Cognition seminars

Visual perception is traditionally studied in isolation from other sensory systems, and while this approach has been exceptionally successful, in the real world, visual objects are often accompanied by sounds, smells, tactile information, or taste. How is visual processing influenced by these other sensory inputs? In this talk, I will review studies from our lab showing that a sound can influence the perception of a visual object in multiple ways. In the first part, I will focus on spatial interactions between sound and sight, demonstrating that co-localized sounds enhance visual perception. Then, I will show that these cross-modal interactions also occur at a higher contextual and semantic level, where naturalistic sounds facilitate the processing of real-world objects that match these sounds. Throughout my talk I will explore to what extent sounds not only improve visual processing but also alter perceptual representations of the objects we see. Most broadly, I will argue for the importance of considering multisensory influences on visual perception for a more complete understanding of our visual experience.

What do people do when they comprehend language in discourse? According to many psychologists, they build and maintain cognitive representations of utterances in four complementary mental models for discourse that interact with each other: the surface text, the text base, the situation model, and the context model. When people encounter metaphors in these utterances, they need to incorporate them into each of these mental representations for the discourse. Since influential metaphor theories define metaphor as a form of (figurative) analogy, involving cross-domain mapping of a smaller or greater extent, the general expectation has been that metaphor comprehension is also based on analogizing. This expectation, however, has been partly borne out by the data, but not completely. There is no one-to-one relationship between metaphor as (conceptual) structure (analogy) and metaphor as (psychological) process (analogizing). According to Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT), only some metaphors are handled by analogy. Instead, most metaphors are presumably handled by lexical disambiguation. This is a hypothesis that brings together most metaphor research in a provocatively new way: it means that most metaphors are not processed metaphorically, which produces a paradox of metaphor. In this talk I will sketch out how this paradox arises and how it can be resolved by a new version of DMT, which I have described in my forthcoming book Slowing metaphor down: Updating Deliberate Metaphor Theory (currently under review). In this theory, the distinction between, but also the relation between, analogy in metaphorical structure versus analogy in metaphorical process is of central importance.

Several species of insects have been observed to perform accurate path integration, constantly updating a vector memory of their location relative to a starting position, which they can use to take a direct return path. Foraging insects such as bees and ants are also able to store and recall the vectors to return to food locations, and to take novel shortcuts between these locations. Other insects, such as dung beetles, are observed to integrate multimodal directional cues in a manner well described by vector addition. All these processes appear to be functions of the Central Complex, a highly conserved and strongly structured circuit in the insect brain. Modelling this circuit, at the single neuron level, suggests it has general capabilities for vector encoding, vector memory, vector addition and vector rotation that can support a wide range of directed and navigational behaviours.

Faces and voices convey much of the non-verbal information that we use when communicating with other people. We look at faces and listen to voices to recognize others, understand how they are feeling, and decide how to act. Recent research in my lab aims to investigate whether there are similar coding mechanisms to represent faces and voices, and whether there are brain regions that integrate information across the visual and auditory modalities. In the first part of my talk, I will focus on an fMRI study in which we found that a region of the posterior STS exhibits modality-general representations of familiar people that can be similarly driven by someone’s face and their voice (Tsantani et al. 2019). In the second part of the talk, I will describe our recent attempts to shed light on the type of information that is represented in different face-responsive brain regions (Tsantani et al., 2021).

In popular media, there is often a connection drawn between the advent of awareness in artificial agents and those same agents simultaneously achieving human or superhuman level intelligence. In this talk, I will examine the validity and potential application of this seemingly intuitive link between consciousness and intelligence. I will do so by examining the cognitive abilities associated with three contemporary theories of conscious function: Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Information Generation Theory (IGT), and Attention Schema Theory (AST), and demonstrating that all three theories specifically relate conscious function to some aspect of domain-general intelligence in humans. With this insight, we will turn to the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and find that, while still far from demonstrating general intelligence, many state-of-the-art deep learning methods have begun to incorporate key aspects of each of the three functional theories. Given this apparent trend, I will use the motivating example of mental time travel in humans to propose ways in which insights from each of the three theories may be combined into a unified model. I believe that doing so can enable the development of artificial agents which are not only more generally intelligent but are also consistent with multiple current theories of conscious function.

Analogical reasoning –learning about new things by relating it to previous knowledge– lies at the heart of human intelligence and creativity and forms the core of educational practice. Children start creating and using analogies early on, making incredible progress moving from associative processes to successful analogical reasoning. For example, if we ask a four-year-old “Horse belongs to stable like chicken belongs to …?” they may use association and reply “egg”, whereas older children will likely give the intended relational response “chicken coop” (or other term to refer to a chicken’s home). Interestingly, despite state-of-the-art AI-language models having superhuman encyclopedic knowledge and superior memory and computational power, our pilot studies show that these large language models often make mistakes providing associative rather than relational responses to verbal analogies. For example, when we asked four- to eight-year-olds to solve the analogy “body is to feet as tree is to …?” they responded “roots” without hesitation, but large language models tend to provide more associative responses such as “leaves”. In this study we examine the similarities and differences between children's and six large language models' (Dutch/multilingual models: RobBERT, BERT-je, M-BERT, GPT-2, M-GPT, Word2Vec and Fasttext) responses to verbal analogies extracted from an online adaptive learning environment, where >14,000 7-12 year-olds from the Netherlands solved 20 or more items from a database of 900 Dutch language verbal analogies.

Analogies between old and new concepts are common during classroom instruction. While previous studies of transfer focus on how features of initial learning guide later transfer to new problem solving, less is known about how to best support analogical transfer from previous learning while children are engaged in new learning episodes. Such research may have important implications for teaching and learning in mathematics, which often includes analogies between old and new information. Some existing research promotes supporting learners' explicit connections across old and new information within an analogy. In this talk, I will present evidence that instructors can invite implicit analogical reasoning through warm-up activities designed to activate relevant prior knowledge. Warm-up activities "close the transfer space" between old and new learning without additional direct instruction.

A complete neuroscience requires multi-level theories that address phenomena ranging from higher-level cognitive behaviors to activities within a cell. Unfortunately, we don't have cognitive models of behavior whose components can be decomposed into the neural dynamics that give rise to behavior, leaving an explanatory gap. Here, we decompose SUSTAIN, a clustering model of concept learning, into neuron-like units (SUSTAIN-d; decomposed). Instead of abstract constructs (clusters), SUSTAIN-d has a pool of neuron-like units. With millions of units, a key challenge is how to bridge from abstract constructs such as clusters to neurons, whilst retaining high-level behavior. How does the brain coordinate neural activity during learning? Inspired by algorithms that capture flocking behavior in birds, we introduce a neural flocking learning rule to coordinate units that collectively form higher-level mental constructs ("virtual clusters"), neural representations (concept, place and grid cell-like assemblies), and parallels recurrent hippocampal activity. The decomposed model shows how brain-scale neural populations coordinate to form assemblies encoding concept and spatial representations, and why many neurons are required for robust performance. Our account provides a multi-level explanation for how cognition and symbol-like representations are supported by coordinated neural assemblies formed through learning.

A long standing challenge in biological and artificial intelligence is to understand how new knowledge can be constructed from known building blocks in a way that is amenable for computation by neuronal circuits. Here we focus on the task of storage and recall of structured knowledge in long-term memory. Specifically, we ask how recurrent neuronal networks can store and retrieve multiple knowledge structures. We model each structure as a set of binary relations between events and attributes (attributes may represent e.g., temporal order, spatial location, role in semantic structure), and map each structure to a distributed neuronal activity pattern using a vector symbolic architecture (VSA) scheme. We then use associative memory plasticity rules to store the binarized patterns as fixed points in a recurrent network. By a combination of signal-to-noise analysis and numerical simulations, we demonstrate that our model allows for efficient storage of these knowledge structures, such that the memorized structures as well as their individual building blocks (e.g., events and attributes) can be subsequently retrieved from partial retrieving cues. We show that long-term memory of structured knowledge relies on a new principle of computation beyond the memory basins. Finally, we show that our model can be extended to store sequences of memories as single attractors.

Our perception of time isn’t like a clock; it varies depending on other aspects of experience, such as what we see and hear in that moment. However, in everyday life, the properties of these simple features can change frequently, presenting a challenge to understanding real-world time perception based on simple lab experiments. We developed a computational model of human time perception based on tracking changes in neural activity across brain regions involved in sensory processing, using fMRI. By measuring changes in brain activity patterns across these regions, our approach accommodates the different and changing feature combinations present in natural scenarios, such as walking on a busy street. Our model reproduces people’s duration reports for natural videos (up to almost half a minute long) and, most importantly, predicts whether a person reports a scene as relatively shorter or longer–the biases in time perception that reflect how natural experience of time deviates from clock time

Research into pitch perception and time perception has typically treated the two as independent processes. However, previous studies of music and speech perception have suggested that pitch and timing information may be processed in an integrated manner, such that the pitch of an auditory stimulus can influence a person’s perception, expectation, and memory of its duration and tempo. Typically, higher-pitched sounds are perceived as faster and longer in duration than lower-pitched sounds with identical timing. We conducted a series of experiments to better understand the limits of this pitch-time integrality. Across several experiments, we tested whether the higher-equals-faster illusion generalizes across the broader frequency range of human hearing by asking participants to compare the tempo of a repeating tone played in one of six octaves to a metronomic standard. When participants heard tones from all six octaves, we consistently found an inverted U-shaped effect of the tone’s pitch height, such that perceived tempo peaked between A4 (440 Hz) and A5 (880 Hz) and decreased at lower and higher octaves. However, we found that the decrease in perceived tempo at extremely high octaves could be abolished by exposing participants to high-pitched tones only, suggesting that pitch-induced timing biases are context sensitive. We additionally tested how the timing of an auditory stimulus influences the perception of its pitch, using a pitch discrimination task in which probe tones occurred early, late, or on the beat within a rhythmic context. Probe timing strongly biased participants to rate later tones as lower in pitch than earlier tones. Together, these results suggest that pitch and time exert a bidirectional influence on one another, providing evidence for integrated processing of pitch and timing information in auditory perception. Identifying the mechanisms behind this pitch-time interaction will be critical for integrating current models of pitch and tempo processing.

Humans and other animals can estimate rapidly the number of items in a scene, flashes or tones in a sequence and motor actions. Adaptation techniques provide clear evidence in humans for the existence of specialized numerosity mechanisms that make up the numbersense. This sense of number is truly general, encoding the numerosity of both spatial arrays and sequential sets, in vision and audition, and interacting strongly with action. The adaptation (cross-sensory and cross-format) acts on sensory mechanisms rather than decisional processes, pointing to a truly general sense.

Relational thinking involves comparing abstract relationships between mental representations that vary in complexity; however, this complexity is rarely made explicit during everyday comparisons. This study explored how people naturally navigate relational complexity and interference using a novel relational match-to-sample (RMTS) task with both minimal and relationally directed instruction to observe changes in performance across three levels of relational complexity: perceptual, analogy, and system mappings. Individual working memory and relational abilities were examined to understand RMTS performance and susceptibility to interfering relational structures. Trials were presented without practice across four blocks and participants received feedback after each attempt to guide learning. Experiment 1 instructed participants to select the target that best matched the sample, while Experiment 2 additionally directed participants’ attention to same and different relations. Participants in Experiment 2 demonstrated improved performance when solving analogical mappings, suggesting that directing attention to relational characteristics affected behavior. Higher performing participants—those above chance performance on the final block of system mappings—solved more analogical RMTS problems and had greater visuospatial working memory, abstraction, verbal analogy, and scene analogy scores compared to lower performers. Lower performers were less dynamic in their performance across blocks and demonstrated negative relationships between analogy and system mapping accuracy, suggesting increased interference between these relational structures. Participant performance on RMTS problems did not change monotonically with relational complexity, suggesting that increases in relational complexity places nonlinear demands on working memory. We argue that competing relational information causes additional interference, especially in individuals with lower executive function abilities.

In this talk I will present our recent behavioural and neuroscience research on how the brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so. I will propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. We show that belief change occurs when the potential outcomes of holding it alters, for example when moving from a safe environment to a threatening environment. Our findings yield predictions about how belief formation alters as a function of mental health. We test these predictions using a linguistic analysis of participants’ web searches ‘in the wild’ to quantify the affective properties of information they consume and relate those to reported psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I will present a study in which we used our framework to alter the incentive structure of social media platforms to reduce the spread of misinformation and improve belief accuracy.

Humans perceive the world in terms of objects and relations between them. In fact, for any given pair of objects, there is a myriad of relations that apply to them. How does the cognitive system learn which relations are useful to characterize the task at hand? And how can it use these representations to build a relational policy to interact effectively with the environment? In this paper we propose that this problem can be understood through the lens of a sub-field of symbolic machine learning called relational reinforcement learning (RRL). To demonstrate the potential of our approach, we build a simple model of relational policy learning based on a function approximator developed in RRL. We trained and tested our model in three Atari games that required to consider an increasingly number of potential relations: Breakout, Pong and Demon Attack. In each game, our model was able to select adequate relational representations and build a relational policy incrementally. We discuss the relationship between our model with models of relational and analogical reasoning, as well as its limitations and future directions of research.

Standard models of episodic memory suggest that lateral (LEC) and medial entorhinal cortex (MEC) send independent inputs to the hippocampus, each carrying different types of information. Here, we describe a pathway by which information is integrated between LEC and MEC prior to reaching hippocampus. We demonstrate that LEC sends strong projections to MEC arising from neurons that receive neocortical inputs. Activation of LEC inputs drives excitation of hippocampal-projecting neurons in MEC layer 2, typically followed by inhibition that is accounted for by parallel activation of local inhibitory neurons. We therefore propose that local circuits in MEC may support integration of ‘what’ and ‘where’ information.