Cognitive Psychology seminars

Constraints on control-dependent processing have become a fundamental concept in general theories of cognition that explain human behavior in terms of rational adaptations to these constraints. However, theories miss a rationale for why such constraints would exist in the first place. Recent work suggests that constraints on the allocation of control facilitate flexible task switching at the expense of the stability needed to support goal-directed behavior in face of distraction. We formulate this problem in a dynamical system, in which control signals are represented as attractors and in which constraints on control allocation limit the depth of these attractors. We derive formal expressions of the stability-flexibility tradeoff, showing that constraints on control allocation improve cognitive flexibility but impair cognitive stability. We provide evidence that human participants adapt higher constraints on the allocation of control as the demand for flexibility increases but that participants deviate from optimal constraints. In continuing work, we are investigating how collaborative performance of a group of individuals can benefit from individual differences defined in terms of balance between cognitive stability and flexibility.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

Many psychological theories assume that qualitatively different cognitive processes can result in identical responses. Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models allow researchers to disentangle latent cognitive processes based on observed response frequencies. Recently, MPT models have been extended to explicitly account for participant and item heterogeneity. These hierarchical Bayesian MPT models provide the opportunity to connect two traditionally isolated disciplines. Whereas cognitive psychology has often focused on the experimental validation of MPT model parameters on the group level, psychometrics provides the necessary concepts and tools for measuring differences in MPT parameters on the item or person level. Moreover, MPT parameters can be regressed on covariates to model latent processes as a function of personality traits or other person characteristics.

Interval timing is a fundamental component action, and is susceptible to motor-related temporal distortions. Previous studies have shown that movement biases temporal estimates, but have primarily considered self-modulated movement only. However, real-world encounters often include situations in which movement is restricted or perturbed by environmental factors. In the following experiments, we introduced viscous movement environments to externally modulate movement and investigated the resulting effects on temporal perception. In two separate tasks, participants timed auditory intervals while moving a robotic arm that randomly applied four levels of viscosity. Results demonstrated that higher viscosity led to shorter perceived durations. Using a drift-diffusion model and a Bayesian observer model, we confirmed these biasing effects arose from perceptual mechanisms, instead of biases in decision making. These findings suggest that environmental perturbations are an important factor in movement-related temporal distortions, and enhance the current understanding of the interactions of motor activity and cognitive processes. https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.10.26.355396v1

How do people learn in real-world environments where the space of possible actions can be vast or even infinite? The study of human learning has made rapid progress in past decades, from discovering the neural substrate of reward prediction errors, to building AI capable of mastering the game of Go. Yet this line of research has primarily focused on learning through repeated interactions with the same stimuli. How are humans able to rapidly adapt to novel situations and learn from such sparse examples? I propose a theory of how generalization guides human learning, by making predictions about which unobserved options are most promising to explore. Inspired by Roger Shepard’s law of generalization, I show how a Bayesian function learning model provides a mechanism for generalizing limited experiences to a wide set of novel possibilities, based on the simple principle that similar actions produce similar outcomes. This model of generalization generates predictions about the expected reward and underlying uncertainty of unexplored options, where both are vital components in how people actively explore the world. This model allows us to explain developmental differences in the explorative behavior of children, and suggests a general principle of learning across spatial, conceptual, and structured domains.

Framing effects in individual decision-making have puzzled economists for decades because they are hard, if at all, to explain with rational choice theories. Why should mere changes in the description of a choice problem affect decision-making? Here, we examine the hypothesis that changes in framing cause changes in the allocation of attention to the different options – measured via eye-tracking – and give rise to changes in decision-making. We document that the framing of a sure alternative as a gain – as opposed to a loss – in a risk-taking task increases the attentional advantage of the sure option and induces a higher choice frequency of that option – a finding that is predicted by the attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM). The model also correctly predicts other key findings such as that the increased attentional advantage of the sure option in the gain frame should also lead quicker decisions in this frame. In addition, the data reveal that increasing risk aversion at higher stake sizes may also be driven by attentional processes because the sure option receives significantly more attention – regardless of frame – at higher stakes. We also corroborate the causal impact of framing-induced changes of attention on choice with an additional experiment that manipulates attention exogenously. Finally, to study the precise mechanisms underlying the framing effect we structurally estimate an aDDM that allows for frame and option-dependent parameters. The estimation results indicate that – in addition to the direct effects of framing-induced changes in attention on choice – the gain frame also causes (i) an increase in the attentional discount of the gamble and (ii) an increased concavity of utility. Our findings suggest that the traditional explanation of framing effects in risky choice in terms of a more concave value function in the gain domain is seriously incomplete and that attentional mechanisms as hypothesized in the aDDM play a key role.

Perceptual learning (PL) is defined as long-term performance improvement on a perceptual task as a result of perceptual experience (Sasaki, Nanez& Watanabe, 2011, Nat Rev Neurosci, 2011). We first found that PL occurs for task-irrelevant and subthreshold features and that pairing task-irrelevant features with rewards is the key to form task-irrelevant PL (TIPL) (Watanabe, Nanez & Sasaki, Nature, 2001; Watanabe et al, 2002, Nature Neuroscience; Seitz & Watanabe, Nature, 2003; Seitz, Kim & Watanabe, 2009, Neuron; Shibata et al, 2011, Science). These results suggest that PL occurs as a result of interactions between reinforcement and bottom-up stimulus signals (Seitz & Watanabe, 2005, TICS). On the other hand, fMRI study results indicate that lateral prefrontal cortex fails to detect and thus to suppress subthreshold task-irrelevant signals. This leads to the paradoxical effect that a signal that is below, but close to, one’s discrimination threshold ends up being stronger than suprathreshold signals (Tsushima, Sasaki & Watanabe, 2006, Science). We confirmed this mechanism with the following results: Task-irrelevant learning occurs only when a presented feature is under and close to the threshold with younger individuals (Tsushima et al, 2009, Current Biol), whereas with older individuals who tend to have less inhibitory control task-irrelevant learning occurs with a feature whose signal is much greater than the threshold (Chang et al, 2014, Current Biol). From all of these results, we conclude that attention and reward play important but different roles in PL. I will further discuss different stages and phases in mechanisms of PL (Seitz et al, 2005, PNAS; Yotsumoto, Watanabe & Sasaki, Neuron, 2008; Yotsumoto et al, Curr Biol, 2009; Watanabe & Sasaki, 2015, Ann Rev Psychol; Shibata et al, 2017, Nat Neurosci; Tamaki et al, 2020, Nat Neurosci).

Humans continuously need to learn to make good choices – be it using a new video-conferencing set up, figuring out what questions to ask to successfully secure a reliable babysitter, or just selecting which location in a house is least likely to be interrupted by toddlers during work calls. However, the goals we seek to attain – such as using zoom successfully – are often vaguely defined and previously unexperienced, and in that sense cannot be known by us as being rewarding. We hypothesized that learning to make good choices in such situations nevertheless leverages reinforcement learning processes, and that executive functions in general, and working memory in particular, play a crucial role in defining the reward function for arbitrary outcomes in such a way that they become reinforcing. I will show results from a novel behavioral protocol, as well as preliminary computational and imaging evidence supporting our hypothesis.

Over the past decade, the domain of face identity processing has seen a surging interest in inter-individual differences, with a focus on individuals with superior skills, so-called Super-Recognizers (SRs; Ramon et al., 2019; Russell et al., 2009). Their study can provide valuable insights into brain-behavior relationships and advance our understanding of neural functioning. Despite a decade of research, and similarly to the field of developmental prosopagnosia, a consensus on diagnostic criteria for SR identification is lacking. Consequently, SRs are currently identified either inconsistently, via suboptimal individual tests, or via undocumented collections of tests. This state of the field has two major implications. Firstly, our scientific understanding of SRs will remain at best limited. Secondly, the needs of government agencies interested in deploying SRs for real-life identity verification (e.g., policing) are unlikely to be met. To counteract these issues, I suggest the following action points. Firstly, based on our and others’ work suggesting novel and challenging tests of face cognition (Bobak et al., 2019; Fysh et al., in press; Stacchi et al., 2019), and my collaborations with international security agencies, I recommend novel diagnostic criteria for SR identification. These are currently being used to screen the Berlin State Police’s >25K employees before identifying SRs via bespoke testing procedures we have collaboratively developed over the past years. Secondly, I introduce a cohort of SRs identified using these criteria, which is being studied in-depth using behavioral methods, psychophysics, eye-tracking, and neuroimaging. Finally, I suggest data acquired for these individuals should be curated to develop and share best practices with researchers and practitioners, and to gain an accurate and transparent description of SR cases to exploit their informative value.

Understanding and remembering realistic experiences in our everyday lives requires activating many kinds of structured knowledge about the world, including spatial maps, temporal event scripts, and semantic relationships. My recent projects have explored the ways in which we build up this schematic knowledge (during a single experiment and across developmental timescales) and can strategically deploy them to construct event representations that we can store in memory or use to make predictions. I will describe my lab's ongoing work developing new experimental and analysis techniques for conducting functional MRI experiments using narratives, movies, poetry, virtual reality, and "memory experts" to study complex naturalistic schemas.

Cognitive architectures are attempts to build larger-scale models of minds. This talk will explore how structure-mapping models of analogical matching, retrieval, and generalization are used in the Companion cognitive architecture. Examples will include modeling conceptual change, learning by reading, and analogical Q/A training.