Vision Science seminars

Colour vision is based on circuit-level comparison of the signals from spectral distinct types of photoreceptors. In our own eyes, the presence of three types of cones enable trichromatic colour vision. However, many phylogenetically ‘older’ vertebrates have four or more cone types, and in almost all their cases the circuits that enable tetra- or possibly even pentachromatic colour vision are not known. This includes the majority of birds, reptiles, amphibians, and bony fish. In the lab we study neuronal circuits for colour vision in non-mammalian vertebrates, with a focus on zebrafish, a tetrachromatic surface dwelling species of teleost. I will discuss how in the case of zebrafish, retinal colour computations are implemented in a fundamentally different, and probably much more efficient way compared to how they are thought to work in humans. I will then highlight how these fish circuits might be linked with those in mammals, possibly providing a new way of thinking about how circuits for colour vision are organized in vertebrates.

It has long been appreciated (and celebrated) that certain species have sensory capabilities that humans do not share, for example polarization, ultraviolet, and infrared vision. What is less appreciated however, is that our position as terrestrial human scientists can significantly affect our study of animal senses and signals, even within modalities that we do share. For example, our acute vision can lead us to over-interpret the relevance of fine patterns in animals with coarser vision, and our Cartesian heritage as scientists can lead us to divide sensory modalities into orthogonal parameters (e.g. hue and brightness for color vision), even though this division may not exist within the animal itself. This talk examines two cases from marine visual ecology where a reconsideration of our biases as sharp-eyed Cartesian land mammals can help address questions in visual ecology. The first case examines the enormous variation in visual acuity among animals with image-forming eyes, and focuses on how acknowledging the typically poorer resolving power of animals can help us interpret the function of color patterns in cleaner shrimp and their client fish. The second case examines the how the typical human division of polarized light stimuli into angle and degree of polarization is problematic, and how a physiologically relevant interpretation is both closer to the truth and resolves a number of issues, particularly when considering the propagation of polarized light

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

Team work makes sensory streams work: our senses work together, learn from each other, and stand in for one another, the result of which is perception and understanding. Learned associations between stimuli in different sensory modalities can shape the way we perceive these stimuli (Mcgurk and Macdonald, 1976). During audio-visual associative learning, auditory cortex is thought to underlie multi-modal plasticity in visual cortex (McIntosh et al., 1998; Mishra et al., 2007; Zangenehpour and Zatorre, 2010). However, it is not well understood how processing in visual cortex is altered by an auditory stimulus that is predictive of a visual stimulus and what the mechanisms are that mediate such experience-dependent, audio-visual associations in sensory cortex. Here we describe a neural mechanism by which an auditory input can shape visual representations of behaviorally relevant stimuli through direct interactions between auditory and visual cortices. We show that the association of an auditory stimulus with a visual stimulus in a behaviorally relevant context leads to an experience-dependent suppression of visual responses in primary visual cortex (V1). Auditory cortex axons carry a mixture of auditory and retinotopically-matched visual input to V1, and optogenetic stimulation of these axons selectively suppresses V1 neurons responsive to the associated visual stimulus after, but not before, learning. Our results suggest that cross-modal associations can be stored in long-range cortical connections and that with learning these cross-modal connections function to suppress the responses to predictable input.

I will discuss the mechanisms that determine whether a weak visual stimulus will reach consciousness or not. If the stimulus is simple, early visual cortex acts as a relay station that sends the information to higher visual areas. If the stimulus arrives at a minimal strength, it will be stored in working memory. However, during more complex visual perceptions, which for example depend on the segregation of a figure from the background, early visual cortex’ role goes beyond a simply relay. It now acts as a cognitive blackboard and conscious perception depends on it. Our results also inspire new approaches to create a visual prosthesis for the blind, by creating a direct interface with the visual cortex. I will discuss how high-channel-number interfaces with the visual cortex might be used to restore a rudimentary form of vision in blind individuals.

We want to understand how the visual system detects and tracks salient stimuli in the environment to initiate and guide specific behaviors (i.e., visual neuroethology). Predator avoidance and prey capture are central selection pressures of animal evolution. Mice use vision to detect aerial predators and hunt insects. I will discuss studies from my group that identify specific circuits and pathways in the early visual system (i.e., the retina and its subcortical targets) mediating predator avoidance and prey capture in mice. Our results highlight the importance of subcellular visual processing in the retina and the alignment of viewing strategies with region- and cell-type-specific retinal ganglion cell projection patterns to the brain.

Having conscious experience is arguably the most important reason why it matters to us whether we are alive or dead. A powerful paradigm to identify neural correlates of consciousness is binocular rivalry, wherein a constant visual stimulus evokes a varying conscious percept. It has recently been suggested that activity modulations observed during rivalry may represent the act of report rather than the conscious percept itself. Here, we performed single-unit recordings from face patches in macaque inferotemporal (IT) cortex using a novel no-report paradigm in which the animal’s conscious percept was inferred from eye movements. These experiments reveal two new results concerning the neural correlates of consciousness. First, we found that high proportions of IT neurons represented the conscious percept even without active report. Using high-channel recordings, including a new 128-channel Neuropixels-like probe, we were able to decode the conscious percept on single trials. Second, we found that even on single trials, modulation to rivalrous stimuli was weaker than that to unambiguous stimuli, suggesting that cells may encode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus. To test this hypothesis, we varied the identity of the suppressed stimulus during binocular rivalry; we found that indeed, we could decode not only the conscious percept but also the suppressed stimulus from neural activity. Moreover, the same cells that were strongly modulated by the conscious percept also tended to be strongly modulated by the suppressed stimulus. Together, our findings indicate that (1) IT cortex possesses a true neural correlate of consciousness even in the absence of report, and (2) this correlate consists of a population code wherein single cells multiplex representation of the conscious percept and veridical physical stimulus, rather than a subset of cells perfectly reflecting consciousness.

Neural responses in the visual system are usually not purely visual but depend on behavioural and internal states such as arousal. This dependence is seen both in primary visual cortex (V1) and in subcortical brain structures receiving direct retinal input. In this talk, I will show that modulation by behavioural state arises as early as in the output of the retina.To measure retinal activity in the awake, intact brain, we imaged the synaptic boutons of retinal axons in the superficial superior colliculus (sSC) of mice. The activity of about half of the boutons depended not only on vision but also on running speed and pupil size, regardless of retinal illumination. Arousal typically reduced the boutons’ visual responses to preferred direction and their selectivity for direction and orientation.Arousal may affect activity in retinal boutons by presynaptic neuromodulation. To test whether the effects of arousal occur already in the retina, we recorded from retinal axons in the optic tract. We found that, in darkness, more than one third of the recorded axons was significantly correlated with running speed. Arousal had similar effects postsynaptically, in sSC neurons, independent of activity in V1, the other main source of visual inputs to colliculus. Optogenetic inactivation of V1 generally decreased activity in collicular neurons but did not diminish the effects of arousal. These results indicate that arousal modulates activity at every stage of the visual system. In the future, we will study the purpose and the underlying mechanisms of behavioural modulation in the early visual system

The eyes send a continuous stream of about two million nerve fibers to the brain, but only a fraction of this information is stored as visual memories. This talk will detail three neurocomputational models that attempt an understanding how the visual system makes on-the-fly decisions about how to encode that information. First, the STST family of models (Bowman & Wyble 2007; Wyble, Potter, Bowman & Nieuwenstein 2011) proposes mechanisms for temporal segmentation of continuous input. The conclusion of this work is that the visual system has mechanisms for rapidly creating brief episodes of attention that highlight important moments in time, and also separates each episode from temporally adjacent neighbors to benefit learning. Next, the RAGNAROC model (Wyble et al. 2019) describes a decision process for determining the spatial focus (or foci) of attention in a spatiotopic field and the neural mechanisms that provide enhancement of targets and suppression of highly distracting information. This work highlights the importance of integrating behavioral and electrophysiological data to provide empirical constraints on a neurally plausible model of spatial attention. The model also highlights how a neural circuit can make decisions in a continuous space, rather than among discrete alternatives. Finally, the binding pool (Swan & Wyble 2014; Hedayati, O’Donnell, Wyble in Prep) provides a mechanism for selectively encoding specific attributes (i.e. color, shape, category) of a visual object to be stored in a consolidated memory representation. The binding pool is akin to a holographic memory system that layers representations of select latent representations corresponding to different attributes of a given object. Moreover, it can bind features into distinct objects by linking them to token placeholders. Future work looks toward combining these models into a coherent framework for understanding the full measure of on-the-fly attentional mechanisms and how they improve learning.

Age-related Macular Degeneration (AMD) and Retinitis Pigmentosa (RP) are vision disorders caused by loss of rod and cone photoreceptors, but downstream retinal neurons also show physiological and morphological changes, resulting in the emergence of hyperactivity and rhythmic firing in many retinal ganglion cells (RGC). We recently discovered that retinoic acid (RA) is a key signal that triggers hyperactivity and that blockers of RA unmask light responses in RGCs that would otherwise be obscured. Recent work is revealing where in the retina circuit RA initiates functional changes. Moreover, interfering with the RA signaling pathway with drug or gene therapy can improve spatial vision in a mouse model of RP, providing a new strategy for enhancing low vision in human RP and AMD.

Individual neurons in visual cortex provide the brain with unreliable estimates of visual features. It is not known if the single-neuron variability is correlated across large neural populations, thus impairing the global encoding of stimuli. We recorded simultaneously from up to 50,000 neurons in mouse primary visual cortex (V1) and in higher-order visual areas and measured stimulus discrimination thresholds of 0.35 degrees and 0.37 degrees respectively in an orientation decoding task. These neural thresholds were almost 100 times smaller than the behavioral discrimination thresholds reported in mice. This discrepancy could not be explained by stimulus properties or arousal states. Furthermore, the behavioral variability during a sensory discrimination task could not be explained by neural variability in primary visual cortex. Instead behavior-related neural activity arose dynamically across a network of non-sensory brain areas. These results imply that sensory perception in mice is limited by downstream decoders, not by neural noise in sensory representations.