The neurobiological mechanisms of arousal and anesthesia remain poorly understood. Recent evidence highlights the key role of interactions between the cerebral cortex and the diffusely projecting matrix thalamic nuclei. Here, we interrogate these processes in a whole-brain corticothalamic neural mass model endowed with targeted and diffusely projecting thalamocortical nuclei inferred from empirical data. This model captures key features seen in propofol anesthesia, including diminished network integration, lowered state diversity, impaired susceptibility to perturbation, and decreased corticocortical coherence. Collectively, these signatures reflect a suppression of information transfer across the cerebral cortex. We recover these signatures of conscious arousal by selectively stimulating the matrix thalamus, recapitulating empirical results in macaque, as well as wake-like information processing states that reflect the thalamic modulation of largescale cortical attractor dynamics. Our results highlight the role of matrix thalamocortical projections in shaping many features of complex cortical dynamics to facilitate the unique communication states supporting conscious awareness.

It is widely accepted that human cognition is the product of spiking neurons. Yet even for basic cognitive functions, such as the ability to make decisions or prepare and execute a voluntary movement, the gap between spikes and computation is vast. Only for very simple circuits and reflexes can one explain computations neuron-by-neuron and spike-by-spike. This approach becomes infeasible when neurons are numerous the flow of information is recurrent. To understand computation, one thus requires appropriate abstractions. An increasingly common abstraction is the neural ‘factor’. Factors are central to many explanations in systems neuroscience. Factors provide a framework for describing computational mechanism, and offer a bridge between data and concrete models. Yet there remains some discomfort with this abstraction, and with any attempt to provide mechanistic explanations above that of spikes, neurons, cell-types, and other comfortingly concrete entities. I will explain why, for many networks of spiking neurons, factors are not only a well-defined abstraction, but are critical to understanding computation mechanistically. Indeed, factors are as real as other abstractions we now accept: pressure, temperature, conductance, and even the action potential itself. I use recent empirical results to illustrate how factor-based hypotheses have become essential to the forming and testing of scientific hypotheses. I will also show how embracing factor-level descriptions affords remarkable power when decoding neural activity for neural engineering purposes.

In this lecture, I would like to share with the broad audience the empirical results gathered and the theoretical advancements made in the framework of the Lendület project entitled ’The cognitive basis of human sociality’. The main objective of this project was to understand the mechanisms that enable the unique sociality of humans, from the angle of cognitive science. In my talk,  I will focus on recent empirical evidence in the study of three fundamental social cognitive functions (social categorization, theory of mind and social learning; mainly from the empirical lenses of developmental psychology) in order to outline a theory that emphasizes the need to consider their interconnectedness. The proposal is that the ability to represent the social world along categories and the capacity to read others’ minds are used in an integrated way to efficiently assess the epistemic states of fellow humans by creating a shared representational space. The emergence of this shared representational space is both the result of and a prerequisite to efficient learning about the physical and social environment.

Retinal projections often poorly represent the structure of the physical world: well-defined boundaries within the eye may correspond to irrelevant features of the physical world, while critical features of the physical world may be nearly invisible at the retinal projection. Visual cortex is equipped with specialized mechanisms for sorting these two types of features according to their utility in interpreting the scene, however we know little or nothing about their perceptual computations. I will present novel paradigms for the characterization of these processes in human vision, alongside examples of how the associated empirical results can be combined with targeted models to shape our understanding of the underlying perceptual mechanisms. Although the emerging view is far from complete, it challenges compartmentalized notions of bottom-up/top-down object segmentation, and suggests instead that these two modes are best viewed as an integrated perceptual mechanism.