Cognition seminars

The integrated conflict monitoring theory of Botvinick introduced cognitive demand into conflict monitoring research. We investigated effects of individual differences of cognitive demand and another determinant of conflict monitoring entitled reinforcement sensitivity on conflict monitoring. We showed evidence of differential variability of conflict monitoring intensity using the electroencephalogram (EEG), functional magnet resonance imaging (fMRI) and behavioral data. Our data suggest that individual differences of anxiety and reasoning ability are differentially related to the recruitment of proactive and reactive cognitive control (cf. Braver). Based on previous findings, the team of the Leue-Lab investigated new psychometric data on conflict monitoring and proactive-reactive cognitive control. Moreover, data of the Leue-Lab suggest the relevance of individual differences of conflict monitoring for the context of deception. In this respect, we plan new studies highlighting individual differences of the functioning of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). Disentangling the role of individual differences in working memory-related cognitive demand, mental effort, and reinforcement-related processes opens new insights for cognitive-motivational approaches of information processing (Passcode to rewatch: 0R8v&m59).

The brain is a prediction machine. Yet the world is never entirely predictable, for any animal. Unexpected events are surprising and this typically evokes prediction error signatures in animal brains. In humans such mismatched expectations are often associated with an emotional response as well. Appropriate emotional responses are understood to be important for memory consolidation, suggesting that valence cues more generally constitute an ancient mechanism designed to potently refine and generalize internal models of the world and thereby minimize prediction errors. On the other hand, abolishing error detection and surprise entirely is probably also maladaptive, as this might undermine the very mechanism that brains use to become better prediction machines. This paradoxical view of brain functions as an ongoing tug-of-war between prediction and surprise suggests a compelling new way to study and understand the evolution of consciousness in animals. I will present approaches to studying attention and prediction in the tiny brain of the fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. I will discuss how an ‘active’ sleep stage (termed rapid eye movement – REM – sleep in mammals) may have evolved in the first animal brains as a mechanism for optimizing prediction in motile creatures confronted with constantly changing environments. A role for REM sleep in emotional regulation could thus be better understood as an ancient sleep function that evolved alongside selective attention to maintain an adaptive balance between prediction and surprise. This view of active sleep has some interesting implications for the evolution of subjective awareness and consciousness.

Children's emerging ability to acquire and apply relational same-different concepts is often cited as a defining feature of human cognition, providing the foundation for abstract thought. Yet, young learners often struggle to ignore irrelevant surface features to attend to structural similarity instead. I will argue that young children have--and retain--genuine relational concepts from a young age, but tend to neglect abstract similarity due to a learned bias to attend to objects and their properties. Critically, this account predicts that differences in the structure of children's environmental input should lead to differences in the type of hypotheses they privilege and apply. I will review empirical support for this proposal that has (1) evaluated the robustness of early competence in relational reasoning, (2) identified cross-cultural differences in relational and object bias, and (3) provided evidence that contextual factors play a causal role in relational reasoning. Together, these studies suggest that the development of abstract thought may be more malleable and context-sensitive than initially believed.

Recent success in training artificial agents and robots derives from a combination of direct learning of behavioral policies and indirect learning via value functions. Policy learning and value learning employ distinct algorithms that depend upon evaluation of errors in performance and reward prediction errors, respectively. In mammals, behavioral learning and the role of mesolimbic dopamine signaling have been extensively evaluated with respect to reward prediction errors; but there has been little consideration of how direct policy learning might inform our understanding. I’ll discuss our recent work on classical conditioning in naïve mice (https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.05.31.446464v1) that provides multiple lines of evidence that phasic dopamine signaling regulates policy learning from performance errors in addition to its well-known roles in value learning. This work points towards new opportunities for unraveling the mechanisms of basal ganglia control over behavior under both adaptive and maladaptive learning conditions.

This talk will focus on the idea that the kind of similarity driving analogical retrieval is determined by the kind of features encoded regarding the source and the target cue situations. Emphasis will be put on educational perspectives in order to show the influence of world semantics on learners’ problem representations and solving strategies, as well as the difficulties arising from semantic incongruence between representations and strategies. Special attention will be given to the recoding of semantically incongruent representations, a crucial step that learners struggle with, in order to illustrate a promising path for going beyond informal strategies.

To act effectively and flexibly in an imperfectly predictable environment with only incomplete and unreliable sensory information, animals must learn to form and compute with internal representations that reflect their necessarily uncertain beliefs about the state of the world. The optimal approach to handling uncertainty is rooted in Bayesian probability, and indeed humans and other animals often approach Bayes optimality with a degree of robustness and flexibility that continues to evade artificial systems. However, the question of how neural circuits organise to achieve this performance remains one of the fundamental mysteries of neuroscience. I will discuss a series of models built around the idea that distributional information is naturally encoded in a distributed fashion by neural population firing rates that converge on the mean values of non-linear functions of state. We will see that such representations emerge naturally in task-optimised systems, and also provide a simple and effective substrate for unsupervised learning. Finally, I will sketch ongoing work that links the emergence of such representations to the architecture of recurrent neural circuits. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2021-07-07. Recording duration: 00:52:28.

There has been a recent surge of interest in the question of whether and how deep learning algorithms might be capable of abstract reasoning, much of which has centered around datasets based on Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM), a visual analogy problem set commonly employed to assess fluid intelligence. This has led to the development of algorithms that are capable of solving RPM-like problems directly from pixel-level inputs. However, these algorithms require extensive direct training on analogy problems, and typically generalize poorly to novel problem types. This is in stark contrast to human reasoners, who are capable of solving RPM and other analogy problems zero-shot — that is, with no direct training on those problems. Indeed, it’s this capacity for zero-shot reasoning about novel problem types, i.e. fluid intelligence, that RPM was originally designed to measure. I will present some results from our recent efforts to model this capacity for zero-shot reasoning, based on an extension of a recently proposed approach to analogical mapping we refer to as Probabilistic Analogical Mapping (PAM). Our RPM model uses deep learning to extract attributed graph representations from pixel-level inputs, and then performs alignment of objects between source and target analogs using gradient descent to optimize a graph-matching objective. This extended version of PAM features a number of new capabilities that underscore the flexibility of the overall approach, including 1) the capacity to discover solutions that emphasize either object similarity or relation similarity, based on the demands of a given problem, 2) the ability to extract a schema representing the overall abstract pattern that characterizes a problem, and 3) the ability to directly infer the answer to a problem, rather than relying on a set of possible answer choices. This work suggests that PAM is a promising framework for modeling human zero-shot reasoning.

Hongjing Lu will present a new computational model of Probabilistic Analogical Mapping (PAM, in collaboration with Nick Ichien and Keith Holyoak) that finds systematic correspondences between inputs generated by machine learning. The model adopts a Bayesian framework for probabilistic graph matching, operating on semantic relation networks constructed from distributed representations of individual concepts (word embeddings created by Word2vec) and of relations between concepts (created by our BART model). We have used PAM to simulate a broad range of phenomena involving analogical mapping by both adults and children. Our approach demonstrates that human-like analogical mapping can emerge from comparison mechanisms applied to rich semantic representations of individual concepts and relations. More details can be found https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2103/2103.16704.pdf

Previous work with complex memory span tasks, in which simple choice decisions are imposed between presentations of to-be-remembered items, shows that these secondary tasks reduce memory span. It is less clear how reconfiguring and maintaining various amounts of information affects decision speeds. We documented and replicated a non-linear effect of accumulating memory items on concurrent processing judgments, showing that this pattern could be made linear by introducing "lead-in" processing judgments prior to the start of the memory list. With lead-in judgments, there was a large and consistent cost to processing response times with the introduction of the first item in the memory list, which increased gradually per item as the list accumulated. However, once presentation of the list was complete, decision responses sped rapidly: within a few seconds, decisions were at least as fast as when remembering a single item. This pattern of findings is inconsistent with the idea that merely holding information in mind conflicts with attention-demanding decision tasks. Instead, it is possible that reconfiguring memory items for responding provokes conflict between memory and processing in complex span tasks.

In human and non-human animals, conceptual knowledge is partially organized according to low-dimensional geometries that rely on brain structures and computations involved in spatial representations. Recently, two separate lines of research have investigated cognitive maps, that are associated with the hippocampal formation and are similar to world-centered representations of the environment, and image spaces, that are associated with the parietal cortex and are similar to self-centered spatial relationships. I will suggest that cognitive maps and image spaces may be two manifestations of a more general propensity of the mind to create low-dimensional internal models, and may play a role in analogical reasoning and metaphorical thinking. Finally, I will show some data suggesting that the metaphorical relationship between colors and emotions can be accounted for by the structural alignment of low-dimensional conceptual spaces.

A central issue in reinforcement learning (RL) is the ‘curse-of-dimensionality’, arising when the degrees-of-freedom are much larger than the number of training samples. In such circumstances, the learning process becomes too slow to be plausible. In the brain, higher cognitive functions (such as abstraction or metacognition) may be part of the solution by generating low dimensional representations on which RL can operate. In this talk I will discuss a series of studies in which we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and computational modeling to investigate the neuro-computational basis of efficient RL. We found that people can learn remarkably complex task structures non-consciously, but also that - intriguingly - metacognition appears tightly coupled to this learning ability. Furthermore, when people use an explicit (conscious) policy to select relevant information, learning is accelerated by abstractions. At the neural level, prefrontal cortex subregions are differentially involved in separate aspects of learning: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex pairs with metacognitive processes, while ventromedial prefrontal cortex with valuation and abstraction. I will discuss the implications of these findings, in particular new questions on the function of metacognition in adaptive behavior and the link with abstraction.

Recent years have seen a considerable surge of research on interest-based engagement, examining how and why people are engaged in activities without relying on extrinsic rewards. However, the field of inquiry has been somewhat segregated into three different research traditions which have been developed relatively independently --- research on curiosity, interest, and trait curiosity/interest. The current talk sets out an integrative perspective; the reward-learning framework of knowledge acquisition. This conceptual framework takes on the basic premise of existing reward-learning models of information seeking: that knowledge acquisition serves as an inherent reward, which reinforces people’s information-seeking behavior through a reward-learning process. However, the framework reveals how the knowledge-acquisition process is sustained and boosted over a long period of time in real-life settings, allowing us to integrate the different research traditions within reward-learning models. The framework also characterizes the knowledge-acquisition process with four distinct features that are not present in the reward-learning process with extrinsic rewards --- (1) cumulativeness, (2) selectivity, (3) vulnerability, and (4) under-appreciation. The talk describes some evidence from our lab supporting these claims.

Recent years have seen a considerable surge of research on interest-based engagement, examining how and why people are engaged in activities without relying on extrinsic rewards. However, the field of inquiry has been somewhat segregated into three different research traditions which have been developed relatively independently -- research on curiosity, interest, and trait curiosity/interest. The current talk sets out an integrative perspective; the reward-learning framework of knowledge acquisition. This conceptual framework takes on the basic premise of existing reward-learning models of information seeking: that knowledge acquisition serves as an inherent reward, which reinforces people’s information-seeking behavior through a reward-learning process. However, the framework reveals how the knowledge-acquisition process is sustained and boosted over a long period of time in real-life settings, allowing us to integrate the different research traditions within reward-learning models. The framework also characterizes the knowledge-acquisition process with four distinct features that are not present in the reward-learning process with extrinsic rewards -- (1) cumulativeness, (2) selectivity, (3) vulnerability, and (4) under-appreciation. The talk describes some evidence from our lab supporting these claims.

The neurobiology of decision-making is informed by neurons capable of representing information over time scales of seconds. Such neurons were initially characterized in studies of spatial working memory, motor planning (e.g., Richard Andersen lab) and spatial attention. For decision-making, such neurons emit graded spike rates, that represent the accumulated evidence for or against a choice. They establish the conduit between the formation of the decision and its completion, usually in the form of a commitment to an action, even if provisional. Indeed, many decisions appear to arise through an accumulation of noisy samples of evidence to a terminating threshold, or bound. Previous studies show that single neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) represent the accumulation of evidence when monkeys make decisions about the direction of random dot motion (RDM) and express their decision with a saccade to the neuron’s preferred target. The mechanism of termination (the bound) is elusive. LIP is interconnected with other brain regions that also display decision-related activity. Whether these areas play roles in the decision process that are similar to or fundamentally different from that of LIP is unclear. I will present new unpublished experiments that begin to resolve these issues by recording from populations of neurons simultaneously in LIP and one of its primary targets, the superior colliculus (SC), while monkeys make difficult perceptual decisions.

Abstract relations are considered the pinnacle of human cognition, allowing analogical and logical reasoning, and possibly setting humans apart from other animal species. Such relations cannot be represented in a perceptual code but can easily be represented in a propositional language of thought, where relations between objects are represented by abstract discrete symbols. Focusing on the abstract relations same and different, I will show that (1) there is a discontinuity along ontogeny with respect to the representations of abstract relations, but (2) young infants already possess representations of same and different. Finally, (3) I will investigate the format of representation of abstract relations in young infants, arguing that those representations are not discrete, but rather built by juxtaposing abstract representations of entities.