Learning Paradigms
learning paradigms
Learning representations of specifics and generalities over time
There is a fundamental tension between storing discrete traces of individual experiences, which allows recall of particular moments in our past without interference, and extracting regularities across these experiences, which supports generalization and prediction in similar situations in the future. One influential proposal for how the brain resolves this tension is that it separates the processes anatomically into Complementary Learning Systems, with the hippocampus rapidly encoding individual episodes and the neocortex slowly extracting regularities over days, months, and years. But this does not explain our ability to learn and generalize from new regularities in our environment quickly, often within minutes. We have put forward a neural network model of the hippocampus that suggests that the hippocampus itself may contain complementary learning systems, with one pathway specializing in the rapid learning of regularities and a separate pathway handling the region’s classic episodic memory functions. This proposal has broad implications for how we learn and represent novel information of specific and generalized types, which we test across statistical learning, inference, and category learning paradigms. We also explore how this system interacts with slower-learning neocortical memory systems, with empirical and modeling investigations into how the hippocampus shapes neocortical representations during sleep. Together, the work helps us understand how structured information in our environment is initially encoded and how it then transforms over time.
Social and non-social learning: Common, or specialised, mechanisms? (BACN Early Career Prize Lecture 2022)
The last decade has seen a burgeoning interest in studying the neural and computational mechanisms that underpin social learning (learning from others). Many findings support the view that learning from other people is underpinned by the same, ‘domain-general’, mechanisms underpinning learning from non-social stimuli. Despite this, the idea that humans possess social-specific learning mechanisms - adaptive specializations moulded by natural selection to cope with the pressures of group living - persists. In this talk I explore the persistence of this idea. First, I present dissociations between social and non-social learning - patterns of data which are difficult to explain under the domain-general thesis and which therefore support the idea that we have evolved special mechanisms for social learning. Subsequently, I argue that most studies that have dissociated social and non-social learning have employed paradigms in which social information comprises a secondary, additional, source of information that can be used to supplement learning from non-social stimuli. Thus, in most extant paradigms, social and non-social learning differ both in terms of social nature (social or non-social) and status (primary or secondary). I conclude that status is an important driver of apparent differences between social and non-social learning. When we account for differences in status, we see that social and non-social learning share common (dopamine-mediated) mechanisms.
Learning to Express Reward Prediction Error-like Dopaminergic Activity Requires Plastic Representations of Time
The dominant theoretical framework to account for reinforcement learning in the brain is temporal difference (TD) reinforcement learning. The TD framework predicts that some neuronal elements should represent the reward prediction error (RPE), which means they signal the difference between the expected future rewards and the actual rewards. The prominence of the TD theory arises from the observation that firing properties of dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area appear similar to those of RPE model-neurons in TD learning. Previous implementations of TD learning assume a fixed temporal basis for each stimulus that might eventually predict a reward. Here we show that such a fixed temporal basis is implausible and that certain predictions of TD learning are inconsistent with experiments. We propose instead an alternative theoretical framework, coined FLEX (Flexibly Learned Errors in Expected Reward). In FLEX, feature specific representations of time are learned, allowing for neural representations of stimuli to adjust their timing and relation to rewards in an online manner. In FLEX dopamine acts as an instructive signal which helps build temporal models of the environment. FLEX is a general theoretical framework that has many possible biophysical implementations. In order to show that FLEX is a feasible approach, we present a specific biophysically plausible model which implements the principles of FLEX. We show that this implementation can account for various reinforcement learning paradigms, and that its results and predictions are consistent with a preponderance of both existing and reanalyzed experimental data.
A Flexible Platform for Monitoring Cerebellum-Dependent Sensory Associative Learning
Climbing fiber inputs to Purkinje cells provide instructive signals critical for cerebellum-dependent associative learning. Studying these signals in head-fixed mice facilitates the use of imaging, electrophysiological, and optogenetic methods. Here, a low-cost behavioral platform (~$1000) was developed that allows tracking of associative learning in head-fixed mice that locomote freely on a running wheel. The platform incorporates two common associative learning paradigms: eyeblink conditioning and delayed tactile startle conditioning. Behavior is tracked using a camera and the wheel movement by a detector. We describe the components and setup and provide a detailed protocol for training and data analysis. This platform allows the incorporation of optogenetic stimulation and fluorescence imaging. The design allows a single host computer to control multiple platforms for training multiple animals simultaneously.
Dissecting the role of accumbal D1 and D2 medium spiny neurons in information encoding
Nearly all motivated behaviors require the ability to associate outcomes with specific actions and make adaptive decisions about future behavior. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is integrally involved in these processes. The NAc is a heterogeneous population primarily composed of D1 and D2 medium spiny projection (MSN) neurons that are thought to have opposed roles in behavior, with D1 MSNs promoting reward and D2 MSNs promoting aversion. Here we examined what types of information are encoded by the D1 and D2 MSNs using optogenetics, fiber photometry, and cellular resolution calcium imaging. First, we showed that mice responded for optical self-stimulation of both cell types, suggesting D2-MSN activation is not inherently aversive. Next, we recorded population and single cell activity patterns of D1 and D2 MSNs during reinforcement as well as Pavlovian learning paradigms that allow dissociation of stimulus value, outcome, cue learning, and action. We demonstrated that D1 MSNs respond to the presence and intensity of unconditioned stimuli – regardless of value. Conversely, D2 MSNs responded to the prediction of these outcomes during specific cues. Overall, these results provide foundational evidence for the discrete aspects of information that are encoded within the NAc D1 and D2 MSN populations. These results will significantly enhance our understanding of the involvement of the NAc MSNs in learning and memory as well as how these neurons contribute to the development and maintenance of substance use disorders.
Is Rule Learning Like Analogy?
Humans’ ability to perceive and abstract relational structure is fundamental to our learning. It allows us to acquire knowledge all the way from linguistic grammar to spatial knowledge to social structures. How does a learner begin to perceive structure in the world? Why do we sometimes fail to see structural commonalities across events? To begin to answer these questions, I attempt to bridge two large, yet somewhat separate research traditions in understanding human’s structural abstraction: rule learning (Marcus et al., 1999) and analogical learning (Gentner, 1989). On the one hand, rule learning research has shown humans’ domain-general ability and ease—as early as 7-month-olds—to abstract structure from a limited experience. On the other hand, analogical learning works have shown robust constraints in structural abstraction: young learners prefer object similarity over relational similarity. To understand this seeming paradox between ease and difficulty, we conducted a series of studies using the classic rule learning paradigm (Marcus et al., 1999) but with an analogical (object vs. relation) twist. Adults were presented with 2-minute sentences or events (syllables or shapes) containing a rule. At test, they had to choose between rule abstraction and object matches—the same syllable or shape they saw before. Surprisingly, while in the absence of object matches adults were perfectly capable of abstracting the rule, their ability to do so declined sharply when object matches were present. Our initial results suggest that rule learning ability may be subject to the usual constraints and signatures of analogical learning: preference to object similarity can dampen rule generalization. Humans’ abstraction is also concrete at the same time.