. The proprioceptive drift reported by monkeys demonstrated that they combined historical information and current multisensory signals to estimate the hidden common source and subsequently updated both the causal structure and sensory representation. Single-unit recordings in premotor and parietal cortices revealed that neural activity in premotor cortex represents the core computation of causal inference, characterizing the estimation and update of the likelihood of integrating multiple sensory inputs at a trial-by-trial level. In response to signals from premotor cortex, neural activity in parietal cortex also represents the causal structure and further dynamically updates the sensory representation to maintain consistency with the causal inference structure. Thus, our results indicate how premotor cortex integrates historical information and sensory inputs to infer hidden variables and selectively updates sensory representations in parietal cortex to support behavior. This dynamic loop of frontal-parietal interactions in the causal inference framework may provide the neural mechanism to answer long-standing questions regarding how neural circuits represent hidden structures for body-awareness and agency.

Decision-making in noisy environments with constant sensory evidence involves integrating sequentially-sampled evidence, a strategy formalized by diffusion models which is supported by decades behavioral and neural findings. By contrast, it is unknown whether this strategy is also used during decision-making when the underlying sensory evidence is expected to change. Here, we trained monkeys to identify the dominant color of a dynamically refreshed checkerboard pattern that doesn't become informative until after a variable delay. Animals' behavioral responses were briefly suppressed after an abrupt change in evidence, and many neurons in the frontal eye field displayed a corresponding dip in activity at this time, similar to the dip frequently observed after stimulus onset. Generalized drift-diffusion models revealed that behavior and neural activity were consistent with a brief suppression of motor output without a change in evidence accumulation itself, in contrast to the popular belief that evidence accumulation is paused or reset. These results suggest that a brief interruption in motor preparation is an important strategy for dealing with changing evidence during perceptual decision making.

The world around us is complex, but at the same time full of meaningful regularities. We can detect, learn and exploit these regularities automatically in an unsupervised manner i.e. without any direct instruction or explicit reward. For example, we effortlessly estimate the average tallness of people in a room, or the boundaries between words in a language. These regularities and prior knowledge, once learned, can affect the way we acquire and interpret new information to build and update our internal model of the world for future decision-making processes. Despite the ubiquity of passively learning from the structured information in the environment, the mechanisms that support learning from real-world experience are largely unknown. By combing sophisticated cognitive tasks in human and rats, neuronal measurements and perturbations in rat and network modelling, we aim to build a multi-level description of how sensory history is utilised in inferring regularities in temporally extended tasks. In this talk, I will specifically focus on a comparative rat and human model, in combination with neural network models to study how past sensory experiences are utilized to impact working memory and decision making behaviours.

One of Tali's cherished goals was to transform biology into physics. In his view, biologists were far too enamored by the details of the specific models they studied, losing sight of the big principles that may govern the behavior of these models. One such big principle that he suggested was the 'information bottleneck (IB) principle'. The iIB principle is an information-theoretical approach for extracting the relevant information that one random variable carries about another. Tali applied the IB principle to numerous problems in biology, gaining important insights in the process. Here I will describe two applications of the IB principle to neurobiological data. The first is the formalization of the notion of surprise that allowed us to rigorously estimate the memory duration and content of neuronal responses in auditory cortex, and the second is an application to behavior, allowing us to estimate 'optimal policies under information constraints' that shed interesting light on rat behavior.

In an ever-changing environment, uncertainty is omnipresent. To deal with this, organisms have evolved mechanisms that allow them to take advantage of environmental regularities in order to make decisions robustly and adjust their behavior efficiently, thus maximizing their chances of survival. In this talk, I will present behavioral evidence that animals perform model-based state inference to predict environmental state changes and adjust their behavior rapidly, rather than slowly updating choice values. This model-based inference process can be described using Bayesian change-point models. Furthermore, I will show that neural populations in the prefrontal cortex accurately predict behavioral switches, and that the activity of these populations is associated with Bayesian estimates. In addition, we will see that learning leads to the emergence of a high-dimensional representational subspace that can be reused when the animals re-learn a previously learned set of action-value associations. Altogether, these findings highlight the role of the PFC in representing a belief about the current state of the world.