Cognitive Psychology seminars

Traditional work in the study of human reward-based learning involves designing an experimental task---often inspired by Reinforcement Learning (RL) theory---and fits a small set of computational models---often inspired by RL algorithms---to that dataset. For example, researchers often model human behavior on bandit tasks using variants of Q-learning. While this approach has been highly productive, leading to landmark discoveries such as the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis, it also has limitations. This talk focuses on the lack of generalizability of such models: Even if they closely fit behavior on the original task, models derived from the one-task-one-model paradigm usually predict behavior on other tasks quite poorly. I argue that this lack of generalizability is a fundamental problem for the cognitive sciences: we intuitively expect our models to be robust to superficial task differences, such as variations in the number of choice options, reward probabilities, or the exact kind of non-stationarity. I will propose potential solutions to this problem along two dimensions: the behavioral dataset and the computational model. Regarding computational models, I will introduce work in which we moved beyond the limitations of hand-crafted one-off models by employing flexible, data-driven methods. These methods allowed us to compare classes of models instead of individual model instances, allowing us to cover the space of possible models more exhaustively, and innovate cognitive mechanisms very efficiently. For the behavioral dataset, we move from using single learning tasks to a comprehensive task space that encompasses most existing paradigms in the literature, while closing the gaps between them in a near-continuous fashion. Our results suggest that more general models in conjunction with broader datasets can pave the road toward increasingly general models of human reward-based learning and decision making, and a persistent departure from many aspects of RL theory. Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2026-05-20. Recording duration: 00:51:19.

Reward expectations – one’s prediction about the likelihood of future outcomes - play a central role in shaping the satisfaction derived from those outcomes. Most existing research treats expectations as static, assuming they remain fixed in time. However, real-life expectations are often dynamic, fluctuating as new information becomes available. For example, during a soccer game, your expectations of seeing your team winning will likely rise and fall as the game unfolds. In the main part of this talk, I will present a series of studies demonstrating that human expectations can be tracked at sub-second timescales. Using slot machines as a case study, we leverage the continuous deceleration of the reels to elicit moment-by-moment fluctuations in rewardexpectations. To capture these dynamics, we take complementary approaches: we use the high temporal resolution of electroencephalography (EEG) to track neural signatures of evolving expectations, and we develop a novel behavioral paradigm (“Slot or Not”) designed to measure changes in expectations via betting behavior. Across four studies, we show that expectations fluctuate continuously and can be tracked both behaviorally and neurally. Extending these findings, a subsequent intracranial study shows that the human orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encodes the moment-by-moment changes of reward expectations. In the second part of this talk, I will return to the relationship between expectations andsatisfaction. If expectations shape satisfaction, and if they are best conceptualized as dynamic trajectories rather than static quantities, a key question arises: does the trajectory leading up to an outcome influence how that outcome is evaluated? I will outline a new research direction aimed at formalizing this relationship using computational modeling. This is ongoing work, and I welcome feedback on how best to formalize these ideas. Finally, I will discuss potential extensions of this framework to psychopathology, asking whether alterations in dynamic expectations may characterize conditions such as Major Depressive Disorder and Gambling disorder. Together, this work introduces a new framework for studying expectations as dynamic processes, offering a richer understanding Presented in the van Vreeswijk Theoretical Neuroscience Seminar series (formerly WWTNS) on 2026-04-29. Recording duration: 00:42:25.

In this talk, I will explore how social affective biases arise even in the absence of motivational factors as an emergent outcome of the basic structure of social learning. In several studies, we found that initial negative interactions with some members of a group can cause subsequent avoidance of the entire group, and that this avoidance perpetuates stereotypes. Additional cognitive modeling discovered that approach and avoidance behavior based on biased beliefs not only influences the evaluative (positive or negative) impressions of group members, but also shapes the depth of the cognitive representations available to learn about individuals. In other words, people have richer cognitive representations of members of groups that are not avoided, akin to individualized vs group level categories. I will end presenting a series of multi-agent reinforcement learning simulations that demonstrate the emergence of these social-structural feedback loops in the development and maintenance of affective biases.

There is a fundamental tension between storing discrete traces of individual experiences, which allows recall of particular moments in our past without interference, and extracting regularities across these experiences, which supports generalization and prediction in similar situations in the future. One influential proposal for how the brain resolves this tension is that it separates the processes anatomically into Complementary Learning Systems, with the hippocampus rapidly encoding individual episodes and the neocortex slowly extracting regularities over days, months, and years. But this does not explain our ability to learn and generalize from new regularities in our environment quickly, often within minutes. We have put forward a neural network model of the hippocampus that suggests that the hippocampus itself may contain complementary learning systems, with one pathway specializing in the rapid learning of regularities and a separate pathway handling the region’s classic episodic memory functions. This proposal has broad implications for how we learn and represent novel information of specific and generalized types, which we test across statistical learning, inference, and category learning paradigms. We also explore how this system interacts with slower-learning neocortical memory systems, with empirical and modeling investigations into how the hippocampus shapes neocortical representations during sleep. Together, the work helps us understand how structured information in our environment is initially encoded and how it then transforms over time.

First, a new measure of MI for reaction times is proposed that takes the entire RT distribution into account. Second, we present some recent developments in TWIN modeling, including a new proposal for the sound-induced flash illusion (SIFI).

Humans constantly make perceptual decisions on human faces and voices. These regularly come with the challenge of receiving only uncertain sensory evidence, resulting from noisy input and noisy neural processes. Efficiently adapting one’s internal decision system including prior expectations and subsequent metacognitive assessments to these challenges is crucial in everyday life. However, the exact decision mechanisms and whether these represent modifiable states remain unknown in the general population and clinical patients with psychosis. Using data from a laboratory-based sample of healthy controls and patients with psychosis as well as a complementary, large online sample of healthy controls, I will demonstrate how a combination of perceptual face and voice recognition decision fidelity, metacognitive ratings, and Bayesian computational modelling may be used as indicators to differentiate between non-clinical and clinical states in the future.

Explicit similarity judgments tend to emphasize relational information more than do difference judgments. In this talk, I propose and test the hypothesis that this asymmetry arises because human reasoners represent the relation different as the negation of the relation same (i.e., as not-same). This proposal implies that processing difference is more cognitively demanding than processing similarity. Both for verbal comparisons between word pairs, and for visual comparisons between sets of geometric shapes, participants completed a triad task in which they selected which of two options was either more similar to or more different from a standard. On unambiguous trials, one option was unambiguously more similar to the standard, either by virtue of featural similarity or by virtue of relational similarity. On ambiguous trials, one option was more featurally similar (but less relationally similar) to the standard, whereas the other was more relationally similar (but less featurally similar). Given the higher cognitive complexity of assessing relational similarity, we predicted that detecting relational difference would be particularly demanding. We found that participants (1) had more difficulty accurately detecting relational difference than they did relational similarity on unambiguous trials, and (2) tended to emphasize relational information more when judging similarity than when judging difference on ambiguous trials. The latter finding was captured by a computational model of comparison that weights relational information more heavily for similarity than for difference judgments. These results provide convergent evidence for a representational asymmetry between the relations same and different.

Vector-space models are used frequently to compare similarity and dimensionality among entity concepts. What happens when we apply these models to relational concepts? What is the evidence that such models do apply to relational concepts? If we use such a model, then one implication is that maximizing surface feature variation should improve relational concept learning. For example, in STEM instruction, the effectiveness of teaching by analogy is often limited by students’ focus on superficial features of the source and target exemplars. However, in contrast to the prediction of the vector-space computational model, the strategy of progressive alignment (moving from perceptually similar to different targets) has been suggested to address this issue (Gentner & Hoyos, 2017), and human behavioral evidence has shown benefits from progressive alignment. Here I will present some preliminary data that supports the computational approach. Participants were explicitly instructed to match stimuli based on relations while perceptual similarity of stimuli varied parametrically. We found that lower perceptual similarity reduced accurate relational matching. This finding demonstrates that perceptual similarity may interfere with relational judgements, but also hints at why progressive alignment maybe effective. These are preliminary, exploratory data and I to hope receive feedback on the framework and to start a discussion in a group on the utility of vector-space models for relational concepts in general.

Humans and other animals can estimate rapidly the number of items in a scene, flashes or tones in a sequence and motor actions. Adaptation techniques provide clear evidence in humans for the existence of specialized numerosity mechanisms that make up the numbersense. This sense of number is truly general, encoding the numerosity of both spatial arrays and sequential sets, in vision and audition, and interacting strongly with action. The adaptation (cross-sensory and cross-format) acts on sensory mechanisms rather than decisional processes, pointing to a truly general sense.

In this talk I will present our recent behavioural and neuroscience research on how the brain motivates itself to form particular beliefs and why it does so. I will propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. We show that belief change occurs when the potential outcomes of holding it alters, for example when moving from a safe environment to a threatening environment. Our findings yield predictions about how belief formation alters as a function of mental health. We test these predictions using a linguistic analysis of participants’ web searches ‘in the wild’ to quantify the affective properties of information they consume and relate those to reported psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I will present a study in which we used our framework to alter the incentive structure of social media platforms to reduce the spread of misinformation and improve belief accuracy.

The predictive map hypothesis provides a promising framework to model representations in the hippocampal formation. I will introduce a tractable implementation of a predictive map called the successor representation (SR), before presenting data showing that rats and humans display SR-like navigational choices on a novel open-field maze. Next, I will show how such a predictive map could be implemented using spatial representations found in the hippocampal formation, before finally presenting how such learning might be well approximated by phenomena that exist in the spatial memory system - namely spike-timing dependent plasticity and theta phase precession.

Magnitude estimation and stimulus discrimination tasks are affected by perceptual biases that cause the stimulus parameter to be perceived as shifted toward the mean of its distribution. These biases have been extensively studied in psychophysics and, more recently and to a lesser extent, with neural activity recordings. New computational techniques allow us to train spiking recurrent neural networks on the tasks used in the experiments. This provides us with another valuable tool with which to investigate the network mechanisms responsible for the biases and how behavior could be modeled. As an example, in this talk I will consider networks trained to discriminate the durations of temporal intervals. The trained networks presented the contraction bias, even though they were trained with a stimulus sequence without temporal correlations. The neural activity during the delay period carried information about the stimuli of the current trial and previous trials, this being one of the mechanisms that originated the contraction bias. The population activity described trajectories in a low-dimensional space and their relative locations depended on the prior distribution. The results can be modeled as an ideal observer that during the delay period sees a combination of the current and the previous stimuli. Finally, I will describe how the neural trajectories in state space encode an estimate of the interval duration. The approach could be applied to other cognitive tasks.

Executive control processes and flexible behaviors rely on the integrity of, and dynamic interactions between, large-scale functional brain networks. The right insular cortex is a critical component of a salience/midcingulo-insular network that is thought to mediate interactions between brain networks involved in externally oriented (central executive/lateral frontoparietal network) and internally oriented (default mode/medial frontoparietal network) processes. How these brain systems reconfigure with development is a critical question for cognitive neuroscience, with implications for neurodevelopmental pathologies affecting brain connectivity. I will describe studies examining how brain network dynamics support flexible behaviors in typical and atypical development, presenting evidence suggesting a unique role for the dorsal anterior insular from studies of meta-analytic connectivity modeling, dynamic functional connectivity, and structural connectivity. These findings from adults, typically developing children, and children with autism suggest that structural and functional maturation of insular pathways is a critical component of the process by which human brain networks mature to support complex, flexible cognitive processes throughout the lifespan.

The gradual accumulation of hyperphosphorylated forms of the Tau protein (pTau) in the human brain correlate with cognitive dysfunction and neurodegeneration. I will present our recent findings on the consequences of human pTau aggregation in the hippocampal formation of a mouse tauopathy model. We show that pTau preferentially accumulates in deep-layer pyramidal neurons, leading to their neurodegeneration. In aged but not younger mice, pTau spreads to oligodendrocytes. During ‘goal-directed’ navigation, we detect fewer high-firing pyramidal cells, but coupling to network oscillations is maintained in the remaining cells. The firing patterns of individually recorded and labelled pyramidal and GABAergic neurons are similar in transgenic and non-transgenic mice, as are network oscillations, suggesting intact neuronal coordination. This is consistent with a lack of pTau in subcortical brain areas that provide rhythmic input to the cortex. Spatial memory tests reveal a reduction in short-term familiarity of spatial cues but unimpaired spatial working and reference memory. These results suggest that preserved subcortical network mechanisms compensate for the widespread pTau aggregation in the hippocampal formation. I will also briefly discuss ideas on the subcortical origins of spatial memory and the concept of the cortex as a monitoring device.