Digital platforms generate unprecedented traces of human behaviour, offering new methodological approaches to understanding collective action, polarisation, and social dynamics. Through analysis of millions of digital traces across multiple studies, we demonstrate how online behaviours predict offline action: Brexit-related tribal discourse responds to real-world events, machine learning models achieve 80% accuracy in predicting real-world protest attendance from digital signals, and social validation through "likes" emerges as a key driver of mobilization. Extending this approach to conspiracy narratives reveals how digital traces illuminate psychological mechanisms of belief and community formation. Longitudinal analysis of YouTube conspiracy content demonstrates how narratives systematically address existential, epistemic, and social needs, while examination of alt-tech platforms shows how emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust correlate with violence-legitimating discourse, with significant differences between narratives associated with offline violence versus peaceful communities. This work establishes digital traces as both methodological innovation and theoretical lens, demonstrating that computational social science can illuminate fundamental questions about polarisation, mobilisation, and collective behaviour across contexts from electoral politics to conspiracy communities.

This presentation delves into the necessity for simplified models in the field of psychological sciences to cater to a diverse audience of practitioners. We introduce the #PsychMapping model, evaluate its merits and limitations, and discuss its place in contemporary scientific culture. The #PsychMapping model is the product of an extensive literature review, initially within the realm of sport and exercise psychology and subsequently encompassing a broader spectrum of psychological sciences. This model synthesizes the progress made in psychological sciences by categorizing variables into a framework that distinguishes between traits (e.g., body structure and personality) and states (e.g., heart rate and emotions). Furthermore, it delineates internal traits and states from the externalized self, which encompasses behaviour and performance. All three components—traits, states, and the externalized self—are in a continuous interplay with external physical, social, and circumstantial factors. Two core processes elucidate the interactions among these four primary clusters: external perception, encompassing the mechanism through which external stimuli transition into internal events, and self-regulation, which empowers individuals to become autonomous agents capable of exerting control over themselves and their actions. While the model inherently oversimplifies intricate processes, the central question remains: does its pragmatic utility outweigh its limitations, and can it serve as a valuable tool for comprehending human behaviour?

This presentation delves into the necessity for simplified models in the field of psychological sciences to cater to a diverse audience of practitioners. We introduce the #PsychMapping model, evaluate its merits and limitations, and discuss its place in contemporary scientific culture. The #PsychMapping model is the product of an extensive literature review, initially within the realm of sport and exercise psychology and subsequently encompassing a broader spectrum of psychological sciences. This model synthesizes the progress made in psychological sciences by categorizing variables into a framework that distinguishes between traits (e.g., body structure and personality) and states (e.g., heart rate and emotions). Furthermore, it delineates internal traits and states from the externalized self, which encompasses behaviour and performance. All three components—traits, states, and the externalized self—are in a continuous interplay with external physical, social, and circumstantial factors. Two core processes elucidate the interactions among these four primary clusters: external perception, encompassing the mechanism through which external stimuli transition into internal events, and self-regulation, which empowers individuals to become autonomous agents capable of exerting control over themselves and their actions. While the model inherently oversimplifies intricate processes, the central question remains: does its pragmatic utility outweigh its limitations, and can it serve as a valuable tool for comprehending human behaviour?

Voluntary actions are actions that agents choose to make. Volition is the set of cognitive processes that implement such choice and initiation. These processes are often held essential to modern societies, because they form the cognitive underpinning for concepts of individual autonomy and individual responsibility. Nevertheless, psychology and neuroscience have struggled to define volition, and have also struggled to study it scientifically. Laboratory experiments on volition, such as those of Libet, have been criticised, often rather naively, as focussing exclusively on meaningless actions, and ignoring the factors that make voluntary action important in the wider world. In this talk, I will first review these criticisms, and then look at extending scientific approaches to volition in three directions that may enrich scientific understanding of volition. First, volition becomes particularly important when the range of possible actions is large and unconstrained - yet most experimental paradigms involve minimal response spaces. We have developed a novel paradigm for eliciting de novo actions through verbal fluency, and used this to estimate the elusive conscious experience of generativity. Second, volition can be viewed as a mechanism for flexibility, by promoting adaptation of behavioural biases. This view departs from the tradition of defining volition by contrasting internally-generated actions with externally-triggered actions, and instead links volition to model-based reinforcement learning. By using the context of competitive games to re-operationalise the classic Libet experiment, we identified a form of adaptive autonomy that allows agents to reduce biases in their action choices. Interestingly, this mechanism seems not to require explicit understanding and strategic use of action selection rules, in contrast to classical ideas about the relation between volition and conscious, rational thought. Third, I will consider volition teleologically, as a mechanism for achieving counterfactual goals through complex problem-solving. This perspective gives a key role in mediating between understanding and planning on the one hand, and instrumental action on the other hand. Taken together, these three cognitive phenomena of generativity, flexibility, and teleology may partly explain why volition is such an important cognitive function for organisation of human behaviour and human flourishing. I will end by discussing how this enriched view of volition can relate to individual autonomy and responsibility.

Many tasks that are easy for humans are difficult for machines. In particular, while humans excel at tasks that require generalising across problems, machine systems notably struggle. One such task that has received a good amount of attention is the Synthetic Visual Reasoning Test (SVRT). The SVRT consists of a range of problems where simple visual stimuli must be categorised into one of two categories based on an unknown rule that must be induced. Conventional machine learning approaches perform well only when trained to categorise based on a single rule and are unable to generalise without extensive additional training to tasks with any additional rules. Multiple theories of higher-level cognition posit that humans solve such tasks using structured relational representations. Specifically, people learn rules based on structured representations that generalise to novel instances quickly and easily. We believe it is possible to model this approach in a single system which learns all the required relational representations from scratch and performs tasks such as SVRT in a single run. Here, we present a system which expands the DORA/LISA architecture and augments the existing model with principally novel components, namely a) visual reasoning based on the established theories of recognition by components; b) the process of learning complex relational representations by synthesis (in addition to learning by analysis). The proposed augmented model matches human behaviour on SVRT problems. Moreover, the proposed system stands as perhaps a more realistic account of human cognition, wherein rather than using tools that has been shown successful in the machine learning field to inform psychological theorising, we use established psychological theories to inform developing a machine system.

Cognitive tasks typically require the integration of working memory, contextual processing, and planning to be carried out in close coordination. However, these computations are typically studied within neuroscience as independent modular processes in the brain. In this talk I will present an alternative view, that neural representations of mappings between expected stimuli and contingent goal actions can unify working memory and planning computations. We term these stored maps contingency representations. We developed a "conditional delayed logic" task capable of disambiguating the types of representations used during performance of delay tasks. Human behaviour in this task is consistent with the contingency representation, and not with traditional sensory models of working memory. In task-optimized artificial recurrent neural network models, we investigated the representational geometry and dynamical circuit mechanisms supporting contingency-based computation, and show how contingency representation explains salient observations of neuronal tuning properties in prefrontal cortex. Finally, our theory generates novel and falsifiable predictions for single-unit and population neural recordings.