Guidelines concerning the potentially harmful effects of scientific studies have historically focused on minimizing risk for participants. However, studies can also indirectly inflict harm on individuals and social groups through how they are designed, reported, and disseminated. As evidenced by recent criticisms and retractions of high-profile studies dealing with a wide variety of social issues, there is a scarcity of resources and guidance on how one can conduct research in a socially responsible manner. As such, even motivated researchers might publish work that has negative social impacts due to a lack of awareness. To address this, we proposed 10 recommendations (“simple rules”) for researchers who wish to conduct more socially responsible science. These recommendations cover major considerations throughout the life cycle of a study from inception to dissemination. They are not aimed to be a prescriptive list or a deterministic code of conduct. Rather, they are meant to help motivated scientists to reflect on their social responsibility as researchers and actively engage with the potential social impact of their research.

Many animals live in complex social groups. To survive, it is essential to know who to avoid and who to interact. Although naïve mice are naturally attracted to any adult conspecifics, a single defeat experience could elicit social avoidance towards the aggressor for days. The neural mechanisms underlying the behavior switch from social approach to social avoidance remains incompletely understood. Here, we identify oxytocin neurons in the retrochiasmatic supraoptic nucleus (SOROXT) and oxytocin receptor (OXTR) expressing cells in the anterior subdivision of ventromedial hypothalamus, ventrolateral part (aVMHvlOXTR) as a key circuit motif for defeat-induced social avoidance learning. After defeat, aVMHvlOXTR cells drastically increase their responses to aggressor cues. This response change is functionally important as optogenetic activation of aVMHvlOXTR cells elicits time-locked social avoidance towards a benign social target whereas inactivating the cells suppresses defeat-induced social avoidance. Furthermore, OXTR in the aVMHvl is itself essential for the behavior change. Knocking out OXTR in the aVMHvl or antagonizing the receptor during defeat, but not during post-defeat social interaction, impairs defeat-induced social avoidance. aVMHvlOXTR receives its private supply of oxytocin from SOROXT cells. SOROXT is highly activated by the noxious somatosensory inputs associated with defeat. Oxytocin released from SOROXT depolarizes aVMHvlOXTR cells and facilitates their synaptic potentiation, and hence, increases aVMHvlOXTR cell responses to aggressor cues. Ablating SOROXT cells impairs defeat-induced social avoidance learning whereas activating the cells promotes social avoidance after a subthreshold defeat experience. Altogether, our study reveals an essential role of SOROXT-aVMHvlOXTR circuit in defeat-induced social learning and highlights the importance of hypothalamic oxytocin system in social ranking and its plasticity.

Individuals vary widely in how they categorize novel phenomena. This individual variation has led canonical theories in cognitive and social science to suggest that communication in large social networks leads populations to construct divergent category systems. Yet, anthropological data indicates that large, independent societies consistently arrive at similar categories across a range of topics. How is it possible for diverse populations, consisting of individuals with significant variation in how they view the world, to independently construct similar categories? Through a series of online experiments, I show how large communication networks within cultures can promote the formation of similar categories across cultures. For this investigation, I designed an online “Grouping Game” to observe how people construct categories in both small and large populations when tasked with grouping together the same novel and ambiguous images. I replicated this design for English-speaking subjects in the U.S. and Mandarin-speaking subjects in China. In both cultures, solitary individuals and small social groups produced highly divergent category systems. Yet, large social groups separately and consistently arrived at highly similar categories both within and across cultures. These findings are accurately predicted by a simple mathematical model of critical mass dynamics. Altogether, I show how large communication networks can filter lexical diversity among individuals to produce replicable society-level patterns, yielding unexpected implications for cultural evolution. In particular, I discuss how participants in both cultures readily harnessed analogies when categorizing novel stimuli, and I examine the role of communication networks in promoting cross-cultural similarities in analogy-making as the key engine of category formation.

In the United States, racial/ethnic inequalities in Alzheimer's disease and related dementias persist even after controlling for socioeconomic factors and physical health. These persistent and unexplained disparities suggest: (1) there are unrecognized dementia risk factors that are socially patterned and/or (2) known dementia risk factors exhibit differential impact across social groups. Pursuing these research directions with data from multiple longitudinal studies of brain and cognitive aging has revealed several challenges to the study of late-life health inequalities, highlighted evidence for both risk and resilience within marginalized communities, and inspired new data collection efforts to advance the field.

Investigations of the neural systems mediating the processing of social groups defined by race, specifically Black and White race groups in American participants, reveals significant overlap with brain mechanisms involved in emotion. This talk will provide an overview of research on the neuroscience of race and emotion, focusing on implicit race attitudes. Implicit race attitudes are expressed without conscious effort and control, and contrast with explicit, conscious attitudes. In spite of sharp decline in the expression of explicit, negative attitudes towards outgroup race members over the last half century, negative implicit attitudes persist, even in the face of strong egalitarian goals and beliefs. Early research demonstrated that implicit, but not explicit, negative attitudes towards outgroup race members correlate with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal in the amygdala – a region implicated in threat representations, as well as emotion’s influence on cognition. Building on this initial finding, we demonstrate how learning and decisions may be modulated by implicit race attitudes and involve neural systems mediating emotion, learning and choice. Finally, we discuss techniques that may diminish the unintentional expression of negative, implicit race attitudes.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.