Analogical Learning
analogical learning
The impact of analogical learning approaches on mathematics education
Is Rule Learning Like Analogy?
Humans’ ability to perceive and abstract relational structure is fundamental to our learning. It allows us to acquire knowledge all the way from linguistic grammar to spatial knowledge to social structures. How does a learner begin to perceive structure in the world? Why do we sometimes fail to see structural commonalities across events? To begin to answer these questions, I attempt to bridge two large, yet somewhat separate research traditions in understanding human’s structural abstraction: rule learning (Marcus et al., 1999) and analogical learning (Gentner, 1989). On the one hand, rule learning research has shown humans’ domain-general ability and ease—as early as 7-month-olds—to abstract structure from a limited experience. On the other hand, analogical learning works have shown robust constraints in structural abstraction: young learners prefer object similarity over relational similarity. To understand this seeming paradox between ease and difficulty, we conducted a series of studies using the classic rule learning paradigm (Marcus et al., 1999) but with an analogical (object vs. relation) twist. Adults were presented with 2-minute sentences or events (syllables or shapes) containing a rule. At test, they had to choose between rule abstraction and object matches—the same syllable or shape they saw before. Surprisingly, while in the absence of object matches adults were perfectly capable of abstracting the rule, their ability to do so declined sharply when object matches were present. Our initial results suggest that rule learning ability may be subject to the usual constraints and signatures of analogical learning: preference to object similarity can dampen rule generalization. Humans’ abstraction is also concrete at the same time.
Analogical Reasoning and Executive Functions - A Life Span Approach
From a developmental standpoint, it has been argued that two major complementary factors contribute to the development of analogy comprehension: world knowledge and executive functions. Here I will provide evidence in support of the second view. Beyond paradigms that manipulate task difficulty (e.g., number and types of distractors and semantic distance between domains) we will provide eye-tracking data that describes differences in the way children and adults compare the base and target domains in analogy problems. We will follow the same approach with ageing people. This latter population provides a unique opportunity to disentangle the contribution of knowledge and executive processes in analogy making since knowledge is (more than) preserved and executive control is decreasing. Using this paradigm, I will show the extent to which world knowledge (assessed through vocabulary) compensates for decreasing executive control in older populations. Our eye-tracking data suggests that, to a certain extent, differences between younger and older adults are analogous to the differences between younger adults and children in the way they compare the base and the target domains in analogy problems.