Cognition seminars

In this talk I will present our recent behavioural and neuroscience research on how the brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so. I will propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. We show that belief change occurs when the potential outcomes of holding it alters, for example when moving from a safe environment to a threatening environment. Our findings yield predictions about how belief formation alters as a function of mental health. We test these predictions using a linguistic analysis of participants’ web searches ‘in the wild’ to quantify the affective properties of information they consume and relate those to reported psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I will present a study in which we used our framework to alter the incentive structure of social media platforms to reduce the spread of misinformation and improve belief accuracy.

Artificial neural networks can be useful for studying brain functions. In cognitive neuroscience, recurrent neural networks are often used to model cognitive functions. I will first offer my opinion on what is missing in the classical use of recurrent neural networks. Then I will discuss two lines of ongoing efforts in our group to move beyond the classical recurrent neural networks by studying multi-system neural networks (the talk will focus on two-system networks). These are networks that combine modules for several neural systems, such as vision, audition, prefrontal, hippocampal systems. I will showcase how multi-system networks can potentially be constrained by experimental data in fundamental ways and at scale.

In this lecture, I would like to share with the broad audience the empirical results gathered and the theoretical advancements made in the framework of the Lendület project entitled ’The cognitive basis of human sociality’. The main objective of this project was to understand the mechanisms that enable the unique sociality of humans, from the angle of cognitive science. In my talk, I will focus on recent empirical evidence in the study of three fundamental social cognitive functions (social categorization, theory of mind and social learning; mainly from the empirical lenses of developmental psychology) in order to outline a theory that emphasizes the need to consider their interconnectedness. The proposal is that the ability to represent the social world along categories and the capacity to read others’ minds are used in an integrated way to efficiently assess the epistemic states of fellow humans by creating a shared representational space. The emergence of this shared representational space is both the result of and a prerequisite to efficient learning about the physical and social environment.

Humans perceive the world in terms of objects and relations between them. In fact, for any given pair of objects, there is a myriad of relations that apply to them. How does the cognitive system learn which relations are useful to characterize the task at hand? And how can it use these representations to build a relational policy to interact effectively with the environment? In this paper we propose that this problem can be understood through the lens of a sub-field of symbolic machine learning called relational reinforcement learning (RRL). To demonstrate the potential of our approach, we build a simple model of relational policy learning based on a function approximator developed in RRL. We trained and tested our model in three Atari games that required to consider an increasingly number of potential relations: Breakout, Pong and Demon Attack. In each game, our model was able to select adequate relational representations and build a relational policy incrementally. We discuss the relationship between our model with models of relational and analogical reasoning, as well as its limitations and future directions of research.

Standard models of episodic memory suggest that lateral (LEC) and medial entorhinal cortex (MEC) send independent inputs to the hippocampus, each carrying different types of information. Here, we describe a pathway by which information is integrated between LEC and MEC prior to reaching hippocampus. We demonstrate that LEC sends strong projections to MEC arising from neurons that receive neocortical inputs. Activation of LEC inputs drives excitation of hippocampal-projecting neurons in MEC layer 2, typically followed by inhibition that is accounted for by parallel activation of local inhibitory neurons. We therefore propose that local circuits in MEC may support integration of ‘what’ and ‘where’ information.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

How does our brain generate consciousness, that is, the subjective experience of what it is like to see face or hear a sound? Do we become aware of a stimulus during early sensory processing or only later when information is shared in a wide-spread fronto-parietal network? Neural correlates of consciousness are typically identified by comparing brain activity when a constant stimulus (e.g., a face) is perceived versus not perceived. However, in most previous experiments, conscious perception was systematically confounded with post-perceptual processes such as decision-making and report. In this talk, I will present recent EEG and fMRI studies dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task-related processing in visual and auditory perception. Our results suggest that consciousness emerges during early sensory processing, while late, fronto-parietal activity is associated with post-perceptual processes rather than awareness. These findings challenge predominant theories of consciousness and highlight the importance of considering task relevance as a confound across different neuroscientific methods, experimental paradigms and sensory modalities.

Results: the main areas which were modified based on participatory feedback were the variety of immersive scenarios to cover a range of ages and interests, the number of levels of complexity to ensure small improvements were measured, the feedback and reward schemes to ensure positive reinforcement, and specific provision for participants with balance issues, who had difficulties when using head-mounted displays. The effectiveness of the finalised BEARS suite will be evaluated in a large-scale clinical trial. We have added in additional login options for other members of the family and based on patient feedback we have improved the accompanying reward schemes. Conclusions: Through participatory design we have developed a training package (BEARS) for young people with bilateral cochlear implants. The training games are appropriate for use by the study population and ultimately should lead to patients taking control of their own management and reducing the reliance upon outpatient-based rehabilitation programmes. Virtual reality training provides a more relevant and engaging approach to rehabilitation for young people.

Vocabulary learning applications like Duolingo have millions of users around the world, but yet are based on very simple heuristics to choose teaching material to provide to their users. In this presentation, we will discuss the possibility to develop more advanced artificial teachers, which would be based on modeling of the learner’s inner characteristics. In the case of teaching vocabulary, understanding how the learner memorizes is enough. When it comes to picking grammar exercises, it becomes essential to assess how the learner reasons, in particular by analogy. This second application will illustrate how analogical and case-based reasoning can be employed in an alternative way in education: not as the teaching algorithm, but as a part of the learner’s model.

Research in the brain and cognitive sciences attempts to uncover the neural mechanisms underlying intelligent behavior in domains such as vision. Due to the complexities of brain processing, studies necessarily had to start with a narrow scope of experimental investigation and computational modeling. I argue that it is time for our field to take the next step: build system models that capture a range of visual intelligence behaviors along with the underlying neural mechanisms. To make progress on system models, we propose integrative benchmarking – integrating experimental results from many laboratories into suites of benchmarks that guide and constrain those models at multiple stages and scales. We show-case this approach by developing Brain-Score benchmark suites for neural (spike rates) and behavioral experiments in the primate visual ventral stream. By systematically evaluating a wide variety of model candidates, we not only identify models beginning to match a range of brain data (~50% explained variance), but also discover that models’ brain scores are predicted by their object categorization performance (up to 70% ImageNet accuracy). Using the integrative benchmarks, we develop improved state-of-the-art system models that more closely match shallow recurrent neuroanatomy and early visual processing to predict primate temporal processing and become more robust, and require fewer supervised synaptic updates. Taken together, these integrative benchmarks and system models are first steps to modeling the complexities of brain processing in an entire domain of intelligence.

Theory of mind, which consists of reasoning about the knowledge, belief, desire, and similar mental states of others, is a key component of social reasoning and social interaction. While it has been studied by cognitive scientists for decades, none of the prevailing theories of the processes that underlie theory of mind reasoning and development explain the breadth of experimental findings. I propose that this is because theory of mind is, like much of human reasoning, inherently analogical. In this talk, I will discuss several theory of mind findings from the psychology literature, the challenges they pose for our understanding of theory of mind, and bring in evidence from the Analogical Theory of Mind (AToM) cognitive model that demonstrates how these findings fit into an analogical understanding of theory of mind reasoning.

New tasks are often similar in structure to old ones. Animals that take advantage of such conserved or “abstract” task structures can master new tasks with minimal training. To understand the neural basis of this abstraction, we developed a novel behavioural paradigm for mice: the “ABCD” task, and recorded from their medial frontal neurons as they learned. Animals learned multiple tasks where they had to visit 4 rewarded locations on a spatial maze in sequence, which defined a sequence of four “task states” (ABCD). Tasks shared the same circular transition structure (… ABCDABCD …) but differed in the spatial arrangement of rewards. As well as improving across tasks, mice inferred that A followed D (i.e. completed the loop) on the very first trial of a new task. This “zero-shot inference” is only possible if animals had learned the abstract structure of the task. Across tasks, individual medial Frontal Cortex (mFC) neurons maintained their tuning to the phase of an animal’s trajectory between rewards but not their tuning to task states, even in the absence of spatial tuning. Intriguingly, groups of mFC neurons formed modules of coherently remapping neurons that maintained their tuning relationships across tasks. Such tuning relationships were expressed as replay/preplay during sleep, consistent with an internal organisation of activity into multiple, task-matched ring attractors. Remarkably, these modules were anchored to spatial locations: neurons were tuned to specific task space “distances” from a particular spatial location. These newly discovered “Spatially Anchored Task clocks” (SATs), suggest a novel algorithm for solving abstraction tasks. Using computational modelling, we show that SATs can perform zero-shot inference on new tasks in the absence of plasticity and guide optimal policy in the absence of continual planning. These findings provide novel insights into the Frontal mechanisms mediating abstraction and flexible behaviour.

The way we represent and perceive time has crucial implications for studying temporality in conscious experience. Contrasting positions posit that temporal information is separately abstracted out like any other perceptual property, or that time is represented through representations having temporal properties themselves. To add to this debate, we investigated alterations in felt time in conditions where only conscious visual experience is altered while a bistable figure remains physically unchanged. In this talk, I will discuss two studies that we have done in relation to answering this question. In study 1, we investigated whether perceptual switches in fixed intervals altered felt time. In three experiments we showed that a break in visual experience (via a perceptual switch) also leads to a break in felt time. In study 2, we are currently looking at figure-ground perception in ambigous displays. Here, in experiment 1 we show that differences in flicker frequencies on ambigous regions can induce figure-ground segregation. To see if a reverse complementarity exists for felt time, we ask participants to view ambigous regions as figure/ground and show that they have different temporal resolutions for the same region based on whether it is seen as figure or background. Overall, the two studies provide evidence for temporal mirroring and isomorphism in visual experience, arguing for a link between the timing of experience and time perception.

Quantifying the timing (duration and frequency) of brief visual events is vital to human perception, multisensory integration and action planning. For example, this allows us to follow and interact with the precise timing of speech and sports. Here we investigate how visual event timing is represented and transformed across the brain’s hierarchy: from sensory processing areas, through multisensory integration areas, to frontal action planning areas. We hypothesized that the dynamics of neural responses to sensory events in sensory processing areas allows derivation of event timing representations. This would allow higher-level processes such as multisensory integration and action planning to use sensory timing information, without the need for specialized central pacemakers or processes. Using 7T fMRI and neural model-based analyses, we found responses that monotonically increase in amplitude with visual event duration and frequency, becoming increasingly clear from primary visual cortex to lateral occipital visual field maps. Beginning in area MT/V5, we found a gradual transition from monotonic to tuned responses, with response amplitudes peaking at different event timings in different recording sites. While monotonic response components were limited to the retinotopic location of the visual stimulus, timing-tuned response components were independent of the recording sites' preferred visual field positions. These tuned responses formed a network of topographically organized timing maps in superior parietal, postcentral and frontal areas. From anterior to posterior timing maps, multiple events were increasingly integrated, response selectivity narrowed, and responses focused increasingly on the middle of the presented timing range. These results suggest that responses to event timing are transformed from the human brain’s sensory areas to the association cortices, with the event’s temporal properties being increasingly abstracted from the response dynamics and locations of early sensory processing. The resulting abstracted representation of event timing is then propagated through areas implicated in multisensory integration and action planning.

How do children learn to read in different countries? How do deficits in various components of the reading network affect learning outcomes? What are the consequences of such deficits in different languages? In this talk, I will present a full-blown developmentally plausible computational model of reading acquisition that has been implemented in English, French, Italian and German. The model can simulate individual learning trajectories and intervention outcomes on the basis of three component skills: orthography, phonology, and vocabulary. I will use the model to show how cross-language differences affect the learning-to-read process in different languages and to investigate to what extent similar deficits will produce similar or different manifestations of dyslexia in different languages.

Space is the universal donor for relations" (Gentner, 2014). This quote is the foundation of my talk. I will explore how and why visual representations and analogies are related, and why. I will also explore how considering the relation between analogy and spatial reasoning can shed light on why and how spatial thinking is correlated with learning in STEM fields. For example, I will consider children’s numbers sense and learning of the number line from the perspective of analogical reasoning.