Animals exhibit remarkable learning capabilities with little direct supervision. Likewise, self-supervised learning is an emergent paradigm in artificial intelligence, closing the performance gap to supervised learning. In the context of biology, self-supervised learning corresponds to a setting where one sense or specific stimulus may serve as a supervisory signal for another. After learning, the latter can be used to predict the former. On the implementation level, it has been demonstrated that such predictive learning can occur at the single neuron level, in compartmentalized neurons that separate and associate information from different streams. We demonstrate the power such self-supervised learning over unsupervised (Hebb-like) learning rules, which depend heavily on stimulus statistics, in two examples: First, in the context of animal navigation where predictive learning can associate internal self-motion information always available to the animal with external visual landmark information, leading to accurate path-integration in the dark. We focus on the well-characterized fly head direction system and show that our setting learns a connectivity strikingly similar to the one reported in experiments. The mature network is a quasi-continuous attractor and reproduces key experiments in which optogenetic stimulation controls the internal representation of heading, and where the network remaps to integrate with different gains. Second, we show that incorporating global gating by reward prediction errors allows the same setting to learn conditioning at the neuronal level with mixed selectivity. At its core, conditioning entails associating a neural activity pattern induced by an unconditioned stimulus (US) with the pattern arising in response to a conditioned stimulus (CS). Solving the generic problem of pattern-to-pattern associations naturally leads to emergent cognitive phenomena like blocking, overshadowing, saliency effects, extinction, interstimulus interval effects etc. Surprisingly, we find that the same network offers a reductionist mechanism for causal inference by resolving the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.

In a famous philosophical paradox, Buridan's ass perishes because he is equally hungry and thirsty, and cannot make up his mind whether to first drink or eat. We are faced daily with the need to pick between alternatives that are equally attractive (or not) to us. What are the processes that allow us to avoid paralysis and to rapidly select between such equal options when there are no preferences or rational reasons to rely on? One solution that was offered is that although on a higher cognitive level there is symmetry between the alternatives, on a neuronal level the symmetry does not maintain. What is the nature of this asymmetry of the neuronal level? In this talk I will present experiments addressing this important phenomenon using measures of human behavior, EEG, EMG and large scale neural network modeling, and discuss mechanisms involved in the process of intention formation and execution, in the face of alternatives to choose from. Specifically, I will show results revealing the temporal dynamics of rapid intention formation and, moreover, ‘change of intention’ in a free choice picking scenario, in which the alternatives are on a par for the participant. The results suggest that even in arbitrary choices, endogenous or exogenous biases that are present in the neural system for selecting one or another option may be implicitly overruled; thus creating an implicit and non-conscious ‘change of mind’. Finally, the question is raised: in what way do such rapid implicit ‘changes of mind’ help retain one’s self-control and free-will behavior?

Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a sexually dimorphic disease. This sexual dimorphism is believed to result from sex-specific molecular alterations affecting functional pathways regulating the capacity of men and women to cope with daily life stress differently. Transcriptional changes associated with epigenetic alterations have been observed in the brain of men and women with depression and similar changes have been reported in different animal models of stress-induced depressive-like behaviors. In fact, most of our knowledge of the biological basis of MDD is derived from studies of chronic stress models in rodents. However, while these models capture certain aspects of the features of MDD, the extent to which they reproduce the molecular pathology of the human syndrome remains unknown and the functional consequences of these changes on the neuronal networks controlling stress responses are poorly understood. During this presentation, we will first address the extent by which transcriptional signatures associated with MDD compares in men and women. We will then transition to the capacity of different mouse models of chronic stress to recapitulate some of the transcriptional alterations associated with the expression of MDD in both sexes. Finally, we will briefly elaborate on the functional consequences of these changes at the neuronal level and conclude with an integrative perspective on the contribution of sex-specific transcriptional profiles on the expression of stress responses and MDD in men and women.

Complex systems can be modeled at various levels of granularity, e.g., we can model a person at the cognitive level, on the neuronal level, or down to the biochemical level. When multiple models represent the same system at different scales, we would like to be able to reason about the causal effects of interventions on each level in such a way that the models remain consistent across levels. In the first part of this talk, I consider which conditions must be fulfilled for two structural equation models (SEMs) to stand in such a causally consistent relation. In the second part of the talk, I present recent work on learning causally consistent SEMs across multiple levels, distinguishing between bottom-up (micro- to macro-level) and top-down (macro- to micro-level) approaches.