The basis of the mind, of mental states, and complex behaviors is the flow of energy through microscopic and macroscopic brain structures. Energy flow through brain circuits is powered by thousands of mitochondria populating the inside of every neuron, glial, and other nucleated cell across the brain-body unit. This seminar will cover emerging approaches to study the mind-mitochondria connection and present early attempts to map the distribution and diversity of mitochondria across brain tissue. In rodents, I will present convergent multimodal evidence anchored in enzyme activities, gene expression, and animal behavior that distinct behaviorally-relevant mitochondrial phenotypes exist across large-scale mouse brain networks. Extending these findings to the human brain, I will present a developing systematic biochemical and molecular map of mitochondrial variation across cortical and subcortical brain structures, representing a foundation to understand the origin of complex energy patterns that give rise to the human mind.

In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.

Face detection is an initial step of many social interactions involving a comparison between a visual input and a mental representation of faces, built from previous experience. Whilst emotional state was found to affect the way humans attend to faces, little research has explored the effects of emotions on the mental representation of faces. Here, we examined the specific perceptual modulation of geometric properties of the mental representations associated with state anxiety and state depression on face detection, and to compare their emotional expression. To this end, we used an adaptation of the reverse correlation technique inspired by Gosselin and Schyns’, (2003) ‘Superstitious Approach’, to construct visual representations of observers’ mental representations of faces and to relate these to their mental states. In two sessions, on separate days, participants were presented with ‘colourful’ noise stimuli and asked to detect faces, which they were told were present. Based on the noise fragments that were identified as faces, we reconstructed the pictorial mental representation utilised by each participant in each session. We found a significant correlation between the size of the mental representation of faces and participants’ level of depression. Our findings provide a preliminary insight about the way emotions affect appearance expectation of faces. To further understand whether the facial expressions of participants’ mental representations reflect their emotional state, we are conducting a validation study with a group of naïve observers who are asked to classify the reconstructed face images by emotion. Thus, we assess whether the faces communicate participants’ emotional states to others.

Theory of mind, which consists of reasoning about the knowledge, belief, desire, and similar mental states of others, is a key component of social reasoning and social interaction. While it has been studied by cognitive scientists for decades, none of the prevailing theories of the processes that underlie theory of mind reasoning and development explain the breadth of experimental findings. I propose that this is because theory of mind is, like much of human reasoning, inherently analogical. In this talk, I will discuss several theory of mind findings from the psychology literature, the challenges they pose for our understanding of theory of mind, and bring in evidence from the Analogical Theory of Mind (AToM) cognitive model that demonstrates how these findings fit into an analogical understanding of theory of mind reasoning.

I will build from Niccolo's discussion of the Blockhead argument to argue that having an FeedForward Network (FN) responding like an recurrent network (RN) in a consciousness experiment is not enough to convince us the two are the same with regards to the posession of mental states and conscious experience. I will then argue that a robust functional equivalence between FFN and RN is akso not supported by the mathematical work on the Universal Approximator theorem, and is also unlikely to hold, as a conjecture, given data in cognitive neuroscience; I will argue that an equivalence of RN and FFN may only apply to static functions between input/output layers and not to the temporal patterns or to the network's reactions to structural perturbations. Finally, I review data indicating that consciousness has functional characteristics, such as a flexible control of behavior, and that cognitive/brain dynamics reveal interacting top-down and bottom-up processes, which are necessary for the mediation of such control processes.

Every thought is associated with a unique pattern of brain activity. Thus, in principle, it should be possible to use these activity patterns as "brain fingerprints" for different thoughts and to read out what a person is thinking based on their brain activity alone. Indeed, using machine learning considerable progress has been made in such "brainreading" in recent years. It is now possible to decode which image a person is viewing, which film sequence they are watching, which emotional state they are in or which intentions they hold in mind. This talk will provide an overview of the current state of the art in brain reading. It will also highlight the main challenges and limitations of this research field. For example, mathematical models are needed to cope with the high dimensionality of potential mental states. Furthermore, the ethical concerns raised by (often premature) commercial applications of brain reading will also be discussed.

David Chalmers’s (1995) hard problem famously states: “It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.” Thomas Nagel (1974) wrote something similar: “If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue about how this could be done.” This presentation will point the way towards the long-sought “good explanation” -- or at least it will provide “a clue”. I will make three points: (1) It is unfortunate that cognitive science took vision as its model example when looking for a ‘neural correlate of consciousness’ because cortical vision (like most cognitive processes) is not intrinsically conscious. There is not necessarily ‘something it is like’ to see. (2) Affective feeling, by contrast, is conscious by definition. You cannot feel something without feeling it. Moreover, affective feeling, generated in the upper brainstem, is the foundational form of consciousness: prerequisite for all the higher cognitive forms. (3) The functional mechanism of feeling explains why and how it cannot go on ‘in the dark’, free of any inner feel. Affect enables the organism to monitor deviations from its expected self-states in uncertain situations and thereby frees homeostasis from the limitations of automatism. As Nagel says, “An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.” Affect literally constitutes the sentient subject.