Predictive processing offers a unifying view of neural computation, proposing that brains continuously anticipate sensory input and update internal models based on prediction errors. In this talk, I will present converging evidence for the computational mechanisms underlying this framework across human neuroscience and deep neural networks. I will begin with recent work showing that large-scale distributed prediction-error encoding in the human brain directly predicts how sensory representations reorganize through predictive learning. I will then turn to PredNet, a popular predictive coding inspired deep network that has been widely used to model real-world biological vision systems. Using dynamic stimuli generated with our Spatiotemporal Style Transfer algorithm, we demonstrate that PredNet relies primarily on low-level spatiotemporal structure and remains insensitive to high-level content, revealing limits in its generalization capacity. Finally, I will discuss new recurrent vision models that integrate top-down feedback connections with intrinsic neural variability, uncovering a dual mechanism for robust sensory coding in which neural variability decorrelates unit responses, while top-down feedback stabilizes network dynamics. Together, these results outline how prediction error signaling and top-down feedback pathways shape adaptive sensory processing in biological and artificial systems.

We are looking for highly motivated Postdocs or PhD students, interested in computational neuroscience, specifically addressing questions concerning neural circuits underlying perception and learning. The perfect candidate has a strong background in math, physics or computer science (or equivalent), programming skills (python), and a strong interest in biological and neural systems. A background in computational neuroscience is ideal, but not mandatory. Our brain maintains an internal model of the world, based on which it can make predictions about sensory information. These predictions are useful for perception and learning in the uncertain and changing environments in which we evolved. The link between high-level normative theories and cellular-level observations of prediction errors and representations under uncertainty is still missing. The lab uses computational and mathematical tools to model cortical circuits and neural networks on different scales.

Understanding the neural mechanisms of reward-guided learning is a long-standing goal of computational neuroscience. Recent methodological innovations enable us to collect ever larger neural and behavioral datasets. This presents opportunities to achieve greater understanding of learning in the brain at scale, as well as methodological challenges. In the first part of the talk, I will discuss our recent insights into the mechanisms by which zebra finch songbirds learn to sing. Dopamine has been long thought to guide reward-based trial-and-error learning by encoding reward prediction errors. However, it is unknown whether the learning of natural behaviours, such as developmental vocal learning, occurs through dopamine-based reinforcement. Longitudinal recordings of dopamine and bird songs reveal that dopamine activity is indeed consistent with encoding a reward prediction error during naturalistic learning. In the second part of the talk, I will talk about recent work we are doing at DeepMind to develop tools for automatically discovering interpretable models of behavior directly from animal choice data. Our method, dubbed CogFunSearch, uses LLMs within an evolutionary search process in order to "discover" novel models in the form of Python programs that excel at accurately predicting animal behavior during reward-guided learning. The discovered programs reveal novel patterns of learning and choice behavior that update our understanding of how the brain solves reinforcement learning problems.

In a first part of the talk, I will present Predictive Coding Light (PCL), a novel unsupervised learning architecture for spiking neural networks. In contrast to conventional predictive coding approaches, which only transmit prediction errors to higher processing stages, PCL learns inhibitory lateral and top-down connectivity to suppress the most predictable spikes and passes a compressed representation of the input to higher processing stages. We show that PCL reproduces a range of biological findings and exhibits a favorable tradeoff between energy consumption and downstream classification performance on challenging benchmarks. A second part of the talk will feature our lab’s efforts to explain how infants and toddlers might learn abstract object representations without supervision. I will present deep learning models that exploit the temporal and multimodal structure of their sensory inputs to learn representations of individual objects, object categories, or abstract super-categories such as „kitchen object“ in a fully unsupervised fashion. These models offer a parsimonious account of how abstract semantic knowledge may be rooted in children's embodied first-person experiences.

Understanding the neural mechanisms of reward-guided learning is a long-standing goal of computational neuroscience. Recent methodological innovations enable us to collect ever larger neural and behavioral datasets. This presents opportunities to achieve greater understanding of learning in the brain at scale, as well as methodological challenges. In the first part of the talk, I will discuss our recent insights into the mechanisms by which zebra finch songbirds learn to sing. Dopamine has been long thought to guide reward-based trial-and-error learning by encoding reward prediction errors. However, it is unknown whether the learning of natural behaviours, such as developmental vocal learning, occurs through dopamine-based reinforcement. Longitudinal recordings of dopamine and bird songs reveal that dopamine activity is indeed consistent with encoding a reward prediction error during naturalistic learning. In the second part of the talk, I will talk about recent work we are doing at DeepMind to develop tools for automatically discovering interpretable models of behavior directly from animal choice data. Our method, dubbed CogFunSearch, uses LLMs within an evolutionary search process in order to "discover" novel models in the form of Python programs that excel at accurately predicting animal behavior during reward-guided learning. The discovered programs reveal novel patterns of learning and choice behavior that update our understanding of how the brain solves reinforcement learning problems.

Humans and other animals approach reward and avoid punishment and pay attention to cues predicting these events. Such motivated behavior thus appears to be guided by value, which directs behavior towards or away from positively or negatively valenced outcomes. Moreover, it is facilitated by (top-down) salience, which enhances attention to behaviorally relevant learned cues predicting the occurrence of valenced outcomes. Using human neuroimaging, we recently separated value (ventral striatum, posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex) from salience (anterior ventromedial cortex, occipital cortex) in the domain of liquid reward and punishment. Moreover, we investigated potential drivers of learned salience: the probability and uncertainty with which valenced and non-valenced outcomes occur. We find that the brain dissociates valenced from non-valenced probability and uncertainty, which indicates that reinforcement matters for the brain, in addition to information provided by probability and uncertainty alone, regardless of valence. Finally, we assessed learning signals (unsigned prediction errors) that may underpin the acquisition of salience. Particularly the insula appears to be central for this function, encoding a subjective salience prediction error, similarly at the time of positively and negatively valenced outcomes. However, it appears to employ domain-specific time constants, leading to stronger salience signals in the aversive than the appetitive domain at the time of cues. These findings explain why previous research associated the insula with both valence-independent salience processing and with preferential encoding of the aversive domain. More generally, the distinction of value and salience appears to provide a useful framework for capturing the neural basis of motivated behavior.

Predictive processing is a computational framework that aims to explain how the brain processes sensory information by making predictions about the environment and minimizing prediction errors. It can also be used to explain some of the key symptoms of psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. In my talk, I will provide an overview of our progress in this endeavor.

Theories from reinforcement learning have been highly influential for interpreting neural activity in the biological circuits critical for animal and human learning. Central among these is the identification of phasic activity in dopamine neurons as a reward prediction error signal that drives learning in basal ganglia and prefrontal circuits. However, recent findings suggest that dopaminergic prediction error signals have access to complex, structured reward predictions and are sensitive to more properties of outcomes than learning theories with simple scalar value predictions might suggest. Here, I will present recent work in which we probed the identity-specific structure of reward prediction errors in an odor-guided choice task and found evidence for multiple predictive “threads” that segregate reward predictions, and reward prediction errors, according to the specific sensory features of anticipated outcomes. Our results point to an expanded class of neural reinforcement learning algorithms in which biological agents learn rich associative structure from their environment and leverage it to build reward predictions that include information about the specific, and perhaps idiosyncratic, features of available outcomes, using these to guide behavior in even quite simple reward learning tasks.

Animals exhibit remarkable learning capabilities with little direct supervision. Likewise, self-supervised learning is an emergent paradigm in artificial intelligence, closing the performance gap to supervised learning. In the context of biology, self-supervised learning corresponds to a setting where one sense or specific stimulus may serve as a supervisory signal for another. After learning, the latter can be used to predict the former. On the implementation level, it has been demonstrated that such predictive learning can occur at the single neuron level, in compartmentalized neurons that separate and associate information from different streams. We demonstrate the power such self-supervised learning over unsupervised (Hebb-like) learning rules, which depend heavily on stimulus statistics, in two examples: First, in the context of animal navigation where predictive learning can associate internal self-motion information always available to the animal with external visual landmark information, leading to accurate path-integration in the dark. We focus on the well-characterized fly head direction system and show that our setting learns a connectivity strikingly similar to the one reported in experiments. The mature network is a quasi-continuous attractor and reproduces key experiments in which optogenetic stimulation controls the internal representation of heading, and where the network remaps to integrate with different gains. Second, we show that incorporating global gating by reward prediction errors allows the same setting to learn conditioning at the neuronal level with mixed selectivity. At its core, conditioning entails associating a neural activity pattern induced by an unconditioned stimulus (US) with the pattern arising in response to a conditioned stimulus (CS). Solving the generic problem of pattern-to-pattern associations naturally leads to emergent cognitive phenomena like blocking, overshadowing, saliency effects, extinction, interstimulus interval effects etc. Surprisingly, we find that the same network offers a reductionist mechanism for causal inference by resolving the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.

A recent formulation of predictive coding theory proposes that a subset of neurons in each cortical area encodes sensory prediction errors, the difference between predictions relayed from higher cortex and the sensory input. Here, we test for evidence of prediction error responses in spiking responses and local field potentials (LFP) recorded in primary visual cortex and area V4 of macaque monkeys, and in complementary electroencephalographic (EEG) scalp recordings in human participants. We presented a fixed sequence of visual stimuli on most trials, and violated the expected ordering on a small subset of trials. Under predictive coding theory, pattern-violating stimuli should trigger robust prediction errors, but we found that spiking, LFP and EEG responses to expected and pattern-violating stimuli were nearly identical. Our results challenge the assertion that a fundamental computational motif in sensory cortex is to signal prediction errors, at least those based on predictions derived from temporal patterns of visual stimulation.

At any given moment the brain receives more sensory information than it can use to guide adaptive behaviour, creating the need for mechanisms that promote efficient processing of incoming sensory signals. One way in which the brain might reduce its sensory processing load is to encode successive presentations of the same stimulus in a more efficient form, a process known as neural adaptation. Conversely, when a stimulus violates an expected pattern, it should evoke an enhanced neural response. Such a scheme for sensory encoding has been formalised in predictive coding theories, which propose that recent experience establishes expectations in the brain that generate prediction errors when violated. In this webinar, Professor Jason Mattingley will discuss whether the encoding of elementary visual features is modulated when otherwise identical stimuli are expected or unexpected based upon the history of stimulus presentation. In humans, EEG was employed to measure neural activity evoked by gratings of different orientations, and multivariate forward modelling was used to determine how orientation selectivity is affected for expected versus unexpected stimuli. In mice, two-photon calcium imaging was used to quantify orientation tuning of individual neurons in the primary visual cortex to expected and unexpected gratings. Results revealed enhanced orientation tuning to unexpected visual stimuli, both at the level of whole-brain responses and for individual visual cortex neurons. Professor Mattingley will discuss the implications of these findings for predictive coding theories of sensory encoding. Professor Jason Mattingley is a Laureate Fellow and Foundation Chair in Cognitive Neuroscience at The University of Queensland. His research is directed toward understanding the brain processes that support perception, selective attention and decision-making, in health and disease.

The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.

Recent success in training artificial agents and robots derives from a combination of direct learning of behavioral policies and indirect learning via value functions. Policy learning and value learning employ distinct algorithms that depend upon evaluation of errors in performance and reward prediction errors, respectively. In mammals, behavioral learning and the role of mesolimbic dopamine signaling have been extensively evaluated with respect to reward prediction errors; but there has been little consideration of how direct policy learning might inform our understanding. I’ll discuss our recent work on classical conditioning in naïve mice (https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.05.31.446464v1) that provides multiple lines of evidence that phasic dopamine signaling regulates policy learning from performance errors in addition to its well-known roles in value learning. This work points towards new opportunities for unraveling the mechanisms of basal ganglia control over behavior under both adaptive and maladaptive learning conditions.

How do people learn in real-world environments where the space of possible actions can be vast or even infinite? The study of human learning has made rapid progress in past decades, from discovering the neural substrate of reward prediction errors, to building AI capable of mastering the game of Go. Yet this line of research has primarily focused on learning through repeated interactions with the same stimuli. How are humans able to rapidly adapt to novel situations and learn from such sparse examples? I propose a theory of how generalization guides human learning, by making predictions about which unobserved options are most promising to explore. Inspired by Roger Shepard’s law of generalization, I show how a Bayesian function learning model provides a mechanism for generalizing limited experiences to a wide set of novel possibilities, based on the simple principle that similar actions produce similar outcomes. This model of generalization generates predictions about the expected reward and underlying uncertainty of unexplored options, where both are vital components in how people actively explore the world. This model allows us to explain developmental differences in the explorative behavior of children, and suggests a general principle of learning across spatial, conceptual, and structured domains.