In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.

We understand the brain in representational terms. E.g., we understand spatial navigation by appealing to the spatial properties that hippocampal cells represent, and the operations hippocampal circuits perform on those representations (Moser et al., 2008). Philosophers have been concerned with the nature of representation, and recently neuroscientists entered the debate, focusing specifically on neural representations. (Baker & Lansdell, n.d.; Egan, 2019; Piccinini & Shagrir, 2014; Poldrack, 2020; Shagrir, 2001). We want to know what representations are, how to discover them in the brain, and why they matter so much for our understanding of the brain. Those questions are framed in a traditional philosophical way: we start with explanations that use representational notions, and to more deeply understand those explanations we ask, what are representations — what is the definition of representation? What is it for some bit of neural activity to be a representation? I argue that there is an alternative, and much more fruitful, approach. Rather than asking what representations are, we should ask what the use of representational *notions* allows us to do in neuroscience — what thinking in representational terms helps scientists do or explain. I argue that this framing offers more fruitful ground for interdisciplinary collaboration by distinguishing the philosophical concerns that have a place in neuroscience from those that don’t (namely the definitional or metaphysical questions about representation). And I argue for a particular view of representational notions: they allow us to impose the structure of one domain onto another as a model of its causal structue. So, e.g., thinking about the hippocampus as representing spatial properties is a way of taking structures in those spatial properties, and projecting those structures (and algorithms that would implement them) them onto the brain as models of its causal structure.

In this talk, I shall not argue for any single thesis or theory in the realm of the (un)consciousness and (in)attention. Instead I will discuss specific examples where philosophers and psychologists can have genuine collaborations in this area. Since issues concerning phenomenological overflow is already too familiar for this audience, I will briefly discuss it only, and focus on other issues that have not been overworked. The exact contents are to be determined, but I will perhaps focus on recent controversies over “sustained representation of perspectival shape” (Morales, Bax, and Firestone, 2020, 2021).

The talk argues for a new approach to analysing analogical reasoning in scientific practice. Traditionally, philosophers of science tend to analyse analogical reasoning in either a top-down way or a bottom-up way. Examples of top-down approaches include Mary Hesse’s seminal work (1963) and Paul Bartha’s articulation model (2010), while most popular bottom-up approach is John Norton’s material approach (2018). I will address the problems of these traditional approaches and introduce an alternative approach, which is motivated by my exemplar-based approach to the history of science, defended in my recent book (2020).

Behaviourism is dead. But what did the 'cognitive revolution' do with the leftover - the idea of 'mind' that nobody seems to want anything to do with, even philosophers. Is studying the brain the same as studying the mind ? Do you need to 'see' inside the brain to study the brain ? Or mind ? How does the tools of behaviourism help ?

Historically, research on the brain has been working its way in from the outside world, hoping that such systematic exploration will take us some day to the middle and on through the middle to the output. Ever since the time of Aristotle, philosophers and scientists have assumed that the brain (or, more precisely, the mind) is initially a blank slate filled up gradually with experience in an outside-in manner. An alternative, brain-centric view, the one I am promoting, is that self-organized brain networks induce a vast repertoire of preformed neuronal patterns. While interacting with the world, some of these initially ‘nonsensical’ patterns acquire behavioral significance or meaning. Thus, experience is primarily a process of matching preexisting neuronal dynamics to events in the world. I suggest that perpetually active, internal dynamic is the source of cognition, a neuronal operation disengaged from immediate senses.

Every day when we fall asleep we lose consciousness, we are not there. And then, every morning, when we wake up, we regain it. What mechanisms give rise to consciousness, and how can we explain consciousness in the realm of the physical world of atoms and matter? For centuries, philosophers and scientists have aimed to crack this mystery. Much progress has been made in the past decades to understand how consciousness is instantiated in the brain, yet critical questions remain: can we develop a consciousness meter? Are computers conscious? What about other animals and babies? We have embarked in a large-scale, multicenter project to test, in the context of an open science, adversarial collaboration, two of the most prominent theories: Integrated information theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory. We are collecting over 500 datasets including invasive and non-invasive recordings of the human brain, i.e.. fMRI, MEG and ECoG. We hope this project will enable theory-driven discoveries and further explorations that will help us better understand how consciousness fits inside the human brain.