Inferotemporal Cortex
inferotemporal cortex
Geometry of concept learning
Understanding Human ability to learn novel concepts from just a few sensory experiences is a fundamental problem in cognitive neuroscience. I will describe a recent work with Ben Sorcher and Surya Ganguli (PNAS, October 2022) in which we propose a simple, biologically plausible, and mathematically tractable neural mechanism for few-shot learning of naturalistic concepts. We posit that the concepts that can be learned from few examples are defined by tightly circumscribed manifolds in the neural firing-rate space of higher-order sensory areas. Discrimination between novel concepts is performed by downstream neurons implementing ‘prototype’ decision rule, in which a test example is classified according to the nearest prototype constructed from the few training examples. We show that prototype few-shot learning achieves high few-shot learning accuracy on natural visual concepts using both macaque inferotemporal cortex representations and deep neural network (DNN) models of these representations. We develop a mathematical theory that links few-shot learning to the geometric properties of the neural concept manifolds and demonstrate its agreement with our numerical simulations across different DNNs as well as different layers. Intriguingly, we observe striking mismatches between the geometry of manifolds in intermediate stages of the primate visual pathway and in trained DNNs. Finally, we show that linguistic descriptors of visual concepts can be used to discriminate images belonging to novel concepts, without any prior visual experience of these concepts (a task known as ‘zero-shot’ learning), indicated a remarkable alignment of manifold representations of concepts in visual and language modalities. I will discuss ongoing effort to extend this work to other high level cognitive tasks.
Hebbian Plasticity Supports Predictive Self-Supervised Learning of Disentangled Representations
Discriminating distinct objects and concepts from sensory stimuli is essential for survival. Our brains accomplish this feat by forming meaningful internal representations in deep sensory networks with plastic synaptic connections. Experience-dependent plasticity presumably exploits temporal contingencies between sensory inputs to build these internal representations. However, the precise mechanisms underlying plasticity remain elusive. We derive a local synaptic plasticity model inspired by self-supervised machine learning techniques that shares a deep conceptual connection to Bienenstock-Cooper-Munro (BCM) theory and is consistent with experimentally observed plasticity rules. We show that our plasticity model yields disentangled object representations in deep neural networks without the need for supervision and implausible negative examples. In response to altered visual experience, our model qualitatively captures neuronal selectivity changes observed in the monkey inferotemporal cortex in-vivo. Our work suggests a plausible learning rule to drive learning in sensory networks while making concrete testable predictions.
NMC4 Short Talk: Untangling Contributions of Distinct Features of Images to Object Processing in Inferotemporal Cortex
How do humans perceive daily objects of various features and categorize these seemingly intuitive and effortless mental representations? Prior literature focusing on the role of the inferotemporal region (IT) has revealed object category clustering that is consistent with the semantic predefined structure (superordinate, ordinate, subordinate). It has however been debated whether the neural signals in the IT regions are a reflection of such categorical hierarchy [Wen et al.,2018; Bracci et al., 2017]. Visual attributes of images that correlated with semantic and category dimensions may have confounded these prior results. Our study aimed to address this debate by building and comparing models using the DNN AlexNet, to explain the variance in representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM) of neural signals in the IT region. We found that mid and high level perceptual attributes of the DNN model contribute the most to neural RDMs in the IT region. Semantic categories, as in predefined structure, were moderately correlated with mid to high DNN layers (r = [0.24 - 0.36]). Variance partitioning analysis also showed that the IT neural representations were mostly explained by DNN layers, while semantic categorical RDMs brought little additional information. In light of these results, we propose future works should focus more on the specific role IT plays in facilitating the extraction and coding of visual features that lead to the emergence of categorical conceptualizations.
A no-report paradigm reveals that face cells multiplex consciously perceived and suppressed stimuli
Having conscious experience is arguably the most important reason why it matters to us whether we are alive or dead. A powerful paradigm to identify neural correlates of consciousness is binocular rivalry, wherein a constant visual stimulus evokes a varying conscious percept. It has recently been suggested that activity modulations observed during rivalry may represent the act of report rather than the conscious percept itself. Here, we performed single-unit recordings from face patches in macaque inferotemporal (IT) cortex using a novel no-report paradigm in which the animal’s conscious percept was inferred from eye movements. These experiments reveal two new results concerning the neural correlates of consciousness. First, we found that high proportions of IT neurons represented the conscious percept even without active report. Using high-channel recordings, including a new 128-channel Neuropixels-like probe, we were able to decode the conscious percept on single trials. Second, we found that even on single trials, modulation to rivalrous stimuli was weaker than that to unambiguous stimuli, suggesting that cells may encode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus. To test this hypothesis, we varied the identity of the suppressed stimulus during binocular rivalry; we found that indeed, we could decode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus from neural activity. Moreover, the same cells that were strongly modulated by the conscious percept also tended to be strongly modulated by the suppressed stimulus. Together, our findings indicate that (1) IT cortex possesses a true neural correlate of consciousness even in the absence of report, and (2) this correlate consists of a population code wherein single cells multiplex representation of the conscious percept and veridical physical stimulus, rather than a subset of cells perfectly reflecting consciousness.