n the neurosciences the need for some 'overarching' theory is sometimes expressed, but it is not always obvious what is meant by this. One can perhaps agree that in modern science observation and experimentation is normally complemented by 'theory', i.e. the development of theoretical concepts that help guiding and evaluating experiments and measurements. A deeper discussion of 'brain theory' will require the clarification of some further distictions, in particular: theory vs. model and brain research (and its theory) vs. neuroscience. Other questions are: Does a theory require mathematics? Or even differential equations? Today it is often taken for granted that the whole universe including everything in it, for example humans, animals, and plants, can be adequately treated by physics and therefore theoretical physics is the overarching theory. Even if this is the case, it has turned out that in some particular parts of physics (the historical example is thermodynamics) it may be useful to simplify the theory by introducing additional theoretical concepts that can in principle be 'reduced' to more complex descriptions on the 'microscopic' level of basic physical particals and forces. In this sense, brain theory may be regarded as part of theoretical neuroscience, which is inside biophysics and therefore inside physics, or theoretical physics. Still, in neuroscience and brain research, additional concepts are typically used to describe results and help guiding experimentation that are 'outside' physics, beginning with neurons and synapses, names of brain parts and areas, up to concepts like 'learning', 'motivation', 'attention'. Certainly, we do not yet have one theory that includes all these concepts. So 'brain theory' is still in a 'pre-newtonian' state. However, it may still be useful to understand in general the relations between a larger theory and its 'parts', or between microscopic and macroscopic theories, or between theories at different 'levels' of description. This is what I plan to do.

Overview of neurosurgery specialty interplay between neurology, psychiatry and neurosurgery. Discussion on benefits and disadvantages of classifications. Presentation of sub-specialties: trauma, oncology, functional, pediatric, vascular and spine. How does an ordinary day of a neurosurgeon look like; outpatient clinic, emergencies, pre/intra/post operative patient care. An ordinary operation. Myth-busting and practical insights of every day practice. An ordinary operation. Hint for research on clinical problems to be solved. The coming ethical frontiers of neuroprosthetics. In part two we will explore the explanatory gap and its significance. We will review the more than 200 theories of the hard problem of consciousness, from the prevailing to the unconventional. Finally, we are going to reflect on the AI advancements and the claims of LLMs becoming conscious

Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

Decades of research on understanding the mechanisms of attentional selection have focused on identifying the units (representations) on which attention operates in order to guide prioritized sensory processing. These attentional units fit neatly to accommodate our understanding of how attention is allocated in a top-down, bottom-up, or historical fashion. In this talk, I will focus on attentional phenomena that are not easily accommodated within current theories of attentional selection – the “attentional platypuses,” as they allude to an observation that within biological taxonomies the platypus does not fit into either mammal or bird categories. Similarly, attentional phenomena that do not fit neatly within current attentional models suggest that current models need to be revised. I list a few instances of the ‘attentional platypuses” and then offer a new approach, the Dynamically Weighted Prioritization, stipulating that multiple factors impinge onto the attentional priority map, each with a corresponding weight. The interaction between factors and their corresponding weights determines the current state of the priority map which subsequently constrains/guides attention allocation. I propose that this new approach should be considered as a supplement to existing models of attention, especially those that emphasize categorical organizations.

In our rapidly evolving digital world, there is increasing concern about the impact of digital technologies and social media on the mental health of young people. Policymakers and the public are nervous. Psychologists are facing mounting pressures to deliver evidence that can inform policies and practices to safeguard both young people and society at large. However, research progress is slow while technological change is accelerating.My talk will reflect on this, both as a question of psychological science and metascience. Digital companies have designed highly popular environments that differ in important ways from traditional offline spaces. By revisiting the foundations of psychology (e.g. development and cognition) and considering digital changes' impact on theories and findings, we gain deeper insights into questions such as the following. (1) How do digital environments exacerbate developmental vulnerabilities that predispose young people to mental health conditions? (2) How do digital designs interact with cognitive and learning processes, formalised through computational approaches such as reinforcement learning or Bayesian modelling?However, we also need to face deeper questions about what it means to do science about new technologies and the challenge of keeping pace with technological advancements. Therefore, I discuss the concept of ‘fast science’, where, during crises, scientists might lower their standards of evidence to come to conclusions quicker. Might psychologists want to take this approach in the face of technological change and looming concerns? The talk concludes with a discussion of such strategies for 21st-century psychology research in the era of digitalization.

This webinar features presentations from SueYeon Chung (New York University) and Srinivas Turaga (HHMI Janelia Research Campus) on theoretical and computational approaches to sensory cognition. Chung introduced a “neural manifold” framework to capture how high-dimensional neural activity is structured into meaningful manifolds reflecting object representations. She demonstrated that manifold geometry—shaped by radius, dimensionality, and correlations—directly governs a population’s capacity for classifying or separating stimuli under nuisance variations. Applying these ideas as a data analysis tool, she showed how measuring object-manifold geometry can explain transformations along the ventral visual stream and suggested that manifold principles also yield better self-supervised neural network models resembling mammalian visual cortex. Turaga described simulating the entire fruit fly visual pathway using its connectome, modeling 64 key cell types in the optic lobe. His team’s systematic approach—combining sparse connectivity from electron microscopy with simple dynamical parameters—recapitulated known motion-selective responses and produced novel testable predictions. Together, these studies underscore the power of combining connectomic detail, task objectives, and geometric theories to unravel neural computations bridging from stimuli to cognitive functions.

Deep learning provides new data-driven tools to relate neural activity to perception and cognition, aiding scientists in developing theories of neural computation that increasingly resemble biological systems both at the level of behavior and of neural activity. But what in a deep neural network should correspond to what in a biological system? This question is addressed implicitly in the use of comparison measures that relate specific neural or behavioral dimensions via a particular functional form. However, distinct comparison methodologies can give conflicting results in recovering even a known ground-truth model in an idealized setting, leaving open the question of what to conclude from the outcome of a systems comparison using any given methodology. Here, we develop a framework to make explicit and quantitative the effect of both hypothesis-driven aspects—such as details of the architecture of a deep neural network—as well as methodological choices in a systems comparison setting. We demonstrate via the learning dynamics of deep neural networks that, while the role of the comparison methodology is often de-emphasized relative to hypothesis-driven aspects, this choice can impact and even invert the conclusions to be drawn from a comparison between neural systems. We provide evidence that the right way to adjudicate a comparison depends on the use case—the scientific hypothesis under investigation—which could range from identifying single-neuron or circuit-level correspondences to capturing generalizability to new stimulus properties

Recent high-profile scientific achievements by machine learning (ML) and especially deep learning (DL) systems have reinvigorated interest in ML for automated scientific discovery (eg, Wang et al. 2023). Much of this work is motivated by the thought that DL methods might facilitate the efficient discovery of phenomena, hypotheses, or even models or theories more efficiently than traditional, theory-driven approaches to discovery. This talk considers some of the more specific obstacles to automated, DL-driven discovery in frontier science, focusing on gravitational-wave astrophysics (GWA) as a representative case study. In the first part of the talk, we argue that despite these efforts, prospects for DL-driven discovery in GWA remain uncertain. In the second part, we advocate a shift in focus towards the ways DL can be used to augment or enhance existing discovery methods, and the epistemic virtues and vices associated with these uses. We argue that the primary epistemic virtue of many such uses is to decrease opportunity costs associated with investigating puzzling or anomalous signals, and that the right framework for evaluating these uses comes from philosophical work on pursuitworthiness.

There are many mysteries in the universe. One of the most significant, often considered the final frontier in science, is understanding how our subjective experience, or consciousness, emerges from the collective action of neurons in biological systems. While substantial progress has been made over the past decades, a unified and widely accepted explanation of the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness remains elusive. The field is rife with theories that frequently provide contradictory explanations of the phenomenon. To accelerate progress, we have adopted a new model of science: adversarial collaboration in team science. Our goal is to test theories of consciousness in an adversarial setting. Adversarial collaboration offers a unique way to bolster creativity and rigor in scientific research by merging the expertise of teams with diverse viewpoints. Ideally, we aim to harness collective intelligence, embracing various perspectives, to expedite the uncovering of scientific truths. In this talk, I will highlight the effectiveness (and challenges) of this approach using selected case studies, showcasing its potential to counter biases, challenge traditional viewpoints, and foster innovative thought. Through the joint design of experiments, teams incorporate a competitive aspect, ensuring comprehensive exploration of problems. This method underscores the importance of structured conflict and diversity in propelling scientific advancement and innovation.

In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.

The nature of emotions and their neural underpinnings remain debated. Appraisal theories such as the component process model propose that the perception and evaluation of events (appraisal) is the key to eliciting the range of emotions we experience. Here we study whether the framework of appraisal theories provides a clearer account for the differentiation of emotional episodes and their functional organisation in the brain. We developed a stealth game to manipulate appraisals in a systematic yet immersive way. The interactive nature of video games heightens self-relevance through the experience of goal-directed action or reaction, evoking strong emotions. We show that our manipulations led to changes in behaviour, physiology and brain activations.

Conscious emotional experiences are very rich in their nature, and can encompass anything ranging from the most intense panic when facing immediate threat, to the overwhelming love felt when meeting your newborn. It is then no surprise that capturing all aspects of emotional consciousness, such as intensity, valence, and bodily responses, into one theory has become the topic of much debate. Key questions in the field concern how we can actually measure emotions and which type of experiments can help us distill the neural correlates of emotional consciousness. In this talk I will give a brief overview of theories of emotional consciousness and where they disagree, after which I will dive into the evidence proposed to support these theories. Along the way I will discuss to what extent studying emotional consciousness is ‘special’ and will suggest several tools and experimental contrasts we have at our disposal to further our understanding on this intriguing topic.

A fundamental question in affective sciences is how the human mind decides if, and in what intensity, to elicit an affective response. Appraisal theories assume that preceding the affective response, there is an evaluation stage in which dimensions of an event are being appraised. Common to most appraisal theories is the assumption that the evaluation phase involves the assessment of the stimulus’ relevance to the perceiver’s well-being. In this talk, I first discuss conceptual and methodological challenges in investigating relevance appraisal. Next, I present two lines of experiments that ask how the human mind uses information about objective and subjective probabilities in the decision about the intensity of the emotional response and how these are affected by the valence of the event. The potential contribution of the results to appraisal theory is discussed.

Theories from reinforcement learning have been highly influential for interpreting neural activity in the biological circuits critical for animal and human learning. Central among these is the identification of phasic activity in dopamine neurons as a reward prediction error signal that drives learning in basal ganglia and prefrontal circuits. However, recent findings suggest that dopaminergic prediction error signals have access to complex, structured reward predictions and are sensitive to more properties of outcomes than learning theories with simple scalar value predictions might suggest. Here, I will present recent work in which we probed the identity-specific structure of reward prediction errors in an odor-guided choice task and found evidence for multiple predictive “threads” that segregate reward predictions, and reward prediction errors, according to the specific sensory features of anticipated outcomes. Our results point to an expanded class of neural reinforcement learning algorithms in which biological agents learn rich associative structure from their environment and leverage it to build reward predictions that include information about the specific, and perhaps idiosyncratic, features of available outcomes, using these to guide behavior in even quite simple reward learning tasks.

The critical brain hypothesis states that the brain can benefit from operating close to a second-order phase transition. While it has been shown that several computational aspects of sensory information processing (e.g., sensitivity to input) are optimal in this regime, it is still unclear whether these computational benefits of criticality can be leveraged by neural systems performing behaviorally relevant computations. To address this question, we investigate signatures of criticality in networks optimized to perform efficient encoding. We consider a network of leaky integrate-and-fire neurons with synaptic transmission delays and input noise. Previously, it was shown that the performance of such networks varies non-monotonically with the noise amplitude. Interestingly, we find that in the vicinity of the optimal noise level for efficient coding, the network dynamics exhibits signatures of criticality, namely, the distribution of avalanche sizes follows a power law. When the noise amplitude is too low or too high for efficient coding, the network appears either super-critical or sub-critical, respectively. This result suggests that two influential, and previously disparate theories of neural processing optimization—efficient coding, and criticality—may be intimately related

Neurons in the rodent hippocampus appear to encode the position of the animal in physical space during movement. Individual ``place cells'' fire in restricted sub-regions of an environment, a feature often taken as evidence that the hippocampus encodes a map of space that subserves navigation. But these same neurons exhibit complex responses to many other variables that defy explanation by position alone, and the hippocampus is known to be more broadly critical for memory formation. Here we elaborate and test a theory of hippocampal coding which produces place cells as a general consequence of efficient memory coding. We constructed neural networks that actively exploit the correlations between memories in order to learn compressed representations of experience. Place cells readily emerged in the trained model, due to the correlations in sensory input between experiences at nearby locations. Notably, these properties were highly sensitive to the compressibility of the sensory environment, with place field size and population coding level in dynamic opposition to optimally encode the correlations between experiences. The effects of learning were also strongly biphasic: nearby locations are represented more similarly following training, while locations with intermediate similarity become increasingly decorrelated, both distance-dependent effects that scaled with the compressibility of the input features. Using virtual reality and 2-photon functional calcium imaging in head-fixed mice, we recorded the simultaneous activity of thousands of hippocampal neurons during virtual exploration to test these predictions. Varying the compressibility of sensory information in the environment produced systematic changes in place cell properties that reflected the changing input statistics, consistent with the theory. We similarly identified representational plasticity during learning, which produced a distance-dependent exchange between compression and pattern separation. These results motivate a more domain-general interpretation of hippocampal computation, one that is naturally compatible with earlier theories on the circuit's importance for episodic memory formation. Work done in collaboration with James Priestley, Lorenzo Posani, Marcus Benna, Attila Losonczy.

Cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience researchers have agreed that the replication of findings is important for establishing which ideas (or theories) are integral to the study of cognition across the lifespan. Recently, high-profile papers have called into question findings that were once thought to be unassailable. Much attention has been paid to how p-hacking, publication bias, and sample size are responsible for failed replications. However, much less attention has been paid to the fidelity by which researchers enact study protocols. Researchers conducting education or clinical trials are aware of the importance in fidelity – or the extent to which the protocols are delivered in the same way across participants. Nevertheless, this idea has not been applied to cognitive contexts. This seminar discusses factors that impact the replicability of findings alongside recent models suggesting that even small fidelity deviations have real impacts on the data collected.

We will explore how neuropsychology can be leveraged to directly test cognitive neuroscience theories using the case of frontotemporal dementias affecting the language network. Specifically, we will focus on pathological, neuroimaging, and cognitive data from primary progressive aphasia. We will see how they can help us investigate the reading network, semantic knowledge organisation, and grammatical categories processing. Time permitting, the end of the talk will cover the temporal dynamics of semantic dimensions recovery and the role played by the task.

Dominant theories of analogical thinking postulate that making an analogy consists in discovering that two superficially different situations share isomorphic systems of similar relations. According to this perspective, the comparison between the two situations may eventually lead to the construction of a schema, which retains the structural aspects they share and deletes their specific contents. We have developed a new approach to analogical thinking, whose purpose is to explain a particular type of analogies: those in which the analogs are exemplars of a schema-governed category (e.g., two instances of robbery). As compared to standard analogies, these comparisons are noteworthy in that a well-established schema (the schema-governed category) mediates each one of the subprocesses involved in analogical thinking. We argue that the category assignment approach is able to provide a better account of how the analogical subprocesses of retrieval, mapping, re-representation, evaluation and inference generation are carried out during the processing of this specific kind of analogies. The arguments presented are accompanied by brief descriptions of some of the studies that provided support for this approach.

What do people do when they comprehend language in discourse? According to many psychologists, they build and maintain cognitive representations of utterances in four complementary mental models for discourse that interact with each other: the surface text, the text base, the situation model, and the context model. When people encounter metaphors in these utterances, they need to incorporate them into each of these mental representations for the discourse. Since influential metaphor theories define metaphor as a form of (figurative) analogy, involving cross-domain mapping of a smaller or greater extent, the general expectation has been that metaphor comprehension is also based on analogizing. This expectation, however, has been partly borne out by the data, but not completely. There is no one-to-one relationship between metaphor as (conceptual) structure (analogy) and metaphor as (psychological) process (analogizing). According to Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT), only some metaphors are handled by analogy. Instead, most metaphors are presumably handled by lexical disambiguation. This is a hypothesis that brings together most metaphor research in a provocatively new way: it means that most metaphors are not processed metaphorically, which produces a paradox of metaphor. In this talk I will sketch out how this paradox arises and how it can be resolved by a new version of DMT, which I have described in my forthcoming book Slowing metaphor down: Updating Deliberate Metaphor Theory (currently under review). In this theory, the distinction between, but also the relation between, analogy in metaphorical structure versus analogy in metaphorical process is of central importance.

In popular media, there is often a connection drawn between the advent of awareness in artificial agents and those same agents simultaneously achieving human or superhuman level intelligence. In this talk, I will examine the validity and potential application of this seemingly intuitive link between consciousness and intelligence. I will do so by examining the cognitive abilities associated with three contemporary theories of conscious function: Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Information Generation Theory (IGT), and Attention Schema Theory (AST), and demonstrating that all three theories specifically relate conscious function to some aspect of domain-general intelligence in humans. With this insight, we will turn to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and find that, while still far from demonstrating general intelligence, many state-of-the-art deep learning methods have begun to incorporate key aspects of each of the three functional theories. Given this apparent trend, I will use the motivating example of mental time travel in humans to propose ways in which insights from each of the three theories may be combined into a unified model. I believe that doing so can enable the development of artificial agents which are not only more generally intelligent but are also consistent with multiple current theories of conscious function.

The spike-threshold nonlinearity is a fundamental, yet enigmatic, component of biological computation — despite its role in many theories, it has evaded definitive characterisation. Indeed, much classic work has attempted to limit the focus on spiking by smoothing over the spike threshold or by approximating spiking dynamics with firing-rate dynamics. Here, we take a novel perspective that captures the full potential of spike-based computation. Based on previous studies of the geometry of efficient spike-coding networks, we consider a population of neurons with low-rank connectivity, allowing us to cast each neuron’s threshold as a boundary in a space of population modes, or latent variables. Each neuron divides this latent space into subthreshold and suprathreshold areas. We then demonstrate how a network of inhibitory (I) neurons forms a convex, attracting boundary in the latent coding space, and a network of excitatory (E) neurons forms a concave, repellant boundary. Finally, we show how the combination of the two yields stable dynamics at the crossing of the E and I boundaries, and can be mapped onto a constrained optimization problem. The resultant EI networks are balanced, inhibition-stabilized, and exhibit asynchronous irregular activity, thereby closely resembling cortical networks of the brain. Moreover, we demonstrate how such networks can be tuned to either suppress or amplify noise, and how the composition of inhibitory convex and excitatory concave boundaries can result in universal function approximation. Our work puts forth a new theory of biologically-plausible computation in balanced spiking networks, and could serve as a novel framework for scalable and interpretable computation with spikes.

A complete neuroscience requires multi-level theories that address phenomena ranging from higher-level cognitive behaviors to activities within a cell. Unfortunately, we don't have cognitive models of behavior whose components can be decomposed into the neural dynamics that give rise to behavior, leaving an explanatory gap. Here, we decompose SUSTAIN, a clustering model of concept learning, into neuron-like units (SUSTAIN-d; decomposed). Instead of abstract constructs (clusters), SUSTAIN-d has a pool of neuron-like units. With millions of units, a key challenge is how to bridge from abstract constructs such as clusters to neurons, whilst retaining high-level behavior. How does the brain coordinate neural activity during learning? Inspired by algorithms that capture flocking behavior in birds, we introduce a neural flocking learning rule to coordinate units that collectively form higher-level mental constructs ("virtual clusters"), neural representations (concept, place and grid cell-like assemblies), and parallels recurrent hippocampal activity. The decomposed model shows how brain-scale neural populations coordinate to form assemblies encoding concept and spatial representations, and why many neurons are required for robust performance. Our account provides a multi-level explanation for how cognition and symbol-like representations are supported by coordinated neural assemblies formed through learning.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Theory of mind, which consists of reasoning about the knowledge, belief, desire, and similar mental states of others, is a key component of social reasoning and social interaction. While it has been studied by cognitive scientists for decades, none of the prevailing theories of the processes that underlie theory of mind reasoning and development explain the breadth of experimental findings. I propose that this is because theory of mind is, like much of human reasoning, inherently analogical. In this talk, I will discuss several theory of mind findings from the psychology literature, the challenges they pose for our understanding of theory of mind, and bring in evidence from the Analogical Theory of Mind (AToM) cognitive model that demonstrates how these findings fit into an analogical understanding of theory of mind reasoning.

Theories of consciousness are commonly grouped into "first-order" and "higher-order" families. As conventional wisdom has it, many more animals are likely to be conscious if a first-order theory is correct. But two recent developments have put pressure on the first/higher-order distinction. One is the argument (from Shea and Frith) that an effective global workspace mechanism must involve a form of metacognition. The second is Lau's "perceptual reality monitoring" (PRM) theory, a member of the "higher-order" family in which conscious sensory content is not re-represented, only tagged with a temporal index and marked as reliable. I argue that the first/higher-order distinction has become so blurred that it is no longer particularly useful. Moreover, the conventional wisdom about animals should not be trusted. It could be, for example, that the distribution of PRM in the animal kingdom is wider than the distribution of global broadcasting.

How and why are analogies spontaneously generated? Despite the prominence of analogy in learning and reasoning, there is little research on whether and how analogy is spontaneously generated in everyday settings. Here we fill this gap by gathering parents' answers to children's real questions, and examining analogy use in parental explanations. Study 1 found that parents used analogy spontaneously in their explanations, despite no prompt nor mention of analogy in the instruction. Study 2 found that these analogical explanations were rated highly by parents, schoolteachers, and university students alike. In Study 3, six-year-olds also rated good analogical explanations highly, but unlike their parents, did not rate them higher than causal, non-analogical explanations. We discuss what makes an analogy a good explanation, and how theories from both explanation and analogy research explain one’s motivation for spontaneously generating analogies.

Prior studies of A:B::C:D verbal analogies have identified several factors that affect performance, including the semantic similarity between source and target domains (semantic distance), the semantic association between the C-term and incorrect answers (distracter salience), and the type of relations between word pairs (e.g., categorical, compositional, and causal). However, it is unclear how these stimulus properties affect performance when utilized together. Moreover, how do these item factors interact with individual differences such as crystallized intelligence and creative thinking? Several studies reveal interactions among these item and individual difference factors impacting verbal analogy performance. For example, a three-way interaction demonstrated that the effects of semantic distance and distracter salience had a greater impact on performance for compositional and causal relations than for categorical ones (Jones, Kmiecik, Irwin, & Morrison, 2022). Implications for analogy theories and future directions are discussed.

Working memory involves the short-term maintenance of information and is critical in many tasks. The neural circuit dynamics underlying working memory remain poorly understood, with different aspects of prefrontal cortical (PFC) responses explained by different putative mechanisms. By mathematical analysis, numerical simulations, and using recordings from monkey PFC, we investigate a critical but hitherto ignored aspect of working memory dynamics: information loading. We find that, contrary to common assumptions, optimal information loading involves inputs that are largely orthogonal, rather than similar, to the persistent activities observed during memory maintenance. Using a novel, theoretically principled metric, we show that PFC exhibits the hallmarks of optimal information loading and we find that such dynamics emerge naturally as a dynamical strategy in task-optimized recurrent neural networks. Our theory unifies previous, seemingly conflicting theories of memory maintenance based on attractor or purely sequential dynamics, and reveals a normative principle underlying the widely observed phenomenon of dynamic coding in PFC.

Individuals vary widely in how they categorize novel phenomena. This individual variation has led canonical theories in cognitive and social science to suggest that communication in large social networks leads populations to construct divergent category systems. Yet, anthropological data indicates that large, independent societies consistently arrive at similar categories across a range of topics. How is it possible for diverse populations, consisting of individuals with significant variation in how they view the world, to independently construct similar categories? Through a series of online experiments, I show how large communication networks within cultures can promote the formation of similar categories across cultures. For this investigation, I designed an online “Grouping Game” to observe how people construct categories in both small and large populations when tasked with grouping together the same novel and ambiguous images. I replicated this design for English-speaking subjects in the U.S. and Mandarin-speaking subjects in China. In both cultures, solitary individuals and small social groups produced highly divergent category systems. Yet, large social groups separately and consistently arrived at highly similar categories both within and across cultures. These findings are accurately predicted by a simple mathematical model of critical mass dynamics. Altogether, I show how large communication networks can filter lexical diversity among individuals to produce replicable society-level patterns, yielding unexpected implications for cultural evolution. In particular, I discuss how participants in both cultures readily harnessed analogies when categorizing novel stimuli, and I examine the role of communication networks in promoting cross-cultural similarities in analogy-making as the key engine of category formation.

Many engineered and biological systems must trade off performance and energy use, and the brain is no exception. While there are theories on how activity levels are controlled in biological networks through feedback control (homeostasis), it is not clear what the effects on population coding are, and therefore how performance and energy can be traded off. In this talk we will consider this tradeoff in auto-encoding networks, in which there is a clear definition of performance (the coding loss). We first show how SNNs follow a characteristic trade-off curve between activity levels and coding loss, but that standard networks need to be retrained to achieve different tradeoff points. We next formalize this tradeoff with a joint loss function incorporating coding loss (performance) and activity loss (energy use). From this loss we derive a class of spiking networks which coordinates its spiking to minimize both the activity and coding losses -- and as a result can dynamically adjust its coding precision and energy use. The network utilizes several known activity control mechanisms for this --- threshold adaptation and feedback inhibition --- and elucidates their potential function within neural circuits. Using geometric intuition, we demonstrate how these mechanisms regulate coding precision, and thereby performance. Lastly, we consider how these insights could be transferred to trained SNNs. Overall, this work addresses a key energy-coding trade-off which is often overlooked in network studies, expands on our understanding of homeostasis in biological SNNs, as well as provides a clear framework for considering performance and energy use in artificial SNNs.

Abstract: There is no doubt that the study of brain damaged individuals has contributed greatly to our understanding of the mind/brain. Within this broad approach, cognitive neuropsychology accentuates the cognitive dimension: it investigates the structure and organization of perceptual, motor, cognitive, and language systems – prerequisites for understanding the functional organization of the brain – through the analysis of their dysfunction following brain damage. Significant insights have come specifically from this paradigm. But progress has been slow and enthusiasm for this approach has waned somewhat in recent years, and the use of existing findings to constrain new theories has also waned. What explains the current diminished status of cognitive neuropsychology? One reason may be failure to calibrate expectations about the effective contribution of different subfields of the study of the mind/brain as these are determined by their natural peculiarities – such factors as the types of available observations and their complexity, opportunity of access to such observations, the possibility of controlled experimentation, and the like. Here, I also explore the merits and limitations of cognitive neuropsychology, with particular focus on the role of intellectual, pragmatic, and societal factors that determine scientific practice within the broader domains of cognitive science/neuroscience. I conclude on an optimistic note about the continuing unique importance of cognitive neuropsychology: although limited to the study of experiments of nature, it offers a privileged window into significant aspects of the mind/brain that are not easily accessible through other approaches. Biography: Alfonso Caramazza's research has focussed extensively on how words and their meanings are represented in the brain. His early pioneering studies helped to reformulate our thinking about Broca's aphasia (not limited to production) and formalised the logic of patient-based neuropsychology. More recently he has been instrumental in reconsidering popular claims about embodied cognition.

Cognitive control allows us to think and behave flexibly based on our context and goals. Most theories of cognitive control propose a control representation that enables the same input to produce different outputs contingent on contextual factors. In this talk, I will focus on an important property of the control representation's neural code: its representational dimensionality. Dimensionality of a neural representation balances a basic separability/generalizability trade-off in neural computation. This tradeoff has important implications for cognitive control. In this talk, I will present initial evidence from fMRI and EEG showing that task representations in the human brain leverage both ends of this tradeoff during flexible behavior.

When making decision under risk, people often exhibit behaviours that classical economic theories cannot explain. Newer models that attempt to account for these ‘irrational’ behaviours often lack neuroscience bases and require the introduction of subjective and problem-specific constructs. Here, we present a decision-making model inspired by the prediction error signals and introspective neuronal replay reported in the brain. In the model, decisions are chosen based on ‘anticipated surprise’, defined by a nonlinear average of the differences between individual outcomes and a reference point. The reference point is determined by the expected value of the possible outcomes, which can dynamically change during the mental simulation of decision-making problems involving sequential stages. Our model elucidates the contribution of each stage to the appeal of available options in a decision-making problem. This allows us to explain several economic paradoxes and gambling behaviours. Our work could help bridge the gap between decision-making theories in economics and neurosciences.

In the first part of this talk, I will briefly present the unfolding argument by Doerig et al. (2019) and the various replies in the philosophical and neuroscientific literature. In the second part of the talk, I will explore the ramifications that this debate has for the science of consciousness and its philosophy, with particular focus on these questions: (i) which type of explanation should a theory of consciousness provide? (ii) what is the evidential basis for theories of consciousness?

Recent economics literature has seen a revival of interest to psychologically-grounded theories of decision under risk. We review the recent proposals in this direction, compare it to classical estimations based on utility functions, and discuss their appropriateness using some original experimental data.

In the past few years, there has been growing evidence that the basic ability for relational generalization starts in early infancy, with 3-month-olds seeming to learn relational abstractions with little training. Further, work with toddlers seem to suggest that relational generalizations are no more difficult than those based on objects, and they can readily consider both simultaneously. Likewise, causal learning research with adults suggests that people infer causal relationships at multiple levels of abstraction simultaneously as they learn about novel causal systems. These findings all appear counter to theories of concept learning that posit when concepts are first learned they tend to be concrete (tied to specific contexts and features) and abstraction proceeds incrementally as learners encounter more examples. The current talk will not question the veracity of any of these findings but will present several others from my and others’ research on relational learning that suggests that when the perceptual or conceptual content becomes more complex, patterns of incremental abstraction re-emerge. Further, the specific contexts and task parameters that support or hinder abstraction reveal the underlying cognitive processes. I will then consider whether the models that posit simultaneous, immediate learning at multiple levels of abstraction can accommodate these more complex patterns.

It is generally agreed upon that qualities of conscious experience instantiate structural properties, usually called relations. They furnish a representation of qualities (or qualia, in fact) in terms of a mathematical space Q (rather than a set), which is crucial to both modelling and measuring of conscious experience." "What is usually disregarded is that “only such structural properties generalize across individuals” (Austen Clark), but that qualities themselves as differentiated by stimulus specifications, behavior or reports do not. We show that this implies that only the part of Q which is invariant with respect to the automorphism group has a well-defined referent, while individual elements do not. This poses a prima facie limitation of any theory or experiment that aims to address individual qualities. We show how mathematical theories of consciousness can overcome this limitation via symmetry groups and group actions, making accessible to science what is properly called private language.

Materials with complex appearances, like textiles and foodstuffs, pose challenges for conventional theories of vision. How does the brain learn to see properties of the world—like the glossiness of a surface—that cannot be measured by any other senses? Recent advances in unsupervised deep learning may help shed light on material perception. I will show how an unsupervised deep neural network trained on an artificial environment of surfaces that have different shapes, materials and lighting, spontaneously comes to encode those factors in its internal representations. Most strikingly, the model makes patterns of errors in its perception of material that follow, on an image-by-image basis, the patterns of errors made by human observers. Unsupervised deep learning may provide a coherent framework for how many perceptual dimensions form, in material perception and beyond.

Sensory experience often depends on one’s own actions, including self-motion. Theories of predictive coding postulate that actions are regulated by calculating prediction error, which is the difference between sensory experience and expectation based on self-generated actions. Signals consistent with prediction error have been reported in mouse visual cortex (V1) when visual flow coupled to running was unexpectedly stopped. Here, we show such signals can be elicited by visual stimuli uncoupled to animal’s running. We recorded V1 neurons while presenting drifting gratings that unexpectedly stopped. We found strong responses to visual perturbations, which were enhanced during running. Perturbation responses were strongest in the preferred orientation of individual neurons and perturbation responsive neurons were more likely to prefer slow visual speeds. Our results indicate that prediction error signals can be explained by the convergence of known motor and sensory signals, providing a purely sensory and motor explanation for purported mismatch signals.

Many tasks that are easy for humans are difficult for machines. In particular, while humans excel at tasks that require generalising across problems, machine systems notably struggle. One such task that has received a good amount of attention is the Synthetic Visual Reasoning Test (SVRT). The SVRT consists of a range of problems where simple visual stimuli must be categorised into one of two categories based on an unknown rule that must be induced. Conventional machine learning approaches perform well only when trained to categorise based on a single rule and are unable to generalise without extensive additional training to tasks with any additional rules. Multiple theories of higher-level cognition posit that humans solve such tasks using structured relational representations. Specifically, people learn rules based on structured representations that generalise to novel instances quickly and easily. We believe it is possible to model this approach in a single system which learns all the required relational representations from scratch and performs tasks such as SVRT in a single run. Here, we present a system which expands the DORA/LISA architecture and augments the existing model with principally novel components, namely a) visual reasoning based on the established theories of recognition by components; b) the process of learning complex relational representations by synthesis (in addition to learning by analysis). The proposed augmented model matches human behaviour on SVRT problems. Moreover, the proposed system stands as perhaps a more realistic account of human cognition, wherein rather than using tools that has been shown successful in the machine learning field to inform psychological theorising, we use established psychological theories to inform developing a machine system.

The success of deep learning sparked interest in whether the brain learns by using similar techniques for assigning credit to each synaptic weight for its contribution to the network output. However, the majority of current attempts at biologically-plausible learning methods are either non-local in time, require highly specific connectivity motives, or have no clear link to any known mathematical optimization method. Here, we introduce Deep Feedback Control (DFC), a new learning method that uses a feedback controller to drive a deep neural network to match a desired output target and whose control signal can be used for credit assignment. The resulting learning rule is fully local in space and time and approximates Gauss-Newton optimization for a wide range of feedback connectivity patterns. To further underline its biological plausibility, we relate DFC to a multi-compartment model of cortical pyramidal neurons with a local voltage-dependent synaptic plasticity rule, consistent with recent theories of dendritic processing. By combining dynamical system theory with mathematical optimization theory, we provide a strong theoretical foundation for DFC that we corroborate with detailed results on toy experiments and standard computer-vision benchmarks.

Holding information in working memory is essential for cognition, but removing unwanted thoughts is equally important. There is great flexibility in how we can manipulate information in working memory, but the processes and consequences of these operations are poorly understood. In this talk I will discuss our recent findings using multivariate pattern analyses of fMRI brain data to demonstrate the successful removal of information from working memory using three different strategies: suppressing a specific thought, replacing a thought with a different one, and clearing the mind of all thought. These strategies are supported by distinct brain regions and have differential consequences on the encoding of new information. I will discuss implications of these results on theories of memory and I will highlight some new directions involving the use of real-time neurofeedback to investigate causal links between brain and behavior.

Interfaces and membranes are ubiquitous in cellular systems across various scales. From lipid membranes to the interfaces of biomolecular condensates inside the cell, these borders not only protect and segregate the inner components from the outside world, but also are actively participating in mechanical regulation and biochemical reaction of the cell. Being part of a living system, these interfaces (membranes) are usually active and away from equilibrium. Yet, it's still not clear how activity can tweak their equilibrium dynamics. Here, I will introduce a model system to tackle this problem. We put together a passive fluid and an active nematics, and study the behavior of this liquid-liquid interface. Whereas thermal fluctuation of such an interface is too weak to be observed, active stress can easily force the interface to fluctuate, overhang, and even break up. In the presence of a wall, the active phase exhibits superfluid-like behavior: it can climb up walls -- a phenomenon we call activity-induced wetting. I will show how to formulate theories to capture these phenomena, highlighting the nontrivial effects of active stress. Our work not only demonstrates that activity can introduce interesting features to an interface, but also sheds light on controlling interfacial properties using activity.

At any given moment the brain receives more sensory information than it can use to guide adaptive behaviour, creating the need for mechanisms that promote efficient processing of incoming sensory signals. One way in which the brain might reduce its sensory processing load is to encode successive presentations of the same stimulus in a more efficient form, a process known as neural adaptation. Conversely, when a stimulus violates an expected pattern, it should evoke an enhanced neural response. Such a scheme for sensory encoding has been formalised in predictive coding theories, which propose that recent experience establishes expectations in the brain that generate prediction errors when violated. In this webinar, Professor Jason Mattingley will discuss whether the encoding of elementary visual features is modulated when otherwise identical stimuli are expected or unexpected based upon the history of stimulus presentation. In humans, EEG was employed to measure neural activity evoked by gratings of different orientations, and multivariate forward modelling was used to determine how orientation selectivity is affected for expected versus unexpected stimuli. In mice, two-photon calcium imaging was used to quantify orientation tuning of individual neurons in the primary visual cortex to expected and unexpected gratings. Results revealed enhanced orientation tuning to unexpected visual stimuli, both at the level of whole-brain responses and for individual visual cortex neurons. Professor Mattingley will discuss the implications of these findings for predictive coding theories of sensory encoding. Professor Jason Mattingley is a Laureate Fellow and Foundation Chair in Cognitive Neuroscience at The University of Queensland. His research is directed toward understanding the brain processes that support perception, selective attention and decision-making, in health and disease.

New memories are initially labile and have to be consolidated into stable long-term representations. Current theories assume that this is supported by a shift in the neural substrate that supports the memory, away from rapidly plastic hippocampal networks towards more stable representations in the neocortex. Rehearsal, i.e. repeated activation of the neural circuits that store a memory, is thought to crucially contribute to the formation of neocortical long-term memory representations. This may either be achieved by repeated study during wakefulness or by a covert reactivation of memory traces during offline periods, such as quiet rest or sleep. My research investigates memory consolidation in the human brain with multivariate decoding of neural processing and non-invasive in-vivo imaging of microstructural plasticity. Using pattern classification on recordings of electrical brain activity, I show that we spontaneously reprocess memories during offline periods in both sleep and wakefulness, and that this reactivation benefits memory retention. In related work, we demonstrate that active rehearsal of learning material during wakefulness can facilitate rapid systems consolidation, leading to an immediate formation of lasting memory engrams in the neocortex. These representations satisfy general mnemonic criteria and cannot only be imaged with fMRI while memories are actively processed but can also be observed with diffusion-weighted imaging when the traces lie dormant. Importantly, sleep seems to hold a crucial role in stabilizing the changes in the contribution of memory systems initiated by rehearsal during wakefulness, indicating that online and offline reactivation might jointly contribute to forming long-term memories. Characterizing the covert processes that decide whether, and in which ways, our brains store new information is crucial to our understanding of memory formation. Directly imaging consolidation thus opens great opportunities for memory research.

Network analytic methods that are ubiquitous in other areas, such as systems neuroscience, have recently been used to test network theories in psychology, including intelligence research. The network or mutualism theory of intelligence proposes that the statistical associations among cognitive abilities (e.g. specific abilities such as vocabulary or memory) stem from causal relations among them throughout development. In this study, we used network models (specifically LASSO) of cognitive abilities and brain structural covariance (grey and white matter) to simultaneously model brain-behavior relationships essential for general intelligence in a large (behavioral, N=805; cortical volume, N=246; fractional anisotropy, N=165), developmental (ages 5-18) cohort of struggling learners (CALM). We found that mostly positive, small partial correlations pervade both our cognitive and neural networks. Moreover, calculating node centrality (absolute strength and bridge strength) and using two separate community detection algorithms (Walktrap and Clique Percolation), we found convergent evidence that subsets of both cognitive and neural nodes play an intermediary role between brain and behavior. We discuss implications and possible avenues for future studies.

Even young children seem to have an early understanding of the world around them, and the people in it. Before children can reliably say "ball", "wall", or "Saul", they expect balls to not go through walls, and for Saul to go right for a ball (if there's no wall). What is the formal conceptual structure underlying this commonsense reasoning about objects and agents? I will raise several possibilities for models underlying core intuitive physics as a way of talking about models of core knowledge and intuitive theories more generally. In particular, I will present some recent ML work trying to capture early expectations about object solidly, cohesion, and permanence, that relies on a rough-derendering approach.

Neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s are devastating conditions with poorly understood mechanisms and no cure. Yet, a striking feature of these conditions is the characteristic pattern of invasion throughout the brain, leading to well-codified disease stages associated with various cognitive deficits and pathologies. How can we use mathematical modelling to gain insight into this process and, doing so, gain understanding about how the brain works? In this talk, I will show that by linking new mathematical theories to recent progress in imaging, we can unravel some of the universal features associated with dementia and, more generally, brain functions.

To date, neuroimaging research has had a limited focus on non-social features of autism. As a result, neurobiological explanations for atypical sensory perception in autism are lacking. To address this, we quantitively condensed findings from the non-social autism fMRI literature in line with the current best practices for neuroimaging meta-analyses. Using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), we conducted a series of robust meta-analyses across 83 experiments from 52 fMRI studies investigating differences between autistic (n = 891) and typical (n = 967) participants. We found that typical controls, compared to autistic people, show greater activity in the prefrontal cortex (BA9, BA10) during perception tasks. More refined analyses revealed that, when compared to typical controls, autistic people show greater recruitment of the extrastriate V2 cortex (BA18) during visual processing. Taken together, these findings contribute to our understanding of current theories of autistic perception, and highlight some of the challenges of cognitive neuroscience research in autism.

Stereopsis – deriving information about distance by comparing views from two eyes – is widespread in vertebrates but so far known in only class of invertebrates, the praying mantids. Understanding stereopsis which has evolved independently in such a different nervous system promises to shed light on the constraints governing any stereo system. Behavioral experiments indicate that insect stereopsis is functionally very different from that studied in vertebrates. Vertebrate stereopsis depends on matching up the pattern of contrast in the two eyes; it works in static scenes, and may have evolved in order to break camouflage rather than to detect distances. Insect stereopsis matches up regions of the image where the luminance is changing; it is insensitive to the detailed pattern of contrast and operates to detect the distance to a moving target. Work from my lab has revealed a network of neurons within the mantis brain which are tuned to binocular disparity, including some that project to early visual areas. This is in contrast to previous theories which postulated that disparity was computed only at a single, late stage, where visual information is passed down to motor neurons. Thus, despite their very different properties, the underlying neural mechanisms supporting vertebrate and insect stereopsis may be computationally more similar than has been assumed.

Though the term has many definitions, computational neuroscience is mainly about applying mathematics to the study of the brain. The brain—a jumble of all different kinds of neurons interconnected in countless ways that somehow produce consciousness—has been described as “the most complex object in the known universe”. Physicists for centuries have turned to mathematics to properly explain some of the most seemingly simple processes in the universe—how objects fall, how water flows, how the planets move. Equations have proved crucial in these endeavors because they capture relationships and make precise predictions possible. How could we expect to understand the most complex object in the universe without turning to mathematics? — The answer is we can’t, and that is why I wrote this book. While I’ve been studying and working in the field for over a decade, most people I encounter have no idea what “computational neuroscience” is or that it even exists. Yet a desire to understand how the brain works is a common and very human interest. I wrote this book to let people in on the ways in which the brain will ultimately be understood: through mathematical and computational theories. — At the same time, I know that both mathematics and brain science are on their own intimidating topics to the average reader and may seem downright prohibitory when put together. That is why I’ve avoided (many) equations in the book and focused instead on the driving reasons why scientists have turned to mathematical modeling, what these models have taught us about the brain, and how some surprising interactions between biologists, physicists, mathematicians, and engineers over centuries have laid the groundwork for the future of neuroscience. — Each chapter of Models of the Mind covers a separate topic in neuroscience, starting from individual neurons themselves and building up to the different populations of neurons and brain regions that support memory, vision, movement and more. These chapters document the history of how mathematics has woven its way into biology and the exciting advances this collaboration has in store.

The cerebellum contains more than half of the brain’s neurons and it is essential for motor control. Its neural circuits have a distinctive architecture comprised of a large, sparse expansion from the input mossy fibres to the granule cell layer. For years, theories of how cerebellar architectural features relate to cerebellar function have been formulated. It has been shown that some of these features can facilitate pattern separation. However, these theories don’t consider the need for it to learn fast in order to control smooth and accurate movements. Here, we confront this gap. This talk will show that the expansion to the granule cell layer in the cerebellar cortex improves learning speed and performance in the context of motor control by considering a cerebellar-like network learning an internal model of a motor apparatus online. By expressing the general form of the learning rate for such a system, this talk will provide a calculation of how increasing the number of granule cells diminishes the effect of noise and increases the learning speed. The researchers propose that the particular architecture of cerebellar circuits modifies the geometry of the error function in a favourable way for learning faster. Their results illuminate a new link between cerebellar structure and function.

Constraints on control-dependent processing have become a fundamental concept in general theories of cognition that explain human behavior in terms of rational adaptations to these constraints. However, theories miss a rationale for why such constraints would exist in the first place. Recent work suggests that constraints on the allocation of control facilitate flexible task switching at the expense of the stability needed to support goal-directed behavior in face of distraction. We formulate this problem in a dynamical system, in which control signals are represented as attractors and in which constraints on control allocation limit the depth of these attractors. We derive formal expressions of the stability-flexibility tradeoff, showing that constraints on control allocation improve cognitive flexibility but impair cognitive stability. We provide evidence that human participants adapt higher constraints on the allocation of control as the demand for flexibility increases but that participants deviate from optimal constraints. In continuing work, we are investigating how collaborative performance of a group of individuals can benefit from individual differences defined in terms of balance between cognitive stability and flexibility.

The cognitive neuroscience of conscious perception has seen considerable growth over the past few decades. Confirming an influential hypothesis driven by earlier studies of neuropsychological patients, we have found that the lateral and polar prefrontal cortices play important causal roles in the generation of subjective experiences. However, this basic empirical finding has been hotly contested by researchers with different theoretical commitments, and the differences are at times difficult to resolve. To address the controversies, I suggest one alternative venue may be to look for clinical applications derived from current theories. I outline an example in which we used closed-loop fMRI combined with machine learning to nonconsciously manipulate the physiological responses to threatening stimuli, such as spiders or snakes. A clinical trial involving patients with phobia is currently taking place. I also outline how this theoretical framework may be extended to other diseases. Ultimately, a truly meaningful understanding of the fundamental nature of our mental existence should lead to useful insights for our colleagues on the clinical frontlines. If we use this as a yardstick, whoever loses the esoteric theoretical debates, both science and the patients will always win.

Since the theories of Marr, Ito, and Albus, the cerebellum has provided an attractive well-characterized model system to investigate biological mechanisms of learning. In recent years, theories have been developed that provide a normative account for many features of the anatomy and function of cerebellar cortex and cerebellum-like systems, including the distribution of parallel fiber-Purkinje cell synaptic weights, the expansion in neuron number of the granule cell layer and their synaptic in-degree, and sparse coding by granule cells. Typically, these theories focus on the learning of random mappings between uncorrelated inputs and binary outputs, an assumption that may be reasonable for certain forms of associative conditioning but is also quite far from accounting for the important role the cerebellum plays in the control of smooth movements. I will discuss in-progress work with Marjorie Xie, Samuel Muscinelli, and Kameron Decker Harris generalizing these learning theories to correlated inputs and general classes of smooth input-output mappings. Our studies build on earlier work in theoretical neuroscience as well as recent advances in the kernel theory of wide neural networks. They illuminate the role of pre-expansion structures in processing input stimuli and the significance of sparse granule cell activity. If there is time, I will also discuss preliminary work with Jack Lindsey extending these theories beyond cerebellum-like structures to recurrent networks.

The emergence of large-scale brain networks, and their continual refinement, represent crucial developmental processes that can drive individual differences in cognition and which are associated with multiple neurodevelopmental conditions. But how does this organization arise, and what mechanisms govern the diversity of these developmental processes? There are many existing descriptive theories, but to date none are computationally formalized. We provide a mathematical framework that specifies the growth of a brain network over developmental time. Within this framework macroscopic brain organization, complete with spatial embedding of its organization, is an emergent property of a generative wiring equation that optimizes its connectivity by renegotiating its biological costs and topological values continuously over development. The rules that govern these iterative wiring properties are controlled by a set of tightly framed parameters, with subtle differences in these parameters steering network growth towards different neurodiverse outcomes. Regional expression of genes associated with the developmental simulations converge on biological processes and cellular components predominantly involved in synaptic signaling, neuronal projection, catabolic intracellular processes and protein transport. Together, this provides a unifying computational framework for conceptualizing the mechanisms and diversity of childhood brain development, capable of integrating different levels of analysis – from genes to cognition. (Pre-print: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.08.13.249391v1)

Are the immune system, brain, mind and mood related? Could this explain why chronic low-grade peripheral inflammation is also noted in approximately 1/3 of those with major depressive disorder (MDD)? The field recognized today as immunopsychiatry was founded on scientific evidence that germinated over 30 years ago. Since, it has been understood that (i) there could be a causal link between inflammation and depression, (ii) select blood immune markers show robust potential as biomarkers for inflammation-linked depression, and more generally, (iii) Descartes' theories on mind-body dualism were biologically erroneous. Nonetheless, the mechanistic brain-immune axis in the trinity formulating inflammation-linked depression i.e. psycho-neuro-immunology, still remains unclear. This talk will discuss findings from our recent investigation endeavored to unpack this by linking functional connectivity abnormalities with peripheral immune markers.

According to the concreteness fading approach, instruction should start with concrete representations and progress stepwise to representations that are more idealized. Various researchers have suggested that concreteness fading is a broadly applicable instructional approach. In this talk, we conceptually analyze examples of concreteness fading in mathematics and various science domains. In this analysis, we draw on theories of analogical and relational reasoning and on the literature about learning with multiple representations. Furthermore, we report on an experimental study in which we employed concreteness fading in advanced physics education. The results of the conceptual analysis and the experimental study indicate that concreteness fading may not be as generalizable as has been suggested. The reasons for this limited generalizability are twofold. First, the types of representations and the relations between them differ across different domains. Second, the instructional goals between domains and the subsequent roles of the representations vary.