Cognition seminars

Structure and function of the hippocampal CA3 module

Join Us for the Memory Decoding Journal Club! A collaboration of the Carboncopies Foundation and BPF Aspirational Neuroscience. This time, we’re diving into a groundbreaking paper: "Motor learning selectively strengthens cortical and striatal synapses of motor engram neurons

Over the past thirty years or so, cognitive neuroscience has made spectacular progress understanding the biological mechanisms of consciousness. Consciousness science, as this field is now sometimes called, was not only inexistent thirty years ago, but its very name seemed like an oxymoron: how can there be a science of consciousness? And yet, despite this scepticism, we are now equipped with a rich set of sophisticated behavioural paradigms, with an impressive array of techniques making it possible to see the brain in action, and with an ever-growing collection of theories and speculations about the putative biological mechanisms through which information processing becomes conscious. This is all good and fine, even promising, but we also seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, or at least to have forgotten it in the crib: consciousness is not just mechanisms, it’s what it feels like. In other words, while we know thousands of informative studies about access-consciousness, we have little in the way of phenomenal consciousness. But that — what it feels like — is truly what “consciousness” is about. Understanding why it feels like something to be me and nothing (panpsychists notwithstanding) for a stone to be a stone is what the field has always been after. However, while it is relatively easy to study access-consciousness through the contrastive approach applied to reports, it is much less clear how to study phenomenology, its structure and its function. Here, I first overview work on what consciousness does (the "how"). Next, I ask what difference feeling things makes and what function phenomenology might play. I argue that subjective experience has intrinsic value and plays a functional role in everything that we do.

We can perceive aesthetic properties such as beauty and sublimity in artworks, environmental nature and even ordinary life. How about consciousness? Does consciousness have aesthetic properties? If so, what kind of aesthetic properties conscious experiences can have? If conscious experiences can have some kinds of aesthetic properties, how can we appreciate them? These questions constitute "Consciousness Aesthetics". In this talk, I will introduce consciousness aesthetics as a new field of aesthetics and discuss some of such questions.

Rhythmic flashing light, or “Ganzflicker”, can elicit altered states of consciousness and hallucinations, bringing your mind’s eye out into the real world. What do you experience if you have a super mind’s eye, or none at all? In this talk, I will discuss how Ganzflicker has been used to simulate psychedelic experiences, how it can help us predict symptoms of psychosis, and even tap into the neural basis of hallucinations.

Various clinical cases have provided evidence linking cardiovascular, neurological, and psychiatric disorders to changes in the brain-heart interaction. Our recent experimental evidence on patients with disorders of consciousness revealed that observing brain-heart interactions helps to detect residual consciousness, even in patients with absence of behavioral signs of consciousness. Those findings support hypotheses suggesting that visceral activity is involved in the neurobiology of consciousness and sum to the existing evidence in healthy participants in which the neural responses to heartbeats reveal perceptual and self-consciousness. Furthermore, the presence of non-linear, complex, and bidirectional communication between brain and heartbeat dynamics can provide further insights into the physiological state of the patient following severe brain injury. These developments on methodologies to analyze brain-heart interactions open new avenues for understanding neural functioning at a large-scale level, uncovering that peripheral bodily activity can influence brain homeostatic processes, cognition, and behavior.

Cognitive maps confer animals with flexible intelligence by representing spatial, temporal, and abstract relationships that can be used to shape thought, planning, and behavior. Cognitive maps have been observed in the hippocampus, but their algorithmic form and the processes by which they are learned remain obscure. Here, we employed large-scale, longitudinal two-photon calcium imaging to record activity from thousands of neurons in the CA1 region of the hippocampus while mice learned to efficiently collect rewards from two subtly different versions of linear tracks in virtual reality. The results provide a detailed view of the formation of a cognitive map in the hippocampus. Throughout learning, both the animal behavior and hippocampal neural activity progressed through multiple intermediate stages, gradually revealing improved task representation that mirrored improved behavioral efficiency. The learning process led to progressive decorrelations in initially similar hippocampal neural activity within and across tracks, ultimately resulting in orthogonalized representations resembling a state machine capturing the inherent struture of the task. We show that a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and a biologically plausible recurrent neural network trained using Hebbian learning can both capture core aspects of the learning dynamics and the orthogonalized representational structure in neural activity. In contrast, we show that gradient-based learning of sequence models such as Long Short-Term Memory networks (LSTMs) and Transformers do not naturally produce such orthogonalized representations. We further demonstrate that mice exhibited adaptive behavior in novel task settings, with neural activity reflecting flexible deployment of the state machine. These findings shed light on the mathematical form of cognitive maps, the learning rules that sculpt them, and the algorithms that promote adaptive behavior in animals. The work thus charts a course toward a deeper understanding of biological intelligence and offers insights toward developing more robust learning algorithms in artificial intelligence.

There are many mysteries in the universe. One of the most significant, often considered the final frontier in science, is understanding how our subjective experience, or consciousness, emerges from the collective action of neurons in biological systems. While substantial progress has been made over the past decades, a unified and widely accepted explanation of the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness remains elusive. The field is rife with theories that frequently provide contradictory explanations of the phenomenon. To accelerate progress, we have adopted a new model of science: adversarial collaboration in team science. Our goal is to test theories of consciousness in an adversarial setting. Adversarial collaboration offers a unique way to bolster creativity and rigor in scientific research by merging the expertise of teams with diverse viewpoints. Ideally, we aim to harness collective intelligence, embracing various perspectives, to expedite the uncovering of scientific truths. In this talk, I will highlight the effectiveness (and challenges) of this approach using selected case studies, showcasing its potential to counter biases, challenge traditional viewpoints, and foster innovative thought. Through the joint design of experiments, teams incorporate a competitive aspect, ensuring comprehensive exploration of problems. This method underscores the importance of structured conflict and diversity in propelling scientific advancement and innovation.

In the science of consciousness, it’s often assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. I'll (1) argue that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, and (2) develop an analysis of degrees of consciousness. On my view, whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I'll also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.

Conscious emotional experiences are very rich in their nature, and can encompass anything ranging from the most intense panic when facing immediate threat, to the overwhelming love felt when meeting your newborn. It is then no surprise that capturing all aspects of emotional consciousness, such as intensity, valence, and bodily responses, into one theory has become the topic of much debate. Key questions in the field concern how we can actually measure emotions and which type of experiments can help us distill the neural correlates of emotional consciousness. In this talk I will give a brief overview of theories of emotional consciousness and where they disagree, after which I will dive into the evidence proposed to support these theories. Along the way I will discuss to what extent studying emotional consciousness is ‘special’ and will suggest several tools and experimental contrasts we have at our disposal to further our understanding on this intriguing topic.

Although each of us was once a baby, infant consciousness remains mysterious and there is no received view about when, and in what form, consciousness first emerges. Some theorists defend a ‘late-onset’ view, suggesting that consciousness requires cognitive capacities which are unlikely to be in place before the child’s first birthday at the very earliest. Other theorists defend an ‘early-onset’ account, suggesting that consciousness is likely to be in place at birth (or shortly after) and may even arise during the third trimester. Progress in this field has been difficult, not just because of the challenges associated with procuring the relevant behavioral and neural data, but also because of uncertainty about how best to study consciousness in the absence of the capacity for verbal report or intentional behavior. This review examines both the empirical and methodological progress in this field, arguing that recent research points in favor of early-onset accounts of the emergence of consciousness.

Subsecond timing underlies nearly all sensory and motor activities across species and is critical to survival. While subsecond temporal information has been found across cortical and subcortical regions, it is unclear if it is generated locally and intrinsically or if it is a read out of a centralized clock-like mechanism. Indeed, mechanisms of subsecond timing at the circuit level are largely obscure. Primary sensory areas are well-suited to address these question as they have early access to sensory information and provide minimal processing to it: if temporal information is found in these regions, it is likely to be generated intrinsically and locally. We test this hypothesis by training mice to perform an audio-visual temporal pattern sensory discrimination task as we use 2-photon calcium imaging, a technique capable of recording population level activity at single cell resolution, to record activity in primary visual cortex (V1). We have found significant changes in network dynamics through mice’s learning of the task from naive to middle to expert levels. Changes in network dynamics and behavioral performance are well accounted for by an intrinsic model of timing in which the trajectory of q network through high dimensional state space represents temporal sensory information. Conversely, while we found evidence of other temporal encoding models, such as oscillatory activity, we did not find that they accounted for increased performance but were in fact correlated with the intrinsic model itself. These results provide insight into how subsecond temporal information is encoded mechanistically at the circuit level.

Higher cortical areas carry a wide range of sensory, cognitive, and motor signals supporting complex goal-directed behavior. These signals mix in heterogeneous responses of single neurons, making it difficult to untangle underlying mechanisms. I will present two approaches for revealing interpretable circuit mechanisms from heterogeneous neural responses during cognitive tasks. First, I will show a flexible nonparametric framework for simultaneously inferring population dynamics on single trials and tuning functions of individual neurons to the latent population state. When applied to recordings from the premotor cortex during decision-making, our approach revealed that populations of neurons encoded the same dynamic variable predicting choices, and heterogeneous firing rates resulted from the diverse tuning of single neurons to this decision variable. The inferred dynamics indicated an attractor mechanism for decision computation. Second, I will show an approach for inferring an interpretable network model of a cognitive task—the latent circuit—from neural response data. We developed a theory to causally validate latent circuit mechanisms via patterned perturbations of activity and connectivity in the high-dimensional network. This work opens new possibilities for deriving testable mechanistic hypotheses from complex neural response data.

Note the later time in the USA!