Cognition seminars
October 2021
In this talk he will present current work in progress on “irruption theory”, a new theory of consciousness that integrates an embodied-enactive account of basic mind with radical formulations of the freedom and efficacy of intentional agency.
Development of multisensory perception and attention and their role in audiovisual speech processing
David Lewkowicz· Haskins Labs & Yale Child Study Ctr.
Thu, Oct 21 · 16:00 UTC
A Functional Approach to Analogical Reasoning in Scientific Practice
Yafeng Shan· University of Kent
Thu, Oct 21 · 16:00 UTC
The talk argues for a new approach to analysing analogical reasoning in scientific practice. Traditionally, philosophers of science tend to analyse analogical reasoning in either a top-down way or a bottom-up way. Examples of top-down approaches include Mary Hesse’s seminal work (1963) and Paul Bartha’s articulation model (2010), while most popular bottom-up approach is John Norton’s material approach (2018). I will address the problems of these traditional approaches and introduce an alternative approach, which is motivated by my exemplar-based approach to the history of science, defended in my recent book (2020).
Through the bottleneck: my adventures with the 'Tishby program'
Eli Nelken· The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Wed, Oct 20 · 05:00 UTC
One of Tali's cherished goals was to transform biology into physics. In his view, biologists were far too enamored by the details of the specific models they studied, losing sight of the big principles that may govern the behavior of these models. One such big principle that he suggested was the 'information bottleneck (IB) principle'. The iIB principle is an information-theoretical approach for extracting the relevant information that one random variable carries about another. Tali applied the IB principle to numerous problems in biology, gaining important insights in the process. Here I will describe two applications of the IB principle to neurobiological data. The first is the formalization of the notion of surprise that allowed us to rigorously estimate the memory duration and content of neuronal responses in auditory cortex, and the second is an application to behavior, allowing us to estimate 'optimal policies under information constraints' that shed interesting light on rat behavior.
The role of high- and low-level factors in smooth pursuit of predictable and random motions
Eileen Kowler· Rutgers
Tue, Oct 19 · 16:00 UTC
Smooth pursuit eye movements are among our most intriguing motor behaviors. They are able to keep the line of sight on smoothly moving targets with little or no overt effort or deliberate planning, and they can respond quickly and accurately to changes in the trajectory of motion of targets. Nevertheless, despite these seeming automatic characteristics, pursuit is highly sensitive to high-level factors, such as the choices made about attention, or beliefs about the direction of upcoming motion. Investigators have struggled for decades with the problem of incorporating both high- and low-level processes into a single coherent model. This talk will present an overview of the current state of efforts to incorporate high- and low-level influences, as well as new observations that add to our understanding of both types of influences. These observations (in contrast to much of the literature) focus on the directional properties of pursuit. Studies will be presented that show: (1) the direction of smooth pursuit made to pursue fields of noisy random dots depends on the relative reliability of the sensory signal and the expected motion direction; (2) smooth pursuit shows predictive responses that depend on the interpretation of cues that signal an impending collision; and (3) smooth pursuit during a change in target direction displays kinematic properties consistent with the well-known two-thirds power law. Implications for incorporating high- and low-level factors into the same framework will be discussed.
Striatal circuitry for reward learning and decision-making
Ilana Witten· Princeton University
Tue, Oct 19 · 15:00 UTC
The Brain and Its Mind: Temporo- Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC)
Georg Northoff· University of Ottawa
Thu, Oct 14 · 18:00 UTC
Towards a Theory of Human Visual Reasoning
Ekaterina Shurkova· University of Edinburgh
Thu, Oct 14 · 16:45 UTC
Many tasks that are easy for humans are difficult for machines. In particular, while humans excel at tasks that require generalising across problems, machine systems notably struggle. One such task that has received a good amount of attention is the Synthetic Visual Reasoning Test (SVRT). The SVRT consists of a range of problems where simple visual stimuli must be categorised into one of two categories based on an unknown rule that must be induced. Conventional machine learning approaches perform well only when trained to categorise based on a single rule and are unable to generalise without extensive additional training to tasks with any additional rules. Multiple theories of higher-level cognition posit that humans solve such tasks using structured relational representations. Specifically, people learn rules based on structured representations that generalise to novel instances quickly and easily. We believe it is possible to model this approach in a single system which learns all the required relational representations from scratch and performs tasks such as SVRT in a single run. Here, we present a system which expands the DORA/LISA architecture and augments the existing model with principally novel components, namely a) visual reasoning based on the established theories of recognition by components; b) the process of learning complex relational representations by synthesis (in addition to learning by analysis). The proposed augmented model matches human behaviour on SVRT problems. Moreover, the proposed system stands as perhaps a more realistic account of human cognition, wherein rather than using tools that has been shown successful in the machine learning field to inform psychological theorising, we use established psychological theories to inform developing a machine system.
Children's relational noun generalization strategies
Eleanor Stansbury· Université de Bourgogne
Thu, Oct 14 · 16:00 UTC
A common result is that comparison settings (i.e., several stimuli introduced simultaneously) favor conceptualization and generalization. However still little is known of the solving strategies used by children to compare and generalize novel words. Understanding the temporal dynamics of children’s solving strategies may help assess which processes underlie generalization. We tested children in noun and relational noun generalization tasks and collected eye tracking data. To analyze and interpret the data we followed predictions made by existing models of analogical reasoning and generalization. The data reveals clear patterns of exploration in which participants compare learning items before searching for a solution. Analyses of the beginning of trials show that early comparisons favor generalization and that errors may be caused by a lake of early comparison. Children then pursue their search in different ways according to the task. In this presentation I will present the generalization strategies revealed by eye tracking, compare the strategies from both tasks and confront them to existing models.
Immersive Neuroscience: Bringing Cognitive Neuroscience Closer to the Real World
Jody Culham· Western University
Tue, Oct 12 · 16:00 UTC
Activity dependent myelination: a mechanism for learning and regeneration?
Thóra Káradóttir· WT-MRC Stem Cell Institute, University of Cambridge
Tue, Oct 12 · 15:00 UTC
The CNS is responsive to an ever-changing environment. Until recently, studies of neural plasticity focused almost exclusively on functional and structural changes of neuronal synapses. In recent years, myelin plasticity has emerged as a potential modulator of neural networks. Myelination of previously unmyelinated axons, and changes in the structure on already-myelinated axons, can have large effects on network function. The heterogeneity of the extent of how axons in the CNS are myelinated offers diverse scope for dynamic myelin changes to fine-tune neural circuits. The traditionally held view of myelin as a passive insulator of axons is now changing to one of lifelong changes in myelin, modulated by neuronal activity and experience. Myelin, produced by oligodendrocytes (OLs), is essential for normal brain function, as it provides fast signal transmission, promotes synchronization of neuronal signals and helps to maintain neuronal function. OLs differentiate from oligodendrocyte precursor cells (OPCs), which are distributed throughout the adult brain, and myelination continues into late adulthood. OPCs can sense neuronal activity as they receive synaptic inputs from neurons and express voltage-gated ion channels and neurotransmitter receptors, and differentiate into myelinating OLs in response to changes in neuronal activity. This lecture will explore to what extent myelin plasticity occurs in adult animals, whether myelin changes occur in non-motor learning tasks, especially in learning and memory, and questions whether myelin plasticity and myelin regeneration are two sides of the same coin.
Large-scale approaches for distributed circuits underlying visual decision-making
Nick Steinmetz· University of Washington
Mon, Oct 11 · 15:00 UTC
Mammalian vision and visually-guided behavior relies on neurons distributed across diverse brain regions. In this talk I will describe our efforts to create tools that allow us to measure activity from these distributed circuits - Neuropixels probes for large-scale electrophysiology - and our findings from studies deploying these tools to study visual detection and discrimination in mice.
The Geometry of Decision-Making
Iain Couzin· Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior & University of Konstanz
Fri, Oct 8 · 09:40 UTC
Choosing among spatially distributed options is a central challenge for animals, from deciding among alternative potential food sources or refuges, to choosing with whom to associate. Here, using an integrated theoretical and experimental approach (employing immersive Virtual Reality), with both invertebrate and vertebrate models—the fruit fly, desert locust and zebrafish—we consider the recursive interplay between movement and collective vectorial integration in the brain during decision-making regarding options (potential ‘targets’) in space. We reveal that the brain repeatedly breaks multi-choice decisions into a series of abrupt (critical) binary decisions in space-time where organisms switch, spontaneously, from averaging vectorial information among, to suddenly excluding one of, the remaining options. This bifurcation process repeats until only one option—the one ultimately selected—remains. Close to each bifurcation the ‘susceptibility’ of the system exhibits a sharp increase, inevitably causing small differences among the remaining options to become amplified; a property that both comes ‘for free’ and is highly desirable for decision-making. This mechanism facilitates highly effective decision-making, and is shown to be robust both to the number of options available, and to context, such as whether options are static (e.g. refuges) or mobile (e.g. other animals). In addition, we find evidence that the same geometric principles of decision-making occur across scales of biological organisation, from neural dynamics to animal collectives, suggesting they are fundamental features of spatiotemporal computation.
Analogy and ethics: opportunities at the intersection
Jeffrey Loewenstein· University of Illinois
Thu, Oct 7 · 16:00 UTC
Analogy offers a new interpretation of a common concern in ethics: whether decision making includes or excludes a consideration of moral issues. This is often discussed as the moral awareness of decision makers and considered a motivational concern. The possible new interpretation is that moral awareness is in part a matter of expertise. Some failures of moral awareness can then be understood as stemming from novicehood. Studies of analogical transfer are consistent with the possibility that moral awareness is in part a matter of expertise, that as a result motivation is less helpful than some prior theorizing would predict, and that many adults are not as expert in the domain of ethics as one might hope. The possibility of expert knowledge of ethical principles leads to new questions and opportunities.
Do you hear what I see: Auditory motion processing in blind individuals
Ione Fine· University of Washington
Thu, Oct 7 · 16:00 UTC
Perception of object motion is fundamentally multisensory, yet little is known about similarities and differences in the computations that give rise to our experience across senses. Insight can be provided by examining auditory motion processing in early blind individuals. In those who become blind early in life, the ‘visual’ motion area hMT+ responds to auditory motion. Meanwhile, the planum temporale, associated with auditory motion in sighted individuals, shows reduced selectivity for auditory motion, suggesting competition between cortical areas for functional role. According to the metamodal hypothesis of cross-modal plasticity developed by Pascual-Leone, the recruitment of hMT+ is driven by it being a metamodal structure containing “operators that execute a given function or computation regardless of sensory input modality”. Thus, the metamodal hypothesis predicts that the computations underlying auditory motion processing in early blind individuals should be analogous to visual motion processing in sighted individuals - relying on non-separable spatiotemporal filters. Inconsistent with the metamodal hypothesis, evidence suggests that the computational algorithms underlying auditory motion processing in early blind individuals fail to undergo a qualitative shift as a result of cross-modal plasticity. Auditory motion filters, in both blind and sighted subjects, are separable in space and time, suggesting that the recruitment of hMT+ to extract motion information from auditory input includes a significant modification of its normal computational operations.
Learning and updating structured knowledge
Oded Bein· Niv lab, Princeton University
Wed, Oct 6 · 17:35 UTC
During our everyday lives, much of what we experience is familiar and predictable. We typically follow the same morning routine, take the same route to work, and encounter the same colleagues. However, every once in a while, we encounter a surprising event that violates our expectations. When we encounter such violations of our expectations, it is adaptive to update our internal model of the world in order to make better predictions in the future. The hippocampus is thought to support both the learning of the predictable structure of our environment, as well as the detection and encoding of violations. However, the hippocampus is a complex and heterogeneous structure, composed of different subfields that are thought to subserve different functions. As such, it is not yet known how the hippocampus accomplishes the learning and updating of structured knowledge. Using behavioral methods and high-resolution fMRI, I'll show that during learning of repeated and predicted events, hippocampal subfields differentially integrate and separate event representations, thus learning the structure of ongoing experience. I then move on to discuss how when events violate our predictions, there is a shift in communication between hippocampal subfields, potentially allowing for efficient encoding of the novel and surprising information. If time permits, I'll present an additional behavioral study showing that violations of predictions promote detailed memories. Together, these studies advance our understanding of how we adaptively learn and update our knowledge.
Neural dynamics of probabilistic information processing in humans and recurrent neural networks
Nuttida Rungratsameetaweemana· Sejnowski lab, The Salk Institute
Wed, Oct 6 · 17:00 UTC
In nature, sensory inputs are often highly structured, and statistical regularities of these signals can be extracted to form expectation about future sensorimotor associations, thereby optimizing behavior. One of the fundamental questions in neuroscience concerns the neural computations that underlie these probabilistic sensorimotor processing. Through a recurrent neural network (RNN) model and human psychophysics and electroencephalography (EEG), the present study investigates circuit mechanisms for processing probabilistic structures of sensory signals to guide behavior. We first constructed and trained a biophysically constrained RNN model to perform a series of probabilistic decision-making tasks similar to paradigms designed for humans. Specifically, the training environment was probabilistic such that one stimulus was more probable than the others. We show that both humans and the RNN model successfully extract information about stimulus probability and integrate this knowledge into their decisions and task strategy in a new environment. Specifically, performance of both humans and the RNN model varied with the degree to which the stimulus probability of the new environment matched the formed expectation. In both cases, this expectation effect was more prominent when the strength of sensory evidence was low, suggesting that like humans, our RNNs placed more emphasis on prior expectation (top-down signals) when the available sensory information (bottom-up signals) was limited, thereby optimizing task performance. Finally, by dissecting the trained RNN model, we demonstrate how competitive inhibition and recurrent excitation form the basis for neural circuitry optimized to perform probabilistic information processing.
Encoding and perceiving the texture of sounds: auditory midbrain codes for recognizing and categorizing auditory texture and for listening in noise
Monty Escabi· University of Connecticut
Fri, Oct 1 · 06:00 UTC
Natural soundscapes such as from a forest, a busy restaurant, or a busy intersection are generally composed of a cacophony of sounds that the brain needs to interpret either independently or collectively. In certain instances sounds - such as from moving cars, sirens, and people talking - are perceived in unison and are recognized collectively as single sound (e.g., city noise). In other instances, such as for the cocktail party problem, multiple sounds compete for attention so that the surrounding background noise (e.g., speech babble) interferes with the perception of a single sound source (e.g., a single talker). I will describe results from my lab on the perception and neural representation of auditory textures. Textures, such as a from a babbling brook, restaurant noise, or speech babble are stationary sounds consisting of multiple independent sound sources that can be quantitatively defined by summary statistics of an auditory model (McDermott & Simoncelli 2011). How and where in the auditory system are summary statistics represented and the neural codes that potentially contribute towards their perception, however, are largely unknown. Using high-density multi-channel recordings from the auditory midbrain of unanesthetized rabbits and complementary perceptual studies on human listeners, I will first describe neural and perceptual strategies for encoding and perceiving auditory textures. I will demonstrate how distinct statistics of sounds, including the sound spectrum and high-order statistics related to the temporal and spectral correlation structure of sounds, contribute to texture perception and are reflected in neural activity. Using decoding methods I will then demonstrate how various low and high-order neural response statistics can differentially contribute towards a variety of auditory tasks including texture recognition, discrimination, and categorization. Finally, I will show examples from our recent studies on how high-order sound statistics and accompanying neural activity underlie difficulties for recognizing speech in background noise.
September 2021
Seeing with technology: Exchanging the senses with sensory substitution and augmentation
Michael Proulx· University of Bath
Thu, Sep 30 · 16:00 UTC
What is perception? Our sensory modalities transmit information about the external world into electrochemical signals that somehow give rise to our conscious experience of our environment. Normally there is too much information to be processed in any given moment, and the mechanisms of attention focus the limited resources of the mind to some information at the expense of others. My research has advanced from first examining visual perception and attention to now examine how multisensory processing contributes to perception and cognition. There are fundamental constraints on how much information can be processed by the different senses on their own and in combination. Here I will explore information processing from the perspective of sensory substitution and augmentation, and how "seeing" with the ears and tongue can advance fundamental and translational research.
Beyond the binding problem: From basic affordances to symbolic thought
John E. Hummel· University of Illinois
Thu, Sep 30 · 16:00 UTC
Human cognitive abilities seem qualitatively different from the cognitive abilities of other primates, a difference Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli (2008) attribute to role-based relational reasoning—inferences and generalizations based on the relational roles to which objects (and other relations) are bound, rather than just the features of the objects themselves. Role-based relational reasoning depends on the ability to dynamically bind arguments to relational roles. But dynamic binding cannot be sufficient for relational thinking: Some non-human animals solve the dynamic binding problem, at least in some domains; and many non-human species generalize affordances to completely novel objects and scenes, a kind of universal generalization that likely depends on dynamic binding. If they can solve the dynamic binding problem, then why can they not reason about relations? What are they missing? I will present simulations with the LISA model of analogical reasoning (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) suggesting that the missing pieces are multi-role integration (the capacity to combine multiple role bindings into complete relations) and structure mapping (the capacity to map different systems of role bindings onto one another). When LISA is deprived of either of these capacities, it can still generalize affordances universally, but it cannot reason symbolically; granted both abilities, LISA enjoys the full power of relational (symbolic) thought. I speculate that one reason it may have taken relational reasoning so long to evolve is that it required evolution to solve both problems simultaneously, since neither multi-role integration nor structure mapping appears to confer any adaptive advantage over simple role binding on its own.