Seminars

Margaret Livingstone of Harvard Medical School presents in Princeton Neuroscience Institute's public seminar series. Livingstone's laboratory studies how visual recognition occurs in the primate brain using behavior, brain imaging, and electrophysiology.

Subsecond timing underlies nearly all sensory and motor activities across species and is critical to survival. While subsecond temporal information has been found across cortical and subcortical regions, it is unclear if it is generated locally and intrinsically or if it is a read out of a centralized clock-like mechanism. Indeed, mechanisms of subsecond timing at the circuit level are largely obscure. Primary sensory areas are well-suited to address these question as they have early access to sensory information and provide minimal processing to it: if temporal information is found in these regions, it is likely to be generated intrinsically and locally. We test this hypothesis by training mice to perform an audio-visual temporal pattern sensory discrimination task as we use 2-photon calcium imaging, a technique capable of recording population level activity at single cell resolution, to record activity in primary visual cortex (V1). We have found significant changes in network dynamics through mice’s learning of the task from naive to middle to expert levels. Changes in network dynamics and behavioral performance are well accounted for by an intrinsic model of timing in which the trajectory of q network through high dimensional state space represents temporal sensory information. Conversely, while we found evidence of other temporal encoding models, such as oscillatory activity, we did not find that they accounted for increased performance but were in fact correlated with the intrinsic model itself. These results provide insight into how subsecond temporal information is encoded mechanistically at the circuit level.

The human middle temporal complex (hMT+) has a crucial biological relevance for the processing and detection of direction and speed of motion in visual stimuli. In both humans and monkeys, it has been extensively investigated in terms of its retinotopic properties and selectivity for direction of moving stimuli; however, only in recent years there has been an increasing interest in how neurons in MT encode the speed of motion. In this talk, I will explore the proposed mechanism of speed encoding questioning whether hMT+ neuronal populations encode the stimulus speed directly, or whether they separate motion into its spatial and temporal components. I will characterize how neuronal populations in hMT+ encode the speed of moving visual stimuli using electrocorticography ECoG and 7T fMRI. I will illustrate that the neuronal populations measured in hMT+ are not directly tuned to stimulus speed, but instead encode speed through separate and independent spatial and temporal frequency tuning. Finally, I will suggest that this mechanism may play a role in evaluating multisensory responses for visual, tactile and auditory stimuli in hMT+.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Information processing is energetically expensive. In the mammalian brain, it is unclear how information coding and energy usage are regulated during food scarcity. I addressed this in the visual cortex of awake mice using whole-cell recordings and two-photon imaging to monitor layer 2/3 neuronal activity and ATP usage. I found that food restriction reduced synaptic ATP usage by 29% through a decrease in AMPA receptor conductance. Neuronal excitability was nonetheless preserved by a compensatory increase in input resistance and a depolarized resting membrane potential. Consequently, neurons spiked at similar rates as controls, but spent less ATP on underlying excitatory currents. This energy-saving strategy had a cost since it amplified the variability of visually-evoked subthreshold responses, leading to a 32% broadening in orientation tuning and impaired fine visual discrimination. This reduction in coding precision was associated with reduced levels of the fat mass-regulated hormone leptin and was restored by exogenous leptin supplementation. These findings reveal novel mechanisms that dynamically regulate energy usage and coding precision in neocortex.

Episodic memory performance decreases with advancing age. According to theoretical models, such memory decline might be a consequence of age-related reductions in the ability to form distinct neural representations of our past. In this talk, I want to present our new age-comparative fMRI study investigating age-related neural dedifferentiation across different representational levels. By combining univariate analyses and searchlight pattern similarity analyses, we found that older adults show reduced category selective processing in higher visual areas, less specific item representations in occipital regions and less stable item representations. Dedifferentiation on all these representational levels was related to memory performance, with item specificity being the strongest contributor. Overall, our results emphasize that age-related dedifferentiation can be observed across the entire cortical hierarchy which may selectively impair memory performance depending on the memory task.

To date, neuroimaging research has had a limited focus on non-social features of autism. As a result, neurobiological explanations for atypical sensory perception in autism are lacking. To address this, we quantitively condensed findings from the non-social autism fMRI literature in line with the current best practices for neuroimaging meta-analyses. Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), we conducted a series of robust meta-analyses across 83 experiments from 52 fMRI studies investigating differences between autistic (n = 891) and typical (n = 967) participants. We found that typical controls, compared to autistic people, show greater activity in the prefrontal cortex (BA9, BA10) during perception tasks. More refined analyses revealed that, when compared to typical controls, autistic people show greater recruitment of the extrastriate V2 cortex (BA18) during visual processing. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of current theories of autistic perception, and highlight some of the challenges of cognitive neuroscience research in autism.

The human visual system enables us to recognize objects (e.g., this is a cup) and act upon them (e.g., grasp the cup) with astonishing ease and accuracy. For decades, it was widely accepted that these different functions rely on two separated cortical pathways. The ventral occipitotemporal pathway subserves object recognition, while the dorsal occipitoparietal pathway promotes visually guided actions. In my talk, I will discuss recent evidence from a series of neuropsychological, developmental and neuroimaging studies that were aimed to explore the nature of object representations in the dorsal pathway. The results from these studies highlight the plausible role of the dorsal pathway in object perception and reveal an interplay between shape representations derived by the two pathways. Together, these findings challenge the binary distinction between the two pathways and are consistent with the view that object recognition is not the sole product of ventral pathway computations, but instead relies on a distributed network of regions.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

The ability to encode the direction of image motion is fundamental to our sense of vision. Direction selectivity along the four cardinal directions is thought to originate in direction-selective ganglion cells (DSGCs), due to directionally-tuned GABAergic suppression by starburst cells. Here, by utilizing two-photon glutamate imaging to measure synaptic release, we reveal that direction selectivity along all four directions arises earlier than expected, at bipolar cell outputs. Thus, DSGCs receive directionally-aligned glutamatergic inputs from bipolar cell boutons. We further show that this bouton-specific tuning relies on cholinergic excitation and GABAergic inhibition from starburst cells. In this way, starburst cells are able to refine directional tuning in the excitatory visual pathway by modulating the activity of DSGC dendrites and their axonal inputs using two different neurotransmitters.

How does a circuit of neurons process sensory information? And how are transformations of neural signals altered by changes in synaptic strength? We investigate these questions in the context of the visual system and the lateral line of fish. A distinguishing feature of our approach is the imaging of activity across populations of synapses – the fundamental elements of signal transfer within all brain circuits. A guiding hypothesis is that the plasticity of neurotransmission plays a major part in controlling the input-output relation of sensory circuits, regulating the tuning and sensitivity of neurons to allow adaptation or sensitization to particular features of the input. Sensory systems continuously adjust their input-output relation according to the recent history of the stimulus. A common alteration is a decrease in the gain of the response to a constant feature of the input, termed adaptation. For instance, in the retina, many of the ganglion cells (RGCs) providing the output produce their strongest responses just after the temporal contrast of the stimulus increases, but the response declines if this input is maintained. The advantage of adaptation is that it prevents saturation of the response to strong stimuli and allows for continued signaling of future increases in stimulus strength. But adaptation comes at a cost: a reduced sensitivity to a future decrease in stimulus strength. The retina compensates for this loss of information through an intriguing strategy: while some RGCs adapt following a strong stimulus, a second population gradually becomes sensitized. We found that the underlying circuit mechanisms involve two opposing forms of synaptic plasticity in bipolar cells: synaptic depression causes adaptation and facilitation causes sensitization. Facilitation is in turn caused by depression in inhibitory synapses providing negative feedback. These opposing forms of plasticity can cause simultaneous increases and decreases in contrast-sensitivity of different RGCs, which suggests a general framework for understanding the function of sensory circuits: plasticity of both excitatory and inhibitory synapses control dynamic changes in tuning and gain.

In many ways, cognitive neuroscience is the attempt to use physiological observation to clarify the mechanisms that shape behavior. Over the past 25 years, fMRI has provided a system-wide and yet somewhat spatially precise view of the response in human cortex evoked by a wide variety of stimuli and task contexts. The current talk focuses on the other direction of inference; the implications of this observed functional organization for behavior. To begin, we must interrogate the methodological and empirical frameworks underlying our derivation of this organization, partially by exploring its relationship to and predictability from gross neuroanatomy. Next, across a series of studies, the implications of two properties of functional organization for behavior will be explored: 1) the co-localization of visual working memory and perceptual processing and 2) implicit learning in the context of distributed responses. In sum, these results highlight the limitations of our current approach and hint at a new general mechanism for explaining observed behavior in context with the neural substrate.

Many visual systems can process information in dynamically changing environments. In general, visual perception scales with changes in the visual stimulus, or contrast, irrespective of background illumination. This is achieved by adaptation. However, visual perception is challenged when adaptation is not fast enough to deal with sudden changes in overall illumination, for example when gaze follows a moving object from bright sunlight into a shaded area. We have recently shown that the visual system of the fly found a solution by propagating a corrective luminance-sensitive signal to higher processing stages. Using in vivo two-photon imaging and behavioural analyses we showed that distinct OFF-pathway inputs encode contrast and luminance. The luminance-sensitive pathway is particularly required when processing visual motion in contextual dim light, when pure contrast sensitivity underestimates the salience of a stimulus. Recent work in the lab has addressed the question how two visual pathways obtain such fundamentally different sensitivities, given common photoreceptor input. We are furthermore currently working out the network-based strategies by which luminance- and contrast-sensitive signals are combined to guide appropriate visual behaviour. Together, I will discuss the molecular, cellular, and circuit mechanisms that ensure contrast computation, and therefore robust vision, in fast changing visual scenes.