Voluntary actions are actions that agents choose to make. Volition is the set of cognitive processes that implement such choice and initiation. These processes are often held essential to modern societies, because they form the cognitive underpinning for concepts of individual autonomy and individual responsibility. Nevertheless, psychology and neuroscience have struggled to define volition, and have also struggled to study it scientifically. Laboratory experiments on volition, such as those of Libet, have been criticised, often rather naively, as focussing exclusively on meaningless actions, and ignoring the factors that make voluntary action important in the wider world. In this talk, I will first review these criticisms, and then look at extending scientific approaches to volition in three directions that may enrich scientific understanding of volition. First, volition becomes particularly important when the range of possible actions is large and unconstrained - yet most experimental paradigms involve minimal response spaces. We have developed a novel paradigm for eliciting de novo actions through verbal fluency, and used this to estimate the elusive conscious experience of generativity. Second, volition can be viewed as a mechanism for flexibility, by promoting adaptation of behavioural biases. This view departs from the tradition of defining volition by contrasting internally-generated actions with externally-triggered actions, and instead links volition to model-based reinforcement learning. By using the context of competitive games to re-operationalise the classic Libet experiment, we identified a form of adaptive autonomy that allows agents to reduce biases in their action choices. Interestingly, this mechanism seems not to require explicit understanding and strategic use of action selection rules, in contrast to classical ideas about the relation between volition and conscious, rational thought. Third, I will consider volition teleologically, as a mechanism for achieving counterfactual goals through complex problem-solving. This perspective gives a key role in mediating between understanding and planning on the one hand, and instrumental action on the other hand. Taken together, these three cognitive phenomena of generativity, flexibility, and teleology may partly explain why volition is such an important cognitive function for organisation of human behaviour and human flourishing. I will end by discussing how this enriched view of volition can relate to individual autonomy and responsibility.

Electric Gymnotiform fish live in muddy, shallow waters near the shore – hiding in the dense filamentous roots of floating plants such as Eichornia crassipes (“camalote”). They explore their surroundings by using a series of electric pulses that serve as self emitted carrier of electrosensory signals. This propagates at the speed of light through this spongiform habitat and is barely sensed by the lateral line of predators and prey. The emitted field polarizes the surroundings according to the difference in impedance with water which in turn modifies the profile of transcutaneous currents considered as an electrosensory image. Using this system, pulse Gymnotiformes create an electrosensory bubble where an object’s location, impedance, size and other characteristics are discriminated and probably recognized. Although consciousness is still not well-proven, cognitive functions as volition, attention, and path integration have been shown. Here I will summarize different aspects of the electromotor electrosensory loop of pulse Gymnotiforms. First, I will address how objects are polarized with a stereotyped but temporospatially complex electric field, consisting of brief pulses emitted at regular intervals. This relies on complex electric organs quasi periodically activated through an electromotor coordination system by a pacemaker in the medulla. Second, I will deal with the imaging mechanisms of pulse gymnotiform fish and the presence of two regions in the electrosensory field, a rostral region where the field time course is coherent and field vector direction is constant all along the electric organ discharge and a lateral region where the field time course is site specific and field vector direction describes a stereotyped 3D trajectory. Third, I will describe the electrosensory mosaic and their characteristics. Receptor and primary afferents correspond one to one showing subtypes optimally responding to the time course of the self generated pulse with a characteristic train of spikes. While polarized objects at the rostral region project their electric images on the perioral region where electrosensory receptor density, subtypes and central projection are maximal, the image of objects on the side recruit a single type of scattered receptors. Therefore, the rostral mosaic has been likened to an electrosensory fovea and its receptive field referred to as foveal field. The rest of the mosaic and field are referred to as peripheral. Finally, I will describe ongoing work on early processing structures. I will try to generate an integrated view, including anatomical and functional data obtained in vitro, acute experiments, and unitary recordings in freely moving fish. We have recently shown have shown that these fish tract allo-generated fields and the virtual fields generated by nearby objects in the presence of self-generated fields to explore the nearby environment. These data together with the presence of a multimodal receptor mosaic at the cutaneous surface particularly surrounding the mouth and an important role of proprioception in early sensory processing suggests the hypothesis that the active electrosensory system is part of a multimodal haptic sense.

The question of free will has been topical for millennia, especially considering its links to moral responsibility and the ownership of that responsibility. Free will, or volition, is an incredibly complex phenomenon - and cannot easily be reduced to a single empirical paradigm. Roskies (2010) proposes that there are five cognitive aspects to be considered when developing a more complete understanding of volition. These are: intention, initiation, feeling, executive control and decision-making. Decision-making will be the focus of this talk, which steps through aspects of the philosophy of free will; highlights experimental paradigms stemming from the seminal work of Benjamin Libet et al., and proposes machine learning as a promising method in progressing the empirical studies of decision-making and free will.