Anthropology
anthropology
Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean
Non-human great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. This presentation will summarise the arguments developed in a recent paper with Christophe Heintz. We make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a ‘special case of’ framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. The paper also argues that the attested tendencies of great ape interaction—for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than ‘displaced’—are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. I will reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie in gradual changes in not communication systems as such, but rather in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species’ cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, ‘language ready’.
A mind set in stone: fossil traces of human brain evolution
Brains do not fossilise, but as they grow and expand during fetal and infant development, they leave an imprint in the bony braincase. Such imprints of fossilised braincases provide direct evidence of brain evolution, but the underlying biological changes have remained elusive. Combining data from fossil skulls, ancient genomes, brain imaging and gene expression helps shed light on the evolutionary changes shaping the human brain. I will highlight two examples separated by more than 3 million years: the evolution of brain growth in Lucy and her kind, and differences between modern humans and Neanderthals.
Do Capuchin Monkeys, Chimpanzees and Children form Overhypotheses from Minimal Input? A Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling Approach
Abstract concepts are a powerful tool to store information efficiently and to make wide-ranging predictions in new situations based on sparse data. Whereas looking-time studies point towards an early emergence of this ability in human infancy, other paradigms like the relational match to sample task often show a failure to detect abstract concepts like same and different until the late preschool years. Similarly, non-human animals have difficulties solving those tasks and often succeed only after long training regimes. Given the huge influence of small task modifications, there is an ongoing debate about the conclusiveness of these findings for the development and phylogenetic distribution of abstract reasoning abilities. Here, we applied the concept of “overhypotheses” which is well known in the infant and cognitive modeling literature to study the capabilities of 3 to 5-year-old children, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys in a unified and more ecologically valid task design. In a series of studies, participants themselves sampled reward items from multiple containers or witnessed the sampling process. Only when they detected the abstract pattern governing the reward distributions within and across containers, they could optimally guide their behavior and maximize the reward outcome in a novel test situation. We compared each species’ performance to the predictions of a probabilistic hierarchical Bayesian model capable of forming overhypotheses at a first and second level of abstraction and adapted to their species-specific reward preferences.
Sensory-motor control, cognition and brain evolution: exploring the links
Drawing on recent findings from evolutionary anthropology and neuroscience, professor Barton will lead us through the amazing story of the evolution of human cognition. Usingstatistical, phylogenetic analyses that tease apart the variation associated with different neural systems and due to different selection pressures, he will be addressing intriguing questions like ‘Why are there so many neurons in the cerebellum?’, ‘Is the neocortex the ‘intelligent’ bit of the brain?’, and ‘What explains that the recognition by humans of emotional expressions is disrupted by trancranial magnetic stimulation of the somatosensory cortex?’ Could, as professor Barton suggests, the cerebellum -modestly concealed beneath the volumetrically dominating neocortex and largely ignored- turn out to be the Cinderella of the study of brain evolution?