Intention
intention
How do our thoughts, imaginations and intentions influence sleep?
Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience
Although each of us was once a baby, infant consciousness remains mysterious and there is no received view about when, and in what form, consciousness first emerges. Some theorists defend a ‘late-onset’ view, suggesting that consciousness requires cognitive capacities which are unlikely to be in place before the child’s first birthday at the very earliest. Other theorists defend an ‘early-onset’ account, suggesting that consciousness is likely to be in place at birth (or shortly after) and may even arise during the third trimester. Progress in this field has been difficult, not just because of the challenges associated with procuring the relevant behavioral and neural data, but also because of uncertainty about how best to study consciousness in the absence of the capacity for verbal report or intentional behavior. This review examines both the empirical and methodological progress in this field, arguing that recent research points in favor of early-onset accounts of the emergence of consciousness.
Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean
Non-human great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. This presentation will summarise the arguments developed in a recent paper with Christophe Heintz. We make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a ‘special case of’ framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. The paper also argues that the attested tendencies of great ape interaction—for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than ‘displaced’—are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. I will reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie in gradual changes in not communication systems as such, but rather in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species’ cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans, ‘language ready’.
The sense of agency as an explorative role in our perception and action
The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one's own behavior and, through them, external events. Why is this subjective feeling important for humans? Is it just a by-product of our actions? Previous studies have shown that the sense of agency can affect the intensity of sensory input because we predict the input from our motor intention. However, my research has found that the sense of agency plays more roles than just predictions. It enhances perceptual processes of sensory input and potentially helps to harvest more information about the link between the external world and the self. Furthermore, our recent research found both indirect and direct evidence that the sense of agency is important for people's exploratory behaviors, and this may be linked to proximal exploitations of one's control in the environment. In this talk, I will also introduce the paradigms we use to study the sense of agency as a result of perceptual processes, and our findings of individual differences in this sense and the implications.
A possible role of the posterior alpha as a railroad switcher between dorsal and ventral pathways
Suppose you are on your favorite touchscreen device consciously and deliberately deciding emails to read or delete. In other words, you are consciously and intentionally looking, tapping, and swiping. Now suppose that you are doing this while neuroscientists are recording your brain activity. Eventually, the neuroscientists are familiar enough with your brain activity and behavior that they run an experiment with subliminal cues which reveals that your looking, tapping, and swiping seem to be determined by a random switch in your brain. You are not aware of it, or its impact on your decisions or movements. Would these predictions undermine your sense of free will? Some have argued that it should. Although this inference from unreflective and/or random intention mechanisms to free will skepticism, may seem intuitive at first, there are already objections to it. So, even if this thought experiment is plausible, it may not actually undermine our sense of free will.
Adaptation via innovation in the animal kingdom
Over the course of evolution, the human race has achieved a number of remarkable innovations, that have enabled us to adapt to and benefit from the environment ever more effectively. The ongoing environmental threats and health disasters of our world have now made it crucial to understand the cognitive mechanisms behind innovative behaviours. In my talk, I will present two research projects with examples of innovation-based behavioural adaptation from the taxonomic kingdom of animals, serving as a comparative psychological model for mapping the evolution of innovation. The first project focuses on the challenge of overcoming physical disability. In this study, we investigated an injured kea (Nestor notabilis) that exhibits an efficient, intentional, and innovative tool-use behaviour to compensate his disability, showing evidence for innovation-based adaptation to a physical disability in a non-human species. The second project focuses on the evolution of fire use from a cognitive perspective. Fire has been one of the most dominant ecological forces in human evolution; however, it is still unknown what capabilities and environmental factors could have led to the emergence of fire use. In the core study of this project, we investigated a captive population of Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) that has been regularly exposed to campfires during the cold winter months for over 60 years. Our results suggest that macaques are able to take advantage of the positive effects of fire while avoiding the dangers of flames and hot ashes, and exhibit calm behaviour around the bonfire. In addition, I will present a research proposal targeting the foraging behaviour of predatory birds in parts of Australia frequently affected by bushfires. Anecdotal reports suggest that some birds use burning sticks to spread the flames, a behaviour that has not been scientifically observed and evaluated. In summary, the two projects explore innovative behaviours along three different species groups, three different habitats, and three different ecological drivers, providing insights into the cognitive and behavioural mechanisms of adaptation through innovation.
Exploring emotion in the expression of ape gesture
Language appears to be the most complex system of animal communication described to date. However, its precursors were present in the communication of our evolutionary ancestors and are likely shared by our modern ape cousins. All great apes, including humans, employ a rich repertoire of vocalizations, facial expressions, and gestures. Great ape gestural repertoires are particularly elaborate, with ape species employing over 80 different gesture types intentionally: that is towards a recipient with a specific goal in mind. Intentional usage allows us to ask not only what information is encoded in ape gestures, but what do apes mean when they use them. I will discuss recent research on ape gesture, on how we approach the question of decoding meaning, and how with new methods we are starting to integrate long overlooked aspects of ape gesture such as group and individual variation, and expression and emotion into our study of these signals.
PiSpy: An Affordable, Accessible, and Flexible Imaging Platform for the Automated Observation of Organismal Biology and Behavior
A great deal of understanding can be gleaned from direct observation of organismal growth, development, and behavior. However, direct observation can be time consuming and influence the organism through unintentional stimuli. Additionally, video capturing equipment can often be prohibitively expensive, difficult to modify to one’s specific needs, and may come with unnecessary features. Here, we describe the PiSpy, a low-cost, automated video acquisition platform that uses a Raspberry Pi computer and camera to record video or images at specified time intervals or when externally triggered. All settings and controls, such as programmable light cycling, are accessible to users with no programming experience through an easy-to-use graphical user interface. Importantly, the entire PiSpy system can be assembled for less than $100 using laser-cut and 3D-printed components. We demonstrate the broad applications and flexibility of the PiSpy across a range of model and non-model organisms. Designs, instructions, and code can be accessed through an online repository, where a global community of PiSpy users can also contribute their own unique customizations and help grow the community of open-source research solutions.
Why would we need Cognitive Science to develop better Collaborative Robots and AI Systems?
While classical industrial robots are mostly designed for repetitive tasks, assistive robots will be challenged by a variety of different tasks in close contact with humans. Hereby, learning through the direct interaction with humans provides a potentially powerful tool for an assistive robot to acquire new skills and to incorporate prior human knowledge during the exploration of novel tasks. Moreover, an intuitive interactive teaching process may allow non-programming experts to contribute to robotic skill learning and may help to increase acceptance of robotic systems in shared workspaces and everyday life. In this talk, I will discuss recent research I did on interactive robot skill learning and the remaining challenges on the route to human-centered teaching of assistive robots. In particular, I will also discuss potential connections and overlap with cognitive science. The presented work covers learning a library of probabilistic movement primitives from human demonstrations, intention aware adaptation of learned skills in shared workspaces, and multi-channel interactive reinforcement learning for sequential tasks.
A transdiagnostic data-driven study of children’s behaviour and the functional connectome
Behavioural difficulties are seen as hallmarks of many neurodevelopmental conditions. Differences in functional brain organisation have been observed in these conditions, but little is known about how they are related to a child’s profile of behavioural difficulties. We investigated whether behavioural difficulties are associated with how the brain is functionally organised in an intentionally heterogeneous and transdiagnostic sample of 957 children aged 5-15. We used consensus community detection to derive data-driven profiles of behavioural difficulties and constructed functional connectomes from a subset of 238 children with resting-state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data. We identified three distinct profiles of behaviour that were characterised by principal difficulties with hot executive function, cool executive function, and learning. Global organisation of the functional connectome did not differ between the groups, but multivariate patterns of connectivity at the level of Intrinsic Connectivity Networks (ICNs), nodes, and hubs significantly predicted group membership in held-out data. Fronto-parietal connector hubs were under-connected in all groups relative to a comparison sample, and children with hot vs cool executive function difficulties were distinguished by connectivity in ICNs associated with cognitive control, emotion processing, and social cognition. This demonstrates both general and specific neurodevelopmental risk factors in the functional connectome. (https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.09.15.21262637v1)
Change of mind in rapid free-choice picking scenarios
In a famous philosophical paradox, Buridan's ass perishes because he is equally hungry and thirsty, and cannot make up his mind whether to first drink or eat. We are faced daily with the need to pick between alternatives that are equally attractive (or not) to us. What are the processes that allow us to avoid paralysis and to rapidly select between such equal options when there are no preferences or rational reasons to rely on? One solution that was offered is that although on a higher cognitive level there is symmetry between the alternatives, on a neuronal level the symmetry does not maintain. What is the nature of this asymmetry of the neuronal level? In this talk I will present experiments addressing this important phenomenon using measures of human behavior, EEG, EMG and large scale neural network modeling, and discuss mechanisms involved in the process of intention formation and execution, in the face of alternatives to choose from. Specifically, I will show results revealing the temporal dynamics of rapid intention formation and, moreover, ‘change of intention’ in a free choice picking scenario, in which the alternatives are on a par for the participant. The results suggest that even in arbitrary choices, endogenous or exogenous biases that are present in the neural system for selecting one or another option may be implicitly overruled; thus creating an implicit and non-conscious ‘change of mind’. Finally, the question is raised: in what way do such rapid implicit ‘changes of mind’ help retain one’s self-control and free-will behavior?
“Mind reading” with brain scanners: Facts versus science fiction
Every thought is associated with a unique pattern of brain activity. Thus, in principle, it should be possible to use these activity patterns as "brain fingerprints" for different thoughts and to read out what a person is thinking based on their brain activity alone. Indeed, using machine learning considerable progress has been made in such "brainreading" in recent years. It is now possible to decode which image a person is viewing, which film sequence they are watching, which emotional state they are in or which intentions they hold in mind. This talk will provide an overview of the current state of the art in brain reading. It will also highlight the main challenges and limitations of this research field. For example, mathematical models are needed to cope with the high dimensionality of potential mental states. Furthermore, the ethical concerns raised by (often premature) commercial applications of brain reading will also be discussed.
“Introducing the irruption theory of consciousness”
In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.
Toward Naturalistic Paradigms of Agency
Voluntary control of behavior requires the ability to dynamically integrate internal states and external evidence to achieve one’s goals. However, neuroscientific studies of intentional action and critical philosophical commentary of that research have taken a rather narrow turn in recent years, focussing on the neural precursors of spontaneous simple actions as potential realizers of intentions. In this session, we show how the debate can benefit from incorporating other types of experimental approaches, focussing on agency in dynamic contexts.
Irruption theory of consciousness
Tom Froese is Assistant Professor at the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University (OIST), where he heads the Embodied Cognitive Science Unit. He is a cognitive scientist with a background in phenomenological philosophy, human-computer interaction, and complex systems theory. His interdisciplinary research centers on the role of agent-environment interaction in shaping cognition and consciousness, specifically when the interaction process involves sociality and technology. In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.
Race and the brain: Insights from the neural systems of emotion and decisions
Investigations of the neural systems mediating the processing of social groups defined by race, specifically Black and White race groups in American participants, reveals significant overlap with brain mechanisms involved in emotion. This talk will provide an overview of research on the neuroscience of race and emotion, focusing on implicit race attitudes. Implicit race attitudes are expressed without conscious effort and control, and contrast with explicit, conscious attitudes. In spite of sharp decline in the expression of explicit, negative attitudes towards outgroup race members over the last half century, negative implicit attitudes persist, even in the face of strong egalitarian goals and beliefs. Early research demonstrated that implicit, but not explicit, negative attitudes towards outgroup race members correlate with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal in the amygdala – a region implicated in threat representations, as well as emotion’s influence on cognition. Building on this initial finding, we demonstrate how learning and decisions may be modulated by implicit race attitudes and involve neural systems mediating emotion, learning and choice. Finally, we discuss techniques that may diminish the unintentional expression of negative, implicit race attitudes.
Free Will and the COINTOB Model of Decision-Making
The COINTOB (conditional intention and integration to bound) model provides a heuristic framework of processes in Libet-style experiments. The model is based on three assumptions. First, brain activation preceding conscious intentions in Libet-style experiments does not reflect an unconscious decision but rather the unfolding of a decision process. Second, the time of conscious decision (W) reflects the moment in time when the decision boundary is crossed. This interpretation of W is consistent with our apparent intuition that we decide in the moment we experience the conscious intention to act. Third, the decision process is configured by conscious intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment based on the experimental instruction. Brass and Mele discuss the model, conceptual background for it, and the model’s bearing on free will.
The emergence and modulation of time in neural circuits and behavior
Spontaneous behavior in animals and humans shows a striking amount of variability both in the spatial domain (which actions to choose) and temporal domain (when to act). Concatenating actions into sequences and behavioral plans reveals the existence of a hierarchy of timescales ranging from hundreds of milliseconds to minutes. How do multiple timescales emerge from neural circuit dynamics? How do circuits modulate temporal responses to flexibly adapt to changing demands? In this talk, we will present recent results from experiments and theory suggesting a new computational mechanism generating the temporal variability underlying naturalistic behavior and cortical activity. We will show how neural activity from premotor areas unfolds through temporal sequences of attractors, which predict the intention to act. These sequences naturally emerge from recurrent cortical networks, where correlated neural variability plays a crucial role in explaining the observed variability in action timing. We will then discuss how reaction times can be accelerated or slowed down via gain modulation, flexibly induced by neuromodulation or perturbations; and how gain modulation may control response timing in the visual cortex. Finally, we will present a new biologically plausible way to generate a reservoir of multiple timescales in cortical circuits.
Becoming Human: A Theory of Ontogeny
Humans are biologically adapted for cultural life in ways that other primates are not. Humans have unique motivations and cognitive skills for sharing emotions, experience, and collaborative actions (shared intentionality). These motivations and skills first emerge in human ontogeny at around one year of age, as infants begin to participate with other persons in various kinds of collaborative and joint attentional activities, including linguistic communication. Our nearest primate relatives understand important aspects of intentional action - especially in competitive situations - but they do not seem to have the motivations and cognitive skills necessary to engage in activities involving collaboration, shared intentionality, and, in general, things cultural.
The emergence and modulation of time in neural circuits and behavior
Spontaneous behavior in animals and humans shows a striking amount of variability both in the spatial domain (which actions to choose) and temporal domain (when to act). Concatenating actions into sequences and behavioral plans reveals the existence of a hierarchy of timescales ranging from hundreds of milliseconds to minutes. How do multiple timescales emerge from neural circuit dynamics? How do circuits modulate temporal responses to flexibly adapt to changing demands? In this talk, we will present recent results from experiments and theory suggesting a new computational mechanism generating the temporal variability underlying naturalistic behavior. We will show how neural activity from premotor areas unfolds through temporal sequences of attractors, which predict the intention to act. These sequences naturally emerge from recurrent cortical networks, where correlated neural variability plays a crucial role in explaining the observed variability in action timing. We will then discuss how reaction times in these recurrent circuits can be accelerated or slowed down via gain modulation, induced by neuromodulation or perturbations. Finally, we will present a general mechanism producing a reservoir of multiple timescales in recurrent networks.
Protecting Machines from Us
The possibilities of machine learning and neural networks in particular are ever expanding. With increased opportunities to do good, however there are just as many opportunities to do harm and even in the case that good intentions are at the helm, evidence suggests that opportunities for good may eventually prove to be the opposite. The greatest threat to what machine learning is able to achieve and to us as humans, is machine learning that does not reflect the diversity of the users it is meant to serve. It is important that we are not so pre-occupied with advancing technology into the future that we have not taken the time to invest the energy into engineering the security measures this future requires. It is important to investigate now, as thoroughly as we investigate differing deep neural network architectures, the complex questions regarding the fact that humans and the society in which they operate is inherently biased and loaded with prejudice and that these traits find themselves in the machines we create (and increasingly allow to run our lives).
Free will, decision-making and machine learning
The question of free will has been topical for millennia, especially considering its links to moral responsibility and the ownership of that responsibility. Free will, or volition, is an incredibly complex phenomenon - and cannot easily be reduced to a single empirical paradigm. Roskies (2010) proposes that there are five cognitive aspects to be considered when developing a more complete understanding of volition. These are: intention, initiation, feeling, executive control and decision-making. Decision-making will be the focus of this talk, which steps through aspects of the philosophy of free will; highlights experimental paradigms stemming from the seminal work of Benjamin Libet et al., and proposes machine learning as a promising method in progressing the empirical studies of decision-making and free will.
Intention decoding from PPC
Neuromatch 5