Seminars

In this webinar on spatial navigation circuits, three researchers—Ann Hermundstad, Ila Fiete, and Barbara Webb—discussed how diverse species solve navigation problems using specialized yet evolutionarily conserved brain structures. Hermundstad illustrated the fruit fly’s central complex, focusing on how hardwired circuit motifs (e.g., sinusoidal steering curves) enable rapid, flexible learning of goal-directed navigation. This framework combines internal heading representations with modifiable goal signals, leveraging activity-dependent plasticity to adapt to new environments. Fiete explored the mammalian head-direction system, demonstrating how population recordings reveal a one-dimensional ring attractor underlying continuous integration of angular velocity. She showed that key theoretical predictions—low-dimensional manifold structure, isometry, uniform stability—are experimentally validated, underscoring parallels to insect circuits. Finally, Webb described honeybee navigation, featuring path integration, vector memories, route optimization, and the famous waggle dance. She proposed that allocentric velocity signals and vector manipulation within the central complex can encode and transmit distances and directions, enabling both sophisticated foraging and inter-bee communication via dance-based cues.

Non-human great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. This presentation will summarise the arguments developed in a recent paper with Christophe Heintz. We make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a ‘special case of’ framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. The paper also argues that the attested tendencies of great ape interaction—for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than ‘displaced’—are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. I will reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie in gradual changes in not communication systems as such, but rather in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species’ cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, ‘language ready’.

When experts are immersed in a task, a natural assumption is that their brains prioritize task-related activity. Accordingly, most efforts to understand neural activity during well-learned tasks focus on cognitive computations and task-related movements. Surprisingly, we observed that during decision-making, the cortex-wide activity of multiple cell types is dominated by movements, especially “uninstructed movements”, that are spontaneously expressed. These observations argue that animals execute expert decisions while performing richly varied, uninstructed movements that profoundly shape neural activity. To understand the relationship between these movements and decision-making, we examined the movements more closely. We tested whether the magnitude or the timing of the movements was correlated with decision-making performance. To do this, we partitioned movements into two groups: task-aligned movements that were well predicted by task events (such as the onset of the sensory stimulus or choice) and task independent movement (TIM) that occurred independently of task events. TIM had a reliable, inverse correlation with performance in head-restrained mice and freely moving rats. This hinted that the timing of spontaneous movements could indicate periods of disengagement. To confirm this, we compared TIM to the latent behavioral states recovered by a hidden Markov model with Bernoulli generalized linear model observations (GLM-HMM) and found these, again, to be inversely correlated. Finally, we examined the impact of these behavioral states on neural activity. Surprisingly, we found that the same movement impacts neural activity more strongly when animals are disengaged. An intriguing possibility is that these larger movement signals disrupt cognitive computations, leading to poor decision-making performance. Taken together, these observations argue that movements and cognitionare closely intertwined, even during expert decision-making.

Humans and animals are not always rational. They not only rationally exploit rewards but also explore an environment owing to their curiosity. However, the mechanism of such curiosity-driven irrational behavior is largely unknown. Here, we developed a decision-making model for a two-choice task based on the free energy principle, which is a theory integrating recognition and action selection. The model describes irrational behaviors depending on the curiosity level. We also proposed a machine learning method to decode temporal curiosity from behavioral data. By applying it to rat behavioral data, we found that the rat had negative curiosity, reflecting conservative selection sticking to more certain options and that the level of curiosity was upregulated by the expected future information obtained from an uncertain environment. Our decoding approach can be a fundamental tool for identifying the neural basis for reward–curiosity conflicts. Furthermore, it could be effective in diagnosing mental disorders.

Running, swimming, or flying through the world, animals are constantly making decisions while on the move—decisions that allow them to choose where to eat, where to hide, and with whom to associate. Despite this most studies have considered only on the outcome of, and time taken to make, decisions. Motion is, however, crucial in terms of how space is represented by organisms during spatial decision-making. Employing a range of new technologies, including automated tracking, computational reconstruction of sensory information, and immersive ‘holographic’ virtual reality (VR) for animals, experiments with fruit flies, locusts and zebrafish (representing aerial, terrestrial and aquatic locomotion, respectively), I will demonstrate that this time-varying representation results in the emergence of new and fundamental geometric principles that considerably impact decision-making. Specifically, we find that the brain spontaneously reduces multi-choice decisions into a series of abrupt (‘critical’) binary decisions in space-time, a process that repeats until only one option—the one ultimately selected by the individual—remains. Due to the critical nature of these transitions (and the corresponding increase in ‘susceptibility’) even noisy brains are extremely sensitive to very small differences between remaining options (e.g., a very small difference in neuronal activity being in “favor” of one option) near these locations in space-time. This mechanism facilitates highly effective decision-making, and is shown to be robust both to the number of options available, and to context, such as whether options are static (e.g. refuges) or mobile (e.g. other animals). In addition, we find evidence that the same geometric principles of decision-making occur across scales of biological organisation, from neural dynamics to animal collectives, suggesting they are fundamental features of spatiotemporal computation.

Understanding what makes human unique is a fundamental research drive for comparative psychologists. Cognitive abilities such as theory of mind, cooperation or mental time travel have been considered uniquely human. Despite empirical evidence showing that animals other than humans are able (to some extent) of these cognitive achievements, findings are still heavily contested. In this context, being able to abstract relations of similarity has also been considered one of the hallmarks of human cognition. While previous research has shown that other animals (e.g., primates) can attend to relational similarity, less is known about what invertebrates can do. In this talk, I will present a series of spatial matching tasks that previously were used with children and great apes and that I adapted for use with wild-caught bumblebees. The findings from these studies suggest striking similarities between vertebrates and invertebrates in their abilities to attend to relational similarity.

What do nonhuman primates know about each other and their social environment, how do they allocate their attention, and what are the functional consequences of social decisions in natural settings? Addressing these questions is crucial to hone in on the co-evolution of cognition, social behaviour and communication, and ultimately the evolution of intelligence in the primate order. I will present results from field experimental and observational studies on free-ranging baboons, which tap into the cognitive abilities of these animals. Baboons are particularly valuable in this context as different species reveal substantial variation in social organization and degree of despotism. Field experiments revealed considerable variation in the allocation of social attention: while the competitive chacma baboons were highly sensitive to deviations from the social order, the highly tolerant Guinea baboons revealed a confirmation bias. This bias may be a result of the high gregariousness of the species, which puts a premium on ignoring social noise. Variation in despotism clearly impacted the use of signals to regulate social interactions. For instance, male-male interactions in chacma baboons mostly comprised dominance displays, while Guinea baboon males evolved elaborate greeting rituals that serve to confirm group membership and test social bonds. Strikingly, the structure of signal repertoires does not differ substantially between different baboon species. In conclusion, the motivational disposition to engage in affiliation or aggressiveness appears to be more malleable during evolution than structural elements of the behavioral repertoire; this insight is crucial for understanding the dynamics of social evolution.

Many insect species maintain a nest around which their foraging behaviour is centered, and can use path integration to maintain an accurate estimate of their distance and direction (a vector) to their nest. Some species, such as bees and ants, can also store the vector information for multiple salient locations in the world, such as food sources, in a common coordinate system. They can also use remembered views of the terrain around salient locations or along travelled routes to guide return. Recent modelling of these abilities shows convergence on a small set of algorithms and assumptions that appear sufficient to account for a wide range of behavioural data, and which can be mapped to specific insect brain circuits. Notably, this does not include any significant topological knowledge: the insect does not need to recover the information (implicit in their vector memory) about the relationships between salient places; nor to maintain any connectedness or ordering information between view memories; nor to form any associations between views and vectors. However, there remains some experimental evidence not fully explained by these algorithms that may point towards the existence of a more complex or integrated mental map in insects.

Life Perceives is a symposium bringing together scientists and artists for an open exploration of how “perception” can be understood as a phenomenon that does not only belong to humans, or even the so-called “higher organisms”, but exists across the entire spectrum of life in a myriad of forms. The symposium invites leading practitioners from the arts and sciences to present unique insights through short talks, open discussions, and artistic interventions that bring us slightly closer to the life worlds of plants and fungi, microbial communities and immune systems, cuttlefish and crows. What do we mean when we talk about perception in other species? Do other organisms have an experience of the world? Or does our human-centred perspective make understanding other forms of life on their own terms an impossible dream? Whatever your answers to these questions may be, we hope to unsettle them, and leave you more curious than when you arrived.

Can nonhuman animals perceive the relation-between-relations? This intriguing question has been studied over the last 40 years; nonetheless, the extent to which nonhuman species can do so remains controversial. Here, I review empirical evidence suggesting that pigeons, parrots, crows, and baboons join humans in reliably acquiring and transferring relational matching-to-sample (RMTS). Many theorists consider that RMTS captures the essence of analogy, because basic to analogy is appreciating the ‘relation between relations.’ Factors affecting RMTS performance include: prior training experience, the entropy of the sample stimulus, and whether the items that serve as sample stimuli can also serve as choice stimuli.

Over the course of evolution, the human race has achieved a number of remarkable innovations, that have enabled us to adapt to and benefit from the environment ever more effectively. The ongoing environmental threats and health disasters of our world have now made it crucial to understand the cognitive mechanisms behind innovative behaviours. In my talk, I will present two research projects with examples of innovation-based behavioural adaptation from the taxonomic kingdom of animals, serving as a comparative psychological model for mapping the evolution of innovation. The first project focuses on the challenge of overcoming physical disability. In this study, we investigated an injured kea (Nestor notabilis) that exhibits an efficient, intentional, and innovative tool-use behaviour to compensate his disability, showing evidence for innovation-based adaptation to a physical disability in a non-human species. The second project focuses on the evolution of fire use from a cognitive perspective. Fire has been one of the most dominant ecological forces in human evolution; however, it is still unknown what capabilities and environmental factors could have led to the emergence of fire use. In the core study of this project, we investigated a captive population of Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) that has been regularly exposed to campfires during the cold winter months for over 60 years. Our results suggest that macaques are able to take advantage of the positive effects of fire while avoiding the dangers of flames and hot ashes, and exhibit calm behaviour around the bonfire. In addition, I will present a research proposal targeting the foraging behaviour of predatory birds in parts of Australia frequently affected by bushfires. Anecdotal reports suggest that some birds use burning sticks to spread the flames, a behaviour that has not been scientifically observed and evaluated. In summary, the two projects explore innovative behaviours along three different species groups, three different habitats, and three different ecological drivers, providing insights into the cognitive and behavioural mechanisms of adaptation through innovation.

Several species of insects have been observed to perform accurate path integration, constantly updating a vector memory of their location relative to a starting position, which they can use to take a direct return path. Foraging insects such as bees and ants are also able to store and recall the vectors to return to food locations, and to take novel shortcuts between these locations. Other insects, such as dung beetles, are observed to integrate multimodal directional cues in a manner well described by vector addition. All these processes appear to be functions of the Central Complex, a highly conserved and strongly structured circuit in the insect brain. Modelling this circuit, at the single neuron level, suggests it has general capabilities for vector encoding, vector memory, vector addition and vector rotation that can support a wide range of directed and navigational behaviours.

Language appears to be the most complex system of animal communication described to date. However, its precursors were present in the communication of our evolutionary ancestors and are likely shared by our modern ape cousins. All great apes, including humans, employ a rich repertoire of vocalizations, facial expressions, and gestures. Great ape gestural repertoires are particularly elaborate, with ape species employing over 80 different gesture types intentionally: that is towards a recipient with a specific goal in mind. Intentional usage allows us to ask not only what information is encoded in ape gestures, but what do apes mean when they use them. I will discuss recent research on ape gesture, on how we approach the question of decoding meaning, and how with new methods we are starting to integrate long overlooked aspects of ape gesture such as group and individual variation, and expression and emotion into our study of these signals.

It is critical for all animals to make appropriate, but also flexible, foraging decisions, especially when facing starvation. Sensing olfactory information is essential to evaluate food quality before ingestion. Previously, we found that Drosophila larvae switch their response to certain odors from aversion to attraction when food deprived. The neural mechanism underlying this switch in behavior involves serotonergic modulation and reconfiguration of odor processing in the early olfactory sensory system. We now investigate if a change in hunger state also influences other behavioral decisions. Since it had been shown that fly larvae can perform cannibalism, we investigate the effect of food deprivation on feeding on dead conspecifics. We find that fed fly larvae rarely use dead conspecifics as a food source. However, food deprivation largely enhances this behavior. We will now also investigate the underlying neural mechanisms that mediate this enhancement and compare it to the already described mechanism for a switch in olfactory choice behavior. Generally, this flexibility in foraging behavior enables the larva to explore a broader range of stimuli and to expand their feeding choices to overcome starvation.

Sex-based modulation of cognitive processes could set the stage for individual differences in vulnerability to neuropsychiatric disorders. While value-based decision making processes in particular have been proposed to be influenced by sex differences, the overall correct performance in decision making tasks often show variable or minimal differences across sexes. Computational tools allow us to uncover latent variables that define different decision making approaches, even in animals with similar correct performance. Here, we quantify sex differences in mice in the latent variables underlying behavior in a classic value-based decision making task: a restless two-armed bandit. While male and female mice had similar accuracy, they achieved this performance via different patterns of exploration. Male mice tended to make more exploratory choices overall, largely because they appeared to get ‘stuck’ in exploration once they had started. Female mice tended to explore less but learned more quickly during exploration. Together, these results suggest that sex exerts stronger influences on decision making during periods of learning and exploration than during stable choices. Exploration during decision making is altered in people diagnosed with addictions, depression, and neurodevelopmental disabilities, pinpointing the neural mechanisms of exploration as a highly translational avenue for conferring sex-modulated vulnerability to neuropsychiatric diagnoses.

Inter-individual variability refers to differences in the expression of behaviors between members of a population. For instance, some individuals take greater risks, are more attracted to immediate gains or are more susceptible to drugs of abuse than others. To probe the neural bases of inter-individual variability we study reward seeking and decision-making in mice, and dissect the specific role of dopamine in the modulation of these behaviors. Using a spatial version of the multi-armed bandit task, in which mice are faced with consecutive binary choices, we could link modifications of midbrain dopamine cell dynamics with modulation of exploratory behaviors, a major component of individual characteristics in mice. By analyzing mouse behaviors in semi-naturalistic environments, we then explored the role of social relationships in the shaping of dopamine activity and associated beahviors. I will present recent data from the laboratory suggesting that changes in the activity of dopaminergic networks link social influences with variations in the expression of non-social behaviors: by acting on the dopamine system, the social context may indeed affect the capacity of individuals to make decisions, as well as their vulnerability to drugs of abuse, in particular nicotine.

Mammals instinctively explore and form mental maps of their spatial environments. Models of cognitive mapping in neuroscience mostly depict map-learning as a process of random or biased diffusion. In practice, however, animals explore spaces using structured, purposeful, sensory-guided actions. We have used threat-evoked escape behavior in mice to probe the relationship between ethological exploratory behavior and abstract spatial cognition. First, we show that in arenas with obstacles and a shelter, mice spontaneously learn efficient multi-step escape routes by memorizing allocentric subgoal locations. Using closed-loop neural manipulations to interrupt running movements during exploration, we next found that blocking runs targeting an obstacle edge abolished subgoal learning. We conclude that mice use an action-driven learning process to identify subgoals, and these subgoals are then integrated into an allocentric map-like representation. We suggest a conceptual framework for spatial learning that is compatible with the successor representation from reinforcement learning and sensorimotor enactivism from cognitive science.