Metaphor is a pervasive phenomenon in language and cognition. To date, the vast majority of psycholinguistic research on metaphor has focused on noun-noun metaphors of the form An X is a Y (e.g., My job is a jail). Yet there is evidence that verb metaphor (e.g., I sailed through my exams) is more common. Despite this, comparatively little work has examined how verb metaphors are processed. In this talk, I will propose a novel account for verb metaphor comprehension: verb metaphors are understood in the same way that analogies are—as comparisons processed via structure-mapping. I will discuss the predictions that arise from applying the analogical framework to verb metaphor and present a series of experiments showing that verb metaphoric extension is consistent with those predictions.

What do people do when they comprehend language in discourse? According to many psychologists, they build and maintain cognitive representations of utterances in four complementary mental models for discourse that interact with each other: the surface text, the text base, the situation model, and the context model. When people encounter metaphors in these utterances, they need to incorporate them into each of these mental representations for the discourse. Since influential metaphor theories define metaphor as a form of (figurative) analogy, involving cross-domain mapping of a smaller or greater extent, the general expectation has been that metaphor comprehension is also based on analogizing. This expectation, however, has been partly borne out by the data, but not completely. There is no one-to-one relationship between metaphor as (conceptual) structure (analogy) and metaphor as (psychological) process (analogizing). According to Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT), only some metaphors are handled by analogy. Instead, most metaphors are presumably handled by lexical disambiguation. This is a hypothesis that brings together most metaphor research in a provocatively new way: it means that most metaphors are not processed metaphorically, which produces a paradox of metaphor. In this talk I will sketch out how this paradox arises and how it can be resolved by a new version of DMT, which I have described in my forthcoming book Slowing metaphor down: Updating Deliberate Metaphor Theory (currently under review). In this theory, the distinction between, but also the relation between, analogy in metaphorical structure versus analogy in metaphorical process is of central importance.

The challenges of problem solving do not exclusively lie in how to perform heuristic search, but they begin with how we understand a given task: How to cognitively represent the task domain and its components can determine how quickly someone is able to progress towards a solution, whether advanced strategies can be discovered, or even whether a solution is found at all. While this challenge of constructing and changing representations has been acknowledged early on in problem solving research, for the most part it has been sidestepped by focussing on simple, well-defined problems whose representation is almost fully determined by the task instructions. Thus, the established theory of problem solving as heuristic search in problem spaces has little to say on this. In this talk, I will present a study designed to explore this issue, by virtue of finding and refining an adequate problem representation being its main challenge. In this exploratory case study, it was investigated how pairs of participants acquaint themselves with a complex spatial transformation task in the domain of iterated mental paper folding over the course of several days. Participants have to understand the geometry of edges which occurs when repeatedly mentally folding a sheet of paper in alternating directions without the use of external aids. Faced with the difficulty of handling increasingly complex folds in light of limited cognitive capacity, participants are forced to look for ways in which to represent folds more efficiently. In a qualitative analysis of video recordings of the participants' behaviour, the development of their conceptualisation of the task domain was traced over the course of the study, focussing especially on their use of gesture and the spontaneous occurrence and use of metaphors in the construction of new representations. Based on these observations, I will conclude the talk with several theoretical speculations regarding the roles of metaphor and cognitive capacity in representational change.

In this talk, I will present the results of two recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses related to analogical reasoning and metaphor processing in autism, together with the results of a study that investigated verbal analogical reasoning and metaphor processing in the same sample of participants. Both metaphors and analogies rely on exploiting similarities, and they necessitate contextual processing. Nevertheless, our findings relating to metaphor processing and analogical reasoning showed distinct patterns. Whereas analogical reasoning emerged as a relative strength in autism, metaphor processing was found to be a relative weakness. Additionally, both meta-analytic studies investigated the relations between the level of intelligence of participants included in the studies, and the effect size of group differences between the autistic and typically developing (TD) samples. These analyses suggested in the case of analogical reasoning that the relative advantage of ASD participants might only be present in the case of individuals with lower levels of intelligence. By contrast, impairments in metaphor processing appeared to be more pronounced in the case of individuals with relatively lower levels of (verbal) intelligence. In our experimental study, we administered both verbal analogies and metaphors to the same sample of high-functioning autistic participants and TD controls. The two groups were matched on age, verbal IQ, working memory and educational background. Our aim was to understand better the similarities and differences between processing analogies and metaphors, and to see whether the advantage in analogical reasoning and disadvantage in metaphor processing is universal in autism.

People from cultures around the world tend to borrow from the domain of space to represent abstract concepts. For example, in the domain on time, we use spatial metaphors (e.g., describing the future as being in front and the past behind), accompany our speech with spatial gestures (e.g., gesturing to the left to refer to a past event), and use external tools that project time onto a spatial reference frame (e.g., calendars). Importantly, these associations are also present in the way we think and reason about time, suggesting that space and time are also linked in the mind. In this talk, I will explore the developmental origins and functional implications of these types of cross-dimensional associations. To start, I will discuss the roles that language and culture play in shaping how children in the US and India represent time. Next, I will use word learning and memory as test cases for exploring why cross-dimensional associations may be cognitively advantageous. Finally, I will talk about future directions and the practical implications for this line of work, with a focus on how encouraging spatial representations of abstract concepts could improve learning outcomes.

Previous work suggests that children’s ability to understand metaphors emerges late in development. Researchers argue that children’s initial failure to understand metaphors is due to an inability to reason about shared relational structures between concepts. However, recent work demonstrates that preschoolers, toddlers, and even infants are already capable of relational reasoning. Might preschoolers also be capable of understanding metaphors, given more sensitive experimental paradigms? I explore whether preschoolers (N = 200, ages 4-5) understand functional metaphors, namely metaphors based on functional similarities. In Experiment 1a, preschoolers rated functional metaphors (e.g. “Roofs are hats”; “Clouds are sponges”) as “smarter” than nonsense statements. In Experiment 1b, adults (N = 48) also rated functional metaphors as “smarter” than nonsense statements (e.g. “Dogs are scissors”; “Boats are skirts”). In Experiment 2, preschoolers preferred functional explanations (e.g. “Both hold water”) over perceptual explanations (e.g. “Both are fluffy”) when interpreting a functional metaphor (e.g. “Clouds are sponges”). In Experiment 3, preschoolers preferred functional metaphors over nonsense statements in a dichotomous-choice task. Overall, this work demonstrates preschoolers’ early-emerging ability to understand functional metaphors.

We live in the age of the network: Internet social neural ecosystems. This has become one of the main metaphors for how we think about complex systems. This view also dominates the account of brain function. The role of neuronsdescribed by Cajal as the "butterflies of the soul" has become diminished to leaky integrate-and-fire point objects in many models of neural network computation. It is perhaps not surprising that networkexplanations of neural phenomena use neurons as elementary particles andascribe all their wonderful capabilities to their interactions in a network. In the network view the Connectome defines the brain and the butterflies have no role. In this talk I'd like to reclaim some key computations from the networkand return them to their rightful place at the cellular and subcellular level. I'll start with a provocative look at potential computational capacity ofdifferent kinds of brain computation: network vs. subcellular. I'll then consider different levels of pattern and sequence computationwith a glimpse of the efficiency of the subcellular solutions. Finally I propose that there is a suggestive mapping between entire nodesof deep networks to individual neurons. This in my view is how we can walk around with 1.3 litres and 20 watts of installed computational capacity still doing far more than giant AI server farms.