Cognition seminars

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

Results: the main areas which were modified based on participatory feedback were the variety of immersive scenarios to cover a range of ages and interests, the number of levels of complexity to ensure small improvements were measured, the feedback and reward schemes to ensure positive reinforcement, and specific provision for participants with balance issues, who had difficulties when using head-mounted displays. The effectiveness of the finalised BEARS suite will be evaluated in a large-scale clinical trial. We have added in additional login options for other members of the family and based on patient feedback we have improved the accompanying reward schemes. Conclusions: Through participatory design we have developed a training package (BEARS) for young people with bilateral cochlear implants. The training games are appropriate for use by the study population and ultimately should lead to patients taking control of their own management and reducing the reliance upon outpatient-based rehabilitation programmes. Virtual reality training provides a more relevant and engaging approach to rehabilitation for young people.

Vocabulary learning applications like Duolingo have millions of users around the world, but yet are based on very simple heuristics to choose teaching material to provide to their users. In this presentation, we will discuss the possibility to develop more advanced artificial teachers, which would be based on modeling of the learner’s inner characteristics. In the case of teaching vocabulary, understanding how the learner memorizes is enough. When it comes to picking grammar exercises, it becomes essential to assess how the learner reasons, in particular by analogy. This second application will illustrate how analogical and case-based reasoning can be employed in an alternative way in education: not as the teaching algorithm, but as a part of the learner’s model.

Research in the brain and cognitive sciences attempts to uncover the neural mechanisms underlying intelligent behavior in domains such as vision. Due to the complexities of brain processing, studies necessarily had to start with a narrow scope of experimental investigation and computational modeling. I argue that it is time for our field to take the next step: build system models that capture a range of visual intelligence behaviors along with the underlying neural mechanisms. To make progress on system models, we propose integrative benchmarking – integrating experimental results from many laboratories into suites of benchmarks that guide and constrain those models at multiple stages and scales. We show-case this approach by developing Brain-Score benchmark suites for neural (spike rates) and behavioral experiments in the primate visual ventral stream. By systematically evaluating a wide variety of model candidates, we not only identify models beginning to match a range of brain data (~50% explained variance), but also discover that models’ brain scores are predicted by their object categorization performance (up to 70% ImageNet accuracy). Using the integrative benchmarks, we develop improved state-of-the-art system models that more closely match shallow recurrent neuroanatomy and early visual processing to predict primate temporal processing and become more robust, and require fewer supervised synaptic updates. Taken together, these integrative benchmarks and system models are first steps to modeling the complexities of brain processing in an entire domain of intelligence.

Theory of mind, which consists of reasoning about the knowledge, belief, desire, and similar mental states of others, is a key component of social reasoning and social interaction. While it has been studied by cognitive scientists for decades, none of the prevailing theories of the processes that underlie theory of mind reasoning and development explain the breadth of experimental findings. I propose that this is because theory of mind is, like much of human reasoning, inherently analogical. In this talk, I will discuss several theory of mind findings from the psychology literature, the challenges they pose for our understanding of theory of mind, and bring in evidence from the Analogical Theory of Mind (AToM) cognitive model that demonstrates how these findings fit into an analogical understanding of theory of mind reasoning.

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property, or that time is represented through representations having temporal properties themselves. To add to this debate, we investigated alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. In this talk, I will discuss two studies that we have done in relation to answering this question. In study 1, we investigated whether perceptual switches in fixed intervals altered felt time. In three experiments we showed that a break in visual experience (via a perceptual switch) also leads to a break in felt time. In study 2, we are currently looking at figure-ground perception in ambigous displays. Here, in experiment 1 we show that differences in flicker frequencies on ambigous regions can induce figure-ground segregation. To see if a reverse complementarity exists for felt time, we ask participants to view ambigous regions as figure/ground and show that they have different temporal resolutions for the same region based on whether it is seen as figure or background. Overall, the two studies provide evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception.

Quantifying the timing (duration and frequency) of brief visual events is vital to human perception, multisensory integration and action planning. For example, this allows us to follow and interact with the precise timing of speech and sports. Here we investigate how visual event timing is represented and transformed across the brain’s hierarchy: from sensory processing areas, through multisensory integration areas, to frontal action planning areas. We hypothesized that the dynamics of neural responses to sensory events in sensory processing areas allows derivation of event timing representations. This would allow higher-level processes such as multisensory integration and action planning to use sensory timing information, without the need for specialized central pacemakers or processes. Using 7T fMRI and neural model-based analyses, we found responses that monotonically increase in amplitude with visual event duration and frequency, becoming increasingly clear from primary visual cortex to lateral occipital visual field maps. Beginning in area MT/V5, we found a gradual transition from monotonic to tuned responses, with response amplitudes peaking at different event timings in different recording sites. While monotonic response components were limited to the retinotopic location of the visual stimulus, timing-tuned response components were independent of the recording sites' preferred visual field positions. These tuned responses formed a network of topographically organized timing maps in superior parietal, postcentral and frontal areas. From anterior to posterior timing maps, multiple events were increasingly integrated, response selectivity narrowed, and responses focused increasingly on the middle of the presented timing range. These results suggest that responses to event timing are transformed from the human brain’s sensory areas to the association cortices, with the event’s temporal properties being increasingly abstracted from the response dynamics and locations of early sensory processing. The resulting abstracted representation of event timing is then propagated through areas implicated in multisensory integration and action planning.

Space is the universal donor for relations" (Gentner, 2014). This quote is the foundation of my talk. I will explore how and why visual representations and analogies are related, and why. I will also explore how considering the relation between analogy and spatial reasoning can shed light on why and how spatial thinking is correlated with learning in STEM fields. For example, I will consider children’s numbers sense and learning of the number line from the perspective of analogical reasoning.

The brain makes decisions by accumulating evidence until there is enough to stop and choose. Neural mechanisms of evidence accumulation are well established in association cortex, but the site and mechanism of termination is unknown. Here, we elucidate a mechanism for termination by neurons in the primate superior colliculus. We recorded simultaneously from neurons in lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) and the superior colliculus (SC) while monkeys made perceptual decisions, reported by eye-movements. Single-trial analyses revealed distinct dynamics: LIP tracked the accumulation of evidence on each decision, and SC generated one burst at the end of the decision, occasionally preceded by smaller bursts. We hypothesized that the bursts manifest a threshold mechanism applied to LIP activity to terminate the decision. Focal inactivation of SC produced behavioral effects diagnostic of an impaired threshold sensor, requiring a stronger LIP signal to terminate a decision. The results reveal the transformation from deliberation to commitment.

Electrophysiological recordings during perceptual decision tasks in monkeys suggest that the degree of confidence in a decision is based on a simple neural signal produced by the neural decision process. Attractor neural networks provide an appropriate biophysical modeling framework, and account for the experimental results very well. However, it remains unclear whether attractor neural networks can account for confidence reports in humans. We present the results from an experiment in which participants are asked to perform an orientation discrimination task, followed by a confidence judgment. Here we show that an attractor neural network model quantitatively reproduces, for each participant, the relations between accuracy, response times and confidence. We show that the attractor neural network also accounts for confidence-specific sequential effects observed in the experiment (participants are faster on trials following high confidence trials), as well as non confidence-specific sequential effects. Remarkably, this is obtained as an inevitable outcome of the network dynamics, without any feedback specific to the previous decision (that would result in, e.g., a change in the model parameters before the onset of the next trial). Our results thus suggest that a metacognitive process such as confidence in one’s decision is linked to the intrinsically nonlinear dynamics of the decision-making neural network.

Theories of consciousness are commonly grouped into "first-order" and "higher-order" families. As conventional wisdom has it, many more animals are likely to be conscious if a first-order theory is correct. But two recent developments have put pressure on the first/higher-order distinction. One is the argument (from Shea and Frith) that an effective global workspace mechanism must involve a form of metacognition. The second is Lau's "perceptual reality monitoring" (PRM) theory, a member of the "higher-order" family in which conscious sensory content is not re-represented, only tagged with a temporal index and marked as reliable. I argue that the first/higher-order distinction has become so blurred that it is no longer particularly useful. Moreover, the conventional wisdom about animals should not be trusted. It could be, for example, that the distribution of PRM in the animal kingdom is wider than the distribution of global broadcasting.

We examine consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer science (TCS), a branch of mathematics concerned with understanding the underlying principles of computation and complexity, including the implications and surprising consequences of resource limitations. We propose a formal TCS model, the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM). The CTM is influenced by Alan Turing's simple yet powerful model of computation, the Turing machine (TM), and by the global workspace theory (GWT) of consciousness originated by cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, George Mashour, and others. However, the CTM is not a standard Turing Machine. It’s not the input-output map that gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness, but what’s under the hood. Nor is the CTM a standard GW model. In addition to its architecture, what gives the CTM its feeling of consciousness is its predictive dynamics (cycles of prediction, feedback and learning), its internal multi-modal language Brainish, and certain special Long Term Memory (LTM) processors, including its Inner Speech and Model of the World processors. Phenomena generally associated with consciousness, such as blindsight, inattentional blindness, change blindness, dream creation, and free will, are considered. Explanations derived from the model draw confirmation from consistencies at a high level, well above the level of neurons, with the cognitive neuroscience literature. Reference. L. Blum and M. Blum, "A theory of consciousness from a theoretical computer science perspective: Insights from the Conscious Turing Machine," PNAS, vol. 119, no. 21, 24 May 2022. https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2115934119

Previous experiments have shown that a comparison of two written narratives highlights their shared relational structure, which in turn facilitates the retrieval of analogous narratives from the past (e.g., Gentner, Loewenstein, Thompson, & Forbus, 2009). However, analogical retrieval occurs across domains that appear more conceptually distant than merely different narratives, and the deepest analogies use matches in higher-order relational structure. The present study investigated whether comparison can facilitate analogical retrieval of higher-order relations across written narratives and abstract symbolic problems. Participants read stories which became retrieval targets after a delay, cued by either analogous stories or letter-strings. In Experiment 1 we replicated Gentner et al. who used narrative retrieval cues, and also found preliminary evidence for retrieval between narrative and symbolic domains. In Experiment 2 we found clear evidence that a comparison of analogous letter-string problems facilitated the retrieval of source stories with analogous higher-order relations. Experiment 3 replicated the retrieval results of Experiment 2 but with a longer delay between encoding and recall, and a greater number of distractor source stories. These experiments offer support for the schema induction account of analogical retrieval (Gentner et al., 2009) and show that the schemas abstracted from comparison of narratives can be transferred to non-semantic symbolic domains.

How and why are analogies spontaneously generated? Despite the prominence of analogy in learning and reasoning, there is little research on whether and how analogy is spontaneously generated in everyday settings. Here we fill this gap by gathering parents' answers to children's real questions, and examining analogy use in parental explanations. Study 1 found that parents used analogy spontaneously in their explanations, despite no prompt nor mention of analogy in the instruction. Study 2 found that these analogical explanations were rated highly by parents, schoolteachers, and university students alike. In Study 3, six-year-olds also rated good analogical explanations highly, but unlike their parents, did not rate them higher than causal, non-analogical explanations. We discuss what makes an analogy a good explanation, and how theories from both explanation and analogy research explain one’s motivation for spontaneously generating analogies.

Cognitive functions like episodic memory require the formation of cohesive representations. Critical for that process is the entorhinal-hippocampal circuitry’s interaction with cortical information streams and the circuitry’s inner communication. With ultra-high field functional imaging we investigated the functional architecture of the human entorhinal-hippocampal circuitry. We identified an organization that is consistent with convergence of information in anterior and lateral entorhinal subregions and the subiculum/CA1 border while keeping a second route specific for scene processing in a posterior-medial entorhinal subregion and the distal subiculum. Our findings agree with information flow along information processing routes which functionally split the entorhinal-hippocampal circuitry along its transversal axis. My talk will demonstrate how ultra-high field imaging in humans can bridge the gap between anatomical and electrophysiological findings in rodents and our understanding of human cognition. Moreover, I will point out the implications that basic research on functional architecture has for cognitive and clinical research perspectives.

A core question in human development is how we bring meaning to conventional symbols. This question is deeply connected to understanding how children learn mathematics—a symbol system with unique vocabularies, syntaxes, and written forms. In this talk, I will present findings from a program of research focused on children’s acquisition of place value symbols (i.e., multidigit number meanings). The base-10 symbol system presents a variety of obstacles to children, particularly in English. Children who cannot overcome these obstacles face years of struggle as they progress through the mathematics curriculum of the upper elementary and middle school grades. Through a combination of longitudinal, cross-sectional, and pretest-training-posttest approaches, I aim to illuminate relational learning mechanisms by which children sometimes succeed in mastering the place value system, as well as instructional techniques we might use to help those who do not.

Change is ubiquitous in living beings. In particular, the connectome and neural representations can change. Nevertheless behaviors and memories often persist over long times. In a standard model, associative memories are represented by assemblies of strongly interconnected neurons. For faithful storage these assemblies are assumed to consist of the same neurons over time. We propose a contrasting memory model with complete temporal remodeling of assemblies, based on experimentally observed changes of synapses and neural representations. The assemblies drift freely as noisy autonomous network activity or spontaneous synaptic turnover induce neuron exchange. The exchange can be described analytically by reduced, random walk models derived from spiking neural network dynamics or from first principles. The gradual exchange allows activity-dependent and homeostatic plasticity to conserve the representational structure and keep inputs, outputs and assemblies consistent. This leads to persistent memory. Our findings explain recent experimental results on temporal evolution of fear memory representations and suggest that memory systems need to be understood in their completeness as individual parts may constantly change.

Prior studies of A:B::C:D verbal analogies have identified several factors that affect performance, including the semantic similarity between source and target domains (semantic distance), the semantic association between the C-term and incorrect answers (distracter salience), and the type of relations between word pairs (e.g., categorical, compositional, and causal). However, it is unclear how these stimulus properties affect performance when utilized together. Moreover, how do these item factors interact with individual differences such as crystallized intelligence and creative thinking? Several studies reveal interactions among these item and individual difference factors impacting verbal analogy performance. For example, a three-way interaction demonstrated that the effects of semantic distance and distracter salience had a greater impact on performance for compositional and causal relations than for categorical ones (Jones, Kmiecik, Irwin, & Morrison, 2022). Implications for analogy theories and future directions are discussed.