What it’s like is all there is: The value of Consciousness
Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.
Neuromodulation of subjective experience
Many psychoactive substances are used with the aim of altering experience, e.g. as analgesics, antidepressants or antipsychotics. These drugs act on specific receptor systems in the brain, including the opioid, serotonergic and dopaminergic systems. In this talk, I will summarise human drug studies targeting opioid receptors and their role for human experience, with focus on the experience of pain, stress, mood, and social connection. Opioids are only indicated for analgesia, due to their potential to cause addiction. When these regulations occurred, other known effects were relegated to side effects. This may be the cause of the prevalent myth that opioids are the most potent painkillers, despite evidence from head-to-head trials, Cochrane reviews and network meta-analyses that opioids are not superior to non-opioid analgesics in the treatment of acute or chronic non-cancer pain. However, due to the variability and diversity of opioid effects across contexts and experiences, some people under some circumstances may indeed benefit from prolonged treatment. I will present data on individual differences in opioid effects due to participant sex and stress induction. Understanding the effects of these commonly used medications on other aspects of the human experience is important to ensure correct use and to prevent unnecessary pain and addiction risk.
NEW TREATMENTS FOR PAIN: Unmet needs and how to meet them
“Of pain you could wish only one thing: that it should stop. Nothing in the world was so bad as physical pain. In the face of pain there are no heroes.- George Orwell, ‘1984’ " "Neuroscience has revealed the secrets of the brain and nervous system to an extent that was beyond the realm of imagination just 10-20 years ago, let alone in 1949 when Orwell wrote his prophetic novel. Understanding pain, however, presents a unique challenge to academia, industry and medicine, being both a measurable physiological process as well as deeply personal and subjective. Given the millions of people who suffer from pain every day, wishing only, “that it should stop”, the need to find more effective treatments cannot be understated." "‘New treatments for pain’ will bring together approximately 120 people from the commercial, academic, and not-for-profit sectors to share current knowledge, identify future directions, and enable collaboration, providing delegates with meaningful and practical ways to accelerate their own work into developing treatments for pain.
Of Grids and Maps
Neuroscientific methods successfully account for a system’s functional properties, but leave out the subjective properties of the accompanying experience. According to IIT, phenomenology can be studied scientifically by unfolding the cause-effect structure specified by a system. To illustrate how, in this talk I compare two systems (a grid and a map) to show that they can be functionally equivalent in performing fixation, but only one can specify a cause-effect structure that accounts for the extendedness of phenomenal space.
Can subjective experience be quantified? Critically examining computational cognitive neuroscience approaches
Computational and cognitive neuroscience techniques have made great strides towards describing the neural computations underlying perceptual inference and decision-making under uncertainty. These tools tell us how and why perceptual illusions occur, which brain areas may represent noisy information in a probabilistic manner, and so on. However, an understanding of the subjective, qualitative aspects of perception remains elusive: qualia, or the personal, intrinsic properties of phenomenal awareness, have remained out of reach of these computational analytic insights. Here, I propose that metacognitive computations, and the subjective feelings that go along with them, give us a solid starting point for understanding subjective experience in general. Specifically, perceptual metacognition possesses ontological and practical properties that provide a powerful and unique opportunity for studying the studying the neural and computational correlates of subjective experience using established tools of computational and cognitive neuroscience. By capitalizing on decades of developments in formal computational model comparisons as applied to the specific properties of perceptual metacognition, we are now in a privileged position to reveal new and exciting insights about how the brain constructs our subjective conscious experiences.
A New Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
David Chalmers’s (1995) hard problem famously states: “It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.” Thomas Nagel (1974) wrote something similar: “If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue about how this could be done.” This presentation will point the way towards the long-sought “good explanation” -- or at least it will provide “a clue”. I will make three points: (1) It is unfortunate that cognitive science took vision as its model example when looking for a ‘neural correlate of consciousness’ because cortical vision (like most cognitive processes) is not intrinsically conscious. There is not necessarily ‘something it is like’ to see. (2) Affective feeling, by contrast, is conscious by definition. You cannot feel something without feeling it. Moreover, affective feeling, generated in the upper brainstem, is the foundational form of consciousness: prerequisite for all the higher cognitive forms. (3) The functional mechanism of feeling explains why and how it cannot go on ‘in the dark’, free of any inner feel. Affect enables the organism to monitor deviations from its expected self-states in uncertain situations and thereby frees homeostasis from the limitations of automatism. As Nagel says, “An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.” Affect literally constitutes the sentient subject.