CBD 2026: The Narrating Brain: The Default Mode Network, the Self, and Consciousness in the Age of AI with Vinod Menon, PhD
Vinod Menon examines the brain's default mode network as a foundation for autobiographical memory, self-related processing, and consciousness, and considers how these functions compare with current artificial intelligence systems. The virtual session is part of Stanford's Contemplation by Design Summit.
Consciousness at the edge of chaos
Over the last 20 years, neuroimaging and electrophysiology techniques have become central to understanding the mechanisms that accompany loss and recovery of consciousness. Much of this research is performed in the context of healthy individuals with neurotypical brain dynamics. Yet, a true understanding of how consciousness emerges from the joint action of neurons has to account for how severely pathological brains, often showing phenotypes typical of unconsciousness, can nonetheless generate a subjective viewpoint. In this presentation, I will start from the context of Disorders of Consciousness and will discuss recent work aimed at finding generalizable signatures of consciousness that are reliable across a spectrum of brain electrophysiological phenotypes focusing in particular on the notion of edge-of-chaos criticality.
Neurosurgery & Consciousness: Bridging Science and Philosophy in the Age of AI
Overview of neurosurgery specialty interplay between neurology, psychiatry and neurosurgery. Discussion on benefits and disadvantages of classifications. Presentation of sub-specialties: trauma, oncology, functional, pediatric, vascular and spine. How does an ordinary day of a neurosurgeon look like; outpatient clinic, emergencies, pre/intra/post operative patient care. An ordinary operation. Myth-busting and practical insights of every day practice. An ordinary operation. Hint for research on clinical problems to be solved. The coming ethical frontiers of neuroprosthetics. In part two we will explore the explanatory gap and its significance. We will review the more than 200 theories of the hard problem of consciousness, from the prevailing to the unconventional. Finally, we are going to reflect on the AI advancements and the claims of LLMs becoming conscious
The speed of prioritizing information for consciousness: A robust and mysterious human trait
What it’s like is all there is: The value of Consciousness
Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.
Consciousness Aesthetics
We can perceive aesthetic properties such as beauty and sublimity in artworks, environmental nature and even ordinary life. How about consciousness? Does consciousness have aesthetic properties? If so, what kind of aesthetic properties conscious experiences can have? If conscious experiences can have some kinds of aesthetic properties, how can we appreciate them? These questions constitute "Consciousness Aesthetics". In this talk, I will introduce consciousness aesthetics as a new field of aesthetics and discuss some of such questions.
Homeostatic Neural Responses to Photic Stimulation
This talk presents findings from open and closed-loop neural stimulation experiments using EEG. Fixed-frequency (10 Hz) stimulation revealed cross-cortical alpha power suppression post-stimulation, modulated by the difference between the individual's alpha frequency and the stimulation frequency. Closed-loop stimulation demonstrated phase-dependent effects: trough stimulation enhanced lower alpha activity, while peak stimulation suppressed high alpha to beta activity. These findings provide evidence for homeostatic mechanisms in the brain's response to photic stimulation, with implications for neuromodulation applications.
Brain-heart interactions at the edges of consciousness
Various clinical cases have provided evidence linking cardiovascular, neurological, and psychiatric disorders to changes in the brain-heart interaction. Our recent experimental evidence on patients with disorders of consciousness revealed that observing brain-heart interactions helps to detect residual consciousness, even in patients with absence of behavioral signs of consciousness. Those findings support hypotheses suggesting that visceral activity is involved in the neurobiology of consciousness and sum to the existing evidence in healthy participants in which the neural responses to heartbeats reveal perceptual and self-consciousness. Furthermore, the presence of non-linear, complex, and bidirectional communication between brain and heartbeat dynamics can provide further insights into the physiological state of the patient following severe brain injury. These developments on methodologies to analyze brain-heart interactions open new avenues for understanding neural functioning at a large-scale level, uncovering that peripheral bodily activity can influence brain homeostatic processes, cognition, and behavior.
Consciousness and the brain: comparing and testing neuroscientific theories of consciousness
Using Adversarial Collaboration to Harness Collective Intelligence
There are many mysteries in the universe. One of the most significant, often considered the final frontier in science, is understanding how our subjective experience, or consciousness, emerges from the collective action of neurons in biological systems. While substantial progress has been made over the past decades, a unified and widely accepted explanation of the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness remains elusive. The field is rife with theories that frequently provide contradictory explanations of the phenomenon. To accelerate progress, we have adopted a new model of science: adversarial collaboration in team science. Our goal is to test theories of consciousness in an adversarial setting. Adversarial collaboration offers a unique way to bolster creativity and rigor in scientific research by merging the expertise of teams with diverse viewpoints. Ideally, we aim to harness collective intelligence, embracing various perspectives, to expedite the uncovering of scientific truths. In this talk, I will highlight the effectiveness (and challenges) of this approach using selected case studies, showcasing its potential to counter biases, challenge traditional viewpoints, and foster innovative thought. Through the joint design of experiments, teams incorporate a competitive aspect, ensuring comprehensive exploration of problems. This method underscores the importance of structured conflict and diversity in propelling scientific advancement and innovation.
Degrees of Consciousness
In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.
Piecing together the puzzle of emotional consciousness
Conscious emotional experiences are very rich in their nature, and can encompass anything ranging from the most intense panic when facing immediate threat, to the overwhelming love felt when meeting your newborn. It is then no surprise that capturing all aspects of emotional consciousness, such as intensity, valence, and bodily responses, into one theory has become the topic of much debate. Key questions in the field concern how we can actually measure emotions and which type of experiments can help us distill the neural correlates of emotional consciousness. In this talk I will give a brief overview of theories of emotional consciousness and where they disagree, after which I will dive into the evidence proposed to support these theories. Along the way I will discuss to what extent studying emotional consciousness is ‘special’ and will suggest several tools and experimental contrasts we have at our disposal to further our understanding on this intriguing topic.
Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience
Although each of us was once a baby, infant consciousness remains mysterious and there is no received view about when, and in what form, consciousness first emerges. Some theorists defend a ‘late-onset’ view, suggesting that consciousness requires cognitive capacities which are unlikely to be in place before the child’s first birthday at the very earliest. Other theorists defend an ‘early-onset’ account, suggesting that consciousness is likely to be in place at birth (or shortly after) and may even arise during the third trimester. Progress in this field has been difficult, not just because of the challenges associated with procuring the relevant behavioral and neural data, but also because of uncertainty about how best to study consciousness in the absence of the capacity for verbal report or intentional behavior. This review examines both the empirical and methodological progress in this field, arguing that recent research points in favor of early-onset accounts of the emergence of consciousness.
Doubting the neurofeedback double-blind do participants have residual awareness of experimental purposes in neurofeedback studies?
Neurofeedback provides a feedback display which is linked with on-going brain activity and thus allows self-regulation of neural activity in specific brain regions associated with certain cognitive functions and is considered a promising tool for clinical interventions. Recent reviews of neurofeedback have stressed the importance of applying the “double-blind” experimental design where critically the patient is unaware of the neurofeedback treatment condition. An important question then becomes; is double-blind even possible? Or are subjects aware of the purposes of the neurofeedback experiment? – this question is related to the issue of how we assess awareness or the absence of awareness to certain information in human subjects. Fortunately, methods have been developed which employ neurofeedback implicitly, where the subject is claimed to have no awareness of experimental purposes when performing the neurofeedback. Implicit neurofeedback is intriguing and controversial because it runs counter to the first neurofeedback study, which showed a link between awareness of being in a certain brain state and control of the neurofeedback-derived brain activity. Claiming that humans are unaware of a specific type of mental content is a notoriously difficult endeavor. For instance, what was long held as wholly unconscious phenomena, such as dreams or subliminal perception, have been overturned by more sensitive measures which show that degrees of awareness can be detected. In this talk, I will discuss whether we will critically examine the claim that we can know for certain that a neurofeedback experiment was performed in an unconscious manner. I will present evidence that in certain neurofeedback experiments such as manipulations of attention, participants display residual degrees of awareness of experimental contingencies to alter their cognition.
Consciousness in the age of mechanical minds
We are now clearly entering a new age in our relationship with machines. The power of AI natural language processors and image generators has rapidly exceeded the expectations of even those who developed them. Serious questions are now being asked about the extent to which machines could become — or perhaps already are — sentient or conscious. Do AI machines understand the instructions they are given and the answers they provide? In this talk I will consider the prospects for conscious machines, by which I mean machines that have feelings, know about their own existence, and about ours. I will suggest that the recent focus on information processing in models of consciousness, in which the brain is treated as a kind of digital computer, have mislead us about the nature of consciousness and how it is produced in biological systems. Treating the brain as an energy processing system is more likely to yield answers to these fundamental questions and help us understand how and when machines might become minds.
Estimating repetitive spatiotemporal patterns from resting-state brain activity data
Repetitive spatiotemporal patterns in resting-state brain activities have been widely observed in various species and regions, such as rat and cat visual cortices. Since they resemble the preceding brain activities during tasks, they are assumed to reflect past experiences embedded in neuronal circuits. Moreover, spatiotemporal patterns involving whole-brain activities may also reflect a process that integrates information distributed over the entire brain, such as motor and visual information. Therefore, revealing such patterns may elucidate how the information is integrated to generate consciousness. In this talk, I will introduce our proposed method to estimate repetitive spatiotemporal patterns from resting-state brain activity data and show the spatiotemporal patterns estimated from human resting-state magnetoencephalography (MEG) and electroencephalography (EEG) data. Our analyses suggest that the patterns involved whole-brain propagating activities that reflected a process to integrate the information distributed over frequencies and networks. I will also introduce our current attempt to reveal signal flows and their roles in the spatiotemporal patterns using a big dataset. - Takeda et al., Estimating repetitive spatiotemporal patterns from resting-state brain activity data. NeuroImage (2016); 133:251-65. - Takeda et al., Whole-brain propagating patterns in human resting-state brain activities. NeuroImage (2021); 245:118711.
Beyond Volition
Voluntary actions are actions that agents choose to make. Volition is the set of cognitive processes that implement such choice and initiation. These processes are often held essential to modern societies, because they form the cognitive underpinning for concepts of individual autonomy and individual responsibility. Nevertheless, psychology and neuroscience have struggled to define volition, and have also struggled to study it scientifically. Laboratory experiments on volition, such as those of Libet, have been criticised, often rather naively, as focussing exclusively on meaningless actions, and ignoring the factors that make voluntary action important in the wider world. In this talk, I will first review these criticisms, and then look at extending scientific approaches to volition in three directions that may enrich scientific understanding of volition. First, volition becomes particularly important when the range of possible actions is large and unconstrained - yet most experimental paradigms involve minimal response spaces. We have developed a novel paradigm for eliciting de novo actions through verbal fluency, and used this to estimate the elusive conscious experience of generativity. Second, volition can be viewed as a mechanism for flexibility, by promoting adaptation of behavioural biases. This view departs from the tradition of defining volition by contrasting internally-generated actions with externally-triggered actions, and instead links volition to model-based reinforcement learning. By using the context of competitive games to re-operationalise the classic Libet experiment, we identified a form of adaptive autonomy that allows agents to reduce biases in their action choices. Interestingly, this mechanism seems not to require explicit understanding and strategic use of action selection rules, in contrast to classical ideas about the relation between volition and conscious, rational thought. Third, I will consider volition teleologically, as a mechanism for achieving counterfactual goals through complex problem-solving. This perspective gives a key role in mediating between understanding and planning on the one hand, and instrumental action on the other hand. Taken together, these three cognitive phenomena of generativity, flexibility, and teleology may partly explain why volition is such an important cognitive function for organisation of human behaviour and human flourishing. I will end by discussing how this enriched view of volition can relate to individual autonomy and responsibility.
LifePerceives
Life Perceives is a symposium bringing together scientists and artists for an open exploration of how “perception” can be understood as a phenomenon that does not only belong to humans, or even the so-called “higher organisms”, but exists across the entire spectrum of life in a myriad of forms. The symposium invites leading practitioners from the arts and sciences to present unique insights through short talks, open discussions, and artistic interventions that bring us slightly closer to the life worlds of plants and fungi, microbial communities and immune systems, cuttlefish and crows. What do we mean when we talk about perception in other species? Do other organisms have an experience of the world? Or does our human-centred perspective make understanding other forms of life on their own terms an impossible dream? Whatever your answers to these questions may be, we hope to unsettle them, and leave you more curious than when you arrived.
Predictive modeling, cortical hierarchy, and their computational implications
Predictive modeling and dimensionality reduction of functional neuroimaging data have provided rich information about the representations and functional architectures of the human brain. While these approaches have been effective in many cases, we will discuss how neglecting the internal dynamics of the brain (e.g., spontaneous activity, global dynamics, effective connectivity) and its underlying computational principles may hinder our progress in understanding and modeling brain functions. By reexamining evidence from our previous and ongoing work, we will propose new hypotheses and directions for research that consider both internal dynamics and the computational principles that may govern brain processes.
On the link between conscious function and general intelligence in humans and machines
In popular media, there is often a connection drawn between the advent of awareness in artificial agents and those same agents simultaneously achieving human or superhuman level intelligence. In this talk, I will examine the validity and potential application of this seemingly intuitive link between consciousness and intelligence. I will do so by examining the cognitive abilities associated with three contemporary theories of conscious function: Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Information Generation Theory (IGT), and Attention Schema Theory (AST), and demonstrating that all three theories specifically relate conscious function to some aspect of domain-general intelligence in humans. With this insight, we will turn to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and find that, while still far from demonstrating general intelligence, many state-of-the-art deep learning methods have begun to incorporate key aspects of each of the three functional theories. Given this apparent trend, I will use the motivating example of mental time travel in humans to propose ways in which insights from each of the three theories may be combined into a unified model. I believe that doing so can enable the development of artificial agents which are not only more generally intelligent but are also consistent with multiple current theories of conscious function.
INC Day 2022: Neuroethics
Organized by the INC in partnership with the BioMedical Engineering Paris international Master’s program and the NeuroParis Master’s programs and is supported by the Faculty of Sciences of Paris Cité University and the Graduate school Psychological science.
Time as its own representation? Exploring a link between timing of cognition and time perception
The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property, or that time is represented through representations having temporal properties themselves. To add to this debate, we investigated alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. In this talk, I will discuss two studies that we have done in relation to answering this question. In study 1, we investigated whether perceptual switches in fixed intervals altered felt time. In three experiments we showed that a break in visual experience (via a perceptual switch) also leads to a break in felt time. In study 2, we are currently looking at figure-ground perception in ambigous displays. Here, in experiment 1 we show that differences in flicker frequencies on ambigous regions can induce figure-ground segregation. To see if a reverse complementarity exists for felt time, we ask participants to view ambigous regions as figure/ground and show that they have different temporal resolutions for the same region based on whether it is seen as figure or background. Overall, the two studies provide evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception.
Integrating theory-guided and data-driven approaches for measuring consciousness
Clinical assessment of consciousness is a significant issue, with recent research suggesting some brain-damaged patients who are assessed as unconscious are in fact conscious. Misdiagnosis of consciousness can also be detrimental when it comes to general anaesthesia, causing numerous psychological problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Avoiding awareness with overdose of anaesthetics, however, can also lead to cognitive impairment. Currently available objective assessment of consciousness is limited in accuracy or requires expensive equipment with major barriers to translation. In this talk, we will outline our recent theory-guided and data-driven approaches to develop new, optimized consciousness measures that will be robustly evaluated on an unprecedented breadth of high-quality neural data, recorded from the fly model system. We will overcome the subjective-choice problem in data-driven and theory-guided approaches with a comprehensive data analytic framework, which has never been applied to consciousness detection, integrating previously disconnected streams of research in consciousness detection to accelerate the translation of objective consciousness measures into clinical settings.
A Framework for a Conscious AI: Viewing Consciousness through a Theoretical Computer Science Lens
We examine consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer science (TCS), a branch of mathematics concerned with understanding the underlying principles of computation and complexity, including the implications and surprising consequences of resource limitations. We propose a formal TCS model, the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM). The CTM is influenced by Alan Turing's simple yet powerful model of computation, the Turing machine (TM), and by the global workspace theory (GWT) of consciousness originated by cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, George Mashour, and others. However, the CTM is not a standard Turing Machine. It’s not the input-output map that gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness, but what’s under the hood. Nor is the CTM a standard GW model. In addition to its architecture, what gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness is its predictive dynamics (cycles of prediction, feedback and learning), its internal multi-modal language Brainish, and certain special Long Term Memory (LTM) processors, including its Inner Speech and Model of the World processors. Phenomena generally associated with consciousness, such as blindsight, inattentional blindness, change blindness, dream creation, and free will, are considered. Explanations derived from the model draw confirmation from consistencies at a high level, well above the level of neurons, with the cognitive neuroscience literature. Reference. L. Blum and M. Blum, "A theory of consciousness from a theoretical computer science perspective: Insights from the Conscious Turing Machine," PNAS, vol. 119, no. 21, 24 May 2022. https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2115934119
The function and localization of human consciousness
Scientific studies of consciousness can be roughly categorized into two directions: (1) How/where does consciousness emerge? (the mechanism of consciousness) and (2) Why is there consciousness? (the function of consciousness). I will summarize my past research on the quest for consciousness in these two directions.
Brain and Mind: Who is the Puppet and who the Puppeteer?
If the mind controls the brain, then there is free will and its corollaries, dignity and responsibility. You are king in your skull-sized kingdom and the architect of your destiny. If, on the other hand, the brain controls the mind, an incendiary conclusion follows: There can be no free will, no praise, no punishment and no purgatory. In this webinar, Professor George Paxinos will discuss his highly respected work on the construction of human and experimental animal brain atlases. He has discovered 94 brain regions, 64 homologies and published 58 books. His first book, The Rat Brain in Stereotaxic Coordinates, is the most cited publication in neuroscience and, for three decades, the third most cited book in science. Professor Paxinos will also present his recently published novel, A River Divided, which was 21 years in the making. Neuroscience principles were used in the formation of charters, such as those related to the mind, soul, free will and consciousness. Environmental issues are at the heart of the novel, including the question of whether the brain is the right ‘size’ for survival. Professor Paxinos studied at Berkeley, McGill and Yale and is now Scientia Professor of Medical Sciences at Neuroscience Research Australia and The University of New South Wales in Sydney.
A talk about consciousness
Prof. Marcello Massimini will give a talk addressed to the Humanitas University Undergraduate Neurological Society students and Humanitas Neuro Center members about consciousness and his groundbreaking studies on this topic. Prof. Maurizio Cecconi and Dr. Villa will then give their clinical point of view as neurointensivists on the pathologic states of consciousness.
How sleep contributes to visual perceptual learning
Sleep is crucial for the continuity and development of life. Sleep-related problems can alter brain function, and cause potentially severe psychological and behavioral consequences. However, the role of sleep in our mind and behavior is far from clear. In this talk, I will present our research on how sleep may play a role in visual perceptual learning (VPL) by using simultaneous magnetic resonance spectroscopy and polysomnography in human subjects. We measured the concentrations of neurotransmitters in the early visual areas during sleep and obtained the excitation/inhibition (E/I) ratio which represents the amount of plasticity in the visual system. We found that the E/I ratio significantly increased during NREM sleep while it decreased during REM sleep. The E/I ratio during NREM sleep was correlated with offline performance gains by sleep, while the E/I ratio during REM sleep was correlated with the amount of learning stabilization. These suggest that NREM sleep increases plasticity, while REM sleep decreases it to solidify once enhanced learning. NREM and REM sleep may play complementary roles, reflected by significantly different neurochemical processing, in VPL.
CNStalk: Being awake while asleep, being asleep while awake
Free will beyond spontaneous volition: Conscious control processes of inhibition and attention in self-control and free will
Polaris Koi (Philosophy) and Jake Gavenas (Neuroscience) begin the seminar by arguing that agentive control is the key requirement for free will, drawing on folk-philosophy findings to support this claim (Gavenas et al., in prep). They explore how two executive control processes that functionally involve consciousness—inhibition and top-down control of attention—connect self-control and free will.
Heartbeat-based auditory regularities induce prediction in human wakefulness and sleep
Exposure to sensory regularities in the environment induces the human brain to form expectations about incoming stimuli and remains partially preserved in the absence of consciousness (i.e. coma and sleep). While regularity often refers to stimuli presented at a fixed pace, we recently explored whether auditory prediction extends to pseudo-regular sequences where sensory prediction is induced by locking sound onsets to heartbeat signals and whether it can occur across vigilance states. In a series of experiments in healthy volunteers, we found neural and cardiac evidence of auditory prediction during heartbeat-based auditory regularities in wakefulness and N2 sleep. This process could represent an important mechanism for detecting unexpected stimuli in the environment even in states of limited conscious and attentional resources.
Interpersonal synchrony of body/brain, Solo & Team Flow
Flow is defined as an altered state of consciousness with excessive attention and enormous sense of pleasure, when engaged in a challenging task, first postulated by a psychologist, the late M. Csikszentmihayli. The main focus of this talk will be “Team Flow,” but there were two lines of previous studies in our laboratory as its background. First is inter-body and inter-brain coordination/synchrony between individuals. Considering various rhythmic echoing/synchronization phenomena in animal behavior, it could be regarded as the biological, sub-symbolic and implicit origin of social interactions. The second line of precursor research is on the state of Solo Flow in game playing. We employed attenuation of AEP (Auditory Evoked Potential) to task-irrelevant sound probes as an objective-neural indicator of such a Flow status, and found that; 1) Mutual link between the ACC & the TP is critical, and 2) overall, top-down influence is enhanced while bottom-up causality is attenuated. Having these as the background, I will present our latest study of Team Flow in game playing. We found that; 3) the neural correlates of Team Flow is distinctively different from those of Solo Flow nor of non-flow social, 4) the left medial temporal cortex seems to form an integrative node for Team Flow, receiving input related to Solo Flow state from the right PFC and input related to social state from the right IFC, and 5) Intra-brain (dis)similarity of brain activity well predicts (dis)similarity of skills/cognition as well as affinity for inter-brain coherence.
Roles of attention and consciousness in perceptual learning
Visual perceptual learning (VPL) is defined as improved performance on a visual task due to visual experience. It was once argued that attention to a visual feature is necessary for VPL of the feature to occur. Contrary to this view, a phenomenon called task-irrelevant VPL demonstrated that VPL can occur due to exposure to a feature which is sub-threshold and task-irrelevant, and therefore, unattended. A series of findings based on task-irrelevant VPL has indicated the following two mechanisms. First, attention to a feature facilitates VPL of the feature while inhibiting VPL of unattended and supra-threshold features. Second, reward paired with a feature enables VPL of the feature irrespective of whether the feature is attended or not. However, we recently found an additional twist; VPL of a task-irrelevant and supra-threshold feature embedded in a natural scene is not subject to the inhibition of attention. This new finding suggests a need to revise the current view or add a new mechanism as to how VPL occurs.
Consciousness and implicit learning
Can we learn without conscious awareness? Numerous evidences in the research of implicit learning have indicated that people can learn the statistical structure of the stimuli but seemingly without any awareness of its underlying rules. However, it remains unclear what types of knowledge can be learned in implicit learning, what is the relationship between conscious and unconscious knowledge, and what are the neural substrates for the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge. In this talk, I will discuss with you about these ongoing questions.
Inferring informational structures in neural recordings of drosophila with epsilon-machines
Measuring the degree of consciousness an organism possesses has remained a longstanding challenge in Neuroscience. In part, this is due to the difficulty of finding the appropriate mathematical tools for describing such a subjective phenomenon. Current methods relate the level of consciousness to the complexity of neural activity, i.e., using the information contained in a stream of recorded signals they can tell whether the subject might be awake, asleep, or anaesthetised. Usually, the signals stemming from a complex system are correlated in time; the behaviour of the future depends on the patterns in the neural activity of the past. However these past-future relationships remain either hidden to, or not taken into account in the current measures of consciousness. These past-future correlations are likely to contain more information and thus can reveal a richer understanding about the behaviour of complex systems like a brain. Our work employs the "epsilon-machines” framework to account for the time correlations in neural recordings. In a nutshell, epsilon-machines reveal how much of the past neural activity is needed in order to accurately predict how the activity in the future will behave, and this is summarised in a single number called "statistical complexity". If a lot of past neural activity is required to predict the future behaviour, then can we say that the brain was more “awake" at the time of recording? Furthermore, if we read the recordings in reverse, does the difference between forward and reverse-time statistical complexity allow us to quantify the level of time asymmetry in the brain? Neuroscience predicts that there should be a degree of time asymmetry in the brain. However, this has never been measured. To test this, we used neural recordings measured from the brains of fruit flies and inferred the epsilon-machines. We found that the nature of the past and future correlations of neural activity in the brain, drastically changes depending on whether the fly was awake or anaesthetised. Not only does our study find that wakeful and anaesthetised fly brains are distinguished by how statistically complex they are, but that the amount of correlations in wakeful fly brains was much more sensitive to whether the neural recordings were read forward vs. backwards in time, compared to anaesthetised brains. In other words, wakeful fly brains were more complex, and time asymmetric than anaesthetised ones.
Why Some Intelligent Agents are Conscious
In this talk I will present an account of how an agent designed or evolved to be intelligent may come to enjoy subjective experiences. First, the agent is stipulated to be capable of (meta)representing subjective ‘qualitative’ sensory information, in the sense that it can easily assess how exactly similar a sensory signal is to all other possible sensory signals. This information is subjective in the sense that it concerns how the different stimuli can be distinguished by the agent itself, rather than how physically similar they are. For this to happen, sensory coding needs to satisfy sparsity and smoothness constraints, which are known to facilitate metacognition and generalization. Second, this qualitative information can under some specific circumstances acquire an ‘assertoric force’. This happens when a certain self-monitoring mechanism decides that the qualitative information reliably tracks the current state of the world, and informs a general symbolic reasoning system of this fact. I will argue that the having of subjective conscious experiences amounts to nothing more than having qualitative sensory information acquiring an assertoric status within one’s belief system. When this happens, the perceptual content presents itself as reflecting the state of the world right now, in ways that seem undeniably rational to the agent. At the same time, without effort, the agent also knows what the perceptual content is like, in terms of how subjectively similar it is to all other possible precepts. I will discuss the computational benefits of this architecture, for which consciousness might have arisen as a byproduct.
The Unfolding Argument: theoretical and methodological implications
In the first part of this talk, I will briefly present the unfolding argument by Doerig et al. (2019) and the various replies in the philosophical and neuroscientific literature. In the second part of the talk, I will explore the ramifications that this debate has for the science of consciousness and its philosophy, with particular focus on these questions: (i) which type of explanation should a theory of consciousness provide? (ii) what is the evidential basis for theories of consciousness?
Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousness
I will build from Niccolo's discussion of the Blockhead argument to argue that having an FeedForward Network (FN) responding like an recurrent network (RN) in a consciousness experiment is not enough to convince us the two are the same with regards to the posession of mental states and conscious experience. I will then argue that a robust functional equivalence between FFN and RN is akso not supported by the mathematical work on the Universal Approximator theorem, and is also unlikely to hold, as a conjecture, given data in cognitive neuroscience; I will argue that an equivalence of RN and FFN may only apply to static functions between input/output layers and not to the temporal patterns or to the network's reactions to structural perturbations. Finally, I review data indicating that consciousness has functional characteristics, such as a flexible control of behavior, and that cognitive/brain dynamics reveal interacting top-down and bottom-up processes, which are necessary for the mediation of such control processes.
Role of primary visual cortex (V1) in visual awareness: insights from blindsight
Being awake while sleeping, being asleep while awake: consequences on cognition and consciousness
Sleep is classically presented as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Yet, there is increasing evidence showing that sleep and wakefulness can actually intermingle and that wake-like and sleep-like activity can be observed concomitantly in different brain regions. I will here explore the implications of this conception of sleep as a local phenomenon for cognition and consciousness. In the first part of my presentation, I will show how local modulations of sleep depth during sleep could support the processing of sensory information by sleepers. I will also how, under certain circumstances, sleepers can learn while sleeping but also how they can forget. In the second part, I will show how the reverse phenomenon, sleep intrusions during waking, can explain modulations of attention. I will focus in particular on modulations of subjective experience and how the local sleep framework can inform our understanding of everyday phenomena such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Through this presentation and the exploration of both sleep and wakefulness, I will seek to connect changes in neurophysiology with changes in behaviour and subjective experience.
3 Reasons Why You Should Care About Category Theory
Category theory is a branch of mathematics which have been used to organize various regions of mathematics and related sciences from a radical “relation-first” point of view. Why consciousness researchers should care about category theory? " "There are (at least) 3 reasons:" "1 Everything is relational" "2 Everything is relation" "3 Relation is everything" "In this talk we explain the reasons above more concretely and introduce the ideas to utilize basic concepts in category theory for consciousness studies.
Cognition is Rhythm
Working memory is the sketchpad of consciousness, the fundamental mechanism the brain uses to gain volitional control over its thoughts and actions. For the past 50 years, working memory has been thought to rely on cortical neurons that fire continuous impulses that keep thoughts “online”. However, new work from our lab has revealed more complex dynamics. The impulses fire sparsely and interact with brain rhythms of different frequencies. Higher frequency gamma (>35 Hz) rhythms help carry the contents of working memory while lower frequency alpha/beta (~8-30 Hz) rhythms act as control signals that gate access to and clear out working memory. In other words, a rhythmic dance between brain rhythms may underlie your ability to control your own thoughts.
(Un)consciousness & (In)attention
In this talk, I shall not argue for any single thesis or theory in the realm of the (un)consciousness and (in)attention. Instead I will discuss specific examples where philosophers and psychologists can have genuine collaborations in this area. Since issues concerning phenomenological overflow is already too familiar for this audience, I will briefly discuss it only, and focus on other issues that have not been overworked. The exact contents are to be determined, but I will perhaps focus on recent controversies over “sustained representation of perspectival shape” (Morales, Bax, and Firestone, 2020, 2021).
The attentional requirement of unconscious processing
The tight relationship between attention and conscious perception has been extensively researched in the past decades. However, whether attentional modulation extended to unconscious processes remained largely unknown, particularly when it came to abstract and high-level processing. I will talk about a recent study where we utilized the Stroop paradigm to show that task load gates unconscious semantic processing. In a series of psychophysical experiments, the unconscious word semantics influenced conscious task performance only under the low task load condition, but not the high task load condition. Intriguingly, with enough practice in the high task load condition, the unconscious effect reemerged. These findings suggest a competition of attentional resources between unconscious and conscious processes, challenging the automaticity account of unconscious processing.
“Introducing the irruption theory of consciousness”
In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.
The Brain and Its Mind: Temporo- Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC)
Bidirectionally connected cores in a mouse connectome: Towards extracting the brain subnetworks essential for consciousness
Where in the brain consciousness resides remains unclear. It has been suggested that the subnetworks supporting consciousness should be bidirectionally (recurrently) connected because both feed-forward and feedback processing are necessary for conscious experience. Accordingly, evaluating which subnetworks are bidirectionally connected and the strength of these connections would likely aid the identification of regions essential to consciousness. Here, we propose a method for hierarchically decomposing a network into cores with different strengths of bidirectional connection, as a means of revealing the structure of the complex brain network. We applied the method to a whole-brain mouse connectome. We found that cores with strong bidirectional connections consisted of regions presumably essential to consciousness (e.g., the isocortical and thalamic regions, and claustrum) and did not include regions presumably irrelevant to consciousness (e.g., cerebellum). Contrarily, we could not find such correspondence between cores and consciousness when we applied other simple methods which ignored bidirectionality. These findings suggest that our method provides a novel insight into the relation between bidirectional brain network structures and consciousness. Our recent preprint on this work is here: https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.07.12.452022.
Metacognition for past and future decision making in primates
As Socrates said that "I know that I know nothing," our mind's function to be aware of our ignorance is essential for abstract and conceptual reasoning. However, the biological mechanism to enable such a hierarchical thought, or meta-cognition, remained unknown. In the first part of the talk, I will demonstrate our studies on the neural mechanism for metacognition on memory in macaque monkeys. In reality, awareness of ignorance is essential not only for the retrospection of the past but also for the exploration of novel unfamiliar environments for the future. However, this proactive feature of metacognition has been understated in neuroscience. In the second part of the talk, I will demonstrate our studies on the neural mechanism for prospective metacognitive matching among uncertain options prior to perceptual decision making in humans and monkeys. These studies converge to suggest that higher-order processes to self-evaluate mental state either retrospectively or prospectively are implemented in the primate neural networks.
Multisensory self in spatial navigation
In search of me: a theoretical approach to identify the neural substrate of consciousness
A major neuroscientific challenge is to identify the neural mechanisms that support consciousness. Though experimental studies have accumulated evidence about the location of the neural substrate of consciousness, we still lack a full understanding of why certain brain areas, but not others, can support consciousness. In this talk, I will give an overview of our approach, taking advantage of the theoretical framework provided by Integrated Information Theory (IIT). First, I will introduce results showing that a maximum of integrated information within the human brain matches our best evidence concerning the location of the NSC, supporting the IIT’s prediction. Furthermore, I will discuss the possibility that the NSC can change its location and even split into two depending on the task demand. Finally, based on some graph-theoretical analyses, I will argue that the ability of different brain regions to contribute or not to consciousness depends on specific properties of their anatomical connectivity, which determines their ability to support high integrated information.
Irruption theory of consciousness
Tom Froese is Assistant Professor at the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University (OIST), where he heads the Embodied Cognitive Science Unit. He is a cognitive scientist with a background in phenomenological philosophy, human-computer interaction, and complex systems theory. His interdisciplinary research centers on the role of agent-environment interaction in shaping cognition and consciousness, specifically when the interaction process involves sociality and technology. In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.
Investigating the neural mechanisms of spatial attention biases during sleep onset
Active sleep in flies: the dawn of consciousness
The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.
From real problems to beast machines: the somatic basis of selfhood
At the foundation of human conscious experience lie basic embodied experiences of selfhood – experiences of simply ‘being alive’. In this talk, I will make the case that this central feature of human existence is underpinned by predictive regulation of the interior of the body, using the framework of predictive processing, or active inference. I start by showing how conscious experiences of the world around us can be understood in terms of perceptual predictions, drawing on examples from psychophysics and virtual reality. Then, turning the lens inwards, we will see how the experience of being an ‘embodied self’ rests on control-oriented predictive (allostatic) regulation of the body’s physiological condition. This approach implies a deep connection between mind and life, and provides a new way to understand the subjective nature of consciousness as emerging from systems that care intrinsically about their own existence. Contrary to the old doctrine of Descartes, we are conscious because we are beast machines.
As soon as there was life there was danger
Organisms face challenges to survival throughout life. When we freeze or flee in danger, we often feel fear. Tracing the deep history of danger gives a different perspective. The first cells living billions of years ago had to detect and respond to danger in order to survive. Life is about not being dead, and behavior is a major way that organisms hold death off. Although behavior does not require a nervous system, complex organisms have brain circuits for detecting and responding to danger, the deep roots of which go back to the first cells. But these circuits do not make fear, and fear is not the cause of why we freeze or flee. Fear a human invention; a construct we use to account for what happens in our minds when we become aware that we are in harm’s way. This requires a brain that can personally know that it existed in the past, that it is the entity that might be harmed in the present, and that it will cease to exist it the future. If other animals have conscious experiences, they cannot have the kinds of conscious experiences we have because they do not have the kinds of brains we have. This is not meant as a denial of animal consciousness; it is simply a statement about the fact that every species has a different brain. Nor is it a declaration about the wonders of the human brain, since we have done some wonderful, but also horrific, things with our brains. In fact, we are on the way to a climatic disaster that will not, as some suggest, destroy the Earth. But it will make it inhabitable for our kind, and other organisms with high energy demands. Bacteria have made it for billions of years and will likely be fine. The rest is up for grabs, and, in a very real sense, up to us.
Higher cognitive resources for efficient learning
A central issue in reinforcement learning (RL) is the ‘curse-of-dimensionality’, arising when the degrees-of-freedom are much larger than the number of training samples. In such circumstances, the learning process becomes too slow to be plausible. In the brain, higher cognitive functions (such as abstraction or metacognition) may be part of the solution by generating low dimensional representations on which RL can operate. In this talk I will discuss a series of studies in which we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and computational modeling to investigate the neuro-computational basis of efficient RL. We found that people can learn remarkably complex task structures non-consciously, but also that - intriguingly - metacognition appears tightly coupled to this learning ability. Furthermore, when people use an explicit (conscious) policy to select relevant information, learning is accelerated by abstractions. At the neural level, prefrontal cortex subregions are differentially involved in separate aspects of learning: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex pairs with metacognitive processes, while ventromedial prefrontal cortex with valuation and abstraction. I will discuss the implications of these findings, in particular new questions on the function of metacognition in adaptive behavior and the link with abstraction.
Dr Lindsay reads from "Models of the Mind : How Physics, Engineering and Mathematics Shaped Our Understanding of the Brain" 📖
Though the term has many definitions, computational neuroscience is mainly about applying mathematics to the study of the brain. The brain—a jumble of all different kinds of neurons interconnected in countless ways that somehow produce consciousness—has been described as “the most complex object in the known universe”. Physicists for centuries have turned to mathematics to properly explain some of the most seemingly simple processes in the universe—how objects fall, how water flows, how the planets move. Equations have proved crucial in these endeavors because they capture relationships and make precise predictions possible. How could we expect to understand the most complex object in the universe without turning to mathematics? — The answer is we can’t, and that is why I wrote this book. While I’ve been studying and working in the field for over a decade, most people I encounter have no idea what “computational neuroscience” is or that it even exists. Yet a desire to understand how the brain works is a common and very human interest. I wrote this book to let people in on the ways in which the brain will ultimately be understood: through mathematical and computational theories. — At the same time, I know that both mathematics and brain science are on their own intimidating topics to the average reader and may seem downright prohibitory when put together. That is why I’ve avoided (many) equations in the book and focused instead on the driving reasons why scientists have turned to mathematical modeling, what these models have taught us about the brain, and how some surprising interactions between biologists, physicists, mathematicians, and engineers over centuries have laid the groundwork for the future of neuroscience. — Each chapter of Models of the Mind covers a separate topic in neuroscience, starting from individual neurons themselves and building up to the different populations of neurons and brain regions that support memory, vision, movement and more. These chapters document the history of how mathematics has woven its way into biology and the exciting advances this collaboration has in store.
Learning and the Origins of Consciousness: An Evolutionary Approach
Over the last fifteen years, Simona Ginsburg and I developed an evolutionary approach for studying basic consciousness, suggesting that the evolution of learning drove the evolutionary transition to from non-conscious to conscious animals. I present the rationale underlying this thesis, which has led to the identification of a capacity that we call the evolutionary transition marker, which, when we find evidence of it, we have evidence that the major evolutionary transition in which we are interested has gone to completion. I then put forward our proposal that the evolutionary marker of basic consciousness is a complex form of associative learning that we call unlimited associative learning (UAL), and that the evolution of this capacity drove the transition to consciousness. I discuss the implications of this thesis for questions pertaining to the neural dynamics that constitute conscious, to its taxonomic distribution and to the ecological context in which it first emerged. I end by pointing to some of the ways in which the relationship between UAL and consciousness can be experimentally tested in humans and in non-human animals.
Psychedelics and the Pharmacology of Consciousness
The study of altered states of consciousness has long had the potential to provide important insight into the nature of consciousness. In recent years there has been a resurgence of research and public interest in atypical or altered states of consciousness. These have focused both on conditions in which consciousness is considered to be impaired due to brain trauma or enhanced in some way through mediation practices or ingestion of psychedelics. The talk will begin with a brief overview of recent scientific approaches to understanding these different types of altered consciousness. The remainder of the talk will focus on lab-based experiments conducted by myself and others looking at the effects of serotoninergic hallucinogens (i.e. psilocybin and LSD) on perceptual and cognitive function. Together this body of research provides important new insights for the scientific study of consciousness and an initial understanding of the neuropharmacological mechanisms underlying conscious experience.
Towards a Translational Neuroscience of Consciousness
The cognitive neuroscience of conscious perception has seen considerable growth over the past few decades. Confirming an influential hypothesis driven by earlier studies of neuropsychological patients, we have found that the lateral and polar prefrontal cortices play important causal roles in the generation of subjective experiences. However, this basic empirical finding has been hotly contested by researchers with different theoretical commitments, and the differences are at times difficult to resolve. To address the controversies, I suggest one alternative venue may be to look for clinical applications derived from current theories. I outline an example in which we used closed-loop fMRI combined with machine learning to nonconsciously manipulate the physiological responses to threatening stimuli, such as spiders or snakes. A clinical trial involving patients with phobia is currently taking place. I also outline how this theoretical framework may be extended to other diseases. Ultimately, a truly meaningful understanding of the fundamental nature of our mental existence should lead to useful insights for our colleagues on the clinical frontlines. If we use this as a yardstick, whoever loses the esoteric theoretical debates, both science and the patients will always win.