Enaction plays a central role in the broader fabric of so-called 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognition. Although the origin of the enactive approach is widely dated to the 1991 publication of the book "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, many of the central ideas trace to much earlier work. Over 40 years ago, the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela put forward the notion of autopoiesis as a way to understand living systems and the phenomena that they generate, including cognition. Varela and others subsequently extended this framework to an enactive approach that places biological autonomy at the foundation of situated and embodied behavior and cognition. I will describe an attempt to place Maturana and Varela's original ideas on a firmer foundation by studying them within the context of a toy model universe, John Conway's Game of Life (GoL) cellular automata. This work has both pedagogical and theoretical goals. Simple concrete models provide an excellent vehicle for introducing some of the core concepts of autopoiesis and enaction and explaining how these concepts fit together into a broader whole. In addition, a careful analysis of such toy models can hone our intuitions about these concepts, probe their strengths and weaknesses, and move the entire enterprise in the direction of a more mathematically rigorous theory. In particular, I will identify the primitive processes that can occur in GoL, show how these can be linked together into mutually-supporting networks that underlie persistent bounded entities, map the responses of such entities to environmental perturbations, and investigate the paths of mutual perturbation that these entities and their environments can undergo.

In recent years it has become increasingly clear that (Shannon) information is a central resource for organisms, akin in importance to energy. Any decision that an organism or a subsystem of an organism takes involves the acquisition, selection, and processing of information and ultimately its concentration and enaction. It is the consequences of this balance that will occupy us in this talk. This perception-action loop picture of an agent's life cycle is well established and expounded especially in the context of Fuster's sensorimotor hierarchies. Nevertheless, the information-theoretic perspective drastically expands the potential and predictive power of the perception-action loop perspective. On the one hand information can be treated - to a significant extent - as a resource that is being sought and utilized by an organism. On the other hand, unlike energy, information is not additive. The intrinsic structure and dynamics of information can be exceedingly complex and subtle; in the last two decades one has discovered that Shannon information possesses a rich and nontrivial intrinsic structure that must be taken into account when informational contributions, information flow or causal interactions of processes are investigated, whether in the brain or in other complex processes. In addition, strong parallels between information and control theory have emerged. This parallelism between the theories allows one to obtain unexpected insights into the nature and properties of the perception-action loop. Through the lens of information theory, one can not only come up with novel hypotheses about necessary conditions for the organization of information processing in a brain, but also with constructive conjectures and predictions about what behaviours, brain structure and dynamics and even evolutionary pressures one can expect to operate on biological organisms, induced purely by informational considerations.