Several full-time, fully paid PhD/PostDoc positions in “Machine Learning for Estimation and Control under Uncertainty” at the Intelligent Sensor-Actuator-Systems Laboratory (ISAS), Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany. We are seeking to fill several PhD/PostDoc positions in the following areas: Flow-based Bayesian state estimation, Deterministic sampling based on information measures, Intelligent distributed estimation architectures, Gaussian processes on manifolds for estimation of rigid body motion. All positions offer the possibility to cooperate with our network of partners from industry and academia on a national and international basis. We offer intensive mentoring and a quick path to the PhD degree (≤ 3 years). Besides research, the supervision of bachelor/master theses and participation in teaching is expected.

We are looking for highly motivated Postdocs or PhD students, interested in computational neuroscience, specifically addressing questions concerning neural circuits underlying perception and learning. The perfect candidate has a strong background in math, physics or computer science (or equivalent), programming skills (python), and a strong interest in biological and neural systems. A background in computational neuroscience is ideal, but not mandatory. Our brain maintains an internal model of the world, based on which it can make predictions about sensory information. These predictions are useful for perception and learning in the uncertain and changing environments in which we evolved. The link between high-level normative theories and cellular-level observations of prediction errors and representations under uncertainty is still missing. The lab uses computational and mathematical tools to model cortical circuits and neural networks on different scales.

Humans and other animals approach reward and avoid punishment and pay attention to cues predicting these events. Such motivated behavior thus appears to be guided by value, which directs behavior towards or away from positively or negatively valenced outcomes. Moreover, it is facilitated by (top-down) salience, which enhances attention to behaviorally relevant learned cues predicting the occurrence of valenced outcomes. Using human neuroimaging, we recently separated value (ventral striatum, posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex) from salience (anterior ventromedial cortex, occipital cortex) in the domain of liquid reward and punishment. Moreover, we investigated potential drivers of learned salience: the probability and uncertainty with which valenced and non-valenced outcomes occur. We find that the brain dissociates valenced from non-valenced probability and uncertainty, which indicates that reinforcement matters for the brain, in addition to information provided by probability and uncertainty alone, regardless of valence. Finally, we assessed learning signals (unsigned prediction errors) that may underpin the acquisition of salience. Particularly the insula appears to be central for this function, encoding a subjective salience prediction error, similarly at the time of positively and negatively valenced outcomes. However, it appears to employ domain-specific time constants, leading to stronger salience signals in the aversive than the appetitive domain at the time of cues. These findings explain why previous research associated the insula with both valence-independent salience processing and with preferential encoding of the aversive domain. More generally, the distinction of value and salience appears to provide a useful framework for capturing the neural basis of motivated behavior.

Although each of us was once a baby, infant consciousness remains mysterious and there is no received view about when, and in what form, consciousness first emerges. Some theorists defend a ‘late-onset’ view, suggesting that consciousness requires cognitive capacities which are unlikely to be in place before the child’s first birthday at the very earliest. Other theorists defend an ‘early-onset’ account, suggesting that consciousness is likely to be in place at birth (or shortly after) and may even arise during the third trimester. Progress in this field has been difficult, not just because of the challenges associated with procuring the relevant behavioral and neural data, but also because of uncertainty about how best to study consciousness in the absence of the capacity for verbal report or intentional behavior. This review examines both the empirical and methodological progress in this field, arguing that recent research points in favor of early-onset accounts of the emergence of consciousness.

Qualitative coding is the process of categorizing and labeling raw data to identify themes, patterns, and concepts within qualitative research. This process requires significant time, reflection, and discussion, often characterized by inherent subjectivity and uncertainty. Here, we explore the possibility to leverage large language models (LLM) to enhance the process and assist researchers with qualitative coding. LLMs, trained on extensive human-generated text, possess an architecture that renders them capable of understanding the broader context of a conversation or text. This allows them to extract patterns and meaning effectively, making them particularly useful for the accurate extraction and coding of relevant themes. In our current approach, we employed the chatGPT 3.5 Turbo API, integrating it into the qualitative coding process for data from the SWISS100 study, specifically focusing on data derived from centenarians' experiences during the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as a systematic centenarian literature review. We provide several instances illustrating how our approach can assist researchers with extracting and coding relevant themes. With data from human coders on hand, we highlight points of convergence and divergence between AI and human thematic coding in the context of these data. Moving forward, our goal is to enhance the prototype and integrate it within an LLM designed for local storage and operation (LLaMa). Our initial findings highlight the potential of AI-enhanced qualitative coding, yet they also pinpoint areas requiring attention. Based on these observations, we formulate tentative recommendations for the optimal integration of LLMs in qualitative coding research. Further evaluations using varied datasets and comparisons among different LLMs will shed more light on the question of whether and how to integrate these models into this domain.

During navigation, animals estimate their position using path integration and landmarks. In a series of two studies, we used virtual reality and electrophysiology to dissect how these inputs combine to generate the brain’s spatial representations. In the first study (Campbell et al., 2018), we focused on the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC) and its set of navigationally-relevant cell types, including grid cells, border cells, and speed cells. We discovered that attractor dynamics could explain an array of initially puzzling MEC responses to virtual reality manipulations. This theoretical framework successfully predicted both MEC grid cell responses to additional virtual reality manipulations, as well as mouse behavior in a virtual path integration task. In the second study (Campbell*, Attinger* et al., 2021), we asked whether these principles generalize to other navigationally-relevant brain regions. We used Neuropixels probes to record thousands of neurons from MEC, primary visual cortex (V1), and retrosplenial cortex (RSC). In contrast to the prevailing view that “everything is everywhere all at once,” we identified a unique population of MEC neurons, overlapping with grid cells, that became active with striking spatial periodicity while head-fixed mice ran on a treadmill in darkness. These neurons exhibited unique cue-integration properties compared to other MEC, V1, or RSC neurons: they remapped more readily in response to conflicts between path integration and landmarks; they coded position prospectively as opposed to retrospectively; they upweighted path integration relative to landmarks in conditions of low visual contrast; and as a population, they exhibited a lower-dimensional activity structure. Based on these results, our current view is that MEC attractor dynamics play a privileged role in resolving conflicts between path integration and landmarks during navigation. Future work should include carefully designed causal manipulations to rigorously test this idea, and expand the theoretical framework to incorporate notions of uncertainty and optimality.

There has been increasing interest in the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying psychotic disorders in recent years. One promising approach is based on the theoretical framework of predictive processing, which proposes that inferences regarding the state of the world are made by combining prior beliefs with sensory signals. Delusions and hallucinations are the core symptoms of psychosis and often co-occur. Yet, different predictive-processing alterations have been proposed for these two symptom dimensions, according to which the relative weighting of prior beliefs in perceptual inference is decreased or increased, respectively. I will present recent behavioural, neuroimaging, and computational work that investigated perceptual decision-making under uncertainty and ambiguity to elucidate the changes in predictive processing that may give rise to psychotic experiences. Based on the empirical findings presented, I will provide a more nuanced predictive-processing account that suggests a common mechanism for delusions and hallucinations at low levels of the predictive-processing hierarchy, but still has the potential to reconcile apparently contradictory findings in the literature. This account may help to understand the heterogeneity of psychotic phenomenology and explain changes in symptomatology over time.

Efficient navigation requires animals to track their position, velocity and heading direction (HD). Some animals’ behavior suggests that they also track uncertainties about these navigational variables, and make strategic use of these uncertainties, in line with a Bayesian computation. Ring-attractor networks have been proposed to estimate and track these navigational variables, for instance in the HD system of the fruit fly Drosophila. However, such networks are not designed to incorporate a notion of uncertainty, and therefore seem unsuited to implement dynamic Bayesian inference. Here, we close this gap by showing that specifically tuned ring-attractor networks can track both a HD estimate and its associated uncertainty, thereby approximating a circular Kalman filter. We identified the network motifs required to integrate angular velocity observations, e.g., through self-initiated turns, and absolute HD observations, e.g., visual landmark inputs, according to their respective reliabilities, and show that these network motifs are present in the connectome of the Drosophila HD system. Specifically, our network encodes uncertainty in the amplitude of a localized bump of neural activity, thereby generalizing standard ring attractor models. In contrast to such standard attractors, however, proper Bayesian inference requires the network dynamics to operate in a regime away from the attractor state. More generally, we show that near-Bayesian integration is inherent in generic ring attractor networks, and that their amplitude dynamics can account for close-to-optimal reliability weighting of external evidence for a wide range of network parameters. This only holds, however, if their connection strengths allow the network to sufficiently deviate from the attractor state. Overall, our work offers a novel interpretation of ring attractor networks as implementing dynamic Bayesian integrators. We further provide a principled theoretical foundation for the suggestion that the Drosophila HD system may implement Bayesian HD tracking via ring attractor dynamics.

Many decisions under uncertainty entail dynamic belief updating: multiple pieces of evidence informing about the state of the environment are accumulated across time to infer the environmental state, and choose a corresponding action. Traditionally, this process has been conceptualized as a linear and perfect (i.e., without loss) integration of sensory information along purely feedforward sensory-motor pathways. Yet, natural environments can undergo hidden changes in their state, which requires a non-linear accumulation of decision evidence that strikes a tradeoff between stability and flexibility in response to change. How this adaptive computation is implemented in the brain has remained unknown. In this talk, I will present an approach that my laboratory has developed to identify evidence accumulation signatures in human behavior and neural population activity (measured with magnetoencephalography, MEG), across a large number of cortical areas. Applying this approach to data recorded during visual evidence accumulation tasks with change-points, we find that behavior and neural activity in frontal and parietal regions involved in motor planning exhibit hallmarks signatures of adaptive evidence accumulation. The same signatures of adaptive behavior and neural activity emerge naturally from simulations of a biophysically detailed model of a recurrent cortical microcircuit. The MEG data further show that decision dynamics in parietal and frontal cortex are mirrored by a selective modulation of the state of early visual cortex. This state modulation is (i) specifically expressed in the alpha frequency-band, (ii) consistent with feedback of evolving belief states from frontal cortex, (iii) dependent on the environmental volatility, and (iv) amplified by pupil-linked arousal responses during evidence accumulation. Together, our findings link normative decision computations to recurrent cortical circuit dynamics and highlight the adaptive nature of decision-related long-range feedback processing in the brain.

To localize ourselves in an environment for spatial navigation, we rely on vision and self-motion inputs, which only provide noisy and partial information. It is unknown how the resulting uncertainty affects navigation behavior and neural representations. Here we show that spatial uncertainty underlies key effects of environmental geometry on navigation behavior and grid field deformations. We develop an ideal observer model, which continually updates probabilistic beliefs about its allocentric location by optimally combining noisy egocentric visual and self-motion inputs via Bayesian filtering. This model directly yields predictions for navigation behavior and also predicts neural responses under population coding of location uncertainty. We simulate this model numerically under manipulations of a major source of uncertainty, environmental geometry, and support our simulations by analytic derivations for its most salient qualitative features. We show that our model correctly predicts a wide range of experimentally observed effects of the environmental geometry and its change on homing response distribution and grid field deformation. Thus, our model provides a unifying, normative account for the dependence of homing behavior and grid fields on environmental geometry, and identifies the unavoidable uncertainty in navigation as a key factor underlying these diverse phenomena.

I am working on color vision in Drosophila, identifying behaviors that involve color vision and understanding the neural circuits supporting them (Longden 2016). I have a long-term interest in understanding how neural computations operate reliably under changing circumstances, be they external changes in the sensory context, or internal changes of state such as hunger and locomotion. On internal state-modulation of sensory processing, I have shown how hunger alters visual motion processing in blowflies (Longden et al. 2014), and identified a role for octopamine in modulating motion vision during locomotion (Longden and Krapp 2009, 2010). On responses to external cues, I have shown how one kind of uncertainty in the motion of the visual scene is resolved by the fly (Saleem, Longden et al. 2012), and I have identified novel cells for processing translation-induced optic flow (Longden et al. 2017). I like working with colleagues who use different model systems, to get at principles of neural operation that might apply in many species (Ding et al. 2016, Dyakova et al. 2015). I like work motivated by computational principles - my background is computational neuroscience, with a PhD on models of memory formation in the hippocampus (Longden and Willshaw, 2007).

The idea that perception in humans relies on some form of probabilistic computations has become very popular over the last decades. It has been extremely difficult however to characterize the extent and the nature of the probabilistic representations and operations that are manipulated by neural populations in the human cortex. Several theoretical works suggest that probabilistic representations are present from low-level sensory areas to high-level areas. According to this view, the neural dynamics implements some forms of probabilistic message passing (i.e. neural sampling, probabilistic population coding, etc.) which solves the problem of perceptual inference. Here I will present recent experimental evidence that human and non-human primate perception implements some form of message passing. I will first review findings showing probabilistic integration of sensory evidence across space and time in primate visual cortex. Second, I will show that the confidence reports in a hierarchical task reveal that uncertainty is represented both at lower and higher levels, in a way that is consistent with probabilistic message passing both from lower to higher and from higher to lower representations. Finally, I will present behavioral and neural evidence that human perception takes into account pairwise correlations in sequences of sensory samples in agreement with the message passing hypothesis, and against standard accounts such as accumulation of sensory evidence or predictive coding.

In decision-making under risk (DMR) participants' choices are based on probability values systematically different from those that are objectively correct. Similar systematic distortions are found in tasks involving relative frequency judgments (JRF). These distortions limit performance in a wide variety of tasks and an evident question is, why do we systematically fail in our use of probability and relative frequency information? We propose a Bounded Log-Odds Model (BLO) of probability and relative frequency distortion based on three assumptions: (1) log-odds: probability and relative frequency are mapped to an internal log-odds scale, (2) boundedness: the range of representations of probability and relative frequency are bounded and the bounds change dynamically with task, and (3) variance compensation: the mapping compensates in part for uncertainty in probability and relative frequency values. We compared human performance in both DMR and JRF tasks to the predictions of the BLO model as well as eleven alternative models each missing one or more of the underlying BLO assumptions (factorial model comparison). The BLO model and its assumptions proved to be superior to any of the alternatives. In a separate analysis, we found that BLO accounts for individual participants’ data better than any previous model in the DMR literature. We also found that, subject to the boundedness limitation, participants’ choice of distortion approximately maximized the mutual information between objective task-relevant values and internal values, a form of bounded rationality.

In an ever-changing environment, uncertainty is omnipresent. To deal with this, organisms have evolved mechanisms that allow them to take advantage of environmental regularities in order to make decisions robustly and adjust their behavior efficiently, thus maximizing their chances of survival. In this talk, I will present behavioral evidence that animals perform model-based state inference to predict environmental state changes and adjust their behavior rapidly, rather than slowly updating choice values. This model-based inference process can be described using Bayesian change-point models. Furthermore, I will show that neural populations in the prefrontal cortex accurately predict behavioral switches, and that the activity of these populations is associated with Bayesian estimates. In addition, we will see that learning leads to the emergence of a high-dimensional representational subspace that can be reused when the animals re-learn a previously learned set of action-value associations. Altogether, these findings highlight the role of the PFC in representing a belief about the current state of the world.

Motivational drives are internal states that can be different even in similar interactions with external stimuli. Curiosity as the motivational drive for novelty-seeking and investigating the surrounding environment is for survival as essential and intrinsic as hunger. Curiosity, hunger, and appetitive aggression drive three different goal-directed behaviors—novelty seeking, food eating, and hunting— but these behaviors are composed of similar actions in animals. This similarity of actions has made it challenging to study novelty seeking and distinguish it from eating and hunting in nonarticulating animals. The brain mechanisms underlying this basic survival drive, curiosity, and novelty-seeking behavior have remained unclear. In spite of having well-developed techniques to study mouse brain circuits, there are many controversial and different results in the field of motivational behavior. This has left the functions of motivational brain regions such as the zona incerta (ZI) still uncertain. Not having a transparent, nonreinforced, and easily replicable paradigm is one of the main causes of this uncertainty. Therefore, we chose a simple solution to conduct our research: giving the mouse freedom to choose what it wants—double freeaccess choice. By examining mice in an experimental battery of object free-access double-choice (FADC) and social interaction tests—using optogenetics, chemogenetics, calcium fiber photometry, multichannel recording electrophysiology, and multicolor mRNA in situ hybridization—we uncovered a cell type–specific cortico-subcortical brain circuit of the curiosity and novelty-seeking behavior. We found in mice that inhibitory neurons in the medial ZI (ZIm) are essential for the decision to investigate an object or a conspecific. These neurons receive excitatory input from the prelimbic cortex to signal the initiation of exploration. This signal is modulated in the ZIm by the level of investigatory motivation. Increased activity in the ZIm instigates deep investigative action by inhibiting the periaqueductal gray region. A subpopulation of inhibitory ZIm neurons expressing tachykinin 1 (TAC1) modulates the investigatory behavior.

Optimally interacting with a changeable and uncertain world requires estimating and representing uncertainty. Psychiatric and neurodevelopmental conditions such as anxiety and autism are characterized by an altered response to uncertainty. I will review the evidence for these phenomena from computational modelling, and outline the planned experiments from our lab to add further weight to these ideas. If time allows, I will present results from a control sample in a novel task interrogating a particular type of uncertainty and their associated transdiagnostic psychiatric traits.

Uncertainty regarding which psychological mechanisms are fundamental in mediating SSRI treatment outcomes and wide-ranging variability in their efficacy has raised more questions than it has solved. Since subjective mood states are an abstract scientific construct, only available through self-report in humans, and likely involving input from multiple top-down and bottom-up signals, it has been difficult to model at what level SSRIs interact with this process. Converging translational evidence indicates a role for serotonin in modulating context-dependent parameters of action selection, affect, and social cognition; and concurrently supporting learning mechanisms, which promote adaptability and behavioural flexibility. We examine the theoretical basis, ecological validity, and interaction of these constructs and how they may or may not exert a clinical benefit. Specifically, we bridge crucial gaps between disparate lines of research, particularly findings from animal models and human clinical trials, which often seem to present irreconcilable differences. In determining how SSRIs exert their effects, our approach examines the endogenous functions of 5-HT neurons, how 5-HT manipulations affect behaviour in different contexts, and how their therapeutic effects may be exerted in humans – which may illuminate issues of translational models, hierarchical mechanisms, idiographic variables, and social cognition.

Animals possess the ability to effortlessly and precisely time their actions even though information received from the world is often ambiguous and is inadvertently transformed as it passes through the nervous system. With such uncertainty pervading through our nervous systems, we could expect that much of human and animal behavior relies on inference that incorporates an important additional source of information, prior knowledge of the environment. These concepts have long been studied under the framework of Bayesian inference with substantial corroboration over the last decade that human time perception is consistent with such models. We, however, know little about the neural mechanisms that enable Bayesian signatures to emerge in temporal perception. I will present our work on three facets of this problem, how Bayesian estimates are encoded in neural populations, how these estimates are used to generate time intervals, and how prior knowledge for these tasks is acquired and optimized by neural circuits. We trained monkeys to perform an interval reproduction task and found their behavior to be consistent with Bayesian inference. Using insights from electrophysiology and in silico models, we propose a mechanism by which cortical populations encode Bayesian estimates and utilize them to generate time intervals. Thereafter, I will present a circuit model for how temporal priors can be acquired by cerebellar machinery leading to estimates consistent with Bayesian theory. Based on electrophysiology and anatomy experiments in rodents, I will provide some support for this model. Overall, these findings attempt to bridge insights from normative frameworks of Bayesian inference with potential neural implementations for the acquisition, estimation, and production of timing behaviors.

In April 2021, in partnership with the UK Dementia Research Institute, the British Neuroscience Association will host its fifth Festival of Neuroscience. Due to the ongoing uncertainty around COVID19, our 2021 event will be the first ever online Festival of Neuroscience. Although we are sorry to miss meeting in person, we're excited to create a whole new Festival experience! The ambition and scope of the BNA Festivals make them unparalleled across neuroscience. Being online will not change how the BNA2021 event will: - bring together multiple organisations with an interest in brain research at a single, shared event, creating a novel, multi-organisation forum featuring all areas of fundamental research in neuroscience and psychology, from both academia and the commercial sector, plus clinical expertise in neurology and psychiatry. - include a programme of public events as well. Past Festivals have seen a rap performance about consciousness, lunchtime talks, sessions in schools, and much more.

Join us for a conversation on the science of uncertainty, mind wandering and creativity!

Join us for a conversation on the science of uncertainty, mind wandering and creativity!

Uncertainty plays a critical role in reinforcement learning and decision making. However, exactly how subjective uncertainty influences behaviour remains unclear. Multi-armed bandits are a useful framework to gain more insight into this. Paired with computational tools such as Kalman filters, they allow us to closely characterize the interplay between trial-by-trial value, uncertainty, learning, and choice. In this talk, I will present recent research where we also measured participants visual fixations on the options in a multi-armed bandit task. The estimated value of each option, and the uncertainty in these estimations, influenced what subjects looked at in the period before making a choice and their subsequent choice, as additionally did fixation itself. Uncertainty also determined how long participants looked at the obtained outcomes. Our findings clearly show the importance of uncertainty in learning and decision making.

Whether we are deciding about Covid-related restrictions, estimating a ball’s trajectory when playing tennis, or interpreting radiological images – most any choice we make is based on uncertain evidence. How do we infer that information is more or less reliable when making these decisions? How does the brain represent knowledge of this uncertainty? In this talk, I will present recent neuroimaging data combined with novel analysis tools to address these questions. Our results indicate that sensory uncertainty can reliably be estimated from the human visual cortex on a trial-by-trial basis, and moreover that observers appear to rely on this uncertainty when making perceptual decisions.

How do people learn in real-world environments where the space of possible actions can be vast or even infinite? The study of human learning has made rapid progress in past decades, from discovering the neural substrate of reward prediction errors, to building AI capable of mastering the game of Go. Yet this line of research has primarily focused on learning through repeated interactions with the same stimuli. How are humans able to rapidly adapt to novel situations and learn from such sparse examples? I propose a theory of how generalization guides human learning, by making predictions about which unobserved options are most promising to explore. Inspired by Roger Shepard’s law of generalization, I show how a Bayesian function learning model provides a mechanism for generalizing limited experiences to a wide set of novel possibilities, based on the simple principle that similar actions produce similar outcomes. This model of generalization generates predictions about the expected reward and underlying uncertainty of unexplored options, where both are vital components in how people actively explore the world. This model allows us to explain developmental differences in the explorative behavior of children, and suggests a general principle of learning across spatial, conceptual, and structured domains.

Computational and cognitive neuroscience techniques have made great strides towards describing the neural computations underlying perceptual inference and decision-making under uncertainty. These tools tell us how and why perceptual illusions occur, which brain areas may represent noisy information in a probabilistic manner, and so on. However, an understanding of the subjective, qualitative aspects of perception remains elusive: qualia, or the personal, intrinsic properties of phenomenal awareness, have remained out of reach of these computational analytic insights. Here, I propose that metacognitive computations, and the subjective feelings that go along with them, give us a solid starting point for understanding subjective experience in general. Specifically, perceptual metacognition possesses ontological and practical properties that provide a powerful and unique opportunity for studying the studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience using established tools of computational and cognitive neuroscience. By capitalizing on decades of developments in formal computational model comparisons as applied to the specific properties of perceptual metacognition, we are now in a privileged position to reveal new and exciting insights about how the brain constructs our subjective conscious experiences.

Cases with visuospatial abnormalities provide opportunities for understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Three cases of visual mirror-reversal have been reported: AH (McCloskey, 2009), TM (McCloskey, Valtonen, & Sherman, 2006) and PR (Pflugshaupt et al., 2007). This research reports a fourth case, BS -- with focal occipital cortical dysgenesis -- who displays highly unusual visuospatial abnormalities. They initially produced mirror reversal errors similar to those of AH, who -- like the patient in question -- showed a selective developmental deficit. Extensive examination of BS revealed phenomena such as: mirror reversal errors (sometimes affecting only parts of the visual fields) in both horizontal and vertical planes; subjective representation of visual objects and words in distinct left and right visual fields; subjective duplication of objects of visual attention (not due to diplopia); uncertainty regarding the canonical upright orientation of everyday objects; mirror reversals during saccadic eye movements on oculomotor tasks; and failure to integrate visual with other sensory inputs (e.g., they feel themself moving backwards when visual information shows they are moving forward). Fewer errors are produced under conditions of certain visual variables. These and other findings have led the researchers to conclude that BS draws upon a subjective representation of visual space that is structured phenomenally much as it is anatomically in early visual cortex (i.e., rotated through 180 degrees, split into left and right fields, etc.). Despite this, BS functions remarkably well in their everyday life, apparently due to extensive compensatory mechanisms deployed at higher (executive) processing levels beyond the visual modality.