Free Energy Principle
free energy principle
Decoding mental conflict between reward and curiosity in decision-making
Humans and animals are not always rational. They not only rationally exploit rewards but also explore an environment owing to their curiosity. However, the mechanism of such curiosity-driven irrational behavior is largely unknown. Here, we developed a decision-making model for a two-choice task based on the free energy principle, which is a theory integrating recognition and action selection. The model describes irrational behaviors depending on the curiosity level. We also proposed a machine learning method to decode temporal curiosity from behavioral data. By applying it to rat behavioral data, we found that the rat had negative curiosity, reflecting conservative selection sticking to more certain options and that the level of curiosity was upregulated by the expected future information obtained from an uncertain environment. Our decoding approach can be a fundamental tool for identifying the neural basis for reward–curiosity conflicts. Furthermore, it could be effective in diagnosing mental disorders.
Canonical neural networks perform active inference
The free-energy principle and active inference have received a significant attention in the fields of neuroscience and machine learning. However, it remains to be established whether active inference is an apt explanation for any given neural network that actively exchanges with its environment. To address this issue, we show that a class of canonical neural networks of rate coding models implicitly performs variational Bayesian inference under a well-known form of partially observed Markov decision process model (Isomura, Shimazaki, Friston, Commun Biol, 2022). Based on the proposed theory, we demonstrate that canonical neural networks—featuring delayed modulation of Hebbian plasticity—can perform planning and adaptive behavioural control in the Bayes optimal manner, through postdiction of their previous decisions. This scheme enables us to estimate implicit priors under which the agent’s neural network operates and identify a specific form of the generative model. The proposed equivalence is crucial for rendering brain activity explainable to better understand basic neuropsychology and psychiatric disorders. Moreover, this notion can dramatically reduce the complexity of designing self-learning neuromorphic hardware to perform various types of tasks.
A New Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
David Chalmers’s (1995) hard problem famously states: “It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.” Thomas Nagel (1974) wrote something similar: “If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue about how this could be done.” This presentation will point the way towards the long-sought “good explanation” -- or at least it will provide “a clue”. I will make three points: (1) It is unfortunate that cognitive science took vision as its model example when looking for a ‘neural correlate of consciousness’ because cortical vision (like most cognitive processes) is not intrinsically conscious. There is not necessarily ‘something it is like’ to see. (2) Affective feeling, by contrast, is conscious by definition. You cannot feel something without feeling it. Moreover, affective feeling, generated in the upper brainstem, is the foundational form of consciousness: prerequisite for all the higher cognitive forms. (3) The functional mechanism of feeling explains why and how it cannot go on ‘in the dark’, free of any inner feel. Affect enables the organism to monitor deviations from its expected self-states in uncertain situations and thereby frees homeostasis from the limitations of automatism. As Nagel says, “An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.” Affect literally constitutes the sentient subject.